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Abstract 
 
This dissertation undertakes the first systematic study of the English merchants who financed the 
Barbados sugar boom in the mid-seventeenth century. It brings together archival material from the UK, 
USA, and the Caribbean to explore their involvement with Barbados in detail and put their commercial 
activity into metropolitan and global context. I trace how merchant capital was invested in the Barbadian 
economy during the 1640s, produced transformative social and economic changes on Barbados and in 
England over the next two decades, before being withdrawn in the 1660s and reinvested elsewhere. By 
placing the merchant financiers of the sugar boom and their trading networks at the centre of my analysis, 
I work at the intersection of three historiographical subfields which are usually studied separately: the 
history of early modern England, Caribbean history, and global history. Bringing these fields into 
conversation has revealed the importance of both political events occurring in the metropole and the 
expansion of the empire in other parts of the globe to the development of the Barbadian sugar industry. 
The capital which merchants used to finance the growth of plantation slavery was generated through a 
variety of domestic and global business activities, and the political and economic uncertainty caused by 
the English Civil War (1642-49) was a key reason why London merchants invested such large amounts of 
money in land and enslaved Africans in the colony during the 1640s. This results in an analysis of early 
modern empire that is more global than is usually seen in current studies of seventeenth-century 
colonialism. It encourages historians to conceptualise the constituent parts of the seventeenth-century 
English empire in America, West Africa, Asia, and the Mediterranean as an integrated whole.   
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Note on Currency 
 
 
In the mid-seventeenth century Barbadian merchants and planters priced most of their transactions in 
terms of a money of account known as Barbados currency. A lack of surviving legislation which clearly 
establishes the exchange rate of Barbados currency before 1666 means that historians are unsure about its 
value in relation to English pounds sterling during the 1640s and 1650s. John McCusker and Russell 
Menard have estimated that it took about £133 of Barbados currency to purchase £100 sterling in these 
decades. Both currencies use the £ sign, and so in this dissertation I have identified when I am talking 
about Barbados currency by writing BMC (Barbados Money Currency) after the value- e.g. £200 BMC.  
 
A lack of specie circulating in the Barbadian economy meant that local commodities were also often used 
as a medium of exchange and to settle debts. It is not entirely clear, however, whether these commodities 
were merely used as an accounting device or if they actually changed hands. Over the course of the 1640s 
there was a shift away from the use of tobacco and cotton as currency, and by 1650 sugar was the 
dominant form of commodity currency. This reflects the rise in sugar as the most significant Barbadian 
export crop. The best estimates for the 1640s are that 1 lb. of tobacco was worth 2d. in Barbados Money 
Currency, 1 lb. of cotton was worth 4d., and 1 lb. of sugar was worth 6d. In this dissertation I have 
remained true to the source material by replicating the currencies which contemporaries used: so that, for 
example, property on Barbados might be sold for 1500 lb. of tobacco or 500 lb. of sugar.  
 
For a more detailed description of Barbadian currency and exchange rates in the mid-seventeenth century, 
see John J. McCusker & Russell R. Menard, ‘The Sugar Industry in the Seventeenth Century: A New 
Perspective on the Barbadian “Sugar Revolution”’, in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Tropical Babylons: Sugar and 
the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450-1680 (Chapel Hill, 2004), pp. 306-311.   
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Between 1550 and 1650 England underwent profound commercial change. The island nation was 
transformed from a marginal power on the northwest fringes of Europe, whose main overseas 
commercial activity was the export trade in woollen cloth, to a nation with an assertive merchant 
community that actively sought to strike out into the wider world. Beginning with the incorporation of 
joint-stock companies such as the Muscovy Company in 1555 and the Turkey Company in 1581, English 
merchants and aristocrats started to participate in long-distance trade to distant and unfamiliar parts of 
the globe. By the middle of the seventeenth century, England maintained trading factories in the eastern 
Mediterranean, West Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia.1 But it was 
the promise of wealth and glory in the Americas which captured the imaginations of English adventurers 
and colonisers. Schemes to establish a permanent English presence in North America and the Caribbean 
were launched in increasing numbers after 1585, and despite several failures, by the 1620s had begun to 
see success. When compared to some other European nations, however, England’s foothold on 
American soil was still insecure in 1650. Her nascent empire consisted of 14 dispersed colonies which 
hugged the eastern seaboard of North America, occupied a few of the tiny islands in the Lesser Antilles, 
and straddled the estuary of the Suriname River in northern Guiana.2 Most of these settlements were 
poorly defended, unable to support themselves without external assistance, and had struggled to find a 
viable cash crop. The recent failure of the Providence Island colony (near modern-day Nicaragua), which 
had been destroyed by Spanish forces, served as a stark reminder of the fate which was likely to befall 
English colonies in the New World.3  
 
1 On seventeenth-century overseas trading companies from a comparative perspective, see William A. Pettigrew and 
David Veevers, eds, Transoceanic Constitutions: The Corporation as a Protagonist in Global History, 1550-1750 (Leiden, 
2019). 
2 The English colonies in North America and the Caribbean in 1650 were: Antigua, Barbados, Bermuda, 
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts Bay, Montserrat, Nevis, New Haven, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, St. 
Christopher (modern-day St. Kitts), Surinam and Virginia. 
3 Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630-1641: The Other Puritan Colony (Cambridge, 1993). 
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In 1650 England had just finished being convulsed by a destructive and bloody civil war, which had 
culminated in regicide. In protest at this revolutionary turn-of-events, several of the American plantations 
had revolted against the new regime.4 One of these rebellious colonies was Barbados. A small island of 
just 166 square miles, located on the eastern fringes of the Lesser Antilles archipelago, Barbados had been 
an English colony since it was first settled in 1627. In their search for a profitable export commodity, 
planters on the island had begun by producing tobacco, before diversifying their economy in the late 
1630s and early 1640s by experimenting with the cultivation of cotton, indigo, ginger, and sugar. A 
commercial sugar industry first emerged on Barbados in 1643, fostering an economic boom and the rapid 
expansion of plantation slavery. It was on this small and isolated island, then, that drastic social and 
economic changes were underway in 1650, which would forever reshape the Caribbean and alter the 
future development of the British Empire.  
The Caribbean sugar boom, a period of remarkable economic expansion and social change which began 
on Barbados in the 1640s, was a pivotal moment in world history. Events on Barbados precipitated the 
expansion of African slavery and the plantation system, institutions which would transform the 
demography and environment of vast swathes of the Americas. It is a centrepiece of early American 
historiography that Barbados functioned as a ‘culture hearth’ for a variety of English-speaking colonies in 
the Americas.5 The legal codes and labour systems pioneered on Barbados were disseminated throughout 
the Greater Caribbean by a ‘Barbadian diaspora’ in the 1650s and 1660s, meaning that the 
transformations which occurred on Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century had a powerful impact far 
beyond the island’s own shores.6 By the 1680s, for instance, Barbadian experts in sugar cultivation and 
 
4 On the English Civil War and its impact in the American colonies, see Carla Gardina Pestana, The English Atlantic in 
an Age of Revolution, 1640–1661 (Cambridge, Mass., 2007); John Donoghue, Fire Under the Ashes: An Atlantic History of 
the English Revolution (Chicago, 2013). 
5 The concept of a ‘culture hearth’ was coined by D. W. Meinig in The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 
500 Years of History: Volume I, Atlantic America, 1492–1800 (New Haven, 1986), p. 52.  
6 The argument that Barbados was important for exporting the plantation system to other British colonies in the 
Americas has been advanced by numerous scholars. For examples, see Alfred D. Chandler, ‘The Expansion of 
Barbados’, Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society, Vol. 13, No. 3-4 (1946), pp. 106-136; Jack P. Greene, 
‘Colonial South Carolina and the Caribbean Connection’, The South Carolina Historical Magazine, Vol. 88, No. 4 (1987), 
pp. 192-210; Russell R. Menard, Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados 
(Charlottesville, VA., 2006), pp. 106-121; Christopher Tomlins, Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in 
Colonizing English America, 1580-1865 (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 428-431; Matthew Mulachy, Hubs of Empire: The 
Southeastern Lowcountry and the British Caribbean (Baltimore, 2014), pp. 3-4, 61-62. For a recent treatment of how the 
‘Barbadian diaspora’ was important in expanding sugar cultivation to Surinam and Jamaica, see Justin Roberts, 
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the management of enslaved Africans could be found as far away as Sumatra in southeast Asia.7 The 
history of mid-seventeenth-century Barbados is thus critical for understanding the origins of the system 
of plantation slavery which would develop in the British Empire and the United States. 
To better understand the origins of the sugar boom, this dissertation will examine how the rapid 
development of the Barbadian sugar industry was financed in the 1640s and 1650s. Based upon accounts 
written in the second half of the seventeenth century, historians originally presumed that it was Dutch 
merchants who funded the expansion of sugar production on Barbados.8 In recent years, however, 
revisionists such as Russell Menard and Larry Gragg have used evidence from the Barbados Department 
of Archives to question the extent to which Dutch involvement in the Barbadian economy precipitated 
the sugar boom, arguing instead that the business activities of English merchants in this period were of 
greater significance than has been previously understood.9 Menard has demonstrated that there is little 
quantitative evidence of Dutch merchants extending credit to English planters on Barbados, and that 
their recorded involvement in the slave trade to the island was minimal during the 1640s and 1650s.10 
This argument has been supported by scholars who have undertaken archival research in the Netherlands. 
Historians of the Dutch Atlantic world and Anglo-Dutch trade, including Wim Klooster and Christian 
Koot, have found almost no evidence to suggest that traders from the Low Countries supplied sugar mills 
and other machinery to Barbadian planters in large quantities, nor that they were major purveyors of 
enslaved Africans to the colony in the early stages of sugar production.11  
 
‘Surrendering Surinam: The Barbadian Diaspora and the Expansion of the English Sugar Frontier, 1650-75’, The 
William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 2 (2016), pp. 225-256.  
7 BL, IOR E/3/91, f. 179, London to St. Helena, 3 August 1687.  
8 The argument that the Dutch financed the growth of the sugar industry and African slavery on Barbados in the 
1640s has been entrenched in the historiography for decades. For examples, see Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: 
The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill, 1972), pp. 19-20, 65-66, 230-231; Richard 
B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the British West Indies, 1623-1775 (Kingston, Jamaica, 1974), p. 
130; Gary A. Puckrein, Little England: Plantation Society and Anglo-Barbadian Politics, 1627-1700 (New York, 1984), p. 
71; Philip D. Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 81-83; 
Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800 (New York, 1997), pp. 
229-232; Yda Schreuder, ‘The Influence of the Dutch Colonial Trade on Barbados in the Seventeenth Century’, 
Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society, Vol. 48 (2002), pp. 50-57. 
9 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, ch. 3; Larry Gragg, Englishman Transplanted: The English Colonization of Barbados, 1627-1660 
(Oxford, 2003), pp. 121-124 & ch. 7. 
10 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 4, 59-64. 
11 Ernst van den Boogaart and Pieter C. Emmer, ‘The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650’, 
in Henry A. Gemery and Jan S. Hogendorn, eds, The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic 
Slave Trade (New York, 1979), pp. 353-375; Christian J. Koot, Empire at the Periphery: British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch 
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The importance of Dutch financial assistance to the growth of the Barbados sugar industry in the 1640s 
has been overstated. Inter-imperial exchanges on Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century mainly took 
place at the water’s edge: only a few Dutch traders were permanent inhabitants and owned landed 
property in the colony, and it was rare for them to extend credit to English planters.12 Nonetheless, it is 
crucial to emphasise that the traditional interpretation of the role played by Dutch merchants in 
stimulating Caribbean plantation economies during the seventeenth century was not completely incorrect. 
Traders from the Low Countries did participate in the provisioning trade to Barbados, supplying planters 
with the foodstuffs, alcohol, clothing, shoes, and draught animals they needed to thrive in the tropics and 
keep their sugar mills turning.13 Tobacco farmers at English colonies in the Leeward Islands were heavily 
dependent on resident Dutch merchants to supply the credit and labour necessary for them to expand 
their small plantations.14 Moreover, the beginnings of a sugar industry on the French islands of 
Martinique and Guadalupe in the second half of the 1650s can be tied to an injection of Dutch capital. 
Following the fall of Pernambuco in 1654, 600 Dutch refugees and their 300 enslaved Africans fled to the 
French Caribbean colonies, providing French colonists with crops and technical knowledge. French sugar 
planters were far more dependent on commercial traffic with the United Provinces and credit extended 
by Dutch merchants than English colonists on Barbados.15 
Historians are now in broad agreement that it was English merchants, rather than the Dutch, who were 
most significant in providing the capital needed to initiate sugar production on Barbados in the 1640s. 
But there has never been a systematic study of the English merchants who financed the sugar boom, 
which brings together archival material from the UK, USA, and the Caribbean to explore their 
involvement with Barbados in detail and put their commercial activity into metropolitan and global 
context. We therefore know very little about a group which played a major role in the development of 
 
Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621-1713 (New York, 2011), pp. 55-58; Wim Klooster, The Dutch 
Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the Seventeenth‑Century (Ithaca, NY, 2016), pp. 167-169.  
12 Koot, Empire at the Periphery, pp. 53-56, 66-67.  
13 See Chapters One and Five of this dissertation. 
14 Koot, Empire at the Periphery, pp. 51-53. The English colonies in the Leeward Islands were Antigua, Nevis, 
Montserrat, and St. Christopher.  
15 Herbert S. Klein & Ben Vinson III, African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean (Oxford, 1986), pp. 51-54; 
Wim Klooster, ‘The Northern European Atlantic World’, in Nicholas Canny and Phillip Morgan, eds, The Oxford 
Handbook of the Atlantic World, 1450-1850 (Oxford, 2011), p. 173. 
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plantation slavery in the English empire. This dissertation will rectify this imbalance by investigating five 
research questions. Who were the English merchants that financed the Barbados sugar boom? Why did 
they invest capital in land and enslaved Africans on Barbados in the 1640s, and where did this capital 
originate? Did an infusion of merchant capital accelerate the process by which the society and economy 
of Barbados was transformed in the mid-seventeenth century? Did English merchants with Barbadian 
investments seek to exert control over the governance of the colony in the era of the sugar boom, and if 
so, were they successful? And where did English merchants reinvest the capital they had generated 
through sugar and slavery on Barbados? 
 
Methodology and Historiography 
To answer my research questions, I place the merchant investors in the sugar boom and their trading 
networks at the centre of my analysis, bringing together three historiographical strands which are usually 
studied separately: the history of early modern England, Caribbean history, and global history. This results 
in a study of Barbados and the merchant financiers of the sugar boom which integrates both the 
metropolitan and the global, while still remaining sensitive to the transnational dimensions of early 
modern empires.  
This approach draws upon elements of J. G. A. Pocock’s project to develop an expansive ‘new British 
history’,16 but has above all been inspired by practitioners of ‘new imperial history’. New imperial 
historians have moved away from traditional mercantilist depictions of empire by decentring the 
metropole from their analyses, recovering subaltern voices, and interrogating empire through the lenses 
of gender and race. Of particular relevance for this project is the emphasis new imperial historians have 
placed on how overseas expansion was a reciprocal process, and that the empire therefore had a 
 
16 J. G. A. Pocock, ‘British history: a plea for a new subject’, Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47 (1975), 
pp. 601-624; David Armitage, ‘Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?’, The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (1999), pp. 427-445. 
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significant impact on the development of British culture and national identity.17 Susan Dwyer Amussen 
and Catherine Hall, for instance, have both developed an interpretative framework for the study of 
empire which is responsive to the fact that ‘the histories of colony and metropole need to be placed in 
one analytic frame, as separate histories that are deeply intertwined’.18 I have adopted a similar framework, 
but seek to modify it slightly by bringing a global perspective to bear on my analysis. This study 
investigates how social and economic developments on Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century were 
shaped not just by forces at work in the metropole and the colony itself, but by England’s interactions 
with parts of the world beyond the Caribbean. William Pettigrew’s concept of ‘corporate 
constitutionalism’, which brings the global and local settings of seventeenth-century corporate activity 
into dialogue, has thus also proved influential.19  
My approach has likewise developed out of a reaction to how Atlantic history has been practised in recent 
years. Since the 1990s Atlantic historians have produced an excellent body of scholarship which 
transcends the restrictive national and imperial boundaries that characterised much of the traditional 
historiography. Our understanding of the process of European expansion has been enriched by the 
emphasis they have placed on the transnational and inter-imperial dimensions of early modern empires.20 
While I deeply admire, and have drawn heavily upon, the scholarship produced by Atlanticists, an Atlantic 
approach was not useful as an interpretative framework for answering my research questions in this 
project. This is because my questions demanded that I interrogate both the metropolitan and the global 
aspects of the business activities conducted by merchant investors in the Barbados sugar boom. For 
example, to better understand why merchants invested so much capital into the development of a sugar 
 
17 For examples of the traditional mercantilist depiction of empire, which characterised so much of ‘old’ imperial 
history, see George Louis Beer, Origins of the British Colonial System, 1578-1660 (New York, 1908); Lawrence Harper, 
The English Navigation Laws: A Seventeenth-century Experiment in Social Engineering (New York, 1964). For a succinct 
description of what new imperial historians seek to do differently, see Kathleen Wilson, ‘Introduction: histories, 
empires, modernities’, in Kathleen Wilson, ed., A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the 
Empire, 1660-1840 (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 1-26.  
18 For this quote, see Susan Dwyer Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges: Slavery and the Transformation of English Society, 1640-
1700 (Chapel Hill, 2007), p. 11. See also: Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English 
Imagination, 1830-1867 (Chicago, 2002), p. 9.  
19 William A. Pettigrew, ‘Corporate Constitutionalism and the Dialogue between the Global and Local in 
Seventeenth-Century English History’, Itinerario, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2016), pp. 487-501. 
20 For a succinct description of the typologies underpinning Atlantic history, see Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: 
Concept and Contours (Cambridge, Mass., 2005). For the various types of approaches which fall under the remit of 
‘Atlantic history’, see David Armitage, ‘Three Concepts of Atlantic History’, in David Armitage and Michael J. 
Braddick, eds, The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke and New York, 2002), pp. 13-29.  
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industry on Barbados, this dissertation will investigate how metropolitan politics, and the English Civil 
War in particular, influenced the investment decisions taken by merchants in the 1640s. Moreover, to 
address where the capital used to finance the sugar boom originated, it will also explore the trading 
ventures undertaken by London merchants to other parts of the globe, including the East Indies and 
Levant. 
Unlike early Americanists, who have wholeheartedly embraced Atlantic history, very few historians who 
were trained principally as historians of early modern England have adopted an Atlantic approach.21 
Inattention to how the sweeping changes which England experienced during the seventeenth century 
were felt in the colonies and impacted the process of overseas expansion means that many historians of 
the English Atlantic world are not being ‘fully Atlantic’ in their studies, much to their detriment.22 
Moreover, despite the efforts of some historians - most notably Peter Coclanis, Alison Games, and Philip 
Stern - to encourage Atlanticists to read historiographies and conduct research in archives which relate to 
societies beyond the Atlantic basin, not enough historians of the English Atlantic world have taken up 
this challenge and put their work into global perspective.23 This is surprising, because scholars of the 
Dutch and Portuguese empires routinely explore the interconnections between Europe, America, Africa, 
and Asia in the early modern period.24 It is because most Atlanticists do not situate their work in a 
metropolitan and global context that this dissertation takes an approach which is inspired more by new 
imperial history than Atlantic history.   
 
21 There are some notable exceptions, however. For examples, see Michael J. Braddick, State Formation in Early 
Modern England, c. 1550-1700 (Cambridge, 2000), ch. 9; Philip Withington, Society in Early Modern England: The 
Vernacular Origins of Some Powerful Ideas (Cambridge, 2010), ch. 7; Steve Pincus, ‘Rethinking Mercantilism: Political 
Economy, the British Empire, and the Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, The William and 
Mary Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2012), pp. 3-34. 
22 There have, however, been some recent Atlantic histories which engage well with the historiography of early 
modern England. For examples, see Pestana, The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution; Donoghue, Fire Under the 
Ashes; Philip Stern and Carl Wennerlind, eds, Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its 
Empire (Oxford, 2014). 
23 Peter A. Coclanis, ‘Atlantic World or Atlantic/World?’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4 (2006), pp. 
725-742; Alison Games, ‘Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities’, The American Historical Review, 
Vol. 111, No. 3 (2006), pp. 741-757; Phillip J. Stern, ‘British Asia and British Atlantic: Comparisons and 
Connections’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4 (2006), pp. 693-712.  
24 E.g. Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto, Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800 (Cambridge, 2007); 
Marcus Vink, ‘“The World’s Oldest Trade”: Dutch Slavery and Slave Trade in the Indian Ocean in the Seventeenth 
Century”, Journal of World History, Vol. 14, No. 2, (2003), pp. 131-177. 




This study of the merchant financiers of the Barbados sugar boom engages with three main 
historiographical debates. First, is scholarship on the colonial development of Barbados from the 1620s 
to the 1670s. Second, is the debate over the sources of capital used to finance the development of the 
sugar industry in the English Caribbean. Third, is the involvement of London merchants in English 
politics and government during the mid-seventeenth century. This section will outline each of these 
historiographical debates, before explaining how the research undertaken in this dissertation advances or 
modifies our current understanding of these topics. 
Following the publication of Eric Williams’ provocative Capitalism and Slavery in 1944, a large part of 
Caribbean historiography has focused on testing Williams’ thesis about the role played by plantation 
slavery in the development of British capitalism and the industrial revolution.25 Beginning in the 1970s, 
however, a generation of scholars began to ask a different set of questions, and sought to try to recapture 
the lived experience of planters, indentured servants, and enslaved Africans by writing social histories of 
the British Caribbean in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Elsa Goveia’s study of slave society in 
the Leeward Islands and Richard Dunn’s magisterial investigation into the growth of the English planter 
class were followed up by social histories written by Hilary Beckles, Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh, 
Trevor Burnard, Natalie Zacek, and most recently Jenny Shaw.26 At around the same time there was also 
a growth in economic histories of the seventeenth-century ‘sugar revolution’. Matthew Edel, Richard 
Sheridan, William Green, and Barry Higman have all compiled quantitative data and used methods of 
 
25 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, 1944). For examples Caribbean historians who have engaged 
heavily with the Williams thesis, see Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery; Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery; S. D. 
Smith, Slavery, Family and Gentry Capitalism in the British Atlantic: The World of the Lascelles, 1648-1834 (Cambridge, 
2006). In recent years, the ‘new history of capitalism’ has given some of Williams’ ideas a new lease of life, because 
its proponents argue vigorously for the importance of slavery to the development of both financial and industrial 
capitalism in the antebellum United States. E.g. Walter Johnson, River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton 
Kingdom (Cambridge, MA, 2013); Edward E. Baptist, The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American 
Capitalism (New York, 2014); Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (London, 2014). 
26 Elsa Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven, 1965); Dunn, 
Sugar and Slaves; Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line: The English in the Caribbean, 1624–1690 (New 
York, 1972); Beckles, White Servitude and Black Slavery; Trevor Burnard, Mastery, Tyranny & Desire: Thomas Thistlewood 
and his slaves in the Anglo-Jamaican World (Chapel Hill, 2004); Natalie Zacek, Settler Society in the English Leeward Islands, 
1670-1776 (Cambridge, 2010); Jenny Shaw, Everyday Life in the Early English Caribbean: Irish, Africans, and the 
Construction of Difference (Athens, GA, 2013). 
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statistical analysis to further our understanding of the social and economic impact of the transition to 
sugar cane monoculture in the Caribbean.27  
Studies of the early modern Caribbean have proliferated in recent years. Over the past decade historians 
of the North American colonies with an interest in an expansive Atlantic history have looked to the 
Caribbean islands for new source material and novel perspectives. Innovative new studies have been 
published which have begun to undermine the Anglocentric bias in the literature by drawing upon 
Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, and Danish sources.28 Another important development is the 
emphasis which scholars are now placing on how indigenous agency was far more substantial in shaping 
Caribbean societies and economies than previously understood.29  
Barbados occupies a prominent place in this literature because it is commonly identified as the location 
where the Caribbean sugar boom first began. Indeed, due to the foundational importance of the sugar 
boom, historians have been interested in early Barbadian history for centuries. It is because of this wide-
ranging body of scholarship that we have a thorough understanding of the social structure, economy, 
demography, government, and environment of early Barbados.30 Until recently, historians agreed that the 
introduction of sugar cane to Barbados during the 1640s precipitated a ‘sugar revolution’ that brought 
transformative social and economic changes to the island, including African slavery and the plantation 
 
27 Edel, ‘The Brazilian Sugar Cycle’; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery; Green, ‘Supply versus Demand in the Barbadian 
Sugar Revolution’; Higman, ‘The sugar revolution’; Menard, Sweet Negotiations.  
28 For examples of this new research on the transnational dimensions of the early modern Caribbean, see: Trevor 
Burnard and John Garrigus, The Plantation Machine: Atlantic Capitalism in French Saint-Domingue and British Jamaica 
(Philadelphia, 2016); David Wheat, Atlantic Africa and the Spanish Caribbean, 1570-1640 (Chapel Hill, 2016); Ernesto 
Bassi, An Aqueous Territory: Sailor Geographies and New Granada’s Transimperial Greater Caribbean World (Durham, N.C., 
2017); Pablo F. Gómez, The Experiential Caribbean: Creating Knowledge and Healing in the Early Modern Atlantic (Chapel 
Hill, 2017); L. H. Roper, ed., The Torrid Zone: Caribbean Colonization and Cultural Interaction in the Long Seventeenth Century 
(Columbia, 2018); Molly A. Warsh, American Baroque: Pearls and the Nature of Empire, 1492-1700 (Chapel Hill, 2018). 
29 E.g. Brett Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France (Chapel Hill, 2012); Carolyn 
Arena, ‘Indian Slaves from Guiana in Seventeenth-Century Barbados,’ Ethnohistory, Vol. 64, No. 1 (2017), pp. 65-90; 
Tessa Murphy, ‘Kalinago Colonizers: Indigenous People and the Settlement of the Lesser Antilles,’ in Roper, ed., 
The Torrid Zone, pp. 17-30. 
30 E.g. Richard Ligon, A true & exact history of the island of Barbados (London, 1657); Nicholas Darnell Davis, The 
Cavaliers & Roundheads of Barbados, 1650-1652: With Some Account of the Early History of Barbados (Georgetown, British 
Guiana, 1887); Vincent T. Harlow, A History of Barbados, 1625–1685 (New York, 1926); Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and 
Slaves; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery; Puckrein, Little England; Hilary McD. Beckles, White Servitude and Black Slavery in 
Barbados, 1627-1715 (Knoxville, TN, 1989); Gragg, Englishman Transplanted; Menard, Sweet Negotiations; Peter 
Thompson, ‘Henry Drax's Instructions on the Management of a Seventeenth-Century Barbadian Sugar Plantation’, 
The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 3 (2009), pp. 565-604.  
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system.31 It was also widely accepted that English planters were the architects of a ‘social disaster’ in 
Barbados because of the excessive mortality rates among colonists, the failure to replicate English family 
life in the tropics, and the brutality of African slavery.32  
However, in the past 20 years two prominent revisionist histories of early Barbados have been written by 
Larry Gragg and Russell Menard, which have challenged elements of this established narrative. Gragg has 
argued that English colonists on Barbados were not the architects of a ‘social disaster’, but in fact formed 
settled family units and were responsible for successfully transplanting English institutions such as the 
Church of England to the island.33 Menard, on the other hand, has focused his attention on proponents 
of the ‘sugar revolution’ hypothesis, arguing that the growth of the plantation system and African slavery 
on Barbados predated the onset of sugar cultivation. For Menard, sugar merely intensified a process 
which was already underway.34 It is important to emphasise, however, that although both revisionists, 
Gragg and Menard disagree on some important points, including when African slavery first became a 
large-scale institution on Barbados.35 This study builds upon the work of these revisionists to provide new 
insights into the history of Barbados in the era of the sugar boom. 
The current interpretation of Barbadian colonial development from the 1620s to the 1670s, based upon 
the revisionist scholarship of Menard and Gragg, can be summarised as follows. Barbados was founded as 
a tobacco-producing colony by Sir William Courteen in 1627. After a disruptive period of political turmoil 
on the island in the years immediately following colonisation, by the late 1630s Barbadians were some of 
the first colonists in the English Atlantic world to successfully diversify their production of agricultural 
export staples away from tobacco monoculture, and therefore enjoyed a period of ‘comfortable, if crude, 
prosperity’.36 This economic dynamism carried over into the 1640s, when the colony underwent a 
 
31 For an exposition of the sugar revolution hypothesis, see Matthew Edel, ‘The Brazilian Sugar Cycle of the 
Seventeenth Century and the Rise of West Indian Competition’, Caribbean Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1969), pp. 24-44; 
William A. Green, ‘Supply versus Demand in the Barbadian Sugar Revolution’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
Vol. 18, No. 3 (1988), pp. 403-418; B. W. Higman, ‘The Sugar Revolution’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 53, No. 
2 (2000), pp. 213-236. 
32 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, passim. 
33 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, ch. 1, 4, & 8. 
34 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 2-4.  
35 Larry Gragg, ‘Review of Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados by 
Russell R. Menard’, The South Carolina Historical Magazine, Vol. 108, No. 2 (2007), pp. 169-170. 
36 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 57.  
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diversified export boom, of which sugar was only one of several commodities that contributed to wealth 
creation on the island. Nevertheless, sugar cultivation was undoubtedly the most attractive prospect for 
Barbadian planters and investors in this decade, because the recent collapse of the Brazilian sugar industry 
due to warfare in Bahia and Pernambuco had wildly inflated the price fetched by the commodity in 
European markets.37 Barbados is also understood to have enjoyed de facto political independence from the 
mother country during the 1640s due to the fact that the King, Parliament, and aristocrats with an interest 
in the Caribbean, such as the Earl of Warwick and the Earl of Carlisle, were distracted by the civil war 
that was unfolding in England.38  
A plantation complex based around sugar production and African slavery emerged rapidly on Barbados 
during the 1640s, principally because the purchase of fixed-capital expenditures (machinery for grinding 
sugar, refining equipment, enslaved Africans) was financed by reinvestments from the sale of Barbadian 
tobacco in the 1630s combined with direct investment and generous extensions of credit provided by 
London merchants.39 In an argument first proposed by Robert Brenner, but accepted by Menard and 
Gragg in their revisionist histories, it has been understood that London merchants invested capital created 
through previous American enterprise, and particularly the profits of the tobacco trade to the North 
American and Caribbean colonies, into the establishment of the Barbadian sugar industry.40 English 
merchants also supplied large numbers of enslaved Africans to Barbados in the 1640s, although due to 
the fragmentary nature of the surviving source material there is some debate in the scholarship about 
when this process began. Menard has extrapolated from correspondence records that as many as 1000 
enslaved Africans arrived at Barbados in the 1630s, whereas Gragg’s systematic study of Barbadian wills 
and plantation inventories suggests that very few Africans were present on the island until the mid-
1640s.41 
 
37 Ibid., p. 52; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 99.   
38 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 42.  
39 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, ch. 3. 
40 Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s Overseas Traders, 1550-1653 
(Princeton, 1993), p. 162. 
41 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 47; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 119.  
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By 1650, commodity transactions suggest that sugar was the leading commodity exported by 
Barbadians,42 and in subsequent decades planters introduced a number of innovations to the island’s 
sugar industry which led to productivity gains. For example, the integrated plantation, which improved 
the efficiency of sugar production by combining the cultivation of sugar and its processing in a single site, 
is understood to have been pioneered by Barbadians such as James Drax in the mid-1650s.43 The London 
merchants who financed the sugar boom decided to pull the majority of their capital out of the island 
following the Restoration, which Menard contends was due to a temporary dip in the sugar market (the 
price of sugar fell by 70% in Barbados between 1646 and 1661) and the difficulties with managing 
plantations from afar as an absentee proprietor.44 Historians agree that, by the early 1670s, Barbados was 
the wealthiest and most important colony in the English empire because of its function as a burgeoning 
centre of plantation production.45 
Although at first glance this narrative of Barbadian colonial development may seem compelling due to its 
coherence, many of its specific details are complicated and modified by studying the collective history of 
the English merchants who financed the sugar boom. For instance, the first part of Chapter One 
develops an analysis of Sir William Courteen’s mercantile career from a broader perspective than other 
historians, leading to a reinterpretation of why the Courteen merchant syndicate financed the initial 
colonisation of Barbados in 1627. Tobacco cultivation was not the intrinsic destiny for the colony’s 
economic development: Barbados’ strategic location in the Lesser Antilles archipelago was more 
significant in the decision to settle the island than has previously been appreciated. An English settlement 
on the island could act as a resupply point in Courteen’s existing tobacco trade with the Essequibo colony 
on the Wild Coast, and in the wider context of the Anglo-Spanish war (1625-1630) could also function as 
a base for launching privateering assaults against the Spanish Empire. Moreover, an analysis of merchant 
involvement with Barbados in the pre-sugar era (c.1627-1643) does not provide support for Menard’s 
argument that the island enjoyed an economic boom during the 1630s due to tobacco and cotton 
 
42 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 18. 
43 Ibid., ch. 4 & 5.   
44 On the declining price of sugar, see Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 69, Table 15. For the withdrawal of merchant 
capital, see Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 60-61. 
45 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 67; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 106-107, 187-188; David Eltis, ‘The Total 
Product of Barbados, 1664-1701’, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 55, No. 2 (1995), pp. 321-338. 
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production.46 The new evidence presented in Chapter One instead reinforces Larry Gragg’s interpretation 
that the economy of Barbados was largely struggling at this early juncture.47 Quantitative and qualitative 
evidence reveals how the poor-quality tobacco produced by Barbadian planters during the 1630s caused 
English merchants to prefer trading with other colonies, especially Virginia. This argument is supported 
through a reconstruction of the voyage of the Abraham (1636-37). The vessel’s owners originally intended 
for the Abraham to travel to Virginia, but unforeseen circumstances meant that they had to divert to 
Barbados, and the inferior tobacco they purchased there is partly why the venture did not turn a profit.  
The onset of the Barbados sugar boom in the 1640s and 1650s is given sustained attention in this 
dissertation. My analysis of Barbadian colonial development in these decades provides strong support for 
Menard and Gragg’s revisionist argument that it was English merchants based in the City of London, and 
not Dutch traders, who financed the sugar boom. In Chapters Two and Three qualitative and quantitative 
data has been collated into a series of tables to highlight in greater detail than ever before how London 
merchants speculated heavily in the Barbados land market, were leading suppliers of enslaved Africans to 
the island, and shipped large quantities of provisions to the colony (especially horses and clothing) in the 
mid-seventeenth century. This study also shows for the first time how London merchants played a vital 
role in the development of the integrated plantation on Barbados, the key institutional innovation in the 
seventeenth-century sugar industry. Merchant capital, in the form of both direct investment and 
extensions of credit, transformed Barbadian plantations by facilitating the process of land aggregation, 
rapidly populating plantations with enslaved Africans, and financing the construction of expensive sugar 
mills and refineries. London merchants such as Maurice Thomson were also working in collaboration 
with members of the Hartlib Circle in the 1640s and 1650s in the pursuit of more efficient methods of 
grinding sugar, and I argue that it is therefore no coincidence that plantations owned by these 
entrepreneurial merchants were among the first to experiment with wind-powered sugar mills in the mid-
1650s.  
 
46 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, ch. 1 & 2. 
47 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 89-92, 98. This interpretation was also common among pre-revisionist scholars. 
E.g. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 49.   
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There are some elements of the existing revisionist narrative of Barbadian colonial development in the 
1640s and 1650s that require modification, however. For example, a prosopographical analysis of the 23 
key merchant financiers of the Barbados sugar boom is developed in Chapter Two, which reveals how 
these merchants were involved in a variety of other overseas enterprises immediately prior to investing in 
the Barbadian plantation system, including the American tobacco trade, West African commerce, the East 
India Company, the Levant Company, the cloth trade to Northern Europe and France, and the Brazilian 
sugar trade. Brenner’s argument that capital created through previous American enterprise was used to 
finance the development of the Barbadian sugar industry does not, therefore, tell the full story. In fact, a 
prosopographical approach highlights how the capital used to finance the growth of the plantation system 
on Barbados was sourced from a much broader range of overseas commercial activities than previously 
understood, and that this capital therefore had global origins.   
In Chapter Two I also reassess why English merchants chose to invest such large sums of money in land 
and enslaved Africans on a distant tropical island during the 1640s. Previous explanations have 
emphasised how the recent decline in Brazilian sugar production meant that English merchants could 
expect their investments in the Barbadian sugar industry to rapidly appreciate in value.48 This argument is 
broadly correct, but also possesses some deficiencies because it is entirely American-focused. A more 
nuanced understanding of the decision-making process behind merchant investment in Barbados can be 
developed by drawing upon the historiography of early modern England, which has been neglected by 
scholars of Caribbean history in recent years. The merchant financiers of the sugar boom were, after all, 
mostly absentee investors, and so it is logical that the political and economic situation in England would 
have had an impact on their investment decisions. Merchant investment in the Barbadian sugar industry 
was heavily dependent on timing. External political and economic circumstances unique to the 1640s, 
including not only the commercial opportunity presented by the collapse of the Brazilian sugar industry 
but also the English Civil War, influenced the investment decisions made by London merchants. The 
political and economic uncertainty caused by the Civil War caused English merchants to diversify their 
business portfolios. Central to my argument is how merchants increasingly began to look overseas for a 
 
48 E.g. Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 52; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 99.   
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more secure outlet to invest their capital during the 1640s. For example, London merchants invested 
heavily in land overseas by participating in the Irish Adventurers Scheme and by directly purchasing 
plantations on Barbados. English merchants thought that investing in a Caribbean island which possessed 
geographical safeguards against the usual risks to colonial enterprise, and whose inhabitants repeatedly 
professed a neutral stance in the Civil War, represented a more secure investment than keeping their 
capital in war-torn England.  
Moreover, studying the trading activities of the London merchants who financed the sugar boom does 
not lend support to the traditional argument that Barbados enjoyed virtual independence from England 
during the 1640s due to the political disruption caused by the Civil War.49 Chapters Three and Four 
demonstrate that, although some members of the landed gentry were indeed preoccupied by English 
politics in this decade, London’s community of overseas traders did not cease their commercial and 
political involvement with Barbados like is often supposed. In fact, English merchant investment in 
Barbadian land and the trade in provisions and unfree labour to the colony intensified during the 1640s. It 
is an overstatement to say that Barbados was entirely free from metropolitan influence at a time when 
Barbadian colonists were becoming increasingly dependent on the London credit market and absentee 
English merchants were rapidly aggregating land on the island.  
This dissertation also provides new insights into the process by which London merchants withdrew their 
capital from Barbados. Although Menard recognised that merchants pulled their money out of the 
Barbadian land market in the early 1660s,50 he failed to appreciate that one of the main reasons why this 
occurred was because London merchants had recently failed in their efforts to exert centralised control 
over the governance of Barbados, which given the tumultuous nature of Barbadian politics, placed their 
investments at risk. Nor did Menard attempt to explore where the merchant financiers of the sugar boom 
reinvested their capital. The analysis developed in the first part of Chapter Five follows merchant careers 
to highlight how merchants reinvested the profits of Barbadian sugar in the Jamaican economy, the joint 
stock of overseas trading companies such as the Royal African Company and the East India Company, 
 
49 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 42. 
50 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 60-61. 
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and the accounts of English goldsmith-bankers. The withdrawal of merchant capital from Barbados after 
the Restoration also had important ramifications for the future organisation of Caribbean trade and 
finance that have hitherto gone unnoticed. It led to a more pronounced division of labour between 
merchants and planters and thereby facilitated the rise of the commission system of merchandising, which 
was the principal means of organising Caribbean commerce until Abolition nearly 200 years later. 
Most historians, including revisionists such as Menard and Gragg, focus on the role of Barbados as a site 
of plantation production within the English empire.51 This has inadvertently reinforced traditional 
mercantilist theories of empire, which emphasise how the sole purpose of colonial dependencies such as 
Barbados was to produce raw materials for the metropole and to provide a captive market for English 
manufactures. The analysis developed in the second part of Chapter Five takes us beyond this restrictive 
mercantilist focus by addressing how the sugar boom transformed Barbados’ role within the structure of 
England’s empire. The expansion of the colony’s own resident merchant community in response to the 
consumer demand created by the sugar boom meant that the island had become a regional centre for 
transnational trade in the Caribbean by the 1660s. A community of Sephardic merchants relocated to the 
island, Bridgetown began to function as an important port in the re-export trade in enslaved Africans to 
Spanish America, and Barbados also became a nursery for further colonial expansion in the Greater 
Caribbean. It is therefore clear that the English empire had two core regions in the 1660s: London and 
Barbados. This highlights how there are major deficiencies with rigid mercantilist depictions of empire 
that focus solely on metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries, and therefore neglect to recognise that 
some colonies, such as Barbados in the 1660s, could function as core regions themselves.  
 
This study of merchant capital investment into Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century also contributes 
to a broad historiographical discussion about the relative importance of English capital to the economic 
development of the Caribbean sugar colonies. In The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith argued that 
 
51 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 67; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 106-107, 187-188. 
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‘the stock which has improved and cultivated the sugar colonies of England has, a great part of it, been 
sent out from England, and has by no means been altogether the produce of the soil and industry of the 
colonists’. He concluded, therefore, that ‘the prosperity of the English sugar colonies has been, in a great 
measure, owing to the great riches of England, of which a part has overflowed, if one may say so, upon 
those colonies’.52 John Stuart Mill concurred in The Principles of Political Economy (1848), where he suggested 
that ‘Our West India colonies, for example, cannot be regarded as countries with a productive capital of 
their own…All the capital employed is English capital’.53  
Richard Pares was the first to challenge this assumption in his posthumous publication Merchants and 
Planters (1960), in which he argued for the importance of reinvestments of the proceeds of plantation 
production to the economic development of the Caribbean colonies. For Pares, the ‘wealth of the West 
Indies was created out of the profits of the West Indies themselves’.54 In her influential 1986 Economic 
History Review article, Nuala Zahedieh launched a similar attack on Adam Smith by carefully documenting 
how locally-generated revenue was of more significance than capital supplied by merchants in the 
metropole to the economic development of early English Jamaica.55 R. C. Nash has supported the 
arguments advanced by Pares and Zahedieh in his excellent overview of transatlantic commerce and 
finance in the British empire.56 However, S. D. Smith has sought to revive Adam Smith’s interpretation 
by suggesting that eighteenth-century London commission agents offered large loans to Caribbean sugar 
planters which accelerated Jamaican economic development after 1730.57 Menard has attempted to bridge 
the gap between these two traditions by arguing that it was a combination of merchant capital and 
 
52 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, A Careful Reprint of Edition (3 Volumes, 
1812) with notes by J. R. McCulloch, ed., p. 463.  
53 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with some of their applications to social philosophy Vol. II (7th ed., London, 
1871), p. 249.  
54 Richard Pares, Merchants and Planters (Cambridge, 1960), p. 50.  
55 Nuala Zahediah, ‘Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development in Early English Jamaica, 1655-89,’ The Economic 
History Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1986), pp. 205-222.  
56 R. C. Nash, ‘The Organization of Trade and Finance in the British Atlantic Economy, 1600-1830’, in Peter A. 
Colcanis, ed., The Atlantic Economy during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and 
Personnel (Columbia, SC, 2005), pp. 95-151. 
57 S. D. Smith, ‘Merchants and Planters Revisited’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2002), pp. 434-465. 
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reinvestments from local plantation production that financed the rise of the plantation system in mid-
seventeenth-century Barbados.58  
This dissertation contributes to this discussion by demonstrating how the 1640s and 1650s were a period 
when metropolitan capital supplied by English merchants was crucial in stimulating the development of 
plantation economies in the Caribbean. It was an infusion of English merchant capital, in the form of 
both direct investment and generous extensions of credit, that played the most important role in 
financing the rapid development of a sugar industry and the integrated plantation on Barbados. Chapter 
Three shows how there is little quantitative evidence to support Menard’s assessment that some planters 
funded the transition to sugar on Barbados by reinvesting profits created locally through the sale of their 
own tobacco crops.59 Instead, the available evidence points towards how Barbadian planters obtained the 
capital they needed to speculate in the sugar industry by securing a line of credit from London merchants 
or by participating in mercantile activity themselves.  
It is important to establish which source of capital was most important in financing the Barbados sugar 
boom, because in my estimation this had a strong bearing on why there was so much variation in the 
timing and speed with which islands in the Caribbean transitioned to a sugar monoculture in the 
seventeenth century. Historians tend to make sweeping generalisations about how the development of the 
Caribbean sugar industry was financed in the seventeenth century, without appreciating that there was 
significant variation between each island due to contingent circumstances.60 
Geography, environment, differing commercial opportunities, warfare, and English politics were all 
factors which influenced economic development in the Caribbean during the seventeenth century. In St. 
Kitts, for instance, repeated invasions by foreign forces due to the proximity of the colony to the French 
and Kalinago severely stunted the emergence of a mature sugar industry.61 Piracy and the entrepot trade 
with Spanish America were both more attractive propositions for accumulating wealth in early English 
 
58 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, ch. 3.  
59 Ibid., pp. 61-66. 
60 E.g. Nash, ‘The Organization of Trade and Finance’, pp. 121-127. 
61 Sheridan, Sugar and Slaves, 149-160. 
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Jamaica than sugar planting, and because the colony lay 1000 miles further away from West Africa when 
compared to colonies in the Lesser Antilles, it was more difficult and expensive for Jamaican planters to 
procure enslaved Africans.62 These circumstances discouraged merchant investment, delaying the 
emergence of a sugar industry on St. Kitts and Jamaica until the 1680s. This dissertation argues that 
Barbados, by contrast, possessed a number of environmental and geographical protections against the 
usual risks to colonial enterprise, and received a massive injection of merchant capital and unfree labour 
during the 1640s due to the tumultuous political situation in England, which served to stimulate 
economic development on the island. 
It is argued in Chapters Two, Three, and Five that the factors described above had an important influence 
on whether merchants decided to directly invest in colonial economies and supply prospective planters 
with credit. In stark contrast to Barbados, other colonies in the English Caribbean did not receive a 
significant injection of merchant capital in the seventeenth century, probably because investment in 
Jamaica, St. Kitts, Nevis, Monserrat, and Antigua was a much riskier prospect than Barbados. By 
necessity, therefore, plantation owners on these islands were forced to reinvest profits generated locally 
(by cultivating minor staples such as tobacco and cotton, for instance) in order to afford the expensive 
purchases necessary to set up a sugar plantation, including enslaved Africans and machinery for sugar 
mills. This was a slow and gradual process, explaining why it took over 30 years longer for a sugar 
industry and African slavery to emerge in these colonies when compared to Barbados. Without the direct 
investment and financial support provided by English merchants, the shift to sugar monoculture and 
African slavery on Barbados would not have been nearly as rapid as it was. Indeed, the depth of merchant 
involvement with Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s explains why this island was the first among all other 
islands in the Caribbean to develop a sugar industry and a mature plantation complex.  
Put simply, this dissertation contributes to the historiographical debate outlined above by arguing that 
historians should not generalise about how the development of the sugar industry and the plantation 
system was financed in the seventeenth-century English Caribbean. The transition to sugar monoculture 
 
62 Zahedieh, ‘Trade, Plunder and Economic Development’; David Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas 
(Cambridge, 2000), pp. 205-206.   
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on Barbados was funded principally by an injection of English merchant capital, thus explaining why this 
process was so rapid and historians have been able to speak of a ‘sugar revolution’ or ‘sugar boom’ 
occurring on the island during the 1640s and 1650s. At most other colonies in the English Caribbean, 
however, reinvestments from the profits of plantation production and other forms of locally-generated 
revenue were the main source of finance for the sugar industry from the 1660s to the 1690s, accounting 
for the much slower rate of economic development in these colonies.       
 
This dissertation also advances our understanding of the involvement of London merchants in English 
politics and government. When viewed collectively, the scholarship on the merchant community of early 
modern England produced by Kenneth Andrews, Ralph Davis, Perry Gauci, Richard Grassby, David 
Hancock, Thomas Leng, and Nuala Zahediah provides an excellent platform for understanding the social 
structure of the English merchant community, their domestic and overseas business activities, and their 
involvement in seventeenth-century politics.63 However, these historians have not studied the English 
merchants who financed the Barbados sugar boom, and have tended to overlook the middle decades of 
the seventeenth century, preferring instead to focus on the early Stuart era and the period following the 
Restoration. The scholarship produced by Robert Brenner and L. H. Roper is therefore most pertinent to 
this project, because they have analysed many of the same merchants (albeit in a context other than 
Barbados) and have given sustained attention to the 1640s and 1650s.64   
 
63 Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Newton Abbot, 1962); 
Kenneth R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630 
(Cambridge, 1984); Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money, and Politic: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I 
(Cambridge, 1991); Richard Grassby, The Business Community of Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1995); David 
Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785 (New 
York, 1995); Nuala Zahediah, ‘Making Mercantilism Work: London Merchants and Atlantic Trade in the 
Seventeenth Century’, Transactions Of The Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, Vol. 9 (1999), pp. 143-158; Perry Gauci, 
The Politics of Trade: The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660-1720 (Oxford, 2001); David Hancock, Oceans of 
Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste (Ann Arbor, 2009); Nuala Zahedieh, The Capital and the 
Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660-1700 (Cambridge, 2010); Tom Leng, ‘Interlopers and Disorderly 
Brethren at the Stade Mart: Commercial Regulations and Practices Amongst the Merchant Adventurers of England 
in the Late Elizabethan Period’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 69, No. 3 (2016), pp. 823-843. 
64 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution; L. H. Roper, Advancing Empire: English Interests and Overseas Expansion, 1613-1688 
(Cambridge, 2017). 
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According to Brenner, long-term structural changes in English commerce due to the rise of import-
oriented trades to the Levant, East Indies, and the American plantations between 1550 and 1640 
produced an assertive class of ‘new merchants’ with a social background outside of London’s mercantile 
elite. These ‘new merchants’ (typified by Maurice Thomson) traded in the deregulated waters of the 
Atlantic and chafed at the exclusive privileges enjoyed by ‘company merchants’ in other regions of the 
world.65 In Brenner’s analysis, it was longstanding commercial conflict between these two factions which 
had simmered for decades that culminated in political revolution in London in 1642. This represented the 
supposed triumph of the ‘new merchants’ in overthrowing the established City oligarchy which had long 
been dominated by conservative-minded company merchants. Brenner’s ‘new merchant’ elite were 
appointed to prominent positions within the Parliamentary financial administration during the 1640s, 
before allying themselves with the radical independent section of English political society in the second 
half of the decade and contributing to the establishment of the Commonwealth regime in 1649. The ‘new 
merchants’ were ascendant under the Commonwealth (1649-53), and exercised power within committees 
formed to administer government finance, the navy, and the American colonies. From Brenner’s 
perspective, therefore, ‘new merchants’ directed the formation of Commonwealth policy relating to the 
forceful reduction of the royalist rebellions in Virginia and Barbados, and pushed through legislation 
instituting monopoly controls over colonial trade via the Navigation Act (1651).66     
Brenner was correct to emphasise that there were long-term changes in English commerce in the century 
after 1550, and that a distinct group of merchants wielded increasing power in governmental institutions 
between 1642 and 1653. But his attempt to connect the two, and argue that long-term commercial 
transformations caused a particular group of London merchants to become involved in popular politics 
and agitate for revolution in the 1640s, is less persuasive.67 The research presented in this dissertation 
suggests that many of the businessmen who Brenner styled as ‘new merchants’ were far more pragmatic 
 
65 David Harris Sacks has observed a similar phenomenon occurring in mid-seventeenth-century Bristol. The new 
opportunities presented by deregulated Atlantic markets led to increased participation of shopkeepers, artisans, and 
sailors in overseas commerce, much to the consternation of the city’s established merchant elite. David Harris Sacks, 
The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450-1700 (Berkeley, 1991), p. 263, 267-270.  
66 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, passim. 
67 This is not the only study to criticise Brenner’s social analysis of the English merchant community. For examples, 
see: Edmond Smith, ‘The Networks of the East India Company in Early Modern London, c. 1599-1625’ (PhD 
dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2015); Roper, Advancing Empire, pp. 112-114, 175-177. 
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than he allowed, and that they did not subscribe to an ideology of free trade.68 Merchants such as Maurice 
Thomson operated outside of corporate monopolies when it suited them, but were also more than willing 
to work within overseas trading companies when possessing exclusive trading rights could lead to private 
commercial advantage. For instance, if Brenner had pushed his analysis beyond 1653, he would have seen 
that many ‘new merchants’ secured appointment to the directorates of chartered companies such as the 
East India Company and Levant Company in the late 1650s and early 1660s. Brenner’s argument that 
there was consensus within London’s community of colonial traders concerning the Commonwealth 
government’s policy to use force to quell the Royalist rebellion on Barbados also requires modification.69 
An analysis of the petitions submitted by the ‘Barbados merchants’ in the period from 1650-51 reveals 
how some of the most important merchant financiers of the sugar boom repeatedly urged the 
Commonwealth government to rethink their forceful approach, because they feared that warfare on the 
island would cause severe damage to the island’s sugar economy and therefore place their invested capital 
at risk.    
My analysis of the influence wielded by the merchant financiers of the Barbados sugar boom within the 
Protectorate and Restoration governments, which is presented in Chapter Four, builds upon Brenner’s 
work in Merchants and Revolution by studying the period after the demise of the Commonwealth in 1653. 
Brenner has demonstrated how Maurice Thomson and his associates fell into disfavour with Cromwell in 
1653,70 and I argue that a new cluster of merchants, most of whom had invested in the Barbados sugar 
boom, moved in to take their place as the most powerful merchant group within the English government. 
It was the wealth generated by Barbadian sugar and African slavery which propelled this network of 
merchants, centred on Martin Noell, to the top of the London merchant community in the 1650s and 
early 1660s. They were well represented in civic institutions in London, exerted increasing control over 
councils and committees formed to administer the American colonies after 1653, received lucrative 
government contracts to provision the Western Design fleet, and sat on the directorates of several 
overseas trading companies. To preserve their financial investments in Barbados, this powerful group of 
 
68 For the ‘new merchant’ ideology, see Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 169-161, 168-181.   
69 Ibid., p. 591. 
70 Ibid., pp. 633-637. 
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merchants also sought to influence the political direction of the colony. In pursuit of these ends they 
submitted numerous petitions to Parliament, forming an informal pressure group which constituted a 
progenitor of the now-infamous West India Interest that lobbied in the eighteenth century to prevent the 
abolition of the slave trade. Although the capacity of the merchant investors in the sugar boom to affect 
policy change in Westminster increased over time, they were not particularly successful in extending their 
reach across the Atlantic to make the local Barbadian government amenable to their interests, despite 
sustained attempts to control the office of Provost Marshal. 
In a recent reinterpretation of the development of the English empire in the seventeenth century, L. H. 
Roper’s has argued that the empire was constructed at the imperial centre by a network of aristocrats and 
merchants, and that the state had almost no input whatsoever.71 Evidence presented in Chapters Two, 
Three, and Four demonstrates how many of these metropolitan figures were crucially important to the 
onset of the Barbados sugar boom in the 1640s, and that Roper is therefore correct to highlight that the 
private interests of merchants were a significant motivating factor behind the growth in English 
colonising activity in the first half of the seventeenth century. However, it is nonetheless clear that 
Roper’s account requires some modification, because the English state became increasingly involved in 
colonial expansion in the mid-1650s when the Western Design was launched. The state’s interest waned 
in the short term following the spectacular failure of that military campaign, but picked up again after the 
Restoration. English overseas expansion was also a far messier and more contingent process than Roper’s 
interpretation allows for, and was shaped just as much by the decisions taken by colonists living in the 
Americas as it was by powerful London merchants. In this respect, the conclusions reached in this 
dissertation are more in line with Jack P. Greene’s analysis, which stresses how the growth of the English 
empire involved a constant process of negotiation between interest groups in the metropole and the 
colonies which had conflicting opinions about what the function of the empire was and how it should 
develop in the future.72  
 
71 Roper, Advancing Empire, passim.  
72 On ‘negotiated empires’, see Greene, Peripheries and Center; Daniels and Kennedy, eds, Negotiated Empires. 




Before moving on to outline the sources used in this dissertation, it is also important to state from the 
outset what this study is not going to do. For instance, one consequence of the sugar boom which will not 
be explored at length in what follows is the impact this event had on the consumption patterns, diet, and 
health of the inhabitants of early modern England. In the early 1660s Barbadian planters and the 
merchant financiers of the sugar boom celebrated the role they had played in making sugar a more 
affordable commodity in English markets.73 Food products sweetened by slave-grown sugar became an 
increasingly important part of the English diet over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, which had a negative effect on public health. In the early modern period, just like today, sugar 
was a highly-addictive substance, and consumption of large quantities led to tooth decay.74 The increasing 
availability of sugar in English markets following the mid-seventeenth-century sugar boom also made a 
central contribution to the ‘consumer revolution’, a transformation in daily rituals, social identities, and 
consumer markets which several historians have identified as occurring during the early modern period 
and have suggested was a contributing factor to proto-industrialisation.75 Phil Withington has placed 
many of the new tropical commodities which were incorporated into English society over the course of 
the seventeenth century into the category of ‘intoxicants’. He contends that the expanding market for 
intoxicants led to a proliferation in ‘companies’ and ‘societies’ in early modern England and helped to 
repurpose ‘consumption’ as a term of political economy.76 Although this dissertation is sensitive to the 
significance of sugar to the consumer revolution, what follows is focused primarily upon merchant 
 
73 They emphasised how: ‘before the said Plantacon [Barbados] no Sugars even not the ordinary sort of 
Muscovadoes Sugars could be bought under £3 10s per hundred[weight]. The said sugars since the said Plantacon 
hath been sold for lesse then halfe the said price and so all other sorts of Sugars even to the highest and most 
refined sort proportconably’. TNA, CO 1/15, ff. 61-62, ‘The humble peticon of the Planters, Merchants, Mariners, 
and Traders in the Island of Barbadoes’, n.d. [c. 1661]. 
74 Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York, 1986); Ralph A. Austen and 
Woodruff D. Smith, ‘Private Tooth Decay as Public Economic Virtue: The Slave-Sugar Triangle, Consumerism, and 
European Industrialization’, Social Science History, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1990), pp. 95-115. 
75 E.g. Joan Thirsk, Economic Policy and Projects: The Development of a Consumer Society in Early Modern England (Oxford, 
1978); Jan de Vries, The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behaviour and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present 
(Cambridge, 2008). 
76 Phil Withington, ‘Intoxicants and Society in Early Modern England’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 54, No. 3, (2011), 
pp. 631-657; Phil Withington, ‘Intoxicants and the invention of “consumption”’, The Economic History Review (2019).  
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involvement in the production of Barbadian sugar and the transatlantic sugar trade, not changing patterns 
of consumer demand in seventeenth-century England.  
I will also not be going into detail about the daily lives of enslaved Africans and indentured servants on 
Barbados. This is because my research questions are focused on the English merchants who financed the 
sugar boom. It is also partly due to the fact that there is already a voluminous historiography related to 
unfree labour on seventeenth-century Barbados and the early modern Caribbean more broadly.77 Without 
new source material my ability to make an original contribution to this debate would be limited. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to remember that it was unfree workers who performed the manual labour 
needed to create the sugar wealth which made the English merchants discussed in this dissertation rich. 
Each indentured servant and enslaved African transported across the Atlantic on a merchant vessel was 
an individual person with a name and family. They were compelled to work in brutal conditions on 
Barbados, often to their death. Although my dissertation will not focus on these men, women, and 
children, we cannot forget the role they played in this story. 
 
Sources: 
In what follows I deploy qualitative and quantitative evidence derived from manuscript and printed 
sources to build up my analysis. At the core of this study is a database of all the merchant investors in the 
Barbados sugar boom during the 1640s and 1650s (Table A4, Appendix 2), which was created using 
source material gathered from archives in the UK, USA, and Barbados. This database is referred to 
throughout the dissertation, because it enables statistical estimates to be made about the involvement of 
English merchants with different aspects of the Barbadian economy in the era of the sugar boom. Due to 
the prevalence of illegal trade in the early Atlantic economy, which mostly went undocumented and is 
 
77 For a general overview of servitude and slavery on Barbados, see Beckles, White Servitude and Black Slavery; Simon 
P. Newman, A New World of Labor: The Development of Plantation Slavery in the British Atlantic (Philadelphia, 2013), chs. 
3, 4, 8, 9; Marisa J. Fuentes, Dispossessed Lives: Enslaved Women, Violence, and the Archive (Philadelphia, 2016).  
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thus forever concealed from historians, it is impossible to comprehensively recapture the contributions 
made by merchants to the development of plantation slavery on Barbados. Despite these limitations, this 
database still represents the best effort to date to use empirical evidence to analyse the array of 
commercial activities undertaken by the English merchants who financed the Barbados sugar boom.       
A variety of primary sources are used to develop my argument in Chapter One. But most prominent are 
correspondence between members of the Hay family (who were trustees of the Earl of Carlisle’s patent to 
the ‘Caribbee Isles’), the port books and customs records for London, and the merchant account books 
associated with the voyage of the Abraham. Letters are widely used by historians as qualitative evidence 
because of their utility in providing insights into personal and business matters which would otherwise be 
lost. A limitation of almost all correspondence dating to the early modern period, including the Hay 
Papers, is that not all of the letters that were exchanged have survived, meaning that historians are often 
only hearing one side of a conversation.78 Consequently, I have used quantitative evidence to complement 
this analysis. The port books are a record of commodities imported into and exported from England, and 
were created to aid the state in collecting customs duties from overseas trade. They have been mined by 
historians interested in compiling quantitative data on early modern commerce, and I have studied some 
of them in Chapter One to investigate the significance of English merchant involvement with Barbados 
in the pre-sugar era. Though it is important to note that the port books only allow historians to study the 
volume of legal trade. Illicit commerce in contraband goods, which was prevalent in the early modern 
world, is not represented at all in these records. Unfortunately, few of the London port books remain for 
the first half of the seventeenth century, and there is no survival at all during the Interregnum (1642-
1660) which is the most important period in this study. Equally disappointing is that there are no 
equivalent records which systematically list imports into and exports out of Barbados until the late 
seventeenth century. I have therefore been unable to use port books as evidence in the later chapters of 
this dissertation.  
 
78 For historians who have used correspondence to great effect in their studies of early modern commerce and 
empire, see George F. Steckley, ed., The Letters of John Paige, London Merchant, 1648-1658 (London, 1984); David 
Hancock, ed., The Letters of William Freeman, London Merchant, 1678-1685 (London, 2002). 
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The private account books kept by merchants and their employees in the seventeenth century are also few 
and far between. Only one exists for Barbados in the period under consideration in this study, which was 
kept primarily by Thomas Anthony during the voyage of the Abraham (1636-37). Because of the 
unprecedented insights these double entry account books give into the structure and organisation of 
transatlantic commerce, it is an invaluable source for understanding how trade with Barbados worked in 
the first half of the seventeenth century. One issue though is that there are few other extant account 
books for trade to the American colonies in the same period to compare it with, so we do not have a 
good understanding of whether the voyage of the Abraham was typical or exceptional. Also problematic is 
the fact that the bookkeeping and arithmetic skills of the merchants who contributed to the upkeep of the 
account books leave a lot to be desired. For instance, when making calculations from the available data 
my figures often do not correspond with those reached by contemporaries. This may reveal what the 
function of account books were for many merchants in this period: a simple list of debits and credits to 
work out which clients were indebted and by what amount, rather than a way of making sophisticated 
calculations about profit and loss.79  
In Chapter Two, qualitative and quantitative evidence is used to conduct a prosopographical investigation 
into the 23 key merchant financiers of the Barbados sugar boom. Source material such as deeds, 
mortgages, wills, state papers, depositions provided during cases heard in the High Court of Admiralty 
and the Mayor’s Court of London, merchant correspondence, the records of trading companies, and 
printed material was studied in order to build up this analysis. I rely in particular on the Barbados deed 
books in this chapter. These documents are housed at the Barbados National Archives, and if one can 
decipher their formulaic legal script, it is possible to find invaluable evidence for the social and economic 
changes which occurred on the island in the seventeenth century. Included within the deed books are 
deeds of sale, mortgages, and letters granting powers of attorney, which have enabled me to reconstruct 
how merchants were involved with the economy of Barbados in the era of the sugar boom. The surviving 
deeds do not form a complete land register, however, and so it is not possible to fully recreate land 
 
79 For more on accounting practices in early modern England, see Craig Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The 
Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England (Basingstoke, 1998), p. 61. 
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ownership on Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century. Indeed, the passage of time, the humidity of the 
tropics, and natural disasters have caused a number of the records to degrade. Fortunately, they were 
meticulously recopied in the nineteenth century, and it is these recopied deed books which are now 
available for the public to consult when visiting the Barbadian archives. This presents methodological 
problems for historians, however. Because the original documents are too frail to consult, I have been 
forced to rely on the recopied deed books, which contain frequent misspellings of names and gaps where 
words that were illegible to the nineteenth-century scribe should be. Despite these limitations, the deed 
books are still the best source we have for understanding how the Barbadian economy changed in the 
1640s and 1650s, and as such have been used to great effect by revisionist historians such as Russell 
Menard and Larry Gragg.80 
I draw heavily upon depositions lodged in the High Court of Admiralty as evidence for my analysis in 
Chapters Three and Five. The Admiralty Court was, in Richard Blakemore’s words, ‘a major institution in 
Britain for punishing seaborne crimes such as piracy, and for resolving disputes between merchants, 
shipowners, and seafarers’.81 The court’s reliance on written testimony meant that it created a large body 
of evidence for historians interested in English trade and maritime affairs, especially for the mid-
seventeenth century. Historians of the early modern Caribbean, and the American colonies more 
generally, have not made enough use of the Admiralty Court records. Even though their depositions were 
mediated by lawyers and scribes, court records produced during cases heard at the High Court of 
Admiralty do give a voice to the sailors of varying social status who helped to construct the English 
empire in the Caribbean, which acts as a counterbalance against the fact that a large part of this 
dissertation concentrates on elite merchants in London.  
Petitions submitted by the self-described ‘Barbados merchants’ are used in Chapter Four as evidence for 
the existence of an informal pressure group of merchants with Barbadian interests in London. Early 
modern England was a petitioning society. Submitting petitions was an important channel through which 
 
80 Menard, Sweet Negotiations; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted. 
81 Richard J. Blakemore, ‘West Africa in the British Atlantic: Trade, Violence, and Empire in the 1640s’, Itinerario, 
Vol. 39, No. 2 (2015), pp. 299-327. 
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ordinary people without official political power could voice their opinions and exert pressure on the 
government to implement policy change. Indeed, the capacity to supplicate to a higher political authority 
was perceived as an ancient right shared by all freeborn Englishmen. Petitions are therefore a useful 
source for historians keen to recapture the perspectives of people of lower social status (although in this 
study the petitions analysed were, for the most part, penned by elite London merchants).82 There are 
several limitations with petitions as a historical source. For instance, petitions are by their very nature 
persuasive writing, and so historians must be aware that their authors might be exaggerating for effect. 
And as Blair Worden has warned, we must always be conscious that ‘pieces of paper can temporarily and 
artificially unite men of very different views’.83 I have been careful, therefore, not to overstate the 
cohesiveness of this lobby group. The petitions submitted by the ‘Barbados merchants’ show that when 
these merchants had a problem with the way the colony was being administered they vented their 
grievances in a relatively organised way to the English government. This is not the same as a unified 
commercial lobby which campaigned in favour of a consistent set of policies, however. But the evidence 
contained within these petitions does suggest that there was a thread of political lobbying which linked 
the ‘Barbados merchants’ of the mid-seventeenth century to the later West India Interest.   
 
Chapter Outlines: 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Building upon the previous scholarship outlined in the 
‘Methodology and Historiography’ section above, these chapters trace how merchant capital was invested 
in the Barbadian economy during the 1640s, produced transformative social and economic changes on 
 
82 For examples of historians of early modern England who have used petitions as a historical source, see Keith 
Lindley, Popular Politics and Religion in Civil War London (Aldershot, 1997); David Zaret, Origins of Democratic Culture: 
Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in Early-Modern England (Princeton, 2000); Derek Hirst, ‘Making Contact: 
Petitions and the English Republic’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2006), pp. 26-50; Jason Peacey, ‘Print 
Culture and Political Lobbying during the English Civil Wars’, Parliamentary History, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2007), pp. 30-48; 
David Dean, ‘Public Space, Private Affairs: Committees, Petitions and Lobbies in the Early Modern English 
Parliament’, in Chris R. Kyle and Jason Peacey, eds, Parliament at Work: : Parliamentary Committees, Political Power and 
Public Access in Early Modern England (Rochester, NY, 2002), pp. 169-180.  
83 Blair Worden, The Rump Parliament, 1648-1653 (Cambridge, 1974), p. 43.  
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Barbados and in England over the next two decades, before being withdrawn in the 1660s and reinvested 
elsewhere.  
In order to understand the significance of merchant investment in the Barbadian sugar industry during 
the 1640s, it is first necessary to investigate the colony’s social structure and economy in the preceding 
decade. Therefore, Chapter One begins by exploring the involvement of English and Dutch merchants 
with Barbados in the pre-sugar era (c.1627-1643). It explores who these merchants were and considers 
what merchant involvement in Barbadian trade can tell us about the economic health of the colony in the 
1630s and early 1640s. The chapter also includes a reconstruction of a merchant venture to Barbados 
using documents presented as evidence in a court case heard in the High Court of Admiralty relating to 
the voyage of the Abraham (1636-1637).  
The origins of the Barbados sugar boom are the focus of Chapter Two. A database of all 254 merchants 
who were involved in the Barbadian sugar economy in the 1640s and 1650s is used to identify the 23 key 
merchant financiers of the sugar boom. A prosopographical study of 6 of these investors is then 
developed in order to highlight the diverse array of domestic and overseas business activities that these 
merchants participated in, and to identify where the merchant capital used to finance the sugar boom 
originated. Beyond tracing the careers of the merchant financiers of the sugar boom, this chapter also 
analyses the motivations behind their heavy investment in the Barbadian plantation system, concluding 
that it was shaped by two external events unique to the 1640s: the collapse of the Brazilian sugar industry 
and the English Civil War.  
Chapter Three uses correspondence records, wills, deeds, mortgages, petitions, and court cases to 
document precisely how absentee English merchants contributed to the emergence of a commercial sugar 
industry on Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s. This analysis reveals how it was London merchants who 
undertook the capital-intensive work of extending credit to the island’s inhabitants, constructing sugar 
refineries on newly-bought plantations, and supplying the colony with indentured servants, enslaved 
Africans, and provisions. Chapter Three also includes a discussion of the relative importance of English 
merchant direct investment and credit in financing the rapid transition to sugar production on Barbados 
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when compared to forms of locally-generated revenue such as reinvestments from the profits of tobacco 
cultivation.  
Chapter Four investigates whether the commercial dynamism of the Barbadian economy in the 1640s and 
1650s encouraged English merchants to try to exert political influence over the governance of the colony. 
The chapter traces the increasing representation of the merchant financiers of the Barbados sugar boom 
on the committees and councils formed in Westminster to administer the American plantations and 
overseas commerce from the 1640s to the 1660s, and analyses how these merchants also sought to 
protect their investments in the Barbados sugar economy by forming an informal pressure group in 
London which petitioned the English government when factional strife threatened to destabilise 
Barbadian politics. In addition, the chapter explores whether London merchants were able to exert 
political influence within governmental institutions on Barbados itself, concluding that despite sustained 
efforts to control the office of Provost Marshal merchants in England were never particularly successful 
in controlling Barbadian politics and government due to their distance from the colony. 
Chapter Five studies the ramifications of the Barbados sugar boom in the years immediately following the 
Restoration of the monarchy in 1660. Besides exploring why merchants decided to withdraw their capital 
from Barbados and where they reinvested this money, the chapter also details how the economic 
transformation resulting from the sugar boom facilitated the development of the commission system of 
merchandising and led to the rise of a local merchant community on Barbados. By the early 1670s 
Barbados was the most important colony within the English empire, functioning as a site of plantation 
production, a regional centre of trade, and a nursery for further colonial expansion in the Greater 
Caribbean. 
The dissertation ends in 1672. This was chosen as a stopping point because the commercial and political 
relationship between English merchants and the Barbadian economy changed fundamentally in 1672 due 
to the re-structuring of the Royal African Company that year.84 Discussing the extensive debates between 
 
84 For the Royal African Company, see K. G. Davies, The Royal African Company (London, 1957). 
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merchants and planters over the African Company’s monopoly rights to the transatlantic slave trade was 
beyond the remit of this study.85 1672 was also a significant year in the history of early modern England. 
The Stop of the Exchequer led to the bankruptcy of several prominent goldsmith-bankers, causing long-
lasting changes in the structure of state finance. It was beyond the scope of this PhD dissertation to trace 
how this seminal event impacted the business activities of the merchants involved in Caribbean trade. 
 
 
85 Two recent books have discussed these debates in detail: William A. Pettigrew, Freedom’s Debt: The Royal African 
Company and the Politics of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1672-1752 (Chapel Hill, 2013); Abigail L. Swingen, Competing Visions 
of Empire: Labor, Slavery, and the Origins of the British Atlantic Empire (New Haven, 2015). 
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Chapter One. Merchant Involvement with Barbados in the Pre-
Sugar Era, 1627-1643 
The history of Barbados during the pre-sugar era, which stretched from the founding of the colony in 
1627 to the beginning of commercial sugar cultivation in 1643, has been scrutinised by historians. It has 
traditionally been argued that these years constituted an exceedingly difficult time in the history of the 
island, during which the cultivation of poor-quality tobacco and political dispute over control of Barbados 
threatened the colony’s continued survival. Things remained this way, so the argument goes, until the 
social and economic transformations wrought by sugar improved the commercial fortunes of the 
struggling colony.1 More recently revisionists have challenged aspects of this narrative. Collectively, the 
work of Robert Carlyle Batie, Alison Games, and Russell Menard presents a picture of 1630s Barbados as 
a seventeenth-century boomtown, where entrepreneurs profited greatly from the sale of their tobacco 
crops and time-expired servants benefited from the numerous opportunities for social advancement not 
available in England. Menard has even gone so far as to argue that the growth of African slavery had 
begun in the 1630s, long before the emergence of a commercial sugar industry in the colony.2  
But by focusing their attention on the experiences of planters living in the colony itself these revisionist 
historians have not considered what the evidence of merchant involvement with Barbados tells us about 
the economic and commercial vitality of the island in the pre-sugar era. The first chapter of this 
dissertation will revisit some of these debates and in the process establish several themes which will 
become prominent in later chapters. The chapter will use new evidence, and especially the detailed 
account books of the voyage of the Abraham (1636-37) preserved in the High Court of Admiralty records, 
to seek answers to the following questions. Which merchants had a commercial interest in Barbados 
 
1 For various versions of this argument see, F. C. Innes, ‘The Pre-Sugar Era of European Settlement in Barbados’, 
Journal of Caribbean History, Vol. 1 (1970), pp. 1-22; Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, ch. 1; Dunn, Sugar and 
Slaves, ch. 2; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 394-395; Puckrein, Little England, ch. 3. 
2 Robert Carlyle Batie, ‘Why Sugar? Economic Cycles and the Changing of Staples on the English and French 
Antilles, 1624-54’, The Journal of Caribbean History, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1976), pp. 1-41; Alison Games, ‘Opportunity and 
Mobility in Early Barbados’, in Robert L. Paquette and Stanley L. Engerman, eds, The Lesser Antilles in the Age of 
European Expansion (Gainesville, 1996), pp. 165-81; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, ch. 1 & 2.  
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during the 1630s and early 1640s? Was it mainly English merchants, or were traders of other nationalities 
more significant to the island’s economy? What goods were being traded to Barbados, what were these 
goods being exchanged for, and what was the importance of credit to business transactions between 
merchants and planters? Was Menard correct to argue that the Barbadian economy was not suffering a 
depression during the 1630s like most historians had previously thought? 
 
1. The Origins of Merchant Involvement with Barbados, 1627-1630 
The first section of this chapter will explore how merchants in the City of London were involved in the 
founding of Barbados in 1627 and were granted substantial landholdings on the island. The protracted 
legal dispute between Sir William Courteen and the Earl of Carlisle over the proprietorship of Barbados is 
a story which is broadly familiar to historians, and therefore will not be recounted in detail here. This 
section will instead be concerned with answering several questions related to merchant involvement with 
early Barbados which have been neglected by historians. Why did the London merchant Sir William 
Courteen choose to finance the colonisation of Barbados in 1627? And what happened to the 10,000 
acres of land granted by the Earl of Carlisle to the merchant syndicate led by Marmaduke Rawdon in 
1630?  
In 1625 the ship captain John Powell was returning to Europe from a successful trading voyage to Guiana 
when he stopped off at an uninhabited and thickly wooded tropical island in the eastern Caribbean. 
Clearly impressed with what he saw during his brief stay, he returned to London and quickly set about 
gathering business partners to help him finance a colonising expedition. Forming a joint-stock company 
was common in such endeavours, as it diminished the threat to personal wealth which came with risky 
overseas ventures. Powell found business partners willing to supply the required capital within his family 
in the form of his son, also named John Powell, and his brother Henry Powell. But he also managed to 
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attract the support of a powerful Anglo-Dutch merchant syndicate operating out of the City of London, 
which had financed his earlier voyage to Guiana, involving Sir William Courteen, his brother Sir Peter 
Courteen, and their brother-in-law John Mounsey. Philip Herbert, the fourth earl of Pembroke, was 
another figure working in conjunction with Powell and Courteen. Whether he adventured capital is 
unknown, but what is certain is that he used his political influence within Charles I’s court to try to secure 
the group a proprietary patent to govern the island. By the end of 1626 they had raised approximately 
£8000 to outfit the William and John, commanded by Capt. Henry Powell, which disembarked 80 
passengers at Barbados on 20 February 1627.3 
Precisely why leading figures in the London merchant community and a prominent member of the 
English gentry decided to pool resources and initiate a speculative venture to colonise Barbados is not 
clear from the surviving source material. But exploring the other trading activities undertaken by these 
men before their endeavour to settle Barbados helps to place into context the growing commercial 
interest of English merchants and courtiers in the Lesser Antilles. When the first English settlement was 
founded on Barbados in 1627, Sir William Courteen led one of the most successful mercantile firms in 
the City of London. In the mid-1620s his trading empire encompassed the cloth trade in the Baltic, 
whaling in the Northern seas, the tobacco trade in South America, and the East Asian commerce in 
calicos and spices. The profits generated by these trading ventures enabled Courteen to become an 
important government moneylender: in the years before 1626 he had extended credit to the Crown in 
three instalments worth a total of £50,500.4  
Of particular significance for understanding Courteen’s participation in the colonisation of Barbados was 
his sustained interest in the tobacco trade on the Wild Coast of Guiana. Under the command of John 
Powell, Courteen’s vessel the Olive had already completed several successful voyages to the Dutch colony 
on the Essequibo River, which were organised in conjunction with Jan de Moor, a merchant of Flushing 
 
3 Trinity College Dublin Library, HM 736, f. 38; Gary Puckrein, ‘Did Sir William Courteen Really Own Barbados?’, 
Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1981), p. 136. 
4 John C. Appleby, ‘Courten, Sir William (c. 1568-1636), merchant and financier’, ODNB (23 September 2004) 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-6445 
(Accessed 8 November 2019). 
Michael D. Bennett 
36 
 
(Vlissingen), and several other agents in Amsterdam, Zeeland, and Middelburg.5 Such voyages reveal the 
depth of Anglo-Dutch commercial connections in the first half of the seventeenth century, and the 
important role that the trading networks forged by English merchants with Brazil and Guiana played in 
the colonisation of Barbados and other islands in the Lesser Antilles.6 It was on the return leg of one of 
these voyages to Guiana that John Powell first encountered Barbados and identified the island as a 
suitable site for establishing a permanent English presence in the eastern Caribbean. The Earl of 
Pembroke also had a diverse business portfolio and was deeply involved in overseas ventures. In 1612 he 
served on the council of the Virginia Company and was an investor in the North-West Passage Company, 
before purchasing stock in the East India Company two years later. Like many other gentry investors 
interested in overseas trade and American colonisation, by the mid-1620s he was increasingly attracted to 
the commercial opportunities opening up in the Caribbean, and as such became one of the first investors 
in the Guiana Company in 1626.7  
What can the wider business portfolios of merchants and courtiers involved in the initial colonisation of 
Barbados tell us about their motivations for settling this small island in the eastern Caribbean? Most 
historians have assumed that the principal interest of the Courteen syndicate was to develop Barbados as 
a new centre of tobacco production.8 Extant records of tobacco prices in London and Amsterdam are 
patchy, but depending on the quality of the leaf, the tobacco produced in Virginia and the recently 
established colony of St. Christopher (St. Kitts) could fetch prices of up to 36 pence per lb. of tobacco in 
1625, generating a tidy profit for planters and merchants.9 It was hoped, so the argument goes, that 
Barbados could emulate the successes of these colonies. Support for this interpretation can be found in 
 
5 Appleby, ‘Courten, Sir William’, ODNB; Esther Mijers, ‘A Natural Partnership? Scotland and Zeeland in the Early 
Seventeenth Century’, in Allan I Macinnes and Arthur H. Williamson, eds, Shaping the Stuart World, 1603-1714: The 
Atlantic Connection (Leiden, 2006), pp. 245-247. 
6 London merchants had been importing contraband tobacco produced on Spanish plantations on the banks of the 
Orinoco River and Trinidad into England long before the settlement of Virginia in 1607. Joyce Lorimer, ‘The 
English contraband tobacco trade from Trinidad and Guiana, 1590-1617’ in Kenneth Andrews et al., The Westward 
Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America, 1480-1650 (Liverpool, 1978); Andrews, Trade Plunder and 
Settlement, p. 225. 
7 David L. Smith, ‘Herbert, Philip, first earl of Montgomery and fourth earl of Pembroke (1584-1650), courtier and 
politician’, ODNB (23 September 2004), 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-13042 
(Accessed 8 November 2019).   
8 E.g. Innes, ‘Pre-Sugar Era’, pp. 13-18.  
9 Batie, ‘Why Sugar’, p. 29 (Table 1).  
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the letters of Henry Winthrop, who arrived on Barbados as part of the first fleet of settlers. He wrote to 
his father in August 1627 to explain how he and his servants had set about planting tobacco, which he 
expected within three years would prove to be a profitable enterprise. Just six months after the first 
settlement of Barbados, Winthrop could report that the English colonists already had ‘a crop of tobacco 
on the gronde’, and that the next time he wrote to England he would be able to ‘send ouer 500 or a 
Thousand weyght of tobackow’.10 However, depositions provided by the first settlers of Barbados suggest 
that the founding party of colonists did not just see tobacco as the key to the colony’s future success, but 
were instead willing to experiment with a variety of cash crops. After the first settlement of Barbados in 
1627, for instance, Henry Powell ventured to Guiana, and returned with an array of seeds and roots for 
the provision of the English colonists (including indigo and sugar cane), along with 32 Arawak Indians to 
provide expertise in how best to cultivate these crops.11  
Moreover, a colony on Barbados could function as a node in Courteen’s existing trade with the Essequibo 
plantation, perhaps as a resupply point. It is instructive that the first action taken by Henry Powell after 
disembarking the founding group of colonists on Barbados was to travel straight to the Essequibo River 
and seek the assistance of the Dutch governor there named Captain Groenewegen, probably at 
Courteen’s request. According to a deposition provided by Henry Powell in the 1650s, during his stay in 
Guiana he left eight men along with a ‘Cargezon of trade for that place’, reinforcing the significance of 
commerce with the Essequibo plantation to Courteen’s plans for Barbados. If we are to believe Powell’s 
testimony, the indigenous Arawak Indians were also enthused by the prospect ‘that wee might driue a 
constant trade between that Iland and the Mayne’.12  
The wider geopolitical context of the mid-1620s, and especially the outbreak of war with Spain in 1625, 
suggests there may have been one other motive behind the colonisation of Barbados. Considering how 
his father was forced to flee the Low Countries in 1568 as a Protestant refugee due to persecution by the 
 
10 Winthrop Papers, Vol. 1., pp. 356-357, Henry Winthrop to Emmanuel Downing, 22 August 1627. 
11 Vincent T. Harlow, Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623-1667 (London, 1924), pp. 37-38. 
12 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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Spanish, it is not surprising that William Courteen repeatedly secured letters of marque to take Spanish 
prizes when his ships travelled to the Caribbean. There were ongoing discussions about the formation of 
an English West India Company to assault Spanish America in the 1620s, and other English settlements 
in the Caribbean such as Providence Island performed a dual function of both plantation colony and 
privateer base.13 It does not, therefore, seem out of the question that the Courteen syndicate could have 
possessed a similar vision for Barbados.14 Barbados could have functioned as an ideal base for English 
privateers to venture out into the Caribbean Sea and prey upon richly laden Spanish treasure fleets, 
thereby contributing to the ongoing conflict against the Catholic Spaniard in the New World. The island’s 
geography would have supported this military function. As the easternmost island in the Lesser Antilles 
archipelago Barbados was situated a long distance away from the centre of Spanish power in America, 
meaning the colony could avoid being extinguished by Spanish invasion in the first years of settlement, 
when it was at its most vulnerable. Barbados was also a highly defendable island with few landing spots 
for enemy forces, meaning that a Spanish invasion could be more easily repelled. Support for this 
interpretation is provided by Henry Powell himself, who stated in a petition how ‘in the yeare 1626 being 
warres between the Kingdome of England and Spaine’ he ‘procured a Comision against the estate of the 
Spaniards’ before venturing to the Caribbean to settle Barbados. In fact, on the outward voyage Powell 
even managed to capture a Spanish prize, which contained a contingent of enslaved Africans who arrived 
on Barbados with the initial colonists.15  
Whatever the role envisioned for Barbados within the Courteen syndicate’s wider trading empire 
happened to be, they would never see it come to fruition. This was because there were competing claims 
to the ownership of Barbados. Sir James Hay, the first Earl of Carlisle, had received letters patent from 
Charles I in July 1627 bestowing upon him the title of Lord Proprietor of most of the islands in the 
Lesser Antilles, including Barbados and St. Christopher. Just seven months later the King granted a 
 
13 John C. Appleby, ‘An association for the West Indies? English plans for a West India Company, 1621–29’, The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1987), pp. 213-41; Kupperman, Providence Island. 
14 I must thank Edmond Smith for encouraging me to think about this possibility. Trinity College Dublin Library, 
HM 736, ff. 38-40; Bodleian Library, Rawlinson Ms. C. 94, also quoted in Harlow, Colonising Expeditions, pp. 36-42; 
Andrews, Trade Plunder and Settlement, pp. 244-5; Appleby, ‘Sir William Courten’, ODNB. 
15 Harlow, Colonising Expeditions, p. 36.  
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similar patent to the Earl of Pembroke, acting on behalf of Courteen and his business associates, which to 
the consternation of the Earl of Carlisle also named Barbados. The story of how these competing patents 
generated confusion in London and conflict on Barbados is long and convoluted, and does not need 
repeating in detail here.16 What is more interesting for our purposes is that Carlisle was working in 
conjunction with a group of London merchants to secure his proprietary title to Barbados. Living an 
extravagant lifestyle as a favoured member of James I’s court meant the Earl of Carlisle owed 
considerable debts to a group of moneylending merchants in the City of London.17 To go some way 
towards repaying his debts, Carlisle granted land on Barbados to nine of his merchant creditors.18 
Marmaduke Rawdon, William Perkins, and Alexander Bannister were the leading members of this 
syndicate. In April 1628 these merchants chose Charles Wolverston to act as their agent, and drafted a 
commission in conjunction with the Earl of Carlisle giving him the power to administer their affairs on 
Barbados and govern those persons they sent over to work on their plantation.19 Wolverston arrived on 
Barbados in June 1628 and immediately ordered the 80 men who accompanied him to begin cultivating 
tobacco for their merchant employers. This tobacco plantation is the first example we have of absentee 
London merchants directly owning land on Barbados, something that will become a prominent theme 
later in this dissertation.  
Initially, things seemed to be going well for the Rawdon syndicate’s tobacco business. By 1629 it looked 
like their first crop would produce 60,000 lb. of tobacco, worth approximately £1000 in England. But 
disputes over proprietary control of the island, which eventually spilled over into violence, disrupted all 
the progress Wolverston had made towards growing tobacco on behalf of the merchants. According to a 
bill of complaint lodged in the High Court of Chancery by the Earl of Carlisle and his merchant 
 
16 For a detailed analysis of these competing proprietary claims to Barbados and the events which followed, see 
James A. Williamson, The Caribbee Islands under the Proprietary Patents (Oxford, 1926), ch. 2 & 3; Puckrein, ‘Did Sir 
William Courteen Really Own Barbados?’. 
17 Roy E. Schreiber, ‘Hay, James, first earl of Carlisle (c. 1580–1636), courtier and diplomat’, ODNB (23 September 
2004), https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-
12723 (Accessed 8 November 2019); Roy E. Schreiber, ‘The First Carlisle: Sir James Hay, First Earl of Carlisle as 
Courtier, Diplomat and Entrepreneur, 1580-1636’, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 74, No. 7 
(1984), pp. 1-202. 
18 These merchants were: Marmaduke Rawdon, William Perkins, Alexander Bannister, Robert Wheatley, Edmond 
Forster, Robert Swinnerton, Henry Wheatley, John Sharpes, and John Farrington.  
19 Huntington Library, HM 17, ‘The Earle of Carlisle’s Commission granted to Charles Wolverston to be Governor 
of the Marchants Plantations, 3 April 1628’. 
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associates in September 1629, John Powell the younger had declared himself governor of the entire island 
on behalf of Sir William Courteen some months earlier, and had subsequently ‘destroyed theire tobacco 
plants and other merchandizes then by them planted wch would have been ripe and readie to be 
reaped’.20 Wolverston was forced to flee the island and return to England, where he provided a dire 
report on the extent of the merchants’ losses. He explained that because he had to keep a constant guard 
against the incursions made by Courteen’s settlers ‘great part of the store & provisions which the 
Merchants sent was consumed’, rather than going towards supplying their servants for the next 18 
months. If they did not furnish their plantation with extra provisions soon, Wolverston warned, then it 
was likely that the entire business venture would collapse, meaning that the Rawdon syndicate would lose 
the £5000 they had adventured to get their tobacco plantation operational.21 In response to this affront, 
the Earl of Carlisle dispatched Captain Henry Hawley to be his new governor, who armed with a letter 
from the King, promptly imprisoned Powell and re-established Carlisle’s control over Barbados.22 
With his proprietary authority reinstated, the Earl of Carlisle moved to compensate his merchant 
creditors, whose prior Barbadian venture had been a financial disappointment. On 22 February 1630 
Carlisle allocated 10,000 acres of land in the parishes of St. Michael and St. George to Marmaduke 
Rawdon, William Perkins, Alexander Bannister, and the rest of their merchant associates. The only 
condition was that they set aside five percent of the annual revenue from the plantation for the Earl of 
Carlisle’s use as proprietor.23 Other than the fact that the land was granted, and that the ‘tenn Thousande 
Acres of Lande which Belongeth to the Merchants of London’ forms the centrepiece of Richard Ligon’s 
famous map (see Figure 1.1, below), historians know surprisingly little about what subsequently happened 
to the Rawdon syndicate’s large plantation. No correspondence between the merchants and their agents 
on Barbados has survived. The piecemeal evidence we have at our disposal indicates that some of the 
merchants were legitimately bought-out of their land by their factors living on Barbados. In May 1638, for 
example, Edward Oistin explained in a letter to Archibald Hay how ‘this land was once the marchants and 
 
20 Williamson, The Caribbee Islands, Appendix 1.  
21 Huntington Library, HM 17, ‘Capt Wolverston’s declaracon of the Merchant’s Losses’. 
22 Puckrein, ‘Did Sir William Courteen Really Own Barbados?’, p. 144-5.  
23 Huntington Library, HM 17, ‘The Earl of Carliles grant of 10000 Acres of Land to the Merchantes’, February 22 
1629/30, in the Papers of James Hay, 1st Earl of Carlisle. 
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I theire facktor there’, and that he later ‘bought them out and gave them one thousand pounds sterling 
money in England’.24  
There is also strong evidence to suggest that the Rawdon syndicate’s 10,000-acre plantation was 
mismanaged throughout the 1630s and 1640s, and that at least some of their profits were embezzled.25 Sir 
George Hastings penned a letter to Archibald Hay in February 1641 ‘conserning the ten thousand akars 
of land belonging to the Londinars Plantation granted by my Lord of Carlisle’. He wrote indignantly that 
‘wee have bine much wronged by som we trusted, who have sold most, if not all of our lands, and given 
us no account’.26 These accusations of corruption were almost certainly aimed at James Holdip, the agent 
entrusted with managing the Rawdon syndicate’s 10,000 acres. Holdip had previously served as a factor 
for Marmaduke Rawdon in various French port towns, co-ordinating the cloth trade there on behalf of 
the Company of Merchants Trading to France.27 By 1630 Holdip was on Barbados in Rawdon’s employ. 
Over the course of the 1630s James Holdip used the power and influence conferred by his governance of 
the 10,000 acres and the public office of Receiver General to become a major Barbadian landowner.28 
Much of his Locust Hall plantation, for instance, was embezzled from his merchant employers. Holdip 
also fraudulently sold some of the land contained within the merchant’s 10,000-acre plot: prior to 1660 he 
was involved in 27 Barbadian land transactions, and was the seller in each case.29  
 
24 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/13, Edward Oistin to Archibald Hay, 29 May 1638.  
25 John Oldmixon, The British Empire in America, Containing the History of the Discovery, Settlement, Progress and State of the 
British Colonies on the Continent and Islands of America, Volume II: On the West Indies Colonies (London, 1708), p. 7.  
26 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/18, Sir George Hastings to Archibald Hay, 6 February 1640/41. 
27 Eric Otremba, ‘Inventing ingenios: experimental philosophy and the secret sugar-makers of the seventeenth-
century Atlantic, History and Technology, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2012), pp. 133-134, 136-137.  
28 The position of Receiver General gave Holdip the power to collect rent payments for the Earl of Carlisle. 
Huntington Library, HM 17, ‘The Earle of Carliles Pattent unto Capt James Holdip sent him by the Phenix of 
London’, February 12 1629/30. 
29 Otremba, ‘Inventing Ingenios’, pp. 136-137.  




The confusion caused by these fraudulent business deals forced Governor Phillip Bell to draw up a 
commission in December 1642 ordering a more accurate measurement of the 10,000-acre tract belonging 
to the merchants, and for surveyors to divide it into three equal plots.30 A document previously unknown 
to historians of the Caribbean provides further insight into this process. It is a copy of a list dating from 
1644 of all the persons who possessed plantations within the London merchant Alexander Bannister’s 
third part of the 10,000 acres on Barbados, and was probably produced in conjunction with the surveyors 
 
30 BDA, RB3/1, pp. 146-7. 
Figure 1.1. A topographicall Description and Admeasurement of the yland of Barbados in the West Indyaes 
with the Mrs. Names of the Seuerall plantacons (1657). Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library.  
The map in Ligon’s True and Exact History of Barbados depicts the Rawdon syndicate’s land grant 
of 10,000 acres on Barbados. The merchants’ plantation was located on fertile land in the 
interior of the island and was close to the expanding port town of St. Michael (modern-day 
Bridgetown) in Carlisle Bay.  
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commissioned by Governor Bell several years earlier. What the document demonstrates is that, in 1644, 
23 different men owned 30 plantations of varying sizes within Bannister’s plot of 3425 acres (Table 1.1, 
below). Only William Perkins, who possessed one of the largest plantations of 500 acres, was a merchant 
named in the Earl of Carlisle’s original land grant. The rest, one must assume, were squatters who 
fraudulently purchased the land from James Holdip. A copy of the list, which survives in the London 
Metropolitan Archives, was drafted by a scrivener in 1653 before John Bannister went to Barbados to try 
to reclaim his brother’s rightful estate. But being unable to proffer a ‘principall writing’ to support his 
claim meant that he ‘could make no effectuall progress therein’. The outcome of a suit subsequently heard 
in the Mayor’s Court of London in March 1656 relating to this dispute is unknown. But it is unlikely there 
was a decisive ruling, because even in the mid-eighteenth century legal hearings were still being pursued 
by the heirs of the Rawdon syndicate, who were eager to receive compensation for being swindled out of 
their inheritance.31  
  
 
31 See, for example, the notebook compiled by a lawyer of the Rawdon family in the mid-eighteenth century. It 
contains abstracts of deeds relating to the fraudulent sale of land parcels of Rawdon’s share of the 10,000 acres in 
the 1650s and 1660s, and notes on legal precedents on Barbados. BL, Add. Ms. 33845. 
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Table 1.1. [Redacted] 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
This section has demonstrated how London merchants supplied capital to finance the colonisation of 
Barbados in 1627 and set up some of the first tobacco plantations on the island. But it is important to 
stress that there is nothing particularly unique about this. The initial planting of St. Christopher in 1623, 
for instance, was financed by the London merchants Ralph Merefield and Maurice Thomson.32 What is 
distinctive about the early history of Barbados, however, were the competing claims to proprietary 
 
32 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 184. 
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control over the colony between different members of the English gentry and their merchant backers in 
the City of London, which created a climate of fear and suspicion in the colony. The failure of both the 
rival Courteen and Rawdon syndicates to retain effective control over their land on Barbados highlights 
the difficulties faced by absentee merchants in managing their distant plantations. Having trustworthy 
agents overseas was essential for merchants to run a successful business in the colonies, along with a legal 
apparatus which supported their right to reclaim debts and prosecute those who misused their land and 
goods. In the first years of settlement English merchants trading to Barbados did not benefit from such 
institutional support and frequently lost out to unscrupulous agents, such as James Holdip. As we will see 
in Chapter Four, in subsequent decades London merchants would seek to tip the scales in their favour by 
attempting to exert control over the institutions in London and Barbados concerned with colonial 
governance.  
 
2. Merchants and the Barbadian Economy, 1630-43 
The second section of this chapter provides a broad overview of merchant involvement with Barbados in 
the pre-sugar era, setting out the necessary background for the third section which will analyse in detail a 
single merchant voyage to Barbados from 1636-37. It will begin with some necessary background 
information on how trade with Barbados operated during the 1630s, before moving on to reassess Russell 
Menard’s argument that the economy of Barbados was buoyant in the 1630s and early 1640s, contrary to 
what historians of the Caribbean had previously understood. 
Attracting merchant shipping to regularly visit a colony was the primary factor in determining the success, 
or failure, of speculative overseas ventures in the seventeenth century. The early Atlantic economy was 
fiercely competitive, and the terms of trade favoured merchants during the 1630s partly because planters 
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in the American colonies were suffering from an economic depression.33 As will become clear, there is 
little evidence to suggest that the merchant community in early modern England possessed a particularly 
strong sense of national loyalty. During the 1630s, English merchants would sell tobacco and cotton in 
markets which offered them the best price. Records produced by the High Court of Admiralty 
demonstrate how English ships sold Barbados tobacco at locations as varied as Amsterdam, Middelburg, 
Hamburg, and Genoa.34 English merchants were far more interested in securing maximum profits for 
themselves than bringing their goods into an English port to guarantee the English state increased 
revenue through customs duties. This suggests that in the initial phases of England’s overseas expansion 
the empire was not a centralised imperial project. 
Similarly, if colonists could not offer a viable product to attract merchant shipping to their shores, then 
traders would simply visit a different colony which could. It seems English merchants were not overly 
concerned about the fact that this would deprive colonists of the labourers, manufactured goods, and 
weaponry necessary for the survival of an overseas plantation. The main factor which ensured traders 
repeatedly sent their ships to visit the same colony was the prominent role which credit played in 
merchant-planter business transactions. Once a merchant vessel visited a colony once and departed 
without settling the debts owed to them by planters, then a return visit in subsequent years was required 
to collect debts from the previous voyage. As this cycle continued, intricate credit relationships predicated 
upon trust and obligation were forged between merchants and planters, leading to repeat business and 
increased trade.   
Merchants from England and the Low Countries traded to Barbados in the 1630s because the island 
represented a new consumer market in the Lesser Antilles. Entrepreneurial merchants willing to risk the 
transatlantic crossing could make money by selling labourers and manufactured goods from Europe at 
high prices. Merchant shipping usually visited the island from February to July, during the harvest season. 
 
33 For this economic depression, see John J. McCusker & Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-
1789 (Chapel Hill, 1985), ch. 3.  
34 E.g. TNA HCA 24/94; TNA HCA 13/57. 
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In October 1637 Peter Hay sent to his kinsman in London Archibald Hay, who in an earlier letter had 
exhibited interest in engaging in the trade to Barbados, a list of items which would be ‘most profitabell 
for to be sent on to this Island’ and ‘yeald the graytest pryce and sendest returne for England’.35 This 
source offers insights into the commodities that were being exchanged in Barbadian commerce during the 
1630s. At the top of his list were ‘men servants and maid servants’. Unfree labourers were the most 
sought-after commodity on Barbados, as they were needed to perform plantation work. In the 1630s, 
indentured servants from the British Isles represented the most common form of labour transported to 
Barbados by merchants, who were commonly sold to planters for between £12 and £15 BMC each.36 The 
importance of servants to the colonial economy was underscored by Peter Hay in October 1638, when he 
observed how ‘a plantation in this place is worth nothing unless there be good store of hands upon it’. 
The next set of commodities on the list included various items of clothing, including shoes, drawers, 
shirts, and Monmouth caps. Indenture contracts usually stipulated that masters were required to provide 
an annual supply of clothing for their servants, and so a strong demand for these items in the American 
colonies was always guaranteed. Other commodities that Hay believed would fetch a good price on 
Barbados were candle wax, tobacco pipes, ‘strong waters’ (spirits such as brandy), and canvas bags for 
storing bales of cotton.37 
Some goods not included on Peter Hay’s list were also commonly transported to Barbados in the 1630s. 
Weaponry and ammunition were high-value items dispatched by merchants and proprietors to the 
American plantations to enable colonists to defend themselves from the threat of indigenous attack and 
assaults from rival European powers. In 1640 both the Earl of Warwick and the Earl of Carlisle 
contracted with London ship captains to freight weapons and gunpowder to Barbados, for example.38 As 
 
35 For Peter Hay’s list of commodities, see NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/1, ‘A inclosure of gudes such ar most 
profitabell for to be sent on to this Island and what will yeald the graytest pryce and sendest returne for England’, 2 
October 1637; NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/2, ‘A note of commodities to be sent to Barbados’, [c. October 1637].  
36 John Wareing, Indentured Migration and the Servant Trade from London to America, 1618-1718: ‘There is Great Want of 
Servants’ (Oxford, 2017), p. 126.   
37 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/1; GD34/924/2. See also NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/40, ‘An invoice of such 
goods as I desire you to send me over for tht moneyes which you shall receave for my owne tobacco’, 11 August 
1638; NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/41, ‘Acompt of that comodities that your wor: sent over unto me’, [c. August 
1638]; NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/9, Letter from Peter Hay, 2 October 1637. For Peter Hay’s comment on the 
importance of servants, see NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/16, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 9 October 1638. 
38 TNA, E 190 44/1, f. 34, 51.  
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the unfree portion of the Barbadian population steadily increased over the course of the 1630s, weapons 
also helped planters to defend their livelihoods against the internal threat posed by servants and enslaved 
Africans. Foodstuffs and condiments such as butter, cheese, beef, oil, pepper, sugar, and nutmeg were 
highly sought after, as were manufactured goods necessary for maintaining an English society in the 
tropics, such as cutlery, tools, and nails.39 Notable absences from the inventories of items imported to 
Barbados during the 1630s are draught animals. This is because the high demand for horses and 
assenegoes (small donkeys from the Azores) in the 1640s and 1650s was closely linked to the animal-
powered mills used on Barbados in the early years of the sugar industry, and as such they were not needed 
in large quantities in the pre-sugar era.  
The servants, manufactured goods, and foodstuffs transported to the Caribbean by merchants were 
exchanged for tropical commodities produced by plantation-owners on Barbados. Trials of new cash 
crops were conducted by plantation-owners on Barbados in the first few decades after the colony was 
founded in 1627. The late 1630s and early 1640s could be aptly described as an era of agricultural 
experimentation in the history of the island. The diverse range of cash crops produced by planters meant 
that merchants visiting Barbados had a degree of choice in what they received for their goods. As has 
already been discussed, tobacco was the first crop Englishmen began to produce when they first settled 
on the island. Evidence from probate records, deed books, and plantation inventories demonstrate how 
tobacco was the most significant commodity produced on Barbados between 1630 and 1643, despite the 
poor price it fetched in Europe. Tobacco was attractive for yeoman farmers because, unlike indigo and 
sugar, the crop required almost no initial capital outlay on expensive equipment to cultivate and process, 
enabling poor planters or time-expired indentured servants with little credit to speculate in the industry.40 
But fluctuating prices, the inferior quality of Barbados tobacco, and declining interest in the island among 
English merchants meant that planters soon began to trial different crops for export.41  
 
39 Winthrop Papers, Vol. 1., pp. 356-357, Henry Winthrop to Emmanuel Downing, 22 August 1627; Winthrop Papers, 
Vol. 1., pp. 361-362, Henry Winthrop to John Winthrop, 15 October 1627; John Bruce, ed., Letters and Papers of the 
Verney Family Down to the End of the Year 1639 (London, 1853), pp. 196-198; APCC, p. 266, 270-71, 278. 
40 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 19-21, 24.  
41 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 53. 
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Cotton, ginger, and indigo emerged as viable candidates. Cotton had been grown on the island as early as 
1631, when Sir Henry Colt reported how ‘ye trade of Cotton’ was filling the planters on Barbados ‘with 
hope’.42 Cotton ‘engines’, which were used to clean the cotton by removing seeds and other impurities, do 
not start appearing in plantation inventories and deed books until 1634, indicating that the cultivation of 
cotton at a commercial scale began around the mid-1630s.43 Unlike the tobacco produced on Barbados, 
the cotton raised by planters had a good reputation among merchants in Europe. According to Archibald 
Hay, ‘Barbados cotton of all other is esteemed best if it be well cleared and it is a staple commoditie that 
will ever be worth money’.44 But planters keen to move away from tobacco cultivation were hampered by 
a lack of canvas bags used to pack cotton for transportation across the Atlantic. In August 1638, for 
example, Peter Hay sent the first of many complaints detailing how he had intended to send cotton home 
to England but had been prevented in doing so due to a lack of canvas bags ‘to stife it in’.45 By the late 
1630s overproduction had caused the price of cotton, which had stood at six pence per lb. in London in 
1636, to fall by nearly 50 percent at markets in England and the Low Countries. Frustrated with declining 
cotton prices and legislation prohibiting the cultivation of tobacco in the Lesser Antilles, planters on 
Barbados were once again forced to experiment with different crops and seek an alternative export 
commodity.46 From about 1639 some plantation-owners on Barbados began to trial the cultivation of 
ginger and indigo. These commodities continued to be produced on Barbados throughout the 
seventeenth century, but indigo took on special significance between 1640 and 1642, when it temporarily 
became ‘the most profitable commodity raised in the West Indies’ due to a buoyant market in London 
and Amsterdam.47  
Now that we have established the broad dimensions of Barbadian trade during the 1630s, we can move 
on to reassess Menard’s revisionist thesis regarding the economic development of Barbados in the pre-
 
42 Harlow, Colonising Expeditions, p. 69.   
43 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 94-97.  
44 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/8, ‘The answere of the letter sent to Peter Hay by the ship William of London’, 10 
October 1637.  
45 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/13, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 11 August 1638; NRS, Hay Papers, 
GD34/924/14, Peter Hay to James and Archibald Hay, 11 August 1638; NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/17, Peter 
Hay to James and Archibald Hay, 24 May 1639. 
46 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 96; Batie, ‘Why Sugar’, pp. 11-12. 
47 Batie, ‘Why Sugar’, pp. 14-15.  
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sugar era, which by his reading disproves the ‘sugar revolution’ hypothesis. The two key elements of his 
argument relate to the chronology of the rise of African slavery and plantation agriculture in the colony. 
He contends that ‘sugar did not bring slavery and plantation agriculture to Barbados. The island was in 
the process of becoming a plantation colony and slave society while sugar was still a relatively minor 
crop’.48 If correct, this interpretation would overturn the longstanding scholarly consensus that it was the 
onset of sugar production in the mid-1640s which brought ‘revolutionary’ demographic, economic, social, 
and environmental changes to Barbados. The bulk of the evidence used by Menard in Sweet Negotiations is 
from deeds and mortgages at the Barbados Department of Archives. His conclusions are modified, 
however, if we look at quantitative and qualitative evidence from correspondence, wills, plantation 
inventories, court cases, and records compiled by officials in the port of London.49  
A good place to start is Menard’s argument that African slavery preceded the emergence of a commercial 
sugar industry on Barbados. It is true that Englishmen had been familiar with African slavery since their 
first forays into the Atlantic world during the sixteenth century, and that enslaved Africans were present 
on Barbados before the onset of sugar cultivation.50 Enslaved Africans were among the colonising party 
which first settled Barbados after being captured from a Spanish prize, for instance.51 The earliest 
example of a slave trading venture to Barbados was undertaken by the Guinea Company and dates to 
1641. The next reference to the transatlantic slave trade was made in January 1642, when a correspondent 
on Barbados made a passing comment in a letter about how ‘here are come lately about five hundred 
Negroes and more dayly expected’.52 Because the earliest remarks about slave trading ventures to 
Barbados date to the period 1641-42, before a commercial sugar industry had emerged on the island, it is 
reasonable to suggest that what served as the initial stimulus to the growth of slavery on the island was 
 
48 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 35. 
49 Also important to note is how Menard did not conduct research in all of the relevant deed books at the Barbados 
Department of Archives. He neglected to use a key volume with a lot of evidence for the period from 1655 to 1660 
(RB3/5). His dataset of deeds and mortgages is therefore not a fully representative sample. Larry Gragg, ‘Review of 
Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados by Russell R. Menard’, The South 
Carolina Historical Magazine, Vol. 108, No. 2 (2007), p. 170. 
50 Michael Guasco, Slaves and Englishmen: Human Bondage in the Early Modern Atlantic World (Philadelphia, 2014). 
51 Harlow, Colonising Expeditions, p. 36. 
52 For the 1641 Guinea Company voyage, see BDA, RB3/1, pp. 202-3. For the January 1642 reference, see NRS, 
Hay Papers, GD34/940/1, James Browne to James and Archibald Hay, 17 January 1641/42. 
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the growing demand for labour caused by the diversification in crops being cultivated for export, which 
included indigo, ginger, and sugar. Some of these enslaved Africans must have also cultivated tobacco and 
cotton, which were still the island’s main export crops in the early 1640s.53 However, this does not 
necessarily support Menard’s conclusion that ‘slavery was expanding rapidly on the island before sugar 
became the dominant crop’, and that in 1643 ‘there were already about six thousand slaves on 
Barbados’.54  
Through careful archival research Larry Gragg has shown how, out of 557 labourers recorded in deeds 
and wills at the Barbados Department of Archives from 1627 to 1641, there was only a single enslaved 
African.55 While this solitary labourer surely cannot have been the only enslaved African living on the 
island between these dates, it raises serious doubts about the validity of Menard’s argument that slavery 
underwent rapid expansion on Barbados in the 1630s, with as many as a thousand enslaved Africans 
arriving each year.56 Moreover, it is only after the emergence of a commercial sugar industry in the mid-
1640s that we begin to see comments from first-hand observers about there being a significant population 
of enslaved Africans on Barbados. Take George Downing, for example, who observed in 1645 that 
‘negroes’ were ‘the life of this place’, affirming how black labourers were becoming an increasingly 
important part of the plantation workforce, a trend that would continue over the course of the sugar 
boom.57 We have no comparable observations for the 1630s to support Menard’s claim that enslaved 
Africans were on the island in sizeable numbers then, despite the survival of substantial correspondence 
relating to Barbados for this decade within the Hay of Haystoun Papers, which Menard did not consult. 
While the impetus behind the commencement of the transatlantic slave trade to Barbados was caused by 
a diversification in the production of cash crops in the early 1640s, only one of which was sugar, the 
 
53 For evidence tobacco and cotton were the main export crops in the early 1640s, see Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 
35.  
54 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 30-31.  
55 This stands in marked contrast to the period from 1642-1660, when three-quarters of the 4,204 labourers 
mentioned in deeds and wills were enslaved Africans. Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 119.  
56 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 47, table 10. Menard does not cite primary source evidence to support this claim.  
57 For Indian slavery on Barbados, see Arena, ‘Indian Slaves from Guiana in Seventeenth-Century Barbados’. For 
George Downing’s quote, see Winthrop Papers, Vol. V., p. 43, Sir George Downing to John Winthrop Jr., 26 August 
1645.  
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evidence clearly demonstrates how slave trading ventures to the colony accelerated markedly after a 
commercial sugar industry had emerged in the mid-1640s. The growth of slavery on Barbados, which 
using Menard’s own quantitative evidence we can ascertain with precision occurred between 1644 and 
1649,58 was a direct response to the escalating demand for labour precipitated by the onset of sugar 
production in 1643-45. This is why imports of indentured servants also increased over the same period.59 
Menard is prepared to admit that ‘the quickened pace of change clearly reflects the rise of sugar’, but to 
make his wider argument about the shortcomings of the ‘sugar revolution’ hypothesis work, reads this 
evidence about escalating imports of enslaved Africans backwards to the 1630s without hard evidence to 
support his argument. The quantitative and qualitative evidence we have at our disposal reinforces the 
traditional interpretation of the rise of African slavery on Barbados. By my reading of surviving deeds, 
wills, and correspondence, the population of enslaved Africans on Barbados was small in the 1630s, and 
the transatlantic slave trade to the island only began to expand noticeably in the mid-1640s, after 
commercial sugar production had begun. A more sustained analysis of the involvement of English 
merchants in the transatlantic slave trade to Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s will be undertaken in 
Chapter Three.  
The second part of Menard’s revisionist interpretation of Barbadian economic development in the pre-
sugar era centres on the growth of plantation agriculture in the colony, arguing that land aggregation and 
the consolidation of large plantations was underway on Barbados long before sugar became a staple 
crop.60 What is the evidence, then, that Barbados enjoyed sustained economic success in the 1630s? The 
clearing of land for tobacco cultivation in the 1630s and the process of farm-building certainly facilitated 
the rapid transition to sugar production which began in the mid-1640s.61 Furthermore, as Alison Games 
has correctly noted, there were opportunities for men of small means to attain social advancement on 
Barbados in this era. With land prices on the island low when compared to what they would become 
 
58 See Menard’s table of ‘Barbadian plantations during the export boom’, which shows how the number of slaves per 
estate among all landowners was 1.4 in the years 1644-45, which increased to 4.5 in the years 1646-49. Menard, Sweet 
Negotiations, p. 33. 
59 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 45.  
60 Ibid., p. 27. 
61 Ibid., p. 12. 
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following the advent of sugar production, there were opportunities for former servants to speculate in the 
tobacco industry, generate tidy profits, and accumulate property.62  
But there is strong archival evidence that the Barbadian economy was struggling for most of this decade. 
English merchants displayed a distinct lack of interest in trading to Barbados during the 1630s, principally 
because the island’s main export commodity, tobacco, was deemed to be of very poor quality when 
compared to that produced at Virginia.63 Barbadian planters diversified the crops they produced in 
response to this economic depression. Menard is correct to suggest that the island’s economic revival 
began in the late 1630s and early 1640s, due to successful experiments with cotton, indigo, and ginger. 
This commercial recovery is notable, as land prices on the island increased from £1.30 per acre to £2.30 
BMC per acre between 1640 and 1642. But it would be a stretch to suggest this represented a sustained 
‘economic boom’, and that increasing Barbadian land prices demonstrates how planters on the island 
were prosperous for much of the pre-sugar era.64 Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh’s analysis of plantation 
inventories on Barbados in 1643, just before the sugar boom began in earnest, highlights how household 
furnishings were crude, even among prominent planters such as John Higginbotham and Philip Bell (the 
colony’s governor).65  
As part of the process through which Barbadians diversified their economy in the early 1640s, planters 
also began experimenting with the cultivation of sugar cane. The earliest evidence for commercial sugar 
production on the island dates to 1643.66 In October 1643 a pioneer of sugar cultivation on Barbados, 
James Holdip, travelled to England to petition the King for a grant ensuring that ‘noe other Sugars may 
bee imported into his Maties dominions but such as are made upon the Barbadas’. Moreover, as part of 
the negotiations which saw a 200-acre plantation sold to the merchant Thomas Applewhaite in December 
1644, James Holdip was required to provide ‘so many good sugar canes to plant and upon the bargained 
 
62 Games, ‘Opportunity and Mobility in Early Barbados’, pp. 165-81.  
63 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 53.  
64 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 27. 
65 Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, p. 116.  
66 The first evidence we have for sugar cultivation on Barbados comes from July 1641, when Francis Skeete sold a 
550-acre plantation along with ‘one Ingen for Sugar’. Although whether Skeete was producing sugar for export is 
unclear. See Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 100. 
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premises as shall be expedient and needfull’.67 A sugar monoculture did not develop straight away, and I 
think Menard is therefore right to speak of a ‘diversified export boom’ in the 1640s. However, the 
evidence clearly points towards how the pace of change picks up after the beginnings of sugar production 
in the period 1643-45. Even though sugar cane did not become the main commodity used in property 
transactions on Barbados until 1648-50, and therefore the island’s dominant export, this does not 
necessarily mean that changes on the island in preceding years were not precipitated by sugar and the 
opportunities this new cash crop presented.68 Surely the timing of the social and economic transformation 
of Barbados, which began at precisely the same time as a commercial sugar industry first emerged, cannot 
be a coincidence.  
Before presenting archival evidence to reinforce this argument, it is helpful to quote in full Nicholas 
Foster’s description, written in 1650, of what he experienced as a planter on Barbados in the 1630s and 
1640s. This supports the argument that interest in the colony among English merchants was low for 
much of the 1630s and that the island underwent a ‘diversified export boom’ in the 1640s, but that the 
commodity most important to this economic upturn was sugar: 
Now many years since, this Island was in a very low condition, in regard the Commodities (then 
there produced) were onely Tobaccoes and Cotton-wools, which (by reason of the great 
quantities transported from thence, and other places) was of very small value: Insomuch that 
Merchants began to neglect the supplying of it in so large a manner as formerly they had done, 
which presented it in a declining condition, and small hopes appeared of raising any fortunes 
there for the future, the Inhabitants (being so wearied out with the small profits they reaped of 
their toylsome labours) daily run from the Island in Boats, being very much indebted both to the 
Merchants, and also to one another. The decaying condition of this Island (so plainly appearing) 
some of ingenious spirits set their wits at worke to consider which way the desolation of this 
Plantation might be prevented; which could not possibly be effected without the producing of 
 
67 For Holdip’s journey to England, see NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/939/6, ‘Thomas Robinson at St Christophers to 
Thomas Chappell secretary to James Earl of Carlisle’, 24 October 1643. For the Holdip-Applewhaite land sale, see 
BDA, RB3/1, pp. 536-538. While there is no direct evidence to support such an argument, Eric Otremba argues it is 
probable that Holdip’s connection with both Marmaduke Rawdon and the London merchant community played a 
role in helping him to become an early adopter of commercial sugar production on Barbados. Otremba, ‘Inventing 
Ingenios’, p. 136-138. 
68 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 18.  
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some richer commodities to invite the Merchants to supply them. And considering Sugar was not 
the least of commodities, (finding the sictuation of the place promising that way) resolved to 
make tryall thereof, and accordingly did; and with divers yeeres paines, care, patience and 
industry, with the disbursing of vast summes of money, brought the same to perfection…in few 
yeares there was a considerable number of works erected so that (for these divers years last past) 
there hath been, and is, a very faire Correspondency held with England, New England, Holland, 
Humbrough, and other places, many both Merchants (and others) having thereby raised 
themselves very considerable Fortunes. There being many Millions of Sugars transported from 
thence yearly, and the number of Ships that come yearely to that Island, not lesse than a hundred 
Sayle; the commodities (being not onely Sugar) but also Indico, Ginger, with Cotton-wools, and 
some small quantities of Tobacco.69 
A standard measure of colonial success is whether a colony enjoyed demographic growth and prospered 
by attracting large numbers of merchant vessels to visit its shores. Estimates indicate that the free and 
unfree population of Barbados saw sustained growth in the first decade following English settlement on 
the island, increasing from 1,000 persons in 1630 to 14,000 persons in 1640.70 In 1635, 20 percent of all 
emigrants leaving London for the American plantations travelled to Barbados.71 We can be confident, 
therefore, that the population of Barbados expanded in the pre-sugar era. The next question to ask is 
whether there is enough source material available to allow historians to quantify the volume of trade to 
Barbados between 1630 and 1643. There are no surviving port books which detail imports and exports 
from Barbados itself until the late seventeenth century, but data abstracted from the London port books 
permits an analysis of the number of vessels dispatched from London to the American plantations by 
denizens and ‘aliens’. When compared to the complete absence of extant London port books for the 
1640s and 1650s, the data available for the 1630s enables historians to make better estimates about the 
dimensions of colonial trade with England in this decade. London port books have survived for 1621, 
1626, 1627-28, 1630, 1633, 1634, 1638, and 1640.72 Poring over these volumes is a laborious and time-
 
69 Nicholas Foster, A briefe relation of the late horrid rebellion acted in the island Barbadas, in the West-Indies. Wherein is 
contained their inhumane acts and actions, in fining an banishing the well-affected to the Parliament of England (both men and women) 
without the least cause given them so to doe: Disposessing all such as any way opposed these their mischievous actions (London, 1650), 
pp. 1-3.  
70 McCusker and Menard, ‘The Sugar Industry in the Seventeenth Century’, p. 293 (Table 9.2).  
71 Alison Games, Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), calculated from the 
data in Table 1.1. on p. 21.  
72 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 103, footnote 41.  
Michael D. Bennett 
56 
 
consuming task, however, and during the three-year confines of a PhD project it was only possible to 
complete a detailed analysis of the year 1640. This sample reveals how, in the year between Christmas 
1639 and Christmas 1640, there were 22 vessels dispatched by denizens of London to the American 
plantations. Ten of these ships went to New England, eight to Barbados, four to Virginia, and none to St. 
Christopher.73 There were no ships dispatched from the port of London to any of the American colonies 
by ‘aliens’ over the same period.74 
This shows how, out of all the American plantations, denizens of London displayed a preference of 
trading to New England and Barbados in the year 1640. This would appear to offer some support for 
Menard’s revisionist argument surrounding the dynamism of the Barbadian economy in the early 1640s 
(before the rise of sugar). Unfortunately, we cannot extrapolate any further conclusions from these data, 
because there are no complementary records for the same year specifying how many vessels were 
dispatched to the American plantations by English-born citizens of London. Another issue is that the 
intended destination of a merchant vessel when leaving England, which is recorded in the export port 
books, was not always where the ship ended up. Take the voyage of the Abraham in 1636 as an example. 
As we will see in the next section of this chapter, Matthew Craddock and his co-partners originally 
intended for their vessel to travel to Virginia, but the ship’s charterparty specified that the master could 
also voyage to St. Christopher or Barbados if necessary. The latter destination is precisely where the 
vessel eventually arrived after unforeseen circumstances forced her to return to the Isle of Wight for 
repairs.75 It is therefore entirely possible that those ships where the intended destination was noted as 
Barbados in the port books never actually ended up there, or vice versa.   
We can come to a deeper understanding of the commercial preferences of London’s colonial traders in 
the 1630s by analysing documentation from the customhouse in the port of London. This provides 
quantitative evidence for how London merchants preferred to import tobacco cultivated in colonies other 
 
73 TNA, E 190 44/1, ff. 14, 27-28, 34-36, 51, 52, 61, 63, 68, 73, 74, 77, 79, 81, 88, 109, 142, 168, 170, 187, 195, 202.  
74 TNA, E 190 44/2. 
75 TNA, HCA 30/636. 
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than Barbados from 1637 to 1640, undermining Menard’s argument that the colony was experiencing an 
economic boom based around tobacco exports at this time (see Figure 1.2, below). Out of a total of 
7,179,114 lb. of tobacco imported into London by English merchants between 1637 and 1640, only 
424,454 lb. (just under six percent) of this tobacco was produced on Barbados. By contrast, 
approximately 77 percent of the tobacco was shipped from Virginia, 14 percent from St. Christopher, and 
3 percent from Spain (see Figure 1.2, below). This might explain why in the London port books for 1640 
we see large quantities of ‘Virgenea tobacco’ being re-exported to Rotterdam, Ostend, and Livorno, but 
very little ‘Barbadoes tobacco’.76  
The amount of Barbados tobacco imported to London by English merchants declined over time as well, 
from 124,593 lb. in 1637 to 66,895 lb. in 1640.77 This probably stands as testament to the commercial 
impact of a cross-national treaty agreed between the English and French to prohibit the production of 
tobacco in the Lesser Antilles between May 1639 and the autumn of 1641, which was intended to help 
the price of the leaf recover after a serious depression linked to overproduction.78 It may also reflect 
changing patterns of production on Barbados, because cotton, indigo, and ginger were also being 
cultivated in the colony by the early 1640s. But we must remember that tobacco was the still the most 
important cash crop produced by planters on the island between 1637-40, and as late as 1647 was 
involved in completing 47 percent of financial transactions on the island.79 We can therefore attach 
importance to what the low quantities of Barbados tobacco imported into London suggests about the 
economic health of the island in the late 1630s, namely that it was not undergoing an export boom. 
 
76 The only example of ‘Barbadoes tobacco’ being re-exported in the 1640 port books was by Joseph Hawes to 
Leghorn (Livorno). TNA, E 190 44/1, f. 67.   
77 BL, Add. Ms. 35865, f. 248, ‘Tobaccoes entred in the porte of London in fower yeeres from Lady day 1637’.  
78 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 92.   
79 Menard and McCusker, in Tropical Babylons, p. 292 (Table 9.1); Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, 92. 









This corroborates what qualitative source material from the correspondence of the Hay Proprietors tells 
us about the size of commerce with the island during the 1630s. The inhabitants of Barbados were 
regularly disappointed with the volume of trade being driven to their island from merchants in the City of 
London. For example, in October 1637 Peter Hay wrote to the Carlisle trustees to advise them that he 
had not been able to ‘find anye shiping in this place bound for London’ for some time, and that he could 
not, therefore, send a large consignment of tobacco to England. In a separate letter, Peter Hay informed 
his employers that the island was usually ‘verie scarce of shiping’ for six months of the year, between 
August and January.80 Such statements about the lack of merchant shipping from London visiting 
Barbados in the 1630s were common, which casts considerable doubt over the proposition that the 
colony was undergoing an export boom in this period, especially when London merchants play such a 
pivotal role in Menard’s argument. Even in the early 1640s, when planters on Barbados had diversified 
their economy, and were producing cotton, indigo, and ginger as well as tobacco, there were still grave 
concerns voiced on Barbados about the economic health of their colony. In August 1640 Peter Hay 
 
80 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/7, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 2 October 1637; NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/9, 





Figure 1.2. Weight of  tobacco entered into London 
by Englishmen 1637-40 (lb. tobacco)
Total weight of tobacco: 7,179,114 lb.
Barbados Virginia St Christopher Spanish Colonies
Source: BL, Add. Ms. 35865, f. 248, ‘Tobaccoes entred in the 
porte of London in fower yeeres from Lady day 1637’. 
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reported that a period of drought had caused very little cotton to be produced that year, meaning ‘the 
inhabitants is like to be starved unless that God be more mercifull unto us’.81 If accurate, such comments 
depict a colony in the throes of depression and not one with a thriving economy.  
Why was it that English merchants displayed such a lack of interest in trading to Barbados during the 
1630s, even though we saw in the previous section that it was London merchants who had financed the 
first settlement of the island in the late 1620s? The most compelling explanation is that other colonies in 
the English Atlantic world, such as Virginia and St. Christopher, were more attractive markets for English 
merchants trading to the American plantations in the 1630s. This is because merchants interested in the 
tobacco trade had already developed business ties based upon debt and credit with planters living in these 
older and well-established colonies. It took time for merchants to develop such relationships with 
planters, which were necessary to ensure repeat business and the growth of trade. The process of forming 
these business relationships was slowed on Barbados, because the main export commodity produced on 
the island in the 1630s, tobacco, was regarded as being of exceedingly poor quality.  
Barbados tobacco fetched a low price in European markets and was discriminated against by the English 
state which placed a higher customs duty on it to discourage production. Part of the problem was that the 
environment of Barbados was not favourable for the cultivation of high-grade tobacco. For optimum 
growth, the tobacco plant needs to be constantly surrounded with well-drained soil, but on Barbados the 
soil becomes highly saturated during the rainy season from May to November. Hence the tobacco 
cultivated on Barbados in the seventeenth century was frequently described as being of poor quality by 
anxious planters and disgruntled merchants. It quickly gained a reputation as being a ‘commoditye of noe 
better estimation, nott worthy anythinge, for it is the worst of all tobaccos’.82 This situation was further 
exacerbated by the lack of care taken by Barbados planters in preparing their crop for shipment, which 
John Winthrop noticed as early as 1629 when he described the tobacco sent by his son as ‘verye ill 
 
81 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/23, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 22 August 1640.  
82 For examples of these complaints, see NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/931 IA 335, Daniel Fletcher to Archibald Hay, 
25 June 1640. Such a situation was compounded by the fact that planters sometimes just left their tobacco in rolls, 
and would not present it nicely so that it could maintain its quality over the course of the transatlantic journey. See 
Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 21.  
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conditioned, fowle, full of stalkes and evill coloured’.83 As the data displayed in Figure 1.2 aptly 
demonstrates, the higher-grade tobacco produced in Virginia was a more appealing alternative for 
London merchants already under pressure by metropolitan legislation to control prices by restricting the 
amount of the leaf they could import on an annual basis.84  
Who were the merchants that were trading at Barbados in the pre-sugar era? The scattered evidence we 
have indicates that those London merchants who were active participants in the provisioning and tobacco 
trades to New England, Virginia, St. Christopher, and Providence Island also maintained business 
interests on Barbados during the 1630s. Figures familiar to early American historians such as Maurice 
Thomson, Matthew Craddock, William Pennoyer, Samuel Vassall, Richard Bateson, Edward Wood, and 
Richard Cranley, all chartered trading ventures to Barbados in this decade.85 These merchants do not 
appear to have directly owned plantations on the island during the 1630s, preferring instead to just be 
involved with marketing and not plantation production. Though, as we will see in subsequent chapters, 
this dynamic would change in subsequent decades following the emergence of a sugar industry on 
Barbados. Lesser known London merchants, such as Alexander Lindsay and Edmund Keysar, began a 
trading relationship with Barbados during the 1630s which would be sustained into the 1640s and 1650s.86  
There is little evidence to suggest that merchants operating out of Bristol maintained extensive trading 
connections with Barbados before the transition to sugar. The Bristol port books for 1636-1660 are no 
longer legible due to water damage, but the survival of depositions heard before the mayor and his court 
of aldermen, which mostly relate to maritime affairs, give an indication of the trading patterns of Bristol 
merchants in the late 1630s and early 1640s.87 While there is evidence of several voyages made to Virginia 
and St. Christopher, there are no examples of trading ventures to Barbados before 1643.88 Of course, this 
 
83 Winthrop Papers, Vol. 2., pp. 66-69, John Winthrop to Henry Winthrop, 30 January 1628/29.  
84 For this metropolitan legislation, see CSPC AWI, Vol .1., p. 125, 6 January 1631. 
85 TNA, HCA 24/101, f. 122; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 186-190. 
86 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/28, Peter Hay to James Hay, 16 September 1641. 
87 H. E. Nott, ed., The Deposition Books of Bristol: Vol. I. 1643-1647 (Bristol, 1935); H. E. Nott & Elizabeth Ralph, eds., 
The Deposition Books of Bristol: Vol. II. 1650—1654 (Bristol, 1948); Roger Hayden, ed., The Records of a Church of Christ 
in Bristol, 1640-1687 (Bristol, 1974), p. 8.  
88 Nott, ed., The Deposition Books of Bristol: Vol. 1., pp. 53-54, 63-65; Nott and Ralph, eds, The Deposition Books of Bristol: 
Vol. 2, pp. 187-90. 
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does not mean that such voyages did not happen. We know that the Bristol merchant George Standfast 
was part-owner of a 50-acre indigo plantation on Barbados in 1641.89 But what it does provide is proxy 
evidence to suggest that in the pre-sugar era the amount of trade between Bristol and Barbados was 
smaller than that to St. Christopher and Virginia, mirroring commercial patterns in London.  
One might also expect to see Scottish merchants maintaining a close relationship with Barbados, 
especially considering that it was a Scotsman (the Earl of Carlisle) who possessed the proprietary patent 
to the ‘Caribbee Isles’. But the available evidence instead reveals that the Hay proprietors were more 
closely associated with the London merchant community. They were heavily dependent on London 
merchants to carry their tobacco taken as rent payments from planters back to the metropole. For 
instance, the Scotsman and proprietary agent Peter Hay had shipped 427 rolls of tobacco in the Abraham, 
241 rolls of tobacco in the William and Martha, and 30 bags of cotton on the Revenge for the use of his 
kinsman Archibald Hay in London by the late 1630s.90 All of these ships were owned by London 
merchants. The Hay proprietors also used the business acumen of merchants in London to try to find the 
best market for their tobacco at various ports in northern Europe.91 By 1640, Archibald Hay had become 
part-owner of the Hopewell with a group of London merchants, and together they adventured £1800 to 
outfit the vessel for a voyage to Barbados. The Hopewell returned with a consignment of 50,000 lb. of 
tobacco, and proceeded to undertake several more successful trading missions to the colony.92 The reason 
why the Earl of Carlisle and those managing his proprietorship came to develop such a close relationship 
with London merchants, as opposed to Scottish traders, was because Carlisle had relocated permanently 
 
89 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 136. 
90 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/42, James Hay to Peter Hay, [c. 1637]. 
91 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/10, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 13 April 1638. 
92 Archibald Hay was part-owner of the Hopewell with Mr Jonson, Mr Thomson (probably Maurice Thomson), Mr 
Roberts, and the ship’s captain Mr Tucker. The parcel of tobacco which the vessel returned with was consigned to 
Thomas Chambers, a merchant in Bristol. See NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/3, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 29 
August 1643. For more evidence of the Hay Proprietors engaging in trade with Barbados, see NRS, Hay Papers, 
GD34/924/7, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 29 September 1637; GD34/924/9, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 2 
October 1637; GD34/939/6, Thomas Robinson at St. Christopher to Thomas Chappell the secretary of the Earl of 
Carlisle, 24 October 1643; GD34/943/3, Letter from William Powrey, 19 November 1643; J. H. Bennett, ‘Peter 
Hay, Proprietary Agent in Barbados, 1636-1641’, Jamaican Historical Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1965), pp. 11-12. 
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to London following the accession of James VI to the throne of England in 1603, which enabled him to 
develop an extensive network within the City.  
Transnational trading connections between Barbados and the United Provinces, and especially Holland 
and Zeeland, deserve special attention. Historians have traditionally argued that Dutch merchants played 
an important role in financing the sugar boom on Barbados in the 1640s. But their involvement with the 
colony in the pre-sugar era has not been given much consideration. After the conquest of Pernambuco in 
1630, Dutch traders regularly took the southern route across the Atlantic, resupplied in Brazil, before 
‘cruising’ the waters of the Caribbean, stopping off at various ports in the Lesser Antilles to trade with 
English and French planters. By 1634, their visits to Barbados had become frequent enough that 
Governor Henry Hawley introduced new legislation ordering that ‘all Dutch, French, and other strange 
Ships’ that traded at Barbados would be required to pay a £1 BMC anchorage fee and a customs duty of 
six percent.93 Such attempts to monitor, control, and tax transnational trade in the 1630s proved 
ineffective, however, as Dutch merchants could easily evade the authorities by trading at the smaller bays 
and inlets of the island.94 Evidence compiled by Yda Schreuder from notarial protocols at the Amsterdam 
Municipal Archives shows how there were 24 Dutch vessels recorded as having traded at Barbados 
between 1633 and 1639.95 It is highly likely there were many more Dutch traders who made ad hoc and 
illicit visits to Barbados in the 1630s. 
When it came to localised exchanges that did not involve extensions of long credit, planters living on 
Barbados and in other English colonies often preferred doing business with Dutch traders. Merchants 
from the United Provinces had a reputation for selling their wares at cheaper rates and offering lower 
freight charges than their English counterparts. When a disgruntled Peter Hay heard that the tobacco he 
had sent to Europe on his own account had produced very little profit, he mused that it would make 
 
93 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 38-39; Koot, Empire at the Periphery, p. 14; Klooster, The Dutch Moment, pp. 164-
166. 
94 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/4, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 10 February 1637/38.  
95 Yda Schreuder, ‘Evidence from the Notarial Protocols in the Amsterdam Municipal Archives about Trade 
Relationships between Amsterdam and Barbados in the Seventeenth Century’, Journal of the Barbados Museum and 
Historical Society, Vol. 52 (2006), pp. 73-74.   
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more financial sense to exchange goods directly with Dutch merchants visiting Barbados. That way he 
could receive manufactured goods immediately and at cheaper rates, not have to pay fees to freight his 
tobacco to Europe, and most importantly, it would enable him to set a price for his tobacco that was not 
determined by an unpredictable market in Europe.96  
Like many Barbados planters, Peter Hay turned to Dutch traders when English merchant shipping was 
unavailable. In August 1638 he struck a deal with the master of a Dutch ship named the Waterdog to 
freight 42,000 lb. of tobacco to Amsterdam. Specific instructions were given for the vessel to proceed 
direct to Hamburg if the market for tobacco at Amsterdam proved unsatisfactory. The futile litigation 
which followed when the vessel did not venture to Hamburg as instructed demonstrates that, unless they 
travelled back to Europe with their merchandise, planters had little power over the market in which their 
goods were to be sold. Peter Hay explained that his reason for ‘shipping of theis goods upon this dutch 
ship was because I could not have any English shipping heare when I made my bargayne and 
convenants…and alsoe because I heare that tobacco was worth no money in England’. While at 
Barbados, the vessel masqueraded as the ‘Waterdog of Southampton’, probably as part of an attempt to 
avoid paying the anchorage fee and custom duty levied on foreign merchants by the colonial authorities.97 
Such fraudulent practices, which we must presume were quite common, makes it extremely difficult for 
historians to be able to compare levels of Dutch trade at Barbados with that of English trade during the 
1630s. All that the available evidence enables us to conclude is that Dutch traders were a familiar sight in 
the waters around Barbados from 1630 and 1643, and that they were often involved in localised 
exchanges with English planters.  
We can say with some confidence, though, that Dutch traders and markets were of more significance to 
the economy of Barbados in the 1630s than during the sugar boom a decade later. At a time when 
English merchant vessels were not frequent visitors to Barbados, preferring instead to trade elsewhere in 
 
96 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/10, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 13 April 1638. See also Koot, Empire at the 
Periphery, pp. 36-37. 
97 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/14, Bill of lading of the Watterdog of Southampton, 5 August 1638; GD34/923/15, 
Peter Hay to James Hay, 3 August 1638; GD34/922/8, Letter to the Governor and Council of Barbados, 27 May 
1639; Bennett, ‘Peter Hay, Proprietary Agent’, p. 15.  
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the English Atlantic world, Dutch traders selling manufactured goods and provisions at cheap rates 
offered a much-needed lifeline to planters on the island struggling to find a viable export crop. The heavy 
customs duties imposed upon tobacco imports into England, and the poor price Barbados tobacco could 
command in London, also meant that markets in the Low Countries such as Middelburg, Amsterdam, 
and Rotterdam played an important role for Barbadian planters during the 1630s, primarily because these 
ports offered more favourable conditions for selling their tobacco. This commercial dynamic would 
change by the mid-1640s, however, as English merchants began to invest heavily in the Barbados sugar 
industry, escalate their involvement in the transatlantic slave trade, and extend large amounts of credit to 
Barbados planters.98 I do not mean to imply that Dutch trade to Barbados was greater in volume in the 
1630s than during the sugar boom, which statistics show was clearly not the case (even after the passage 
of the Navigation Act in 1651), just that it was of greater significance to Barbadian planters in this decade 
relative to English shipping.  
This section has explored merchant involvement with Barbados in the 1630s and early 1640s, and in the 
process has re-evaluated the historiographical debate on the economic development of Barbados in the 
pre-sugar era. By studying mercantile activity on Barbados between 1630-43, it is evident that for most of 
this period England’s overseas traders were more interested in tobacco produced in Virginia than 
Barbados. This was because English merchants had already established business ties with planters at this 
colony, and also because Barbados tobacco was an inferior product that fetched lower prices and was 
subject to higher customs duties in English ports. It has been argued, therefore, that Dutch merchants 
and markets in the Low Countries were of increased significance to the economy of Barbados in the pre-
sugar era. To explore this view further, the final section of this chapter will analyse the accounts and letter 
books of the Abraham to recreate a single merchant voyage to Barbados in 1636-37. 
 
 
98 These developments will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  
Michael D. Bennett 
65 
 
3. Matthew Craddock and the 1636-7 voyage of the Abraham  
Deposited within the High Court of Admiralty records at the British National Archives are a series of 
accounts and letter books which relate to the voyage of the Abraham from London to Barbados in 1636-
37. As far as I am aware, this constitutes the only extant example of a set of merchant accounts relating to 
Barbados before Richard Poor’s ledger from the early eighteenth century (1699-1713), and as such this set 
of sources provides an unprecedented level of detail about trade to Barbados in the early period of the 
colony’s settlement.99 The documents were preserved because the chief factor of the ship, Thomas 
Anthony, fell ill and died soon after the conclusion of the voyage, and his heirs subsequently sued the 
owners of the Abraham for unpaid wages. Few historians have studied these documents. Kenneth 
Andrews has developed a case study around Thomas Anthony as part of his inquiry into seafaring in the 
reign of Charles I, and more recently L. H. Roper has used the voyage of the Abraham as an example of a 
typical provision voyage to the American plantations.100 But until now no historian of the Caribbean has 
analysed these accounts and letters in detail, nor considered what they can tell us about trade with 
Barbados during the 1630s.101  
Planning for the voyage of the Abraham began in March 1636, when Thomas Anthony agreed to serve as 
the factor for Matthew Craddock and Company in a journey ‘for Vergenye or any other where for 50 
shillings the month’. Matthew Craddock was both the chief owner and chief freighter of the Abraham in 
this venture, owning a quarter share in the vessel.102 Craddock’s involvement in overseas trade began in 
1616, when he was apprenticed to the cloth trader Sir William Cokayne in the Skinners’ Company. 
Cokayne was a prominent London merchant, who served as governor of the Eastland Company, director 
 
99 S. D. Smith, ‘The Account Book of Richard Poor, Quaker Merchant of Barbados’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 
Vol. 66, No. 3 (2009), pp. 605-628. 
100 Andrews, Ships, Money, and Politics, ch. 4; Roper, Advancing Empire, pp. 37-41. 
101 The Abraham account books have not been cited by other historians interested in the economic history of the 
early Barbados, such as Russell Menard and Larry Gragg. 
102 For information on the shares owned by different merchants in the Abraham, see HCA 30/636/5/4; Andrews, 
Ships, Money, and Politics, pp. 90-92.  
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of the East India Company (1606-09), and Lord Mayor of London (1617-20).103 By the time of his 
freedom Craddock was a participant in the cloth trade to the Baltic under the auspices of the Eastland 
Company and the Russia Company, and had developed commercial connections in France, Spain, and the 
Levant. In the late 1620s he owned £2000 of stock in the East India Company. Craddock’s Puritan 
religious background appears to have been the catalyst for his becoming involved in transatlantic trade. In 
March 1629 he was listed as a founding member of the newly incorporated Massachusetts Bay Company, 
and shortly thereafter was elected the company’s first governor. Craddock played an important role in the 
early history of New England: it was he who first proposed that the freemen move permanently to North 
America and take the company’s charter with them. Craddock remained in London but would continue to 
support his Puritan brethren in the Massachusetts colony by regularly dispatching servants and 
provisions, and he also owned a large plantation on the Mystic River as an absentee proprietor. Over the 
course of the 1630s he emerged as a leading figure in the tobacco trade to Virginia, St. Christopher, and 
Barbados. Craddock’s business career demonstrates that those involved in Barbadian trade had 
commercial interests beyond the Caribbean, in areas as diverse as the North Sea, the North American 
colonies, the East Indies, and the Mediterranean.104 
As was common in English merchant shipping during the seventeenth century, Craddock was co-owner 
of the Abraham alongside seven other business partners in the City of London. Venturing capital in 
conjunction with other merchants and sailors minimised the risk to personal wealth if something should 
go awry during the journey. Together William Pennoyer and one ‘Cokayne’ owned a quarter share in the 
ship. Pennoyer, a close business associate of Craddock, was another leading figure in colonial trade during 
the 1630s. He was heavily involved in the re-export of American tobacco from England to markets in the 
eastern Mediterranean. Pennoyer will become an important figure in this dissertation, as he was a major 
investor in the Barbados sugar industry during the 1640s. It is probable that ‘Mr Cokayne’ was William 
 
103 Vivienne Aldous, ‘Cokayne, Sir William (1559/60–1626), merchant’, ODNB (23 September 2004), 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-5824 
(Accessed 8 November 2019). 
104 Troy O. Bickham, ‘Cradock, Matthew (c. 1590–1641), merchant and colonial investor’, ODNB (23 September 
2004), https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-
6562 (Accessed 8 November 2019); Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 137-40; TNA, PROB 11/171/450, ‘Will of 
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Cokayne, a relation of Craddock’s former master who was mentioned in Craddock’s will. Edward 
Meredith, Thomas Colthurst, and Thomas Stegge each possessed an eighth share in the Abraham. 
Throughout the 1630s Thomas Stegge played a prominent role in the tobacco trade as the Virginia factor 
for both Matthew Craddock and the ubiquitous London merchant Maurice Thomson. Grace Hardwyn 
and Andrew Hardy, the ship’s master, both owned sixteenth shares in the Abraham.105 
In April 1636 the Abraham was docked in London, and Andrew Hardy was preparing the vessel for its 
voyage. Their intended destination was at present undecided, but there was talk of dispatching the vessel 
to Virginia or New England. Hardy’s account book shows that while at London and Gravesend he was 
busy disbursing money towards refitting the vessel and hiring carpenters to make necessary repairs.106 A 
ledger of ‘the Cargazoone or goods shipt in the Abraham at London’ reveals that an array of 
manufactured goods and foodstuffs were laden aboard the vessel for sale in the American plantations. 
Clothes of varying material and quality, shoes, ribbon, rugs, oatmeal, butter, flour, currants, ginger, sugar, 
nutmeg, pepper, salt, vinegar, liquor, claret wine, nails, pewter dishes, chamber pots, lead, candlesticks, 
axes, hatchets, hoes, pistols, and ammunition were just some of the items put aboard the ship.107 
Preparations in London took four months, and it was not until late August that the Abraham arrived in 
Kinsale harbour to pick up servants and extra provisions for the transatlantic journey. In the seventeenth 
century Kinsale was a bustling port town in southeast Ireland and a focal point of English efforts to 
expand their plantation in the province of Munster. Its convenient location meant that the town was a 
regular stopping point for vessels making their final preparations for a voyage across the Atlantic, and it 
became a site regularly exploited by merchants looking to procure indentured servants. Getting people to 
sign indentures took time and energy, and so Matthew Craddock had sent his factor Thomas Anthony to 
Kinsale earlier in the year to work towards gathering servants, commodities, and provisions for the 
Abraham.108 Anthony wrote to Craddock in early August of 1636 to explain how he had ‘mad[e] divers of 
 
105 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 137-39; TNA, PROB 11/171/450, ‘Will of Matthew Cradocke or Cradock 
of Caverswall, Staffordshire’. 
106 TNA, HCA 30/636/3. 
107 TNA, HCA 30/636/5/2, ‘A note of the Cargazoone or goods shipt in the Abraham at London’. 
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Michael D. Bennett 
68 
 
servants acquented with our voiadg’, and was advertising the intended voyage and the pressing need for 
servants in nearby towns such as Bandon, Cork, and Youghal. Unfortunately for Craddock, Anthony 
suffered numerous setbacks which hindered his ability to procure servants. A Dutch ship had stopped off 
at Kinsale earlier in the year and had assembled a large contingent of between 120 and 140 servants to be 
taken to St. Christopher. Moreover, reports that servants at St. Christopher would be accorded a generous 
wage meant that ‘every one mans mind in thes place is bent that waye’, hindering Anthony’s attempts to 
encourage people to sign an indenture taking them elsewhere. This was incorrect information, and 
Craddock quickly set the record straight in a curt reply to Anthony. But the lie about wages for servants 
living on St. Christopher had proved persuasive in the environs of Kinsale, and stands as a testament to 
the deceptive acts performed by merchants to get impressionable young men and women to sign 
indentures. Indeed, it seems that Anthony also resorted to coercion and other questionable methods 
when procuring servants for Craddock, as there are entries in his account book relating to expenses 
incurred for plying prospective servants with alcohol and recapturing runaways.109  
In July 1636 Craddock had written to Thomas Anthony in Kinsale explaining that the owners were 
resolved to dispatch the Abraham to Virginia, partly because of the extensive business connections that 
Thomas Stegge, one of the co-owners of the vessel, maintained there. Stegge had already set sail for 
Virginia earlier in the year and was primed to receive the servants sent over on the Abraham.110 The 
superior quality of Virginia tobacco, and the lower customs it incurred upon arrival in the port of London 
when compared to that of St. Christopher and Barbados, probably also played a part in Craddock’s 
decision to specify Virginia as his first choice destination. The fact that the owners of the Abraham 
displayed a clear preference to trade to Virginia over Barbados supports the argument made in the 
previous section that London merchants were not particularly interested in Barbadian commerce until 
after the expansion of the island’s sugar industry in the mid-1640s.  
 
109 TNA, HCA 30/636/5/6; HCA 30/636/5/7; HCA 30/636/5/8. For more on coercive ‘spiriting’ practices, see 
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On 7 November 1636 the Abraham departed Kinsale, and was bound for Virginia with 56 servants and a 
variety of commodities expected to turn a profit in America. After sailing 276 miles, or roughly one-tenth 
of the way to Virginia, the vessel was ‘mett with contrary winds and foull weathers and a very leeke 
shippe’. This misfortune forced the master of the Abraham to turn back and put in at Cowes harbour on 
the Isle of Wight for repairs, where the vessel arrived on 22 November and remained for over a month. 
Given the significant delays which the expedition had suffered, the London merchants who owned the 
vessel thought it too late in the year to travel to Virginia and find a good market. Thomas Anthony 
himself later admitted how ‘we weare desirous to have gonn for Virginea’, but that ‘we douted in making 
our voiadge by the resson that ther have bine so many ships laden from thence and dout full that wee 
suld not procure our lading but in longe time’.111 New instructions were given to ‘goe for St Christophers 
or the Barbados’, and to that end Craddock and his co-partners provided ‘letters of assistance in eather 
place’. After a long voyage, which lasted just over a month, the Abraham reached Carlisle Bay on the 
southwest coast of Barbados on 25 January 1637.  
The first thing Thomas Anthony did upon the arrival of the Abraham at Barbados was to get in touch 
with the business contacts of his merchant employers, who it was hoped would assist them in selling their 
commodities. Copies of William Pennoyer’s letters of introduction to two of his contacts on Barbados, 
George Bowyer and Thomas Ball, have survived, and highlight the importance of reputation and trust in 
facilitating long distance trade in the seventeenth century. In a letter to Thomas Ball, one of his factors on 
Barbados, Pennoyer declared that ‘thes shippe belongeth to me and Frinds of myne merchants of 
London, and therefore I dow in treat you to asiste the merchant & mr the best you cann to put of thear 
passingers and comoditys for such Comodityes is fit to be had’.112 Pennoyer’s reputation as a wealthy and 
powerful merchant in the City of London, who possessed many connections in the American plantations, 
meant that his letter of recommendation carried great weight on Barbados.113 Indeed, Thomas Anthony 
 
111 TNA, HCA 30/636/6 Book E, Thomas Anthony to Matthew Craddock, 13 February 1636/37. 
112 TNA, HCA 30/636/6 Book E, William Pennoyer to Thomas Ball, 26 November 1636. In the deed records at the 
Barbados Department of Archives, Thomas Ball is described as a ‘Barbados merchant’ of St. Lucy parish. BDA, RB 
3/7, p. 174. 
113 On the importance of reputation to credit relationships in the early modern economy, see Muldrew, Economy of 
Obligation. 
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would later inform Craddock that he had ‘delivered Mr Wm Pennoyers lettar to Capt George Boyear 
according to direction’, and that Bowyer ‘duth assest us, and will be a great helpe for that he is a justis of 
this part’. With the help of Pennoyer’s contacts on Barbados, who held public office in the colony and 
were therefore of high standing, Thomas Anthony and the rest of the Abraham’s crew began to unload 
their goods at a storehouse ‘neer unto the Indian Bridge’, in the centre of modern-day Bridgetown.114  
Three days after their arrival on Barbados, James Hooke (who like Thomas Anthony was also a factor on 
the Abraham), put the indentured servants procured in Kinsale up for auction.115 Servants were the most 
valuable commodities shipped on the Abraham, and also those most coveted on Barbados, and it is 
therefore unsurprising that the factors prioritised the sale of their human cargo. The most powerful 
members of Barbadian society were given first choice. On 28 January 1637, Governor Hawley, President 
Pierce, Edward Cranfield, and Francis Skeet purchased most of the male servants, who were generally 
favoured over their female counterparts because of their superior strength and endurance which was 
useful when performing plantation work. Due to his position of power and high standing within the 
colony, Governor Hawley was given preferential treatment, paying only 450 lb. of tobacco per servant, 
which was less than the going rate of 500 lb. paid by everybody else. It was well known that Hawley used 
his political influence to accumulate property for himself in the colony, and in 1640 was reported to be 
heavily indebted because he had ‘ingaged himself for plantations and other goods and servants unto 
merchants’.116 The remaining servants shipped on the Abraham, most of whom were women, were 
bought-up by planters the following day. The 56 servants shipped from Kinsale had all been sold within 




114 TNA, HCA 30/636/6 Book E, Thomas Anthony to Matthew Craddock, 13 February 1636/37. 
115 TNA, HCA 30/636/6 Book C, ‘A Journall taken by me J: H: [James Hooke] of all my dealings in merchandize at 
Barbados’. 
116 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/24, Peter Hay to Archibald and James Hay, 29 September 1640. 
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Table 1.2. [Redacted] 
      
     
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
     
 
Over the next four months, from the end of January to the end of May 1637, Thomas Anthony and 
James Hooke sold the merchandise brought over on the Abraham to the inhabitants of Barbados from 
their waterfront storehouse near the Indian Bridge. While most of the goods shipped from London and 
Kinsale had arrived at Barbados safely, some of the oatmeal, wine, and liquor were spoiled due to the 
inclement weather endured during the transatlantic journey.117 Their double entry account books, which 
like most ledgers kept by traders in early modern England were just a simple list of purchases and sales, 
reveal that merchandise was sold to 180 different people on Barbados, generating a total of 71,181 lb. of 
tobacco. Out of this total, 47,196 lb. (65%) was paid upfront in ready goods, while 24,986 lb. (35%) 
remained owing to the merchants as debts (Table A1, Appendix 1).118 These figures demonstrate how 
credit was an important part of business transactions on Barbados, even before the transition to a sugar 
 
117 TNA, HCA 30/636/6 Book E, Thomas Anthony to Matthew Craddock, 13 February 1636/37. 
118 TNA, HCA 30/636/2, ‘Abraham Barbados Accounts’; HCA 30/636/4, ‘Ledger for Shippe Abraham’. On 
double entry account books in early modern England more broadly, see Muldrew, Economy of Obligation, p. 61.  
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production began and credit took on even greater significance due to the capital-intensive nature of this 
process. All the goods from the Abraham were sold in exchange for tobacco, which appears to have been 
Craddock and his factors’ preferred commodity. Thomas Anthony reported that ‘sundry men would 
willingly put of ther cotton wools wheareof is great plenty in thes Iland’, but he seems to have only 
accepted tobacco as a form of payment.119 James Hooke’s receipt books disclose how varying quantities 
of tobacco were laden aboard the Abraham at regular increments over the course of several months (Table 
A2, Appendix 1). This was probably due to the limited capacity of their storehouse, but may also have 
been intended to prevent spoilage and theft.120  
In late May 1637 preparations were underway for the return voyage of the Abraham. Decisions were being 
made about which of the commodities that remained unsold should be left on Barbados with James 
Hooke, and which should be transported back to Europe with Thomas Anthony.121 On 2 June a 
charterparty was signed authorising the vessel to transport its cargo of tobacco from Barbados to either 
London, Middelburg, or Hamburg. Asymmetric flows of business information between England and the 
American plantations meant that it was common in the seventeenth century for merchant vessels to wait 
until they were closer to Europe before deciding which market they would sell their goods in. This 
decision-making process was reflected in open-ended charterparties, such as that drawn up for the 
Abraham. Ports in continental Europe, such as Hamburg, Middelburg, Amsterdam, and Genoa, were 
important locations for merchants offloading tobacco and cotton from Barbados in the 1630s due to 
lower customs duties and the superior rates merchants there offered for these commodities when 
compared to the price they could command in England. 
Along with the tobacco generated from the sale of servants and commodities for Matthew Craddock and 
Company, 12 Barbados planters were given permission to freight their own tobacco on the Abraham, for 
which they paid a rate of 2.5 pence per lb. of tobacco, generating Craddock and his co-partners a further 
 
119 TNA, HCA 30/636/6 Book E, Thomas Anthony to Matthew Craddock, 13 February 1636/37. 
120 TNA, HCA 30/636/6 Book A, ‘James Hooke's receipt book of tobacco received into the store house [in 
Barbados]’. 
121 TNA, HCA 30/636/2, ‘Abraham Barbados Accounts’. 
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£578. The largest consignment belonged to Peter Hay, the receiver of the rents on Barbados for the Earl 
of Carlisle, who freighted 25,938 lb. Other planters, including John Brookehaven, Robert Moore, and 
Henry Hammon also shipped their own tobacco on Craddock’s vessel (see Table A3, Appendix 1).122 
Nine people took passage to Europe on the Abraham, most of whom were planters travelling with the 
tobacco they had freighted on the vessel. Robert Moore even journeyed with his wife and two young 
children. Permitting Barbados planters to travel on the vessel back to Europe raised £28 for Craddock 
and his business partners.123  
After receiving directions from Craddock to sell his tobacco in the Low Countries, the Abraham arrived in 
Middelburg on 29 July 1637. Prospects for finding a good market for Barbados tobacco in Europe were 
poor in the late 1630s. As has been mentioned in the previous section, the low prices fetched by tobacco 
entered into the port of London, along with high duties, often drove English merchants such as 
Craddock to look to the continent for a better market. Jeremy William Ashman, Craddock’s factor in 
Middelburg, was there to welcome the Abraham upon her arrival. Unfortunately for the owners of the 
Abraham, the price of tobacco in Middelburg fell steeply over the space of three weeks, from 13 stuivers 
per pound of tobacco to just 6 stuivers, after their inferior Barbados tobacco flooded the market.124 Such 
were the uncertainties of the seventeenth-century marketplace. Craddock subsequently decided to store 
his tobacco at a warehouse in Amsterdam until the market improved, as it looked like the revenue 
generated from its sale would not even cover customs and freight charges. The voyage of the Abraham to 
Barbados had been a losing venture, and as Kenneth Andrews aptly states, exemplified ‘the hazards of the 
early plantations trade, a rough and risky free-for-all, with few winners and many losers’.125  
 
122 TNA, HCA 30/636/5/3, ‘Mr Ashmans Account for ship Abrahams fraight in Middelboro’. Things get 
complicated when the Abraham reaches Middelburg, as there were different methods of weighing and measuring 
tobacco in London and Amsterdam, resulting in two different weights being given in the sources. For the purposes 
of clarity, only the English weight is being referenced here.  
123 TNA, HCA 30/636/2, ‘Abraham Barbados Accounts’. 
124 TNA, HCA 30/636/6 Book E, Thomas Anthony to Matthew Craddock, 31 July 1637, 4 August 1637, 11 August 
1637, 18 August 1637 & Matthew Craddock to Thomas Anthony, 4 August 1637; HCA 30/636/6 Book G; HCA 
30/636/5/3, ‘Mr Ashmans Account for ship Abrahams fraight in Middelro August 1637’; HCA 30/636/5/4; HCA 
30/636/2, ‘Abraham Barbados Accounts’. 
125 Andrews, Ships, Money, and Politics, p. 104. 




This chapter has explored mercantile activity on Barbados between 1627 and 1643. In doing so, it has 
introduced several themes and topics which will be explored in greater detail in subsequent chapters, and 
has challenged Menard’s revisionist argument about the dynamism of the Barbadian economy in the 
1630s. Two syndicates of London merchants, led by Sir William Courteen and Marmaduke Rawdon, were 
involved in the colonisation of Barbados between 1627 and 1630. But over the course of the next decade, 
the available evidence suggests that English merchants did not sustain this initial interest. During the 
1630s, English merchants were not nearly as deeply involved with the colony as they would become 
following the expansion of the sugar industry. This was because English merchants preferred to trade to 
Virginia, where they had already established networks of credit with planters and could receive better 
quality tobacco. Dutch traders and markets were therefore of increased significance to the economy of 
Barbados in the period from 1630-43 than in subsequent decades. They were a more regular presence in 
the waters of the eastern Caribbean due to their ‘cruising’ ventures launched from Brazil, and often made 
ad hoc visits to Barbados. Equally important was the fact that markets in the Low Countries offered a 
superior price for tobacco than those in England, and so merchants and planters preferred to sell their 
low-grade Barbados tobacco there.  
These findings cast doubt over Menard’s assertion that the colony was undergoing an export boom as 
early as the 1630s. There is almost no evidence to suggest that there was marked economic expansion and 
large numbers of enslaved Africans on Barbados before 1641-43. It is true that by the early 1640s planters 
on Barbados were cultivating a wider range of commodities for export to Europe, including cotton, 
indigo, ginger, and sugar. While this certainly represented a diversification in agricultural production and 
is a testament to the remarkable ability of Barbados planters to innovate, it does not in itself provide 
support for Menard’s conclusion that Barbados was undergoing an export boom.  
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The available evidence suggests instead that such efforts towards diversification were a direct result of the 
stagnating (or possibly even declining) economic health of the colony between 1630 and 1641, and 
desperation on the part of planters to find a profitable export commodity that would drive increased 
merchant traffic to their shores. Moreover, it was the sugar industry which precipitated the rapid 
commercial upturn and the growth of African slavery seen on the island from 1643 onwards. The 
evidence of merchant involvement with Barbados suggests that it might be better, therefore, to temper 
some of the conclusions drawn by revisionists in the last thirty years about the health of the Barbadian 
economy. There certainly were opportunities for time-expired indentured servants to attain social 
advancement and for planters to steadily expand their plantations by aggregating land, but it would be an 
overstatement to suggest that this was the consequence of an economic boom and not just the process of 
colonial development at a modest scale.
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Chapter Two. London Merchants, the English Civil War, and the 
Financing of the Barbados Sugar Boom, 1643-1660 
During the debates over the Navigation Act in the 1650s, one tract justified the mercantilist policies 
supported by London merchants by claiming that the English islands in the Caribbean ‘were planted and 
grown upp to this degree of prosperitie, by the exceeding charge and expence of the English Merchants 
and Adventurers’. Although the anonymous authors recognised and valued the contributions of planters, 
especially ‘their Ingenuitye and their Industrie [in] the settling of Plantacons’, they remained adamant that 
these sugar-producing colonies would not have reached their current levels of prosperity ‘if the merchants 
had not sowed it (as it were) with their Gold’.1 Russell Menard has presented compelling evidence from 
the deed books at the Barbados Department of Archives to support this interpretation. He has argued it 
was English merchants, as opposed to Dutch traders, who were most significant in extending credit and 
supplying enslaved Africans to planters on Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century. As Menard notes, 
the transition to sugar would have been much slower and less forceful on Barbados if it had not been for 
the heavy involvement of English merchants based in the City of London.2  
Seeing as the broad question of who financed the sugar boom has been answered satisfactorily by Menard, 
the first section of this chapter will explore in greater detail where the capital which they invested 
originated. By tracing the careers of these merchants, and placing their Caribbean investments into 
broader context, it will be argued that the capital used to finance the expansion of sugar and slavery on 
Barbados came from many different domestic and overseas sources, and thus had global origins. This 
challenges Robert Brenner’s argument that ‘to supply the unprecedented capital requirements for 
founding [sugar] plantations, the merchants relied on the wealth they had already accumulated in 
American enterprise’.3  
 
1 BL, Add. Ms. 11411, ff. 3-5, ‘The state of the difference as it is pressed between the merchants and the planters in 
relation to free trade att the Charibee Islands. And the meanes of reconciliation and general satisfaction proposed’, 
n.d. [1655-1658]. 
2 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 49-61.  
3 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 162.  
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The second section of this chapter will investigate why London merchants chose to invest so heavily in the 
economy of Barbados during the 1640s. New insights into the Barbados sugar boom can be gained by 
exploring the historiography of early modern England. Most merchants in the City of London who 
invested in Caribbean plantation economies in the mid-seventeenth century never themselves visited the 
American colonies. Historians have not placed enough emphasis, therefore, on how their business 
preferences were influenced by events occurring in England itself. They have developed an American-
focused explanation for why merchants invested in Barbados, which has failed to consider how the 
transformative events occurring in England during the 1640s shaped the financial decisions taken by 
merchants. London merchants diversified their business portfolios in response to the political and 
economic uncertainty generated by the Civil War. Barbados, which was undergoing a commercial boom 
following the collapse of the Brazilian sugar industry, is one of the places where merchants secured their 
capital in the 1640s. There were impressive profits to be made from speculating in sugar production and 
owning enslaved Africans, and Barbados was also a safe location to invest capital. This was partly due to 
inherent geographical and environmental features which protected the island from some of the usual risks 
to colonial enterprise. But most important, it will be argued, was the fact that the colony’s government 
articulated a policy of neutrality in the Civil War.  
 
1. Where did the merchant capital invested in the Barbados sugar industry 
during the 1640s originate? 
Those who intended to venture in the Barbados sugar economy required adequate funding to begin 
operations. Constructing sugar refineries on newly-bought plantations was a capital-intensive procedure. 
Entrepreneurs keen to speculate in the seventeenth-century sugar industry were faced with a series of 
large initial expenditures. Besides purchasing a plantation, prospective planters also had to fund the 
construction of a mill, boiling house, still house, and curing house. An assortment of agricultural tools 
and equipment needed for the processing of sugar cane also had to be bought. New plantation owners 
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were required to obtain handsaws, hoes, rollers for the mill, cisterns, ladles, skimmers, copper stills, 
cooling basins, and a multitude of earthenware pots. One of the most expensive costs for start-up sugar 
planters was procuring servants or enslaved Africans. The extraordinary demand for labour amplified the 
purchase price of skilled and unskilled workers. On top of the high entry costs to begin growing and 
processing sugar, planters were also obliged to have a large pool of liquid capital to cover the annual 
expenses of maintaining a sugar plantation in the tropics. Replacing dead or lame indentured servants, 
enslaved Africans, and livestock made the largest dent into a planter’s annual income. Then there were 
maintenance costs associated with purchasing fuel for the furnaces, fixing broken machinery, and 
repairing damaged tools (for a brief description of the operation of the Barbados sugar industry in the 
seventeenth century, see Appendix 3).4  
Given the high capital outlay required to initiate sugar production, the question of who financed the 
Barbados sugar boom, and where the capital they invested originated, is an important topic. Larry Gragg 
has analysed some of the English merchants who financed the development of sugar production on 
Barbados during the 1640s and 1650s by dividing them by place of origin. This has highlighted how 
merchants who operated from towns with a strong maritime heritage, such as London, Bristol, and 
Boston (New England), all contributed to the transition to a sugar economy on Barbados.5 Here, though, 
I will take a slightly different approach and divide these English merchants into different categories 
according to their trading activities in the 1630s and early 1640s (before they speculated in Barbados 
sugar). These divisions are somewhat artificial, because some of the merchants discussed held investments 
in a variety of different overseas enterprises in this decade. But studying merchant careers is still helpful, 
as it is suggestive of where the capital that merchants invested in the sugar boom originated. 
A database of all 254 of the English merchants who are known to have been involved with the Barbadian 
economy between 1640 and 1660 has been created (see Table A4, Appendix 2). In the database there are 
five measures of how a merchant could be ‘involved’ with Barbados: owning a plantation on the island, 
 
4 Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 264-266; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 104-105. 
5 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, ch. 7.  
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participating in the servant trade, participating in the transatlantic slave trade, participating in the 
provisioning trade, and petitioning the English government as a ‘Barbados merchant’. There are 23 
merchants for whom there is documentary evidence that they partook in three or more of these 
activities.6 They have therefore been identified as the most important merchant investors in the sugar 
boom, and it is the careers of these merchants which I will now investigate. 
These 23 merchant financiers of the Barbados sugar boom can be divided into six clusters. First, are the 
merchants who were previously involved in American trade, including Maurice Thomson, William 
Pennoyer, Michael Davison (Pennoyer’s former apprentice), Richard Batson, Thomas Frere, and George 
Pasfield. These men had already developed business ties with tobacco and cotton planters on Barbados, 
making their investments in the island’s sugar industry a natural progression.7 Not all the merchants 
involved in the tobacco and cotton trade to Barbados came to invest in sugar production, however. There 
is no surviving evidence, for instance, that Joseph Hawes, a merchant who owned 94 percent of the 
64,000 lb. of Barbados tobacco imported into London in 1638, had any involvement in the sugar boom.8 
Nor is there any indication that the merchant syndicate who were granted the massive 10,000-acre 
plantation on Barbados in 1630 by the Earl of Carlisle speculated in sugar a decade later.  
Second, are the merchants who had been involved in West African trade, in some cases under the 
auspices of the Guinea Company, and who were mostly interested in Barbados as a market for selling 
enslaved Africans. This group comprised of John Wood, Thomas Parris, and Samuel Farmer.9 Third, are 
the participants in the trade to the East Indies and the Mediterranean, such as Andrew Riccard, William 
 
6 These 23 merchants were: Thomas Applewhaite, Richard Batson, Nicholas Blake, John Colleton, Edwin Brown, 
Edward Bushell, Michael Davison, Samuel Farmer, Thomas Frere, Thomas Kendall, Peter Lear, Robert Lewellin, 
Mark Mortimer, Martin Noell, Thomas Parris, George Pasfield, William Pennoyer, Andrew Riccard, Maurice 
Thomson, John Vincent, James White, William Williams, John Wood. 
7 Brenner aptly demonstrates the participation of these merchants in the American tobacco trade during the 1630s 
and early 1640s. Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, ch. 4, esp. pp. 162-163. 
8 For the tobacco imported by Joseph Hawes in 1638, see Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 138 (fn. 78). Data 
derived from the London Port Book for Imports, 1640, TNA, E 190/43/5.    
9 John Wood’s prior involvement in West African trade will be explored in detail below. In a 1656 deposition 
Thomas Parris stated that he visited Barbados in 1628, soon after the colony’s founding. But the available evidence 
suggests he did not stay for long, and instead returned to London and became a major transatlantic slave trader with 
his brother, the New England merchant John Parris. Complete Book of Emigrants, p. 466. For the Bristol merchant 
Samuel Farmer’s slave trading connections, see Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 136-137.  
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Williams, and Edwin Browne.10 Fourth, are the English merchants who had previously been heavily 
involved in the sugar trade within the Portuguese Empire, including Edward Bushell and Thomas 
Kendall, who probably looked to Barbados as a new site for sugar production following the decline in the 
Brazilian industry.11 Fifth, are the participants in the cloth trade in woollen manufactures to Northern 
Europe, France, and Spain. Thomas Applewhaite, John Colleton, and James White were all involved in 
this trade, the most traditional sector of England’s overseas commerce, prior to developing an interest in 
Barbados.12 Sixth, are the men who have no recorded background in overseas trade before their 
investments in Barbados. Martin Noell, Nicholas Blake, Peter Lear, Robert Lewellin, Mark Mortimer, and 
John Vincent all fall into this category, and it seems likely therefore that the opportunity to invest in the 
Barbados sugar boom prompted their participation in overseas commerce.13  
The account books of the merchants who financed the sugar boom have not survived. This makes it 
impossible to determine with certainty where the money they invested in land and enslaved Africans on 
the island was generated. We can, however, improve our understanding of this historical process by 
tracing merchant careers and placing their investments in the Barbados sugar industry into broader 
 
10 For the involvement of Riccard, Williams, and Browne in the trade to the East Indies, see CCMEIC, Vol. 2, p. 
148, 150, 331. For the service of Riccard and Williams on the court of directors of the Levant Company in 1640, see 
TNA, SP 105/149, f. 215. Edwin Browne was also a Levant Company director. See Brock, ‘The Company Director’, 
p. 380.   
11 Edward Bushell’s participation in the Brazilian sugar trade will be explored in detail below. Thomas Kendall was 
resident in Lisbon in 1638 and involved in the Brazil trade. See TNA, SP 89/4, ff. 17-18.   
12 Thomas Applewhaite is described as a former cloth merchant in Gragg, Englishman Transplanted, p. 135. For John 
Colleton’s involvement in the Exeter cloth trade prior to emigrating to Barbados, see J. E. Buchanan, ‘The Colleton 
Family and the Early History of South Carolina and Barbados’ (PhD dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1989), 
pp. 9-43. James White, a merchant of Tower Hill in London, was a Master of the Clothworkers Company in 1641. 
‘Records of London’s Livery Companies Online’, 
https://www.londonroll.org/event/?company=clw&event_id=CLLL25777 (Accessed 11/09/2019).  
13 Martin Noell began his business career as a scrivener in London: his background will be explored in further detail 
below. Mark Mortimer is an obscure figure. He was a close associate of Noell in Barbadian affairs, and it is therefore 
possible that he also began life as a scrivener. Nicholas Blake is another obscure London merchant, and other than 
the fact he invested in the Irish Adventurers Scheme, he does not appear to have been involved in overseas trade 
prior to purchasing plantations on Barbados in the mid-1640s. John Vincent is described in various Barbados deeds 
as a ‘London grocer’ and elsewhere as a ‘saltmaster’. It is probable, therefore, that he dealt in the wholesale of salt 
prior to his investments in Barbados sugar. He may also have been related to William Vincent, a London merchant 
who was a member of the East India and Levant companies, and who also became involved in Barbadian 
commerce. For John Vincent, see BDA, RB3/2, pp. 510-13; TNA, SP 16/233, f. 31. Robert Lewellin received his 
freedom of the Salter’s Company in 1639, and like Vincent probably also began his career in domestic salt 
wholesaling. For Lewellin, see ‘Records of London’s Livery Companies Online’, 
https://www.londonroll.org/event/?company=slt&event_id=SLMM5172 (Accessed 11/09/2019). Other than the 
fact he grew up in Devon, I have been unable to find any information on Peter Lear’s business activities in the 
1630s and early 1640s. This is extremely surprising, because in 1660 he had become a merchant of some repute and 
was handed a baronetcy by Charles II. 
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context. A detailed exploration of the career of one merchant from each category, which considers both 
the domestic and global dimensions of their economic activities between 1630 and 1670, will now be 
developed.  
Some of the men who invested in the sugar boom have already received a great deal of attention from 
historians of the merchant community of early modern England. As pre-eminent overseas traders in the 
City of London in the first half of the seventeenth century, the careers of Maurice Thomson and William 
Pennoyer have already been described in detail by historians such as Robert Brenner, for example. The 
diverse commercial activities which Thomson and Pennoyer participated in epitomise how the merchants 
who invested in the Barbados sugar boom had both domestic and global business interests. In the 1630s 
and 1640s Maurice Thomson was one of London’s leading colonial traders, importing 113,000 lb. of 
American tobacco in 1638, more than any other merchant. He subscribed to the Irish Adventurers 
Scheme, financed the colonisation of St. Christopher, traded to West Africa, and was involved in East 
Indian interloping.14 William Pennoyer possessed a similarly broad business portfolio. He was principally 
a tobacco merchant trading to North America and the Caribbean, but was also an interloper in 
Mediterranean trade, pioneering, in Brenner’s words, the ‘Virginia-England-Levant tobacco reexport 
commerce’. Pennoyer was also an investor in the Irish Adventurers Scheme, heavily involved in the 
transatlantic slave trade, and another participant in interloping commerce to the East Indies.15 Moreover, 
both men were key supporters of the Parliamentary government during the 1640s, and were therefore 
appointed to various offices to farm the customs and excise.16 By 1647 Thomson and Pennoyer co-
owned a Barbados plantation, and were seeking permission from Parliament to export horses to the 
colony to drive their sugar mills.17  
 
14 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 118-20, 125-29, 140 (fn. 88), 164-165, 173-175, 402; Roper, Advancing Empire, 
pp. 32-33, 57, 74-76, 79-81, 110.  
15 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 137, 153, 163, 402; Roper, Advancing Empire, p. 76. 
16 James Scott Wheeler, The Making of a World Power: War and the Military Revolution in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Stroud, 1999), ch. 6, 7 and especially pp. 130-136. 
17 ‘The humble petition of William Pennoyer’, 14 October 1647 & ‘The humble petition of Maurice Thompson and 
Company’, 23 October 1647, in Proceedings and Debates, pp. 196-197. 
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The six case studies explored in detail below have been selected because there has been less previously 
written on these merchants. The prosopographical study developed here is also more complete than 
previous analyses because it more fully contextualises the professional lives of these merchants, 
considering both their domestic and global trading activities and the offices they held within the English 
government. It is nonetheless important to highlight that what follows are not comprehensive business 
histories. It is better to view this prosopographical analysis and six-fold categorisation as a portrayal of 
how diverse the business portfolios of the English merchants who financed the sugar boom were.  
 
Richard Batson (? – 1672) 
The career of Richard Batson underscores how merchants with a background in the tobacco trade to the 
American colonies helped to finance the Barbados sugar boom. Batson was born into an obscure family 
from Wiltshire. He was not apprenticed into a livery company, and although the origins of his career as a 
merchant remain uncertain, it seems that he began his professional life as a cutler. By the mid-1630s he 
had become involved in the tobacco and provisioning trade to Virginia, Bermuda, and the Caribbean, 
often working in partnership with other London merchants such as Maurice Thomson, Samuel Vassall, 
and William Pennoyer.18 His trading interests in the Atlantic also extended to privateering ventures, which 
he had begun to participate in by 1637. Possibly because of the personal connections he possessed with 
powerful merchants within the City of London, by 1640 Batson had established himself as one of the 
most significant English traders to the American plantations. That year he imported 15,000 lb. of Virginia 
tobacco, for instance. There is also some isolated evidence that Batson worked with William Courteen 
and Maurice Thomson in financing ships which were interloping in the East Indies, but the extent to 
which he was involved in this trade is not clear. We do know, however, that he subscribed to the Second 
General Voyage of the East India Company in 1647. As far as his domestic business activities were 
 
18 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 278-279. 
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concerned, Batson was involved in the production and trade in glassware within England, and in the early 
1640s challenged the glassmaking patent which permitted Robert Mansell to monopolise the trade.19  
Like many of his business partners in London, Batson supported the Parliamentarian cause in the Civil 
War, perhaps because of his godly religious sensibilities. In conjunction with 150 other parishioners living 
in St. Dunstan’s-in-the-East, Richard Batson signed a petition in late March 1642 calling for the 
appointment of John Simpson as their new minister. Simpson was one of the most radical 
congregationalist ministers in London, which suggests that Batson held puritan proclivities, especially as 
he played a role in the governance of the parish in subsequent years.20 It is surprising, therefore, that 
Batson does not appear in Tai Liu’s list of London puritans, and that he did not invest in the Irish 
Adventurers scheme, a programme to expropriate Irish land which was motivated by a strong puritan 
impulse.21 Moreover, unlike some of his peers in the London merchant community, Batson did not 
secure positions on committees relating to trade and colonial affairs during the Interregnum, nor did he 
receive an office to farm the excises. He was, however, appointed as a commissioner for Billingsgate ward 
in 1648 to collect assessments imposed by the Parliamentary government for the maintenance of the 
army.22 Although he occasionally exchanged letters with Secretary of State John Thurloe, based on this 
wider evidence, it appears that Batson did not have strong connections within the Parliamentary, 
Commonwealth, and Protectorate regimes.23 
Richard Batson began a commercial relationship with Barbados around the year 1640. It was the cotton 
trade which first attracted his interest in the colony. In 1640 Batson received (along with his co-partner 
 
19 TNA, HCA 24/101, f. 122; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 135-6, 159n, 160, 168, 175, 268. For the EIC’s 
Second General Voyage, see CCMEIC, Vol. 3., pp. 342-343, ‘A Meeting of the Committees for the Second General 
Voyage’, 17 August 1649. For a summary of the court case which related to a partnership formed between Samuel 
Vassall, Richard Batson, Edward Wood, and George Menefie, who freighted the Dove to trade for Virginia tobacco 
in 1637, see TNA, C 2/ChasI/C90/28 or Complete Book of Emigrants, p. 217. 
20 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 413-414, 449.  
21 For Tai Liu’s list of London puritans, see Tai Liu, Puritan London: A Study of Religion and Society in the City Parishes 
(Newark, 1986), Appendix B. For a list of investors in the Irish Adventurers Scheme, see Karl S. Bottigheimer, 
English Money and Irish Land: The ‘Adventurers’ in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland (Oxford, 1971), Appendix A. 
22 Acts and Ordinances, Vol. 1, pp. 1128-1131, ‘An Ordinance for the speedy bringing in the Arreares of the 
Assessments in the City of London and Liberties thereof’, 24 April 1648.  
23 Thurloe Papers, Vol. 4, p. 318, ‘R. Bateson to Secretary Thurloe’, 15 December 1655; Bodleian Library, MS Rawl A. 
26, p. 56; Bodleian Library, MS Rawl A. 29, p. 280. 
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Maurice Thomson) 2605 lb. of cotton from two Barbados planters in repayment for a debt, and in the 
same year his nephew Thomas Batson begins appearing in the Barbados Department of Archives buying 
and selling land on the island. In 1642 Richard Batson’s ship the Gillyflower was due to receive 120 bags of 
cotton at Barbados on the account of the London merchant Morgan Davies, and in 1644 he dispatched 
the Planter (co-owned with Edmond Keysar and Thomas Clarke) to Barbados to collect 13,500 lb. of 
cotton from Peter Hay.24 He had been aware of the profits that could be made by trading in sugar as early 
as 1640, when he instructed one of his correspondents ‘if any duch shipps or others should chance to 
come in Barbados yt bring either sugers or any other good comodities yt you know are vendable to 
venture the buying of three fowre or five or six hundred pounds worth starling money to be payd by my 
hand’.25  
With the advent of the island’s own sugar industry in the mid-1640s, Richard Batson began to escalate his 
involvement with Barbados. He speculated in sugar production by purchasing large tracts of land in the 
colony and financed trading ventures to supply the island with horses from Norway. Batson’s 
participation in slaving expeditions on the West Africa coast began as early as 1647. His involvement with 
the transatlantic slave trade to Barbados deepened over the course of the 1650s, and by 1660 he was one 
of the leading suppliers of enslaved Africans to the colony. Richard Batson’s business interests on 
Barbados were administered by his nephew Thomas Batson, his brother Henry Batson, and his attorneys 
William Tickle and Nicholas Martin, all of whom relocated to the island during the sugar boom.26 
Following his investments in Barbados sugar, Batson diversified his trading interests. In April 1652, for 
example, he organised a whaling venture to Greenland in conjunction with his business partners James 
 
24 For Richard Batson trading in cotton in the early 1640s, see BDA, RB3/1, pp. 30-31, 414-417, 900. For Thomas 
Batson’s land transactions in 1640, see BDA, RB3/1, p. 795; BDA, RB3/2, p. 353.  
25 BDA, RB3/1, p. 417. 
26 For the Batson syndicate’s landholding interests on Barbados, see BDA, RB3/1, p. 785; BDA, RB3/2, p. 353; 
BDA, RB3/1, pp. 870-871; BDA, RB3/1, pp. 867-868; BDA, RB3/5, pp. 848-849; BDA, RB3/5, p. 144; BDA, 
RB3/2, pp. 579-580; BDA, RB3/5, pp. 634-637; BDA, RB3/2, pp. 582-585; BDA, RB3/3, pp. 262-266; BDA, 
RB3/2, pp. 580-582; BDA, RB3/8, pp. 122-123; BDA, RB3/2, pp. 564-567; BDA, RB3/8, pp. 115-118; Complete 
Book of Emigrants, p. 482. For Richard Batson’s involvement in the transatlantic slave trade, see TNA, HCA 13/65, 
ff. 45-46; TNA, HCA 13/124, ff. 34-36 & ff. 58-60. For his involvement in the Barbados provisioning trade and 
supplying horses from Norway, see TNA, HCA 13/71, ff. 167-170. 
Michael D. Bennett 
86 
 
Salmon and Humphrey Beane, co-owners of the Dove.27 But the profits from sugar production and 
Barbados trade remained his main source of revenue during the 1650s and 1660s.  
In 1670, when the will of Richard Batson was being executed, Thomas Batson inherited his uncle’s 360-
acre integrated sugar plantation in the alluvial upland parishes of St. Phillip and St. George. An inventory 
of Richard Batson’s plantation taken upon his death reveals that the business operation had grown 
extremely prosperous over the years. The plantation possessed its own ‘ingenio’ for the processing of 
sugar cane, along with a stock of 157 enslaved Africans, 8 white servants, 50 sheep, 36 cattle, 6 horses, 
and 6 asses.28 Batson died a merchant made rich by the Barbados sugar industry and African slavery. He 
had operated outside of corporate monopolies for most of his career, preferring instead to trade in the 
unregulated waters of the Caribbean. 
 
John Wood (? – 1661) 
John Wood, a longstanding member of the Guinea Company, serves as a good example of how 
merchants with commercial interests in West Africa contributed to the Barbados sugar boom. In fact, the 
evidence we have of Wood trading in enslaved Africans to Barbados as early as 1641 means that we can 
be quite confident in asserting that he was one of the architects of the English transatlantic slave trading 
networks which would bring millions of enslaved Africans to the Caribbean over the next two centuries. 
John Wood began his business career as an apprentice to Humphrey Slaney in the 1620s, for whom he 
served overseas as a factor on the ‘River Cerbero’ (the Sierra Leone river). This was an important centre 
of trade for desirable commodities such as redwood, primarily due to the natural harbour at the river’s 
 
27 TNA, HCA 13/125. A similar voyage was undertaken in 1654, as evidenced by documentation requesting 
protection from impress for 14 harpooners travelling to Greenland on a ship owned by Batson and Beane. See 
TNA, SP 18/67, f. 108. 
28 Out of a total of 157 enslaved Africans, 62 were male, 63 were female, and 32 were children. The names of every 
servant and slave are also recorded. The plantation was situated in one of the most ideal places on Barbados for 
sugar production. It neighboured Henry Drax’s Drax Hall Plantation. BDA, RB3/8, ff. 58-63. 
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estuary, but also because the river allowed seafaring vessels to penetrate 25 miles into the interior. 
Testimony recorded in the High Court of Admiralty reveals how during his time as an agent for Slaney in 
Sierra Leone John Wood developed extensive mercantile contacts in the region, laying the foundation for 
his later commercial success as a London-based Africa trader.29 Humphrey Slaney was pivotal in 
incorporating four new merchants from among his personal business circle into the Guinea Company in 
the second half of the 1620s. These men included his son-in-law William Cloberry, the brothers Nicholas 
and Samuel Crispe, and his former apprentice John Wood. Together this group effectively ran the 
company for the next decade, using its monopoly to exert a heavy influence over Anglo-Africa trade and 
to protect their private interests from outside competition. Wood returned to West Africa for a brief time 
from 1638-39 as the company’s chief factor at their new headquarters of Kormantin on the Gold Coast 
(near modern day Abandze, Ghana), where he oversaw successful negotiations with the local Fante rulers, 
securing the right for the company to erect a fort and establish a permanent presence in the region.30 
After his arrival back in England John Wood rose to even greater prominence within the Guinea 
Company and the London merchant community. By the early 1640s some core members had left the 
company, notably Slaney and Cloberry, while Nicholas Crispe had been forced to withdraw from active 
involvement in overseas trade after his private estate was sequestered by Parliament due to the support he 
gave the Stuart monarchy. As one of London’s most experienced participants in West African trade, it 
was John Wood who became governor of the Guinea Company following these departures, guiding it 
through the political and economic turbulence of the 1640s. During these years the company’s monopoly 
came under increasing assault from independent traders, such as Maurice Thomson and Samuel Vassall, 
who sought to profit from the trade in both luxuries and enslaved Africans. John Wood was instrumental 
in incorporating these two competitors into the company over the coming years, which preserved the 
company’s exclusive trading privileges.31 Also significant was Wood’s role in representing the Guinea 
 
29 TNA, HCA 13/121, ‘The personal answers of Henry Futter, Thomas Cust, and George Ireland, made in response 
to an allegation of John Wood, c. June 1648’. The depositions record how ‘that for the space of about twenty years 
last past the said John Wood hath (by the consent and approbacon of the said negroes) traded in the pts arlate for 
himself and others by whome hee was imployed as a factor’. 
30  Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 164-5; Julie Svalastog, ‘Mastering the worst of trades: England’s early Africa 
companies and their traders, 1618-1672’ (PhD dissertation, University of Leiden, 2018), p. 78, 90-91, 96-98. 
31 Svalastog, ‘Mastering the worst of trades’, p. 92, 96-99.  
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Company during an inquest into their finances by a Committee of Accounts in 1644. This investigation 
was prompted by Parliament’s suspicion that Crispe was concealing some of his estate within the 
company to avoid its seizure from the sequestration authorities.32 Wood’s own allegiance in the Civil War 
is uncertain, but based on this evidence, it appears that he was at least trusted by Parliament. However, he 
was not deemed important enough to the regime to have been appointed to committees and tax farming 
offices like some of his counterparts in London. The Guinea Company was issued a new patent in 1651. 
After this John Wood was replaced as governor by Samuel Vassall, but he nonetheless remained an active 
participant in trade with West Africa in subsequent years.33 
During his time as a factor, member, and governor of the Guinea Company from the 1620s to the 1650s, 
John Wood financed numerous trading ventures to the West African coast. Along with other members of 
the company, he described in a 1652 petition how they had ‘adventured abroad on that coast aboute 
£70,000 with severall ships and pinnace[s] for discoverie and trade, and have yearely vented many 
manufactories, and returned Gold, hides, wax, Elephants teeth, Redwood, Guinny graine etc to a 
considerable value’.34 But many of these voyages were met with a mixed degree of success: the high 
frequency with which Wood’s name appears in the records of the High Court of Admiralty is testament 
to this.35  
The earliest record we have of John Wood’s involvement with Barbados dates to 1641.36 It seems his 
commercial connection with the island developed out of his capacity as a member of the Guinea 
 
32 TNA, SP 16/540/4, ‘Series of documents relating to the affairs of the Guinea Company, from 18th February 
1642-43 to 8th July 1647, but mostly of the year 1644’. See also Svalastog, ‘Mastering the worst of trades’, pp. 98-
105. 
33 The members of the Guinea Company in 1651 were: Samuel Vassall, Maurice Thomson, Rowland Wilson Sr., 
Rowland Wilson Jr., and John Wood. See Svalastog, ‘Mastering the worst of trades’, p. 131.  
34 TNA, CO 1/11, f. 186. 
35 Dorothy O. Shilton and Richard Holworthy, eds, High Court of Admiralty Examinations 1637-1638 (London, 1932), 
Case 445; TNA, SP 18/9, f. 192; TNA SP 18/41 f. 60; Elizabeth Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade to 
America, Vol. 1 (Washington, 1930), pp. 126-128, Document 24, ‘The Guinea Company to James Pope’, 17 
September 1651. 
36 There is some isolated evidence that John Wood may have had a relationship with the proprietor of Barbados 
much earlier than this, however. In 1626 Sir Henry Vane wrote to the Earl of Carlisle to recommend to the Earl’s 
favour one of his friends, Capt. John Wood. Whether this is the same John Wood who would later become a 
member of the Guinea Company and trade in slaves to Barbados is uncertain. TNA, SP 16/121, f. 86.    
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Company. That year the Star, a Guinea Company vessel owned by Nicholas Crispe, Samuel Crispe, and 
John Wood arrived on Barbados with ‘divers negroes’. Some of them were used by the company to 
bargain for a parcel of land, the deed for which was possessed in partnership by the Crispe brothers and 
Wood. News in 1642 that their agent George Read had mismanaged the debts they were owed on the 
island was received with consternation by the three Guinea Company merchants, and it may have been 
for this reason that for much of the 1640s and 1650s a more trustworthy factor, Francis Soane (who was 
John Wood’s nephew) was employed as their Barbados factor.37  
Over the course of the 1640s and 1650s John Wood co-ordinated numerous slave trading voyages to 
Barbados. In December 1651, for example, Wood and other members of the company wrote to James 
Pope, their factor at the River Gambia, instructing him to buy for their ship the Supply ‘as many good 
lusty negers as shee can well cary and so dispatch her for the Barbados, with Invoice and bill of Ladeing 
Consigned unto Mr. Francis Soane’. It had been agreed with ‘Mr John Wood that such negers as shall 
come from the River Gambra in our said Frigot Supply that you take them upon his plantation makeing 
sale of them so soone as you can for our most advantage for ready payment’.38 It was probably because of 
his growing dependence on Barbados as a market for enslaved Africans and the fact he also owned land 
there that John Wood signed two petitions relating to the affairs of the colony.39  
Beyond his trade with West Africa and Barbados, John Wood also possessed other business interests. In 
June 1642 Wood was named as a commissioner for the Additional Sea Venture, a Parliamentary initiative 
to suppress the Irish Rebellion which had broken out the year before. He subscribed £1685 to the 
Adventurers scheme, and in the lotteries of 1653-4 was accorded 2712 acres in Leinster and 312 acres in 
Ulster.40 By July 1647 John Wood was becoming involved in trading ventures beyond the Atlantic, 
investing in the East India Company’s Second General Voyage, for example. Alongside his Guinea 
 
37 BDA, RB3/1, pp. 202-3. For Soane as the Company’s Barbados factor, see Roper, Advancing Empire, pp. 82-3; 
Svalastog, ‘Mastering the worst of trades’, pp. 132-33. 
38 Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade, Documents 25-27, pp. 129-33.   
39 TNA, CO 1/11, f. 62; TNA, CO1/69, A3(1). 
40 Acts and Ordinances, Vol. 1, pp. 9-12, ‘The Ordinance for the Sea Adventure to Ireland’, 17 June 1642; 
Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, Appendix A, p. 130 & Appendix B, p. 213; Brenner, Merchants and 
Revolution, p. 404; Roper, Advancing Empire, p. 126.  
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Company counterpart Maurice Thomson, Wood played a crucial role in the process which saw the 
integration of the West African and East Indian trades over the next decade. This culminated with the 
East India Company leasing the Guinea Company’s charter to the monopoly over English commerce 
with West Africa in 1658. Following these successful negotiations, Wood was elected to the directorate of 
the company alongside fellow Barbados plantation owner James Drax in July 1659.41 John Wood died in 
1661, and was therefore never able to guide this ambitious project to completion.42 But over the course of 
his career he had become one of England’s leading Africa traders, earning himself the dubious honour of 
being a pioneer of the transatlantic slave trade to Barbados.  
 
Andrew Riccard (1603/4 – 1672) 
The career of Andrew Riccard demonstrates how merchants with a background in corporations trading to 
the Mediterranean and East Indies invested in the Barbados sugar boom. This underscores how Brenner’s 
argument that company merchants ‘never wished to invest in plantations’ needs to be modified.43 Riccard 
came from a poor family background in Dorset, before moving to London to train to become a 
merchant, where he was apprenticed into the East India Company. Particularly important for his early 
career advancement was his marriage to Catherine, daughter of Robert Bateman, who was the treasurer of 
the EIC and a prominent figure in the City of London. Between 1639 and 1641 he was admitted as an 
assistant of the Levant Company’s court and as a member of the EIC based on service, cementing his 
reputation as one of the rising stars in Eastern trade. He had also become a Master of the Draper’s 
Company by 1640, and was possibly a member of the Muscovy Company at this time. His stance in the 
Civil War, at least initially, was to offer support for the King. In the early 1640s Riccard signed two 
petitions alongside other royalist Levant and East India company traders criticising the actions of the 
 
41 CCMEIC, Vol. 3, p. 275, 342-3; Vol. 4, p. 340; Vol. 5, pp. 277, 333-4; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 176; 
Svalastog, ‘Mastering the worst of trades’, pp. 115-6, 124, 137. 
42 TNA, PROB 11/303/72, ‘Will of John Wood, Merchant of London’, 14 January 1661. 
43 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 271.  
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common council and condemning the committee of safety for seizing control of the London militia. He 
did not invest in the Irish Adventurers scheme, and for the remainder of the Civil War there is no 
evidence to suggest where his political sympathies lay.44  
Riccard’s involvement with trade to the American colonies began with his investment in a 300-acre 
Barbados plantation in 1646. The tract of land on Barbados was bought in conjunction with his long-time 
mercantile associate, brother-in-law, and fellow Eastern trader, William Williams, along also with Edwin 
Browne, another member of the East India Company. Riccard subsequently made an indenture 
agreement with one Thomas Bason, who was to be his servant on Barbados for the term of ten years. 
1646 was a good year for Andrew Riccard, for along with his Barbados investments, he was also elected 
to the court of directors of the EIC for the first time in July.45  
Andrew Riccard rose to become a leading member of the London merchant community during the 
Interregnum, and in subsequent years developed close ties with both the Protectorate and Restoration 
governments. He became an alderman and served as the sheriff of London in the early 1650s, and in 1654 
was elected as an MP. The trade to the East Indies and Levant remained his principal commercial interest. 
In February 1654 he became the governor of the Levant Company, an office which he retained until 
1672. He also served as the deputy governor of the EIC between 1653 and 1660, before becoming 
governor of that company for three terms from 1660-62, 1666-8, and 1670-72. Despite occupying 
distinguished offices within the administration of several overseas trading companies, Riccard maintained 
his business interests in Barbados sugar, and was a signatory of three key petitions penned by the 
‘Barbados Merchants’ during the 1650s and 1660s. It was probably due to his experience in Caribbean 
affairs that Riccard was invited by Cromwell to serve on the planning committee for the Western Design 
 
44 Timothy Venning, ‘Riccard, Sir Andrew (1603/4–1672), merchant’, ODNB (23 September 2004) 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-58151 
(Accessed 8 November 2019); Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 375. Andrew Riccard, a self-described ‘member of 
Turkey & Muscovy Companys’ became the master of Richard Hardy, who was apprenticed into the Drapers 
Company on 22 July 1640. See Records of London's Livery Companies Online. https://www.londonroll.org/about 
(Accessed 15/03/2019). The absence of any court records for the Muscovy Company before the Great Fire in 1666 
make it impossible to confirm Riccard’s membership. 
45 For Riccard’s Barbados interests, see John Carter Brown Library, Shelf Et647 1 Ms; LMA, MCD Box 5, 
CLA/024/06/005. For his election to the directorate of the EIC, see CCMEIC, Vol. 3., p. 153.  
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alongside Maurice Thomson, Martin Noell, and William Williams (also an EIC and Levant Company 
trader). It was these merchants who specified that Spanish America should be the target for the 
revolutionary state’s military campaign. They also helped to supply weapons and provisions for the 
invasion force. A 1670 petition of ‘Merchants and Freeholders of Jamaica residing in London’ suggests 
that Riccard even extended his involvement in Caribbean commerce beyond Barbados, and owned land 
on Jamaica once the colony had been seized from the Spanish.46  
After the Restoration he subscribed to the successor of the Guinea Company, the Royal Adventurers 
Trading into Africa. Escalating English involvement in the transatlantic slave trade was a firm objective of 
this newly incorporated company, further demonstrating Riccard’s commitment to Atlantic and 
Caribbean trade.47 In 1660 he was also appointed by Charles II to serve on both the Council for Foreign 
Plantations and the Council of Trade.48 Andrew Riccard, who was born into humble beginnings, died in 
1672 as one of the most powerful figures in London’s community of overseas traders. This was 
principally due to his longstanding involvement in the trade to the East Indies and the Mediterranean. But 
his Barbados investments in the mid-1640s did come at a crucial point in his career. The capital generated 
through the sugar boom, and the personal connections he made with merchants and planters involved in 




46 For the Barbados petitions, see TNA CO 1/11, f. 62; TNA, CO 1/12, f. 42; TNA, CO 1/20, f. 328. The content 
of these and other petitions will be explored in Chapter Four. For the Western Design committee, see Thurloe Papers, 
Vol. 2, p. 542, ‘Mr Andrew Riccard &c. to the protector’, 14 August 1654; Thurloe Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 571-574, ‘A list 
of the ships provisions, presented to his highness’, [n.d. c. 1654-55]; Thurloe Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 203-204, 
‘Commissioners for the southern expedition to the protector’ and ‘Provisions to be made for the West Indies’, 7 
March 1654/55. For the Jamaica petition, see TNA, CO 1/25, f. 227. 
47 Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade, pp. 169-172, Document 48, ‘A List of the Royal Adventurers of 
England Trading to Africa, 1667’ 
48 TNA, CO 1/14, f. 142; TNA, CO 1/23, f. 161. 
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Edward Bushell (c. 1620 – 1693)  
The career of Edward Bushell highlights how English merchants with transnational trading interests in 
Brazil came to participate in the Barbados sugar boom. Bushell became a prolific London merchant in the 
1660s. However, only Charles Boxer has previously discussed Bushell in his article on English shipping in 
the Brazil trade, and even then, he only elicited a brief mention.49 Edward Bushell was born around the 
year 1620. The origins of his business career are uncertain, but it seems that he served his apprenticeship 
within the small English merchant community at Lisbon in the late 1630s and early 1640s. In either 1643 
or 1644 he relocated to the City of London, but still maintained a close relationship with merchants in 
Portugal.50 There is no record of him being a member of a livery company, and although his investments 
in the Irish Adventurers Scheme indicates that his sympathies lay with Parliament, his allegiance in the 
Civil War cannot be determined with certainty.51  
During the 1640s and 1650s Edward Bushell’s trading business was co-ordinated through a factor based 
in Lisbon, John Bushell, who was also his brother. In 1651 Edward deposed in a High Court of Admiralty 
suit, explaining how: 
the interrogated John Bushell his this deponents brother living at Lisbone hath for several yeares 
last past managed and driven a considerable trade thence to the Brazila and coast of Angola, and 
hath frequently sugars and other merchandizes laden for his accompt upon diverse shipps trading 
for those parts, which hee knoweth having interest with him in several of those voyages, and hath 
had often and frequent advise from him concerning his said dealing there and retournes thence.52 
 
49 C. R. Boxer, ‘English Shipping in the Brazil Trade, 1640–65’, The Mariner's Mirror, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1951), pp. 197-
230. 
50 In 1651 Edward Bushell deposed in the High Court of Admiralty that ‘when hee lived at Lisbone, did himselfe 
trade to Brazila, and since hee hath continually traded there for theise seaven or eight yeares by his factors’. This 
suggests he left Lisbon for London in either 1643 or 1644. There is further evidence to corroborate this claim. On 
22 January 1643/44 Edward Bushell appeared in the Mayor’s Court of London to lodge a complaint on behalf of 
Richard Beare, an English merchant resident in Lisbon, who was owed a large debt from John Lyn, an English 
merchant based in Porto. See TNA, HCA 13/65, f. 39; LMA, MCD, Box 1.  
51 On Bushell’s Irish investments, see TNA, SP 63/300, f. 137; Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, Appendix 
B, p. 200. 
52 TNA, HCA 13/65, f. 39. See also TNA, SP 89/4, f. 117. 
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Working through his brother in Lisbon, Edward Bushell developed a profitable shipping business and 
drove a trade in sugar with the Portuguese empire from his base of operations in the City of London. 
Between August 1648 and February 1649, for instance, John Bushell hired a 240-ton Barnstable vessel the 
Green Lyon for a venture to the Azores to lade sugar and precious woods, which were subsequently sent to 
his brother Edward and father Thomas in London.53 In 1658 the Governor of Angola, Joao Fernandes 
Viera, employed one of Bushell’s vessels called the Brazil Frigate for a voyage from Luanda to 
Pernambuco, but was intercepted by a Dutch privateer which seized her cargo of 1200 enslaved Africans 
and 22,000 lb. of ivory.54 In 1659 Symon Rodrigez Chavez and Diego de Chavez freighted Bushell’s ship 
the Hope, which picked up 136 chests of Brazilian sugar at the Azores, but was captured by Turkish 
pirates while en-route to Venice, and taken into Algiers as a prize. It seems that Edward Bushell often 
conducted business with the two Chavez merchants, because in 1661 he dispatched £674 worth of tin to 
Lisbon on the Marigold, which was consigned to them.55 
Brazilian sugar was the primary focus of the Bushell trading firm. In 1651, for example, two vessels 
owned by Edward and John Bushell, the Lady Conception and Saint Anthony, were carrying 29 chests of 
Brazilian sugar when they were captured by a Dutch warship.56 English merchants had been trading with 
Brazil for decades: in the 1630s 80 percent of the sugar sold in London was grown in Brazil.57 Notable 
London merchants such as Nicholas Crispe, Humphrey Slaney, Samuel Vassall, Richard Shute, Roger 
Vivian, and Richard Cranley were all involved in this trade.58 But there was a marked expansion in English 
participation in Brazilian commerce in the 1640s. According to Charles Boxer, this was due to the split 
between the Portuguese and Spanish crowns, and the revolt of Pernambuco against their Dutch overlords 
in 1645. Some English merchants resident in Lisbon, including the Bushell syndicate, were accorded 
 
53 TNA, HCA 13/61, ff. 362-63, 379-80, 383-84. 
54 Boxer, ‘English Shipping in the Brazil Trade, 1640–65’, p. 214. In the same year Edward Bushell signed a petition, 
alongside other merchants (including Thomas Kendall), recommending that Thomas Maynard should be made the 
English consul in Lisbon. See Bodleian Library, MS Rawl A. 61, ff. 411-19.  
55 LMA, MCD, Boxes 10 & 12. Edward Bushell had connections with Venetian merchants too. In 1651 he 
petitioned on the behalf of Francisco and Bartolomeu Mora, who were trading to Brazil in one of his ships when it 
was seized by Parliament’s fleet. TNA, SP 89/4, f. 98 
56 TNA, HCA 13/65, f. 39. 
57 Stuart B. Schwartz, ‘Looking for a New Brazil: Crisis and Rebirth in the Atlantic World after the Fall of 
Pernambuco’, in Michiel Van Groesen (ed.), The Legacy of Dutch Brazil (Cambridge, 2014), p. 49. 
58 For Crispe and Slaney, see TNA, HCA 24/94. For Vassall and the others, see Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 
192.  
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privileges in the trade to Brazil by King João IV. Consequently, Portuguese subjects often hired English 
ships to transport their merchandise to West Africa and Brazil. Despite high customs duties levied by the 
Crown on foreign merchants importing and exporting goods, Englishmen such as the Bushell brothers 
were still keen to profit from the trade in sugar. There were 20 English vessels involved in the Brazil trade 
from 1648-49, including at least one of Edward Bushell’s ships, the Roebuck, which was seized by Prince 
Rupert at the Tagus estuary in 1649.59  
The formation of the Companhia do Brasil (Brazil Company) in 1649 changed the dynamics of English 
trade to Brazil.60 Foreign traders were now prevented from exporting wine, flour, codfish, and olive oil to 
the colony, as these commodities fell under the purview of the company’s monopoly. Foreign merchants 
could, however, become shareholders of the company.61 Edward Bushell and William Bird, two English 
merchants who would later become involved in the sugar trade to the English Caribbean, both invested in 
the Brazil Company. In 1661 they acted as substitute agents for the company, prosecuting the owners of 
four English ships that had traded directly to Brazil for sugar and Brazilwood and had returned to 
London without first stopping off in Lisbon to pay the required customs duties.62  
Edward Bushell’s business portfolio was not restricted to trade with Portugal and her empire. He invested 
in Irish land through the Adventurers scheme, spending £400 to secure 2000 acres in Lecale, County 
Down.63 He also bought stock in the East India Company, and on 26 February 1661 transferred just 
under £1000 of stock to Rowland Hill and Thomas Tomblings.64 Edward Bushell’s business ties with 
Barbados can be traced to the onset of the sugar boom. In his mid-20s when the transition to sugar 
began, he was one of the youngest London merchants to have become involved with the Barbadian 
economy in the mid-seventeenth century. His kinsman, Thomas Bushell, served as his factor on the island 
 
59 Boxer, ‘English Shipping in the Brazil Trade’, p. 204. For evidence that the Roebuck was owned by Bushell, see 
LMA, MCD, Box 9.  
60 Charles R. Boxer, ‘Padre António Vierira, S.J., and the Institution of the Brazil Company in 1649’, The Hispanic 
American Historical Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1949), pp. 474-497. 
61 Boxer, ‘English Shipping in the Brazil Trade’, p. 208. 
62 TNA, SP 89/5, ff. 45-49, 54-55, 86.  
63 TNA, SP 63/300, f. 137; Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, Appendix B, p. 200.  
64 CCMEIC, Vol. 6., p. 372. 
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during the 1650s. Another possible relation, Ferdinando Bushell, was also living on Barbados at this time, 
but it is unclear whether he was involved in the family business.65 Although Thomas Bushell owned land 
and property on Barbados as early as 1647, the Bushell merchant syndicate did not speculate in the 
production of sugar.66 Instead, they took advantage of the commercial dynamism on the island by setting 
up shop in Bridgetown, and in the process became heavily involved in the marketing of sugar and the 
shipping industry. In a 1663 petition to the Privy Council, Edward Bushell detailed how he had: 
out of mere Charity and Compassion taken into his Service and Imployment one Thomas 
Bushell, a poore Kinsman of his to doe him good for his better Encouragement and 
Advancement sent him (some yeares past) beyond the Seas and settled him in the Barbadoes, 
intrusting him as the Petitioner’s Servant and Factor, with considerable Cargoes of goods and 
Summes of Moneys and thereby hath at present in his hand and possession a great part of the 
Petitioners Estate to the value of 7 or 8000 l. sterling. 
Edward was not pleased, however, with his kinsman’s management of his business affairs on Barbados. 
He protested to the Privy Council how Thomas Bushell had ‘dealt unfaithfully and ingratefully’ with him 
and had grown rich by converting his estate to a source of personal wealth, even becoming a freeholder 
of the island by using the firm’s trading stock to purchase a 16-acre plantation. The King was persuaded 
by his petition, and subsequently sent orders to Governor Willoughby on Barbados to help Edward 
Bushell recover his estate.67  
Edward Bushell’s commercial involvement with Barbados became more pronounced in the late 1650s 
and early 1660s. His deepening business ties with the island after the Restoration can be interpreted as an 
extension of his ongoing participation in the Brazilian sugar trade. Bushell’s claim in 1663 that in ‘late 
 
65 For Ferdinando Bushell on Barbados in the 1650s and 1660s see, BDA, RB3/3, pp. 367-368; BDA, RB3/5, pp. 
166-167, 252-253; BDA, RB3/7, pp. 75-76; BDA, RB3/8, pp. 149-151; Barbados Council Minutes, p. 118, 163. For his 
Barbados will, see BDA, RB6/14, p. 127. 
66 It is possible that Thomas Bushell was living on Barbados as early as 1638, because he appears in a list of 
freeholders owning more than 10 acres of land on the island. William Duke, Some Memoirs of the first Settlement of the 
Island of Barbados and other the Carribbee Islands with the Succession of the Governours and Commanders in Chief of Barbados to the 
Year 1741 (Barbados, 1741), p. 70. Although this has not been able to be verified using the deed books at the 
Barbados Department of Archives: the first time he appears in these records is in 1647. BDA, RB3/2, pp. 165-6.  
67 For the petition, see APCC, no. 584, pp. 343-44.  
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Yeares [he] hath had a Considerable Trade to the said Plantation both in stock and shipping’, is supported 
by documentation from the Colonial Office Records. For example, he fitted out his ship the Amity 
(formerly known as the Brazil Frigate) with provisions, passengers, and servants to be transported to 
Barbados in April 1668.68 Bushell signed two petitions in conjunction with other London merchants 
trading to Barbados: one in 1655 for Cromwell’s permission to transport weaponry and ammunition to 
the island, and another in 1666 beseeching the King to appoint William Willoughby as the colony’s 
governor.69 He also assisted the English state’s efforts to defend their Caribbean holdings. The Brazil 
Frigate, one of Edward Bushell’s ships, was part of the fleet commanded by Sir George Ayscue sent to 
reduce Barbados in 1652.70 Along with eight other merchants Edward Bushell petitioned the King for 
speedy payment after two of his vessels had been hired by the state in 1666 to transport Sir Tobias 
Bridge’s regiment to Barbados to prosecute the war against England’s rivals in the Caribbean during the 
Second Anglo-Dutch War. 135 soldiers were transported to the island on board the Morning Star and the 
Lawrell Tree, and reimbursement had been promised out of the duty of four-and-a-half percent levied on 
Barbados sugar.71  
Following its conquest in 1655, Jamaica was integrated into Edward Bushell’s trading network, and 
quickly became an important part of his business operations. Edward’s keen interest in Jamaica may have 
developed because his kinsman and Barbados factor Thomas Bushell was a lieutenant colonel in the 
English force which seized the island from the Spanish in 1655. Thomas subsequently owned land on the 
island, presumably as a reward for his service in the Western Design.72 By 1660 both Edward Bushell and 
William Bird were despatching their vessels to trade at Jamaica. In Bushell’s case, his Caribbean trading 
ventures were combined with his existing commerce to Portugal and her overseas colonies. The master of 
his ship the Francis and Richard was instructed in 1660 to procure a lading at Madeira, travel to Jamaica and 
 
68 APCC, no. 584, pp. 343-44; TNA, CO 1/22, f. 105.  
69 TNA, CO1/69, A3(1); TNA, CO 1/20, f. 328.  
70 TNA, SP 18/17, f. 99. 
71 Huntington Library, Blathwayt Papers Box 1, BL 380, ‘Petition of the Commanders and owners of ships that have 
parted Sir Tobias Bridges Regiment to Barbados’; BL 387, ‘Peticon of Divers Merchants and commanders of Shipps 
which were taken up at Barbados in ye time of ye late wars’. 
72 For Thomas Bushell’s involvement in the Western Design, see CSPC AWI, Vol. 9., Addenda, pp. 88-91. For his 
land on Jamaica, see BDA, RB6/15, Will of Ann Bushell, 21 March 1662/3. 
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discharge her goods, before returning to either London or Lisbon. These plans were hampered, however, 
by an inability to obtain the full consignment of commodities promised by Bushell’s factors at Jamaica. 
This provides indirect evidence for how the transition towards an economy based around plantation 
production, and especially the cultivation of sugar cane, had not yet taken hold on Jamaica by the 1660s. 
The Francis and Richard was forced instead to proceed on a turtling voyage to the Cayman islands, and 
Bushell lodged a complaint in the Mayor’s Court of London seeking partial absolution from an insurance 
agreement for the Jamaica venture he had made with Samuel Free, a merchant resident in Hamburg.73   
Edward Bushell died in 1693 at the age of 73.74 Throughout his life his principal trading interests were 
focused on a single commodity: sugar. Even Samuel Pepys, writing in 1664, was aware of ‘Bushell's 
business of sugars’.75 In his will Edward Bushell specified that he was owed a debt from the King of 
Portugal, which stands as testament to his enduring influence in Lisbon as a merchant and moneylender.76 
Though he never secured a prominent office within the English government, he was nonetheless one of 
London’s most successful merchants. Over the course of his career his family business had become an 
expansive trading empire, which was mainly focused upon London and Lisbon, but from these nodes 
reached out to Madeira, the Azores, Cape Verde, Brazil, Angola, Venice, Barbados, and Jamaica. 
Particularly important for our purposes is that he was involved in both the Brazilian sugar trade and the 
Barbados sugar boom. The course of Edward Bushell’s career, and his changing business preferences, 
reflects the wider process which saw the locus of sugar production in the Atlantic world shift from Brazil 
to the Caribbean islands over the course of the seventeenth century. 
John Colleton (1608-1667) 
 
73 LMA, MCD Boxes 10 & 12.   
74 He maintained an interest in Barbados right until his death. In 1692 he petitioned on the behalf of Ralph Lane, a 
Barbados merchant, who had been imprisoned. TNA, SP 44/235, f. 413. 
75 Robert Latham and William Matthews, eds, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, Vol. 5, (London, 1971), p. 43, 10 February 
1664. 
76 TNA, Prob 11/418, ‘The Will of Edward Bushell of Hackney in the County of Middlesex Merchant, 1693’. 
William Lord Willoughby of Parham, governor of Barbados, had an outstanding debt to Edward Bushell when his 
will was proved in 1673. See Joanne McRee Sanders, Barbados Wills and Administrations Vol. I: 1639-1680 (Baltimore, 
1979), pp. 392-3.  
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The career of John Colleton highlights how English merchants who had begun their careers in the cloth 
trade became leading investors in the sugar boom. Indeed, Colleton went on to found one of the most 
important and long-lasting Barbadian planter dynasties. The region where his sugar plantation once stood 
in the 1650s is still called ‘Colleton’ today, and the ‘Colleton Great House’ has recently been turned into a 
guest home for tourists.77  
John Colleton was raised in Exeter, and for decades his family had been involved in the cloth trade as 
members of the town’s Society of Merchant Adventurers Trading beyond the Seas. Created by royal 
charter in 1558, Exeter’s Merchant Adventurer’s Company was modelled on the London corporation of 
the same name, and reserved monopoly trading privileges to members engaged in the export of cloth 
from the port of Exeter to overseas markets.78 By the mid-1630s John Colleton had become a freeman of 
Exeter by succession, had inherited substantial property in the town, and was trading in woollen 
manufactures from his warehouse on the banks of the River Exe to port towns in France and Northern 
Europe.  
Like many others of his generation, the outbreak of Civil War in 1642 had a transformative impact on his 
life and career. Colleton opted to support the King’s cause, helping to secure Exeter as a royalist 
stronghold for most of the war through financial donations, military service as a cavalry officer, and his 
leadership as governor of the town. Following a protracted siege, General Thomas Fairfax captured the 
city for Parliament in the spring of 1646. Colleton was punished with expulsion from the Exeter 
corporation and given a hefty fine of £610 for his political affiliation. The increasingly hostile 
environment in his hometown and the fact he was on the losing side of the Civil War played a major role 
in his decision to relocate to London, before eventually emigrating overseas. It is no coincidence that in 
March 1647, less than a year after the social dislocation and financial injury he had suffered at the hands 
of Parliament, Colleton purchased a 90-acre plantation on Barbados for 24,000 lb. of tobacco. This 
 
77 http://www.colletonhouse.com/ (Accessed 11/09/2019).  
78 Wallace T. MacCaffrey, Exeter, 1540-1640: The Growth of an English County Town (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), pp. 136-
137. 
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marked the beginning of a process through which Colleton transferred his entire family, estate, and 
livelihood to Barbados, in direct response to the political uncertainty in England created by the Civil 
War.79   
Unlike most of the other merchant investors in the sugar boom described in this dissertation, who were 
absentee plantation-owners that managed their landholdings through trusted agents, John Colleton 
emigrated to Barbados himself during the sugar boom and lived on the island for over a decade. He 
arrived on Barbados around the year 1650, while the colony was in the throes of a Royalist rebellion and 
when England was not a safe place for someone with his political sympathies, taking up residence on a 
sugar estate with his sons Peter and Thomas. Over the course of the next decade the Colleton family 
spent £30,000 on purchasing and improving Barbadian land, amassing 700 acres in total. To populate his 
plantations with the labourers needed to cultivate sugar cane, John Colleton began to partake in the 
transatlantic slave trade. The earliest record we have of Colleton’s involvement in a slave trading venture 
dates to November 1648, when he was living in London. Colleton and his co-partners Richard Batson, 
Laurence Steele, and John Roberts dispatched the Royall Merchant from Bristol to Guinea, and then on to 
Barbados with a consignment of enslaved Africans. Colleton remained an active participant in the 
transatlantic slave trade, becoming a founding member of the Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa.80 
While he resided on Barbados during the 1650s he was appointed to powerful public offices, including 
the vestry of St. Joseph parish, the colonial judiciary, and the council in 1658.81  
Following a decade of living on Barbados and amassing wealth through sugar production, John Colleton 
returned to England after the King’s restoration in 1660, leaving his sons on Barbados to manage his 
plantations.82 Soon after his arrival in London Colleton was handed honours and offices from Charles II 
in recognition of the loyalty and military service he had given to the Royalist cause during the Civil War. 
He was knighted in 1660 and appointed to the newly-formed Council for Foreign Plantations, and 
 
79 Buchanan, ‘The Colleton Family’, pp. 9-15. For the 1647 land sale, see BDA, RB3/2, pp. 116-117. 
80 Buchanan, ‘The Colleton Family’, pp. 16-43; Newman, A New World of Labor, pp. 251-252. For the 1648 slave 
trading voyage, see TNA, HCA 13/124, ff. 34-36. 
81 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 66; Barbados Council Minutes, p. 34, 300. 
82 Buchanan, ‘The Colleton Family’, pp. 9-43; Newman, A New World of Labor, pp. 251-252.  
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subsequently led deliberations over whether to institute a four-and-a-half per cent duty on Barbadian 
exports. Alongside fellow investors in the sugar boom such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, in 1663 Colleton 
became a Lord Proprietor of Carolina, and played an important role in financing the colony’s settlement 
and facilitating the transfer Barbadian-style plantation agriculture and labour systems to the Carolina 
Lowcountry.83 Colleton died in 1676 with propertied interests in Barbados and Carolina. His mercantile 
career had begun in the Exeter cloth trade, before the Civil War severed his family’s generations-old 
connection to the export of woollen manufactures, encouraging him to instead turn his attention towards 
colonial commerce. Colleton’s plans were shaped by both English politics and the allure of Barbadian 
sugar. 
  
Martin Noell (c. 1614 – 1665) 
Martin Noell’s career as a businessman and public servant is perhaps the most remarkable of all the 
merchants who financed the sugar boom. Noell was a man made rich from the profits generated through 
Caribbean sugar and the shifting political circumstances in England during the Civil War and 
Interregnum. He was born in Stafford, where he was baptised in 1614. The early years of his career are 
obscure, but based on circumstantial evidence it appears he began life as a scrivener in London. This 
profession was important to the operation of daily business in English towns because scriveners were 
trained to write legal documentation detailing bills of sale and extensions of credit: the cornerstone of the 
economy in early modern England. He continued to be an active member of the Scrivener’s Company for 
his entire life.84 Noell secured rapid career advancement in the 1640s, primarily due to the personal 
connections he forged in the City of London through his job as a scrivener and the support he gave to 
 
83 Buchanan, ‘The Colleton Family’, pp. 43-56. 
84 G. E. Aylmer, ‘Noell, Sir Martin (bap. 1614, d. 1665), financier and merchant’, ODNB (23 September 2004), 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-37814 
(Accessed 8 November 2019). For more on scriveners in early modern England, see Frank T. Melton, Sir Robert 
Clayton and the origins of English deposit banking, 1658-1685 (Cambridge, 1986), ch. 1 & 2.  
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Parliament in the ensuing civil conflict. This political influence afforded Noell the opportunity to profit 
from the Civil War. In 1645, for instance, he was buying up sequestered land in Lancashire and Yorkshire 
and was acting as a creditor to Parliament. Alongside other ‘merchant-revolutionaries’, including Maurice 
Thomson and William Pennoyer, Noell was named as a commissioner of the militia in January 1648, 
giving him the power to collect tax arrears in London.85 
There is no record of Martin Noell being involved in trade (either domestic and overseas) before the large 
investments he made in land on Barbados in 1646. It seems highly likely, therefore, that Noell invested 
the profits he was generating from the ongoing Civil War into Barbadian land. Martin’s brother, Stephen, 
had settled on the island in the late 1630s, but the Noell syndicate’s involvement with Barbados began to 
expand markedly following the advent of sugar production in the colony and Parliamentary successes in 
the Civil War. In partnership with his brothers James, Stephen, and Thomas, Martin Noell purchased a 
total of 845.5 acres on Barbados between March 1646 and November 1647.86 It was probably through his 
standing as a prominent landowner on the island and his growing reputation in the London business 
community that Noell became acquainted with Phillip Bell, the governor of Barbados, with whom he 
began to exchange letters.87 By 1650 Martin Noell had expanded his Caribbean operations with the 
purchase of an estate on Montserrat, where he was trading to in conjunction with Robert Wilding (a 
merchant involved in the American tobacco trade during the 1630s) in their ship the Montserrat Merchant.88 
Because Noell first became involved with overseas commerce and colonisation through his participation 
in the Barbados sugar boom, it is highly likely that the profits of sugar and slavery helped to secure his 
career advancement in the City of London’s merchant community. 
Patronage networks linking Martin Noell to leading figures in the revolutionary state propelled his career 
to new heights in the 1650s. Noell’s brother-in-law, for example, was the spymaster and secretary-of-state 
 
85 Michael J. Braddick, The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558-1714 (Manchester, 1996), 
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86 For these land purchases, see BDA, RB3/1, ff. 699-700; BDA, RB3/1, f. 336; BDA, RB3/1, f. 402; BDA, RB3/1, 
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BDA, RB3/2, ff. 203-207; BDA, RB3/2, f. 265.  
87 Proceedings and Debates, pp. 188-89; NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/952, ‘Capt Bell to Martin Noel’, 15 February 1650. 
88 For Noell’s Montserrat interests, see Complete Book of Emigrants, p. 250; CSPC AWI, Vol. 1., pp. 347-348. 
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John Thurloe. Such connections helped him to secure appointments to lucrative tax farming offices. In 
1651 he was selected as the new farmer of the salt excise, a position which was made even more 
profitable by the control he exerted over its domestic production after purchasing the saltpans in North 
and South Shields.89 Further privileges to farm the customs and excise were granted throughout the 
Interregnum, enabling Noell to skim revenue for himself by collecting the duties imposed on 
commodities such as linen, drapery, silk, glass, alum, wines, mercury, and coal exports. Between 1657 and 
1659 he occupied the prestigious office of post-master general.90 Noell’s extensive political influence 
probably owed a lot to his role as a moneylender to the government. He secured regular contracts to 
provision the army and navy. In November 1654, for instance, he advanced Parliament £16,000 to enable 
Cromwell to outfit and supply his naval forces.91  
The Parliamentary regime operated as a ‘government by committee’, and Martin Noell was often able to 
influence the formation of policy during the Interregnum because of his appointments to various 
committees related to trade and colonial affairs.92 Some of these positions may have been secured 
through his friendship and business relationship with the bureaucrat Thomas Povey.93 Particularly 
significant for our purposes was Noell’s participation in committees convened to strategize the Western 
Design. As well as helping to plan the assault against Spanish America in 1655, Noell also profited from 
the expedition, securing government contracts to supply the naval expedition with weapons and 
provisions.94 Martin Noell continued to trade to Barbados and own a sugar works on the island, 
 
89 Aylmer, ‘Sir Martin Noell’, ODNB; TNA, SP 18/94, f. 158; TNA, SP 25/75, f. 677.     
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Slavery, pp. 90-92. For the office of Postmaster General, see Aylmer, ‘Sir Martin Noell’, ODNB. 
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Commissioner for Prize Goods, see TNA, SP 25/76, f. 324. 
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Thomas Povey’.  
94 TNA, SP 18/117, f. 202; BL, Stowe MS 185, f. 83; Thurloe Papers, Vol. 2., p. 542, ‘Mr Andrew Riccard &c. to the 
protector’, 14 August 1654; Thurloe Papers, Vol. 2., pp. 571-574, ‘A list of the ships provisions, presented to his 
highness’, [n.d. c. 1654-55]; Thurloe Papers, Vol. 3., pp. 203-204, ‘Commissioners for the southern expedition to the 
protector’ and ‘Provisions to be made for the West Indies’, 7 March 1654/55. For the Jamaica petition, see TNA, 
CO 1/25, f. 227. The weaponry supplied by Noell through his government contracts was not always of good quality 
or the correct quantity. A report made following the fleet’s arrival at Barbados, for instance, commented how ‘we 
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dispatching a ship called the Happy Fortune there in April 1655. He became a leading figure in the servant 
trade, using his appointments to committees on poor relief to export ‘undesirable’ members of English 
society (especially vagrants and royalists) to meet the incessant demand for cheap labour on Barbados. As 
a direct consequence of these questionable business practices, Noell became embroiled in a passionate 
Parliamentary debate during his time serving as an MP for Stafford between 1656 and 1659, in which he 
was accused of selling Englishman into slavery in the Caribbean.95  
Like many other businessmen in the City of London, Martin Noell survived the Restoration and was not 
punished by Charles II for his close association with the revolutionary regime. In fact, he was knighted in 
1662 and even given a gift of £8000 by the King.96 The reasons for this turn of events are unclear but 
were probably related to Noell’s role as a prominent government creditor and his valuable expertise in 
trade and colonial affairs. With his intricate networks of credit which crossed political divides, spanned 
the Atlantic, and supported the English state, it should come as no surprise that the restored monarchy 
could not afford to displace such a crucial figure in the operation of both private and public finance. Over 
the course of the 1650s Martin Noell had ascended to the summit of London’s merchant community, 
serving on the directorate of the East India, Levant, and Baltic companies, and through his political 
connections and creditworthiness had become firmly enmeshed within the English government. He 
became a member of the newly incorporated Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa in the early 1660s, 
and in 1664 negotiated with the Genoese firm Grillo & Lomellino on behalf of the company, securing for 
the Royal Adventurers the lucrative asiento contract to supply enslaved Africans to Spanish America.97 
Also significant was how Noell invested in Irish land expropriated through the Cromwellian settlement. 
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He adventured £1040 and subsequently became a substantial property owner in County Wexford, 
controlling 2311 acres of land.98  
On 29 September 1665 Samuel Pepys noted in his diary that ‘Sir Martin Noell is this day dead of the 
plague in London, where he hath lain sick of it these eight days’. His wife, Dame Elizabeth Noell, also 
died (supposedly from grief) a little over a week later, making it highly unlikely she ever saw any financial 
benefits from the one-third part of the annual profits of the Homehall plantation on Barbados which had 
been promised to her in his will. Indeed, because Martin Noell had ‘dealt in so many things, publique and 
private’, it was rumoured that nobody could understand where his estate was located nor how much it 
was worth. Pepys mused that this was the ultimate ‘fate of these great dealers at everything’.99 By tracing 
Noell’s successful business career, it is apparent that his ascendancy out of relative obscurity can be traced 
to two unique events which occurred in the 1640s: Parliamentary successes in the Civil War, which greatly 
increased his political influence, and the capital generated from Barbados sugar. 
 
Summary 
Analysing the careers of the merchants who invested in the Barbados sugar boom provides new insights 
into the history of the Caribbean and the merchant community of early modern England. It demonstrates 
how the English merchants who contributed to the transition to sugar monoculture on Barbados had 
diverse business portfolios. Out of the 23 most important merchant financiers of the sugar boom, 17 
were involved in overseas trade to different corners of the globe during the 1630s and early 1640s (prior 
to their Barbadian investments). Six merchants participated in the tobacco trade to North America and 
 
98 Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, Appendix B, p. 207; Donogue, Fire Under the Ashes, p. 209. For further 
information on the Cromwellian settlement, see Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, pp. 145-163; Nicholas 
Canny, Making Ireland British, 1580-1650 (Oxford, 2001), pp. 552-3, 556-7.   
99 Latham and Matthews, eds, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, Vol. 6, p. 245 and pp. 257-258, 28 September 1665 and 8 
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the Caribbean; three were investors in and directors of the trading companies which administered the 
commerce in luxury cloths and spices from the East Indies and Mediterranean; three drove a trade in 
gold, ivory, redwood, and slaves on the west coast of Africa; two were involved in the Brazilian sugar 
trade; and three partook in the cloth trade to Northern Europe and France. There were, however, six 
prominent merchant investors in the sugar boom who do not appear to have had a background in 
overseas commerce prior to becoming involved with Barbados. This reminds us about how important 
domestic business interests were to merchant careers in the seventeenth century. Some of the merchants 
in this category profiteered from the Civil War by securing lucrative government contracts to provision 
the army and navy, and generated capital through appointments to offices which enabled them to farm 
the customs and excise, for example. 
The fact that the leading merchant investors in the Barbados sugar boom possessed broad domestic and 
overseas business interests in the 1630s and early 1640s (before the sugar boom) strongly suggests that 
the capital used by London merchants to finance the expansion of the plantation system and African 
slavery on Barbados had global origins. This challenges Brenner’s argument that it was merchants with 
existing interests in American enterprise, and especially the tobacco trade, who ‘provided much of the 
energy and capital’ behind the advent of the Caribbean sugar industry.100 It also highlights how 
developments in the American colonies were influenced by trading activity beyond the Atlantic basin. The 
broad array of trades which merchant investors in the sugar boom participated in may have been a 
distinctive feature of the first half of the seventeenth century, because by the close of the century most 
London merchants had specialised in one branch of trade due to the commercial advantages gained by 
possessing expert knowledge and creditworthy contacts in a specific trade. An eighteenth-century 
commission agent involved in Caribbean trade was highly unlikely to have invested in EIC joint stock, let 
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alone to have served as a director of the EIC, like several of the merchant financiers of the Barbados 
sugar boom in the mid-seventeenth century.101 
Can this analysis also tell us something about the significance of participation in the Barbados sugar 
boom to the career trajectories of merchants in early modern England? The most striking pattern relates 
to the timing of these investments within their wider careers. It is remarkable how many of the merchant 
financiers of the 1640s sugar boom rose from their marginal position outside of the established City elite 
to become the leaders of London’s business community during the 1650s and early 1660s, sitting on the 
directorates of various overseas companies and wielding extraordinary influence in the English 
government.  
After the sugar boom merchants with Caribbean business ties were increasingly elected as alderman, 
wielding power over the civic governance of the corporation of London: Thomas Noell in 1649, Andrew 
Riccard in 1651, William Williams in 1652, William Pennoyer in 1657, Martin Noell in 1657, William 
Vincent in 1658, Richard Ford in 1661, and Michael Davison in 1666.102 Thirteen prominent investors in 
Barbados occupied seats on the court of directors of the East India Company in the period between 1650 
and 1670: Maurice Thomson, William Pennoyer, Andrew Riccard, Edwin Browne, Thomas Andrews, 
Michael Davison, Jeremy Blackman, Martin Noell, Roger Vivian, John Wood, William Williams, James 
Drax, and Thomas Kendall. Maurice Thomson and Andrew Riccard even became the governor of the 
East India Company for a time.103 A smaller number of merchant financiers of the sugar boom also 
served in the directorate of the Levant Company: Edwin Browne William Williams, Andrew Riccard, 
Roger Vivian, and Thomas Kendall. Andrew Riccard served as the governor of Levant Company for 
eighteen years.104 Merchant financiers of the Barbados sugar boom subscribed heavily to the new slave 
 
101 On the diverse business portfolios maintained by London merchants in the early seventeenth century, see Smith, 
‘Global Dimensions of London’s Commercial Community’. On the greater specialisation seen at the end of the 
seventeenth century, see Nash, ‘The Organization of Trade and Finance’, pp. 112-115.  
102 Alfred P. Beaven, 'Chronological list of aldermen: 1601-1650' & 'Chronological list of aldermen: 1651-1700', in 
The Aldermen of the City of London Temp. Henry III - 1912 (London, 1908), pp. 47-119. British History Online 
https://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/london-aldermen/hen3-1912 (Accessed 29 May 2019). 
103 CCMEIC, Vols. 4 – 6.  
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trading company, the Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa, first incorporated by royal patent in 1660: 
Martin Noell, James Noell, Thomas Noell, Thomas Povey, Andrew Riccard, and John Colleton.105 As we 
will explore in greater detail in Chapter Four, merchant investors in Barbados sugar production also 
became central figures within successive English governments, and were heavily represented on 
committees and councils related to trade and colonial business between 1653 and 1665. Their growing 
wealth, improved reputations, and political influence enabled them to secure appointments to offices to 
farm the customs and excise and function as moneylenders to the government, becoming so 
indispensable to government finance that they remained highly influential after the Restoration.  
The proceeds of sugar and slavery played a larger part in advancing the careers of some London 
merchants than has hitherto been appreciated. Indeed, it appears that a specific generation of merchants, 
born predominantly in the 1600s and 1610s (when the American plantations were first being settled), 
were particularly heavy investors in the 1640s Barbados sugar boom. For many of these men, their 
participation in the sugar boom came early in their careers, suggesting that these investments were 
instrumental in their subsequent rise to prominence. But we must be careful not to overemphasise the 
significance of Barbados in causing this pattern. Allegiance to Parliament in the Civil War, or at the very 
least political equivocation, was also important in securing the rise of these merchants in the City of 
London during the 1640s and 1650s.  
The career of the merchant Nicholas Crispe serves as a good example of how important this factor could 
be. Crispe was a London-based trader with a varied business portfolio during the 1620s and 1630s.106 His 
principal interest was West African commerce, where he operated as both a private trader and member of 
 
105 The initial membership of the Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa in 1660 was almost wholly made up of the 
King and his courtiers. Only after 1663 did merchants begin to invest capital in the company. Others with 
Caribbean business interests who subscribed included: Sir Nicholas Crispe, Thomas Crispe, Capt. Edward Crispe, 
Sir Richard Ford, Sir Thomas Modyford, and Sir James Modyford. See Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the Slave 
Trade, pp. 169-172 (and associated footnotes), Document 48, ‘A List of the Royal Adventurers of England Trading 
into Africa’, 1667. 
106 On top of his deep commercial ties with West Africa, Nicholas Crispe was a Merchant Adventurer, stockholder 
and director of the East India Company, a Mediterranean trader, and a subscriber to the 1642 Irish Adventurers 
scheme. Robert Ashton, ‘Crisp, Sir Nicholas, first baronet (c. 1599–1666), merchant and royalist’, ODNB (23 
September 2004), https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-
9780198614128-e-6705 (Accessed 8 November 2019). 
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the Guinea Company, spearheading English efforts to establish a commercial presence on the Gold 
Coast. By 1640 Crispe was in a prime position to profit from the upcoming Barbados sugar boom. In 
partnership with John Wood and his brother Samuel, he had begun trading in enslaved Africans to the 
island in the early 1640s and had even purchased a plantation on the island. But the Civil War intervened. 
Following the outbreak of hostilities between King and Parliament in 1642, Crispe chose to give public 
backing to the King. This was probably due to the favour he had received from Charles I in recent years: 
he was appointed as a collector of customs in the western ports in 1638, as a farmer of duties on various 
commodities, and was knighted in 1640. During the Civil War Crispe bolstered the royalist cause by 
lending money to the Crown, providing intelligence, relocating to the King’s court at Oxford, and 
equipping a squadron of 15 vessels out of personal funds.107  
Parliament could not countenance such overt public support for Charles I. Crispe’s fortune and company 
stock was sequestered in 1644, which made it next to impossible to continue trading to West Africa and 
to invest in Barbadian sugar production alongside other Guinea Company members such as John Wood, 
who had kept their heads down following the declaration of war. Crispe absconded to France in 1646 and 
remained there for the duration of the Interregnum, only returning to London once the English 
monarchy had been restored in 1660.108 As we have seen, some other royalist merchants such as John 
Colleton opted to flee to the American colonies. He became a merchant-planter on Barbados for the 
duration of the 1650s, and only felt safe returning to England following the Restoration. Outright 
hostility to the Parliamentary regime usually ended with the sequestration of private property, a massive 
loss of political influence, and ultimately ostracisation from the merchant community in the City of 
London for nearly two decades. Allegiance in the Civil War therefore had a decisive influence over which 
merchants became leading figures in London’s community of overseas traders at mid-century.  
 
107 Ashton, ‘Sir Nicholas Crisp’, ODNB. 
108 R. Porter, ‘The Crispe Family and the African Trade in the Seventeenth Century’, The Journal of African History, 
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2. Why did London merchants invest in the Barbados sugar industry during 
the 1640s? 
In this section it will be argued that timing was crucial to the rapid emergence of a sugar industry on 
Barbados. The decision taken by London merchants to invest heavily in Barbados sugar production was 
directly influenced by two external events. First, the new commercial opportunities opening up in the 
1640s due to the collapse of the Brazilian sugar industry, which caused the price of sugar in European 
markets to soar. Second, the increased economic and political uncertainty in England generated by the 
Civil War. Rather than securing their liquid capital in English land and the joint stock of overseas trading 
companies, which was perilous during the 1640s due to the ongoing conflict, the evidence suggests that 
London merchants sought to mitigate against increased risk by diversifying their investment portfolios. 
Merchants invested in the war by securing government contracts and tax farming offices, stored their 
money with goldsmith-bankers, and increasingly looked beyond England’s shores for secure locations to 
store their assets. They secured their money in Irish land through the Adventurers Scheme, and also on 
Barbados, where they speculated in the sugar industry by purchasing plantations and enslaved Africans. 
The precipitous decline in Brazilian sugar production and the English Civil War proved to be unique 
events, which caused English merchants to invest heavily in the Barbados sugar industry during the 
1640s, accelerating Barbadian economic development.  
Why did sugar become a significant export crop on Barbados at a specific point in time, namely the mid-
1640s? The sugar cane crop had been present on Barbados since 1627, when Henry Powell had fetched 
an array of seeds and plants from the Essequibo plantation for the use of the initial settlers.109 Why, then, 
did planters struggle with tobacco and cotton for nearly two decades before turning towards commercial 
sugar production? This question has puzzled historians for decades. The answer, I would argue, is that it 
was not until the 1640s that the knowledge of how to efficiently cultivate and process the plant reached 
Barbadian planters through connections with Brazil. It was also during the 1640s that the Barbadian 
 
109 Harlow, Colonising Expeditions, pp. 37-38. 
Michael D. Bennett 
111 
 
economy first received massive capital investment and an influx of unfree labour supplied by English 
merchants. Practical knowledge, unfree labour, and capital investment were needed to initiate commercial 
sugar production in the seventeenth century, and a fortuitous convergence of external political and 
economic circumstances in the 1640s meant that Barbados received this all at once. This helps to explain 
why a fully-fledged plantation economy developed so rapidly on Barbados, whereas elsewhere in the 
English Caribbean it took several decades for a commercial sugar industry to emerge.  
A protracted period of violence in Brazil between the Portuguese and the Dutch began in 1630 with the 
conquest of Recife and the establishment of a Dutch colony known as New Holland. Warfare in northern 
Brazil, which flared in 1645, had a twofold impact on the development of the Barbados sugar industry. It 
facilitated transfers in useful knowledge related to the cultivation and refining of sugar came from Brazil 
to Barbadian planters, and the spike in sugar prices caused by the conflict meant that getting involved in 
sugar production represented a new and profitable commercial opportunity for English merchants.  
Barbados is the closest island in the Lesser Antilles to the alluvial sugar-producing regions of northern 
Brazil. The proximity of Barbados to the South American continent enabled entrepreneurial English 
planters to visit Brazil for instruction in the cultivation of sugar, and also meant that the island was a 
prime location for refugees fleeing the escalating violence between the Dutch and Portuguese in the 
1640s. This suggests that connections between Barbados and northern Brazil facilitated the dissemination 
of useful knowledge to Barbadian planters. Several of the narratives written in the seventeenth century 
which describe the origins of cane cultivation on Barbados attribute the establishment of the sugar 
industry on the island to the distribution of plants and expertise from Brazil. Richard Ligon, a royalist 
exile who recorded his experiences on the island between 1647 and 1650 in his True and Exact History of 
Barbados (1657), claimed that when he first arrived at the colony in September 1647, ‘the great work of 
Sugar making, was but newly practised by the inhabitants there’. According to Ligon, ‘some of the most 
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industrious men, having gotten Plants from Pernambuco’, decided to make a ‘trial of them at the 
Barbados’.110  
Through a process of trial and error, along with ‘new directions from Brazil’, planters on Barbados were 
able to quickly improve the quality and quantity of their yields. Ligon explained that sometimes this 
process of knowledge exchange and technology transfer between Brazil and Barbados was facilitated by 
Englishmen who travelled to Brazil seeking ‘the secrets of that mystery’, who returned with ‘Plants and 
better Knowledge’, while at other occasions by ‘strangers’ from the mainland who settled on the island. It 
is likely these ‘strangers’ were Sephardic refugees who had fled to the Caribbean islands following the 
escalating conflict between the Dutch and Portuguese in northern Brazil, and had experience in the sugar 
trade.111 It has even been plausibly argued that the ‘Portugall negroes’ described as labouring on James 
Drax’s plantation may have been Afro-Brazilians, who were purchased specifically because of their pre-
existing knowledge in how to raise a bountiful sugar crop and process the cane.112 By the time Ligon left 
Barbados in 1650, planters on the island had learnt how to plant sugar efficiently, had realised that the 
ideal time to harvest the ripe cane was after 15 months, and had become proficient in the industrial 
processes associated with boiling and curing away the molasses to produce white sugar.113  
The economic impact of warfare in northern Brazil during the 1640s is a key part of the explanation for 
why London merchants became deeply involved with the Barbados sugar economy in the same decade. 
English planters and merchants were able to capitalise upon the elevation in sugar prices that this disorder 
generated by developing a new source of supply on Barbados which they themselves controlled. The 
Dutch conquest of Pernambuco and the establishment of the captaincies on the northeastern coast of 
Brazil between 1630 and 1654 severely disrupted the Atlantic sugar economy. This disturbance was 
generated by the combined impact of the interruption to sugar production and the harm which Dutch 
privateers caused to Portuguese maritime commerce with Brazil. Both the invaders and the resistors 
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destroyed engenhos (sugar mills) and burned cane fields, rendering around one third of the mills in the 
region out of operation by 1639.114 To compound these issues further, a high proportion of the 
Portuguese vessels engaged in the Brazil trade were captured by Dutch privateers, with approximately 220 
merchant caravels being taken in the two years from 1647 to 1648.115 It has been estimated that the 
tumult in Bahia and Pernambuco caused annual sugar exports from Brazil to contract from a high of 
around 14,900 crates of sugar in 1641 to approximately 1,500 crates every year in the period between 
1647 and 1652.116 The precipitous decline in sugar exports from Brazil to Europe presented an excellent 
commercial opportunity for those willing to enter the market and develop a new source of sugar 
production in the Caribbean or elsewhere.117 Samuel Hartlib, the Anglo-German intellectual living in 
England, was aware that because of ‘the mills being destroyed in Brasil, the Sugar-trade in Berbados 
prospers the more’.118  
Entrepreneurial planters on Barbados capitalised upon this opportunity as early as October 1643. That 
month Thomas Robinson had written to the Earl of Carlisle to report, though certainly with some 
exaggeration about the rate of sugar production, how: 
the Island of the Barbadas is growne the most flourishing Island in all those American pts and I 
verily believe in all the world for the p[ro]ducing of Sugars Indico Ginger…this shippe is laden 
with 70tie cheists of sugar all of one mans p[ro]duce and their Sugar works are brought to that 
maturity that each worke for the space of eight monethes in the yeare can and doeth yield 500 li 
of sugar each 24 howeres.119 
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Once reports began to filter back to England that experiments with cultivating and refining sugar cane on 
Barbados were proving fruitful, merchants in the City of London began to speculate in the industry 
themselves. Affluent merchants were in a prime position to take advantage of this new business 
opportunity, as they could quickly raise or borrow the capital needed to purchase a plantation and initiate 
sugar production. As we saw in the previous section, some even had existing business ties with Barbados, 
which gave them an added advantage. The annual income which could be generated through the sale of 
sugar was lauded by many on the island. In 1646, one of the pioneers of sugar cultivation on Barbados, 
William Powrey, wrote favourably about the financial returns that investing in a sugar plantation could 
bring. To encourage his uncle Archibald Hay to transfer ownership of the Hope Plantation into his own 
hands, Powrey highlighted how this parcel of land had the potential to ‘make one of the best sugar 
plantations in this Island’. With the expense of £1000 necessary to begin operations, he hoped to be able 
to raise for his uncle a thriving industry on Barbados, which after just three years promised returns of up 
to £2000 per annum.120 From his experience working on the island as an overseer on Thomas Modyford’s 
estate between 1647 and 1650, Richard Ligon claimed that, when operational, a 500-acre sugar plantation 
would generate an annual profit of £7516.121  
The accounts of sugar planters on Barbados have not survived for the mid-seventeenth century, which 
makes it impossible to assess the veracity of these claims. But if annual profits for the pioneers of sugar 
cultivation on Barbados were indeed in the region of 40 to 50 percent like these figures suggest, then this 
would have represented an extremely lucrative business investment for merchants. The average return on 
a business portfolio comprised of both safe and risky investments was in the order of 10 to 15 percent in 
the first half of the seventeenth century. The East India Company’s first joint stock yielded shareholders 
7.25 percent per annum, while the trade to the Levant, Spain, and Portugal generally provided merchants 
with returns of between 10 and 12 percent. Profits generated from the manufacturing and domestic retail 
trades were similar in magnitude.122 Barbados sugar, by comparison, offered investors an extraordinary 
 
120 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/39, William Powrey to Archibald Hay, 20 November 1646.  
121 Ligon, True and Exact History, pp. 189-192. 
122 Grassby, Business Community, pp. 236-240.  
Michael D. Bennett 
115 
 
profit margin in the 1640s. This was a direct consequence of the massive spike in sugar prices within the 
Atlantic market caused by the warfare in northern Brazil during the 1640s.123  
On top of the new commercial opportunities arising from the disruption to the Atlantic economy caused 
by the collapse of the Brazilian sugar industry, the political crisis unfolding in England, which spilled over 
into civil war in 1642, also played a decisive role in shaping the investment decisions of merchants. 
Accommodation with the King always seemed the most likely outcome, but England’s political and 
economic horizons became ever more uncertain as the war continued to drag on over multiple years. The 
London economy was hit particularly hard in the period from summer 1643 to spring 1644 because of a 
royalist blockade of internal trade and the exacting demands of Parliamentary taxation.124 Besides the 
large pitched battles fought by field armies at Edgehill, Newbury, and Marston Moor there were also 
smaller engagements, skirmishes, and sieges fought across England in these years. 62,000 war deaths 
(along with a further 100,000 casualties from disease), the widespread destruction of private property, and 
the sequestration of land were just some of the consequences of the First Civil War between 1642 and 
1646.125 Warfare in England indirectly stimulated the development of the plantation system on Barbados 
by injecting a large supply of unfree labour into the island’s economy: exiled prisoners of war and political 
captives sent over from the British Isles performed a lot of the agricultural and industrial work associated 
with sugar production in the 1640s.126 
The Civil War (1642-46) and the subsequent revolution (1647-49) influenced the investment decisions 
made by English merchants. It transformed what merchants could do with their available capital. In the 
seventeenth century it was common for merchants to make their money in commerce, before steadily ‘de-
risking’ over the course of their business careers by placing their capital in more stable investments, such 
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as landed property, real estate, moneylending to the Crown, and government contracts to farm taxes.127 
But the tumult caused by civil war meant that, in the 1640s, some of these traditional outlets for capital 
investment became unreliable. Owning landed property in England, for instance, suddenly became a 
much less secure prospect for investment. Land was rendered unusable due to widespread sequestrations, 
and depending on the outcome of the war, which was not certain until late 1648, landowners faced the 
possibility of not even having legal recourse to reclaim their property following the cessation of hostilities. 
In a process which began in the summer of 1642 but probably reached its peak in late 1643, London 
merchants and scriveners withdrew their investments from the provincial economy because they believed 
debts would not be repaid and their property was under threat of destruction and sequestration. While 
some English merchants and army grandees with political ties to the parliamentary regime took advantage 
of the opportunity presented by sequestration, and bought-up royalist lands in England seized by the state 
at cheap rates, this process only began in earnest after the end of the First Civil War in 1646. Investing in 
English land during the war was not a secure prospect, and few merchants were willing to shoulder this 
risk.128 Though closer to hand, owning real estate in London was not necessarily a more reliable option, as 
landlords were forced to lower rents after struggling to receive payments from impoverished tenants.129  
Disruption to the usual business practices of merchants during the 1640s was not just restricted to landed 
investments. Domestic and overseas trade was almost immediately put in an unsettled state with the onset 
of hostilities. This was anticipated by the sugar boom investor Thomas Povey in a lengthy diatribe 
published at the beginning of the conflict in 1642. Povey highlighted the negative consequences the war 
would have on commerce, stressing how ‘certaine the utter decay of trade (the livelihood of the State) will 
be’, and that ‘the treasure of this Land, heaped up by a long lived peace, will be suddenly powred out, and 
be seene no more’.130 The Civil War did not cause London’s domestic and overseas trade to cease 
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altogether, but it did harm the city’s economy and made dispatching vessels a much riskier prospect for 
merchants. This generated anxiety among merchants about the viability of overseas trade, and also made 
it more expensive to conduct commerce safely, as the cost of insuring vessels and cargo increased. James 
Howell offered a bleak assessment of this situation in December 1647. He observed how ‘the Mint is 
starv’d for want of Bullion; Trade which was ever the sinew of this Island doth visibly decay, and the 
Insurance of Ships is risen from two to ten in the hundred’.131  
From 1643-44 the King sought to stifle London’s commerce by encouraging foreign princes and 
governors of the American colonies to declare the city’s merchants as enemies. Such legislative action had 
limited success: only the King of Denmark prohibited trade with London merchants and their colonial 
trade continued unabated.132 It was the activity of royalist and Irish privateers in organising blockades and 
harassing merchant vessels which caused the most disruption to London’s overseas trade. Privateering 
was a logical strategy for royalists, because the customs revenue generated from the import and export of 
commodities through the port of London played a role in bankrolling Parliament’s ultimate victory.133 
Total merchant losses to privateers are hard to estimate, because the prize lists produced by royalist and 
Irish authorities have not survived. But qualitative sources suggest that at least 370 vessels were taken by 
privateers operating out of bases in Ireland and the Channel Islands. The scale of privateering during the 
Civil War was vast, and historians agree that these figures underestimate the total number of vessels 
belonging to London merchants taken as prizes, as they do not include data from other provincial ports 
under royalist control such as Bristol and Dartmouth.134 The records of the High Court of Admiralty and 
 
Bulstrode Whitelocke voiced similar concerns that same year, noting how the people of England had been brought 
‘very low’ due to ‘the present general decay of trade’. Quoted in Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, p. 48. 
131 Quoted in Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, p. 228. 
132 Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, pp. 117-125. 
133 For the importance of controlling the port of London to Parliament’s victory in the Civil War, see Robert M. 
Bliss, Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (Manchester, 1990), pp. 48-
49.  
134 Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, pp. 125-127; Richard J. Blakemore and Elaine Murphy, 
The British Civil Wars at Sea, 1638-1653 (Woodbridge, 2018), pp. 78-79. 
Michael D. Bennett 
118 
 
the Mayor’s Court of London for the 1640s are full of examples of trading voyages gone awry due to the 
actions of royalist privateers.135 
The commercial impact of royalist privateers escalated over the course of the war, with complaints from 
merchants reaching their height in the last two years of the 1640s. The mutiny of Parliament’s navy 
further complicated matters, as during the summer of 1648 the rebel fleet was used to blockade the 
Thames estuary and seize merchant vessels, bringing London’s maritime trade to a virtual standstill.136 By 
the middle of the decade the deleterious economic impact of the Civil War was increasingly being felt 
across the Atlantic. Growing insecurity in commerce and the resultant decline in merchant shipping 
restricted the flow of goods and information coming into the American colonies. The anxieties this 
generated were articulated in a 1646 letter from William Powrey on Barbados to Archibald Hay in 
England. ‘I pray God send peace’, he remonstrated, so ‘that there may bee a settled way of tradeinge 
againe sett on foot and that you may be able to assist and direct mee such a course that I may make the 
best of my commodities that the same may be sould to the best advantage’.137 
The Civil War caused extensive disruption to England’s overseas commerce. Total cloth exports to the 
Baltic through Plymouth Sound plummeted from 42,000 pieces in 1642 to just 5000 in 1644. Impositions 
collected in London on exports to the eastern Mediterranean, under the remit of the Levant Company, 
deteriorated from £1,843 in 1643 to £528 in 1644, a fall of 72 percent in the space of a year. In 1645 the 
Levant Company expressed the ‘distressed condition’ of their trade in a letter to Sir Sackville Crowe, the 
ambassador in Constantinople.138 Imports also saw precipitous decline, principally because of the 
shrinking market for luxury commodities caused by the war and the increased difficulty with which 
merchants and wholesalers in port towns were able to reach their provincial customers. The Levant 
Company’s impositions on imports of currants and other consumer goods stood at £2,491 in 1635, but 
 
135 E.g. In July 1647 the Cormantine Frigat, a Guinea Company vessel owned by the London merchants Rowland 
Wilson, Maurice Thompson, and Thomas Walter was seized by a royalist warship in the service of the Prince of 
Wales and taken to Holland before being sold as a prize. LMA, MCD Box 2, CLA/024/06/002. 
136 Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, pp. 127-137. 
137 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/945/1, William Powrey to Archibald Hay, 15 November 1646. 
138 Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company (Oxford, 1935), pp. 52-53; Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the 
Economy of London, pp. 169-170. 
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had decreased by 70 percent to only £760 in 1644. In response to the near collapse of the re-export trade 
to European markets, imports of tobacco from the Chesapeake and Bermuda fell by nearly one half, from 
1,463,000 lb. in 1640 to 788,000 lb. in 1647.139 The negative impact of the fractious political climate on 
overseas commerce made investors reluctant to subscribe to the joint stock of overseas trading 
companies. Only £105,000 was invested in East India Company’s fourth joint stock in 1643, for instance, 
which forced the company to borrow £120,000 to finance their trade.140  
It would be wrong to suggest, however, that there was a consistent decline in all of England’s overseas 
import and export trades during the Civil War. While imports of French wines fell markedly, imports of 
Spanish wines from the Canary Islands actually expanded, offsetting some of the negative impacts the 
English consumer felt from the disturbance in the French wine trade. There was also a slight recovery in 
London’s overseas trade after 1644 as the war began to turn in Parliament’s favour: though this limited 
revival was halted in 1647-48 due to anxieties about the radical political events occurring in the city and 
the mutiny of the navy.141 But from what historians have been able to surmise from the available 
quantitative evidence, the overall trend in England’s overseas trade between 1642 and 1649 was sharply 
downwards. This echoes what contemporary commentators observed. A pamphlet published in London 
in June 1648 remarked on: ‘The sensible decay of forraigne Traffick, which even before the late great 
alteration in the Navy, was shrunk to a third part lesse then formerly it was wont to be, as may be 
demonstrated by the Customes; and (as it is justly feared) will now fall to nothing’.142 
With English land an increasingly unreliable investment option and overseas trade in an unsettled state, 
London merchants looked for alternative means of making money and securing their liquid capital in the 
1640s. One potentially lucrative opportunity for domestic investment was to act as a military supplier for 
 
139 Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, pp. 171-175; J. S. Kepler, ‘Estimates of Direct 
Shipments of Tobacco and Sugar from the Chief English Plantations to European Markets, 1620-1669’, Journal of 
European Economic History, Vol. 28 (1999), p. 119. 
140 CCMEIC, Vol. 2., p. XXVI.  
141 On the wine trade and the temporary recovery in trade after 1644, see Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the 
Economy of London, pp. 172-175.  
142 Anon., The Necessity of the Speedy Calling a Common-Hall, In respect of the present grievances of this City. With the Resolution of 
many Thousand, honest, peaceable, and wel-affected Citizens thereupon (London, 1648), p. 3. 
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the parliamentary war machine. Following the outbreak of war in 1642, the government quickly became 
an important customer for English merchants and craftsmen. Those who possessed political connections 
with the new regime were handed government contracts to arm and equip Parliament’s armies with goods 
in steady demand due to the exacting requirements of war, including muskets, pikes, saltpetre, 
gunpowder, heavy ordnance, clothing, shoes, horses, saddles, and food.143 Stephen Estwicke, the London-
based merchant and haberdasher, was commissioned to provision clothing, and in the first eight months 
of the war issued over £23,000 worth of clothes to the Earl of Essex’s army. While Jenkin Ellis and John 
Mings, members of the Cordwainer’s company, were major suppliers of shoes to Parliament.144  
As one might expect, the parliamentary government’s efforts to provision weapons and ammunition 
consumed the largest sums, which provided a significant stimulus to the London armaments and 
munitions industries. In September 1642 Parliament contracted with the merchants Thomas Andrewes 
and Stephen Estwicke to import £15,000 worth of weaponry from Holland and France. The American 
tobacco traders and religious radicals, Owen Rowe and John Bradley, were charged with oversight of the 
provision of munitions and ordnance. But by the time of the formation of the New Model Army in 1645, 
domestic arms manufacturers such as the London Gunsmith’s Company had grown to a sufficient size to 
supply Parliament’s forces with most of what they needed to prosecute the war effort.145 During the 
Interregnum both William Pennoyer and Maurice Thomson contracted with the East India Company on 
behalf of the state for a supply of saltpetre, a key ingredient in the manufacture of gunpowder, which was 
extracted from mineral deposits in Bihar near the banks of the River Ganges and used in the London 
munitions industries.146 Those merchants and artificers involved in the carrying trade, by both sea and 
land, also did well in the 1640s due to the government’s need to resort to private contractors to transport 
 
143 Ian Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1663 (Oxford, 1992), pp. 40-47; Coates, The 
Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, ch. 4; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 397-399. On the supply 
of horses, see Gavin Robinson, ‘Horse Supply and the Development of the New Model Army, 1642–1646’, War in 
History, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2008), pp. 121–40  
144 Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, p. 93, 102-103. See also Gentles, The New Model Army, 
pp. 41-42.   
145 Peter Edwards, Dealing in Death: The Arms Trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638-52 (Stroud, 2000); Coates, The 
Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, pp. 93-96; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 155-156, 338.  
146 CCMEIC, Vol. 3, p. 349, 351-352, 355; Vol. 5, pp. 62-63, 155. 
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these provisions to its armies across England. Wartime demand for carts and wagons enabled the master 
wheelwright, Thomas Bateman, to generate an annual income of £370, far above his usual paygrade.147 
Another opportunity for domestic investment, which helped to create some of the largest merchant 
fortunes during the Civil War years, was participation in public finance.148 Robert Brenner has 
demonstrated how the London merchants who assisted in the capture of the English state in 1641-42 
were heavily represented in the new financial bureaucracy constructed to bankroll the Parliamentary war 
effort through direct taxation. An ordinance enacted in November 1642 introduced a weekly assessment 
on the City of London, which was administered by a commission consisting of, among others, Maurice 
Thomson, Samuel Vassall, John Fowke, Isaac Pennington, and John Venn. Thomson and his associates 
also dominated another newly appointed commission associated with state finance, the committee for the 
sequestration of delinquents' estates, which was formed in March 1643 to levy a fine on royalists who 
wished to recover their sequestered property.149 The committee of accounts, first appointed in February 
1644 to audit the accounts of those who had received Parliamentary funds, was also largely composed of 
London merchants.150  
Indirect taxes, such as the customs and excise, accounted for the majority of the revenue that Parliament 
raised in London during the Civil War. Wealthy merchants were often employed as tax collectors in 
seventeenth-century England because they had the expertise to ensure efficient collection and could 
perform useful financial services for the government, including advancing the regime large sums from 
their personal pool of credit. Government financing expanded significantly in the 1640s due to the 
demands of the parliamentary war effort, and it was mostly underwritten by private merchants who 
contracted for revenue collection, and not by public means (e.g. direction taxation). In return for a set 
income to be paid at a pre-determined date, the parliamentary government sold private individuals the 
 
147 Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, p. 399.  
148 Ibid., pp. 403-404; Braddick, The Nerves of State, pp. 34-41.  
149 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 389, 428-435; Braddick, The Nerves of State, ch. 3; Wheeler, The Making of a 
World Power, ch. 8. 
150 Jason Peacey, ‘Politics, Accounts and Propaganda in the Long Parliament’, in Chris R. Kyle and Jason Peacey, 
eds, Parliament at Work: Parliamentary Committees, Political Power and Public Access in Early Modern England (Woodbridge, 
2002), pp. 59-78 (esp. p. 62).  
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right to collect the customs and excise on their behalf, enabling merchants to skim revenue and profiteer 
from this powerful position. Merchants required reserves of liquid capital to get started in tax farming, 
but this was a low-risk high-reward activity, which usually multiplied the initial money invested rapidly.151 
It was merchants with political ties to the parliamentary government, like Maurice Thomson, William 
Pennoyer, and Martin Noell, who were handed offices to farm the customs and excise during the 
Interregnum. These merchants invested their capital into the new system of government financing which 
emerged in England to fund the Civil War.152 The involvement of merchants in government contracting 
and tax farming demonstrates how the Civil War generated profits, not just destruction. While English 
land and overseas trade were unreliable business options for merchants during the 1640s, the material and 
financial demands of war created new investment opportunities. As the case of the Martin Noell aptly 
shows, the profits that some London businessmen made from financing the parliamentary war machine 
found their way into overseas investment, including the Barbados sugar industry.  
As well as investing in the war by tax farming and securing government contracts to provision the army 
and navy, London merchants also sought to minimise the risk to their personal assets caused by an 
uncertain political and economic climate by depositing their money in more secure locations, such as with 
goldsmith-bankers or in land overseas. In the mid-seventeenth century there was no centralised banking 
institution within which wealthy individuals could store their money securely, though both scriveners and 
goldsmiths did offer this service on a personal basis. Instead, it was established practice for merchants to 
entrust their money in the hands of a senior servant or apprentice. But new economic opportunities arose 
for servants during the Civil War, such as joining the army, which caused many to desert their masters. 
The anonymous author of The Mystery of the New Fashioned Goldsmiths or Bankers (1676) suggests that this 
change in circumstances led London merchants and the landed gentry to increasingly deposit their money 
with goldsmith-bankers, who were perceived to be a more secure place to store private wealth and 
 
151 Braddick, The Nerves of State, pp. 34-41, 95-101; Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, p. 403. See also William J. 
Ashworth, Customs and Excise: Trade, Production, and Consumption in England, 1640-85 (Oxford, 2003). 
152 Wheeler, The Making of a World Power, ch. 6, 7 and especially pp. 130-136. 
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offered investors regular interest payments (four pence per day).153 Unfortunately, the accounts for 
scriveners and goldsmith-bankers like Robert Abbot who operated in the 1640s have not survived, so it is 
impossible to ascertain how much money London merchants were storing with them during the Civil 
War. Although, as we will see in Chapter Five, many of the merchants who financed the Barbados sugar 
boom appear in the ledgers of the goldsmith-banker Edward Backwell for the period from 1663-1672. It 
is highly likely, therefore, that London merchants were also depositing their money with similar figures 
before this, and conformed to the general pattern which saw businessmen store increasing amounts of 
capital with goldsmith-bankers during the 1640s.   
London merchants also began to increasingly look beyond the shores of war-torn England during the 
1640s for locations to secure their liquid capital. Such an interpretation is supported by the historian Ben 
Coates, who argues that ‘the impact of the Civil War on overseas merchants was mitigated by the greater 
range of economic options open to them…they could more readily disengage from the domestic 
economy because it was relatively easy for them to move their capital out of the country’. In August 1643, 
for example, the Committee for the Navy noted that large sums of money were being shipped overseas. 
This flight of capital was also observed by James Howell in 1647 when he described how England’s ‘gold 
is ingrossed in privat hands, or gon beyond Sea to travell without Licence’.154 Merchant investment in 
Barbados was part of a wider pattern which saw English merchants, and particularly those in the City of 
London, secure their capital in overseas locations during the Civil War.  
The first location where London merchants invested their capital in the 1640s was Ireland. A rebellion in 
Ulster was launched in 1641, which began initially as an elite movement to voice grievances against the 
 
153 Anon., The Mystery of the New Fashioned Goldsmiths or Bankers (London, 1676), pp. 3-4; Eric Kerridge, Trade and 
Banking in Early Modern England (Manchester, 1988), p. 69; Melton, Sir Robert Clayton and the origins of English deposit 
banking, pp. 18-21, 30-34; Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, pp. 85-86. It is important to 
emphasise, however, that not all historians agree with this analysis. Melton claims that the The Mystery of the New 
Fashioned Goldsmiths was an ideologically charged pamphlet because it was published in the context of the Stop of the 
Exchequer. The most important point of contention in this debate is that goldsmith-bankers were operating in 
England prior to 1640. But this does not falsify the general trend described in the pamphlet: that goldsmith-bankers 
expanded their business operations and became more important to the English economy in response to the Civil 
War. See Melton, Sir Robert Clayton, 18-20, 30-33, 211-212. 
154 For these quotes, see Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, p. 163, 221, 228.  
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provincial administration, but soon became framed as a widespread religious conflict. Authors of 
numerous books and pamphlets began to publicise alleged atrocities inflicted by barbarous Irish Catholics 
against godly Protestant settlers.155 The English government, fractured as it was politically and limited in 
its ability to raise funds, appealed to private individuals to help finance the subjugation of Ireland. The 
Irish Adventurers Scheme (1642-3) was a Parliamentary initiative to quickly raise capital for the English 
reconquest of Ireland by using the promise of 2.5 million acres of confiscated Irish land as security. The 
scheme was thrown open to investors in March 1642 with the passage of the ‘Act for the speedy and 
effectual reducing of the rebels in His Majesty’s Kingdom of Ireland’. The legislation aimed to raise £1 
million by promising investors profitable Irish land at cheap rates.156 Karl Bottigheimer has calculated 
there were approximately 1,533 subscribers to the Irish Adventurers scheme, who invested a total of 
£306,718. By far the largest number (689, or 45%) fell into the category of ‘urban’ investors who supplied 
£139,333, or just under half the total capital invested. This category encompassed adventurers involved in 
an array of urban trades, most notably merchants (117 members contributing £36,169), merchant-tailors, 
grocers, and haberdashers. In general, the profile of the investors in the Irish Adventures of 1642-3 
tended to be London-based, more merchant than gentry, more inclined to support Parliament, and to be 
more Independent than Presbyterian in confession.157 
London merchants were the heaviest investors in the Irish Adventurers scheme. Their interests were 
represented on the committee for Ireland, first convened in September 1642, by the merchants David 
Watkins, Maurice Thomson, William Thomson, Samuel Moyer, William Pennoyer, Thomas Andrews, 
Michael Herring, Samuel Avery, Gregory Clement, Samuel Warner, and Robert Wilding. All were 
religious and political radicals who agitated for reform in London during the 1640s.158 Militant London 
merchants were also the impetus behind the Additional Sea Adventure to Ireland, which was sanctioned 
 
155 See, as an example, Anon., Worse and Worse Newes from Ireland (London, 1641). Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, 
pp. 166-168; Canny, Making Ireland British, ch. 8. 
156 Land would be allocated on a scale according to its differing value in the four provinces. An acre of land in Ulster 
was worth 4s; in Connacht 6s, in Munster 10s, and Leinster 12s. See Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, pp. 
40-42.  
157 Ibid., p. 54, 66-73.  
158 Keith Lindley, ‘Irish Adventurers and Godly Militants in the 1640s’, Irish Historical Studies, Vol. 29, No. 113 
(1994), pp. 4-8; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 402.  
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by Parliamentary ordinance in June 1642. To accelerate the subduing of Ireland, the Londoners offered to 
finance an expeditionary force consisting of 12 ships, 6 pinnaces, and land troops. The commissioners 
organising the venture included many London merchants, some of whom already had or would develop 
business interests in the Barbadian plantation economy. Parliament appointed Maurice Thomson, his 
brothers George and William, William Pennoyer, John Wood, Nicholas Crispe, Thomas Chamberlain, 
William Willoughby, Richard Shute, Gregory Clement, Samuel Moyer, and Richard Hill to sit on the 
commission for the Sea Adventure.159 £43,000 was raised under the ordinance, but when the invasion 
force reached the shores of Munster in July 1642 it failed in its intended aim to deliver England a decisive 
military victory over the rebels.160 
The decision taken by merchants, gentry, and ordinary people to invest capital in the Irish Adventurers 
Scheme of 1642-3 was motivated by both religious and material concerns. As stories of purported 
atrocities committed against Protestants circulated widely through word-of-mouth and print, investing in 
the scheme was increasingly seen by the ranks of the godly as a means of combatting the rising threat of 
Irish popery. Bulstrode Whitelocke, writing in February 1642, encapsulated these anxieties when he 
exhorted how the ‘Reducing of Ireland concerns not only the civil power, but the existence of our 
religion’.161 Another key motivation, especially for merchants, was to secure alluvial land at cheap rates in 
an overseas location, which could then be developed and sold on in the future for a profit.162  
The Adventurers scheme had fallen out of favour among both gentry and merchant investors by late 
1642. This was because the conquest of Ireland was not progressing with the speed they had anticipated. 
Money and forces were being diverted away from the suppression of the Irish rebellion towards 
 
159 Acts and Ordinances, Vol. 1, pp. 9-12, ‘The Ordinance for the Sea Adventure to Ireland’, 17 June 1642; Brenner, 
Merchants and Revolution, pp. 400-410; Lindley, ‘Irish Adventurers’, pp. 8-10. Nicholas Crispe subscribed £2600 to the 
Adventurers scheme (£900 in the original adventure, and a further £1700 under the sea ordinance). Crispe 
represents the most glaring exception to the trend that those merchants who invested in the Adventurers scheme 
were religious radicals and London militants who supported Parliament in the Civil War. Bottigheimer, English Money 
and Irish Land, p. 71. 
160 Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, pp. 83-84; Blakemore and Murphy, The British Civil Wars at Sea, pp. 54-
56. 
161 Lindley, ‘Irish Adventurers and Godly Militants in the 1640s’; The Whitelocke quotation is quoted in 
Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, p. 48.  
162 Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, p. 68.  
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Parliament’s fight against the King in England.163 The adventurers knew that it would not be until the 
process of subjugating Ireland had been finalised that the capital they had advanced would become 
parcels of land. Consequently, private investors lost confidence in the scheme, and in the future refused 
to finance the reduction of Ireland with hypothetical land grants as collateral. Only one-third of the £1 
million which Parliament had originally hoped for had been raised. The doubling ordinance of July 1643 
was almost a complete failure: just 171 people decided to invest in this advantageous opportunity, raising 
a paltry sum of between £10-12,000.164  
Henceforth, large loans to fund the Irish war were raised using the promise of repayment via future 
revenue from Parliamentary taxation, which expanded in the 1640s and represented a more reliable form 
of security.165 It was not until a decade later, when Cromwell had forcefully subdued the rebels in the 
military campaign of 1649-52, that confiscated Irish land would finally be expropriated to investors. The 
passage of the ‘Act for the Setling of Ireland’ in August 1652 and the lotteries of 1653-54 distributed land 
to the adventurers and soldiers as a form of repayment for their assistance in the reconquest. The harsh 
Cromwellian settlement radically reshaped land ownership in Ireland. London merchants made 
substantial gains from the large-scale confiscation of Irish land in the 1650s. Martin Noell, for instance, 
secured property in Wexford and reported in 1658 that he had ‘transplanted much of my interest, and 
affairs, and relations into Ireland’.166 
Despite showing early promise as a profitable commercial opportunity which could also accomplish key 
religious objectives, Ireland proved to be too entangled with the unfolding war in the Three Kingdoms to 
be a site for merchants to make safe investments in the 1640s. Parliament’s failure to quell the initial 
 
163Ibid., ch. 4.  
164 Ibid., pp. 85-93, 112-113. 
165 Acts and Ordinances, Vol. 1., pp. 192-197 & 220-221, ‘An Ordinance for the encouragement of Adventurers to 
make new Subscriptions for Towns, Cities, and Lands in Ireland’, 14 July 1643 and ‘Ordinance Appointing 
Commissioners to receive Subscriptions in Holland for Ireland’, 29 July 1643; Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish 
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Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenth-Century England: Local Administration and Response (Woodbridge, 1994); 
Braddick, The Nerves of State, pp. 16-18 & ch. 5.  
166 For the ‘Act for the Setling of Ireland’, 12 August 1652, see Acts and Ordinances, Vol. 2, pp. 598-603. For the 
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rebellion in Ulster caused this local conflict to develop into a protracted and widespread war of resistance, 
meaning that owning Irish land presented similar risks to possessing land in England (namely that it could 
be ruined by warfare). Indeed, during the winter of 1643-44 it looked possible that Anglo-Scottish forces 
might be compelled to temporarily retreat from Ireland, placing the adventurers’ investments in grave 
danger. Some investors panicked when faced with these risks and chose to sell their shares for a loss.167 
With Irish land appearing to be a less promising investment by 1643, London merchants increasingly 
looked across the Atlantic for a place to secure and augment their fortunes. 
The second overseas location where merchants invested their liquid capital in the 1640s was Barbados, 
which by the middle of the decade was showing clear signs that it was undergoing an export boom due to 
successful experiments with indigo, ginger, and sugar cultivation. This commercial dynamism caused the 
price of land to rise rapidly on the island. As early as 1637 there were complaints that ‘land is verie deare 
in this place’, but it was the onset of the sugar boom which caused an extraordinary increase in land prices 
on Barbados.168 One member of the Hartlib Circle (probably Benjamin Worsley), described how, ‘by 
falling upon new commodities’, Barbados had ‘within the space of 10 yeers…so prospered that their 
ground which was at first worth nothing almost is now dearer then in England’.169 Such statements are 
supported by quantitative evidence collated by Russell Menard, which reveals that the price of land saw a 
fivefold increase from £1.30 BMC per acre in 1640 to £5.50 BMC in 1650, making it a potentially 
lucrative investment for merchants.170  
An analysis of surviving source material detailing Barbadian land transactions in the 1640s, most of which 
can be found in the deed books held at the Barbados Department of Archives, reveal how 64 different 
English merchants, operating alone or in partnership, purchased 5739 acres of land on Barbados between 
1640 and 1650 (see Table 2.1, below). Barbados is a small island of only 106,000 acres, meaning that 
 
167 Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land, p. 87.  
168 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/7, Peter Hay to Archibald Hay, 29 September 1637. 
169 Hartlib Papers, ‘A Memorandum of the Virginia Plantation’ [undated], 61/5/1A-2B. For further information 
about Benjamin Worsley’s colonial activities and intellectual interests, see Thomas Leng, Benjamin Worsley (1618-
1677): Trade, Interest, and the Spirit in Revolutionary England (Woodbridge, 2008). 
170 For changing Barbadian land prices, see McCusker and Menard, ‘The Sugar Industry in the Seventeenth Century’, 
p. 299, Table 9.5. 
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English merchants acquired an interest in approximately 5 percent of all the land on Barbados during the 
1640s, a high proportion of which was probably alluvial land suitable for the cultivation of high-quality 
sugar cane.171 Menard has calculated that merchant investments in the 1640s injected £25,000 sterling into 
the Barbadian economy, which when adjusted for inflation, approximates to £6 million in today’s 
money.172 Important for the purposes of my argument is that 84 percent of the deeds of sale on Barbados 
in the 1640s involving English merchants purchasing land are clustered between the years from 1643 to 




171 My figures here differ to those collated by Russell Menard. He found that 75 English merchants purchased 
Barbadian land in the 1640s. See Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 52. Menard does not provide a copy of the database 
he used to calculate this figure in the appendix to his book. Without access to his raw data, it is not possible for me 
to be certain why Menard found 11 more merchants involved in Barbadian land transactions in the 1640s than I did. 
If forced to speculate, however, I would think that it is because Menard included those referred to as ‘London gent’ 
in Barbados deeds within his analysis, which I purposefully excluded because my study is focused solely on 
merchants.     
172 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 52. For the calculation of the merchant’s investment in 2018 money the Bank of 
England’s Inflation Calculator was used: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-
calculator (Accessed 19/02/2019).   
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Table 2.1. [Redacted] 
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The involvement of English merchants in the Barbados land market rose to a ‘powerful crescendo’ in 
1647. In this year alone, 33 English merchants obtained 2294.5 acres on the island (see Table 2.1, 
above).173 It is important to note, therefore, that in 1647 the economy of London saw another sharp 
downturn and popular politics in England had once again turned increasingly radical. The New Model 
Army had occupied London in August, prompting the East India Company to refuse to sell its wares, 
foreign merchants to withdraw their capital from the city, the value of sterling to drop in international 
markets, and London merchants to refuse to bring their bullion to the mint.174 The King’s efforts to 
secure himself a favourable settlement involved exploiting the fractures emerging in the Parliamentary 
camp. The New Model Army was quickly becoming a powerful political player separate from Parliament, 
while revolutionary ideas about implementing a programme for social levelling (one method for which 
was the redistribution of wealth and private property) were being discussed publicly during the Putney 
debates. Such fractious and radical politics were reminiscent of the polarised religious debates during the 
paper war of 1642, raising the possibility that the resumption of outright hostilities was imminent.175 The 
wider political and economic context of 1647 was one of confusion and financial crisis, and the City of 
London was at the epicentre of this national disorder. Is it any surprise, then, that in this year above all 
others London merchants looked overseas for a more secure location to invest their money? 
Merchants did not just invest in land, but also movable property. Chattel slaves were brought to Barbados 
from West Africa in increasing numbers by many of the same merchants who were also purchasing 
plantations on the island. Historians have developed several theories to explain the trend towards African 
slavery on Barbados, which intensified during the 1640s. We can be certain that the transition from 
servitude to slavery on Barbados was not due to a decline in the supply of servants: transportation of 
indentured servants, convicts, and prisoners of war to the American colonies increased during the 
Interregnum due to the successive military engagements in the Three Kingdoms, and only began to 
decline after 1660. Nor was it caused by the low price of enslaved Africans when compared to servants: 
 
173 My figures here differ to those collated by Russell Menard. He found that 22 merchants had purchased 1654.5 
acres in 1647. See Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 52-53. My analysis is more complete than Menard’s because it 
draws on a broader range of source material. 
174 Coates, The Impact of the Civil War on the Economy of London, pp. 227-229. 
175 Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire, pp. 479-506 & ch. 18. 
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the price for a healthy enslaved African rose from £16.50 BMC in 1640 to £27.70 BMC in 1650, an 
increase of nearly 60 percent. Explanations have instead focused on the demands of sugar as a labour-
intensive crop, and that it was ‘easier’ to discipline an enslaved African to perform hard plantation work 
than it was to compel white servants to carry out the same exhausting tasks.176 But the rapid expansion of 
African slavery on Barbados in the 1640s was not just caused by the difficulties encountered by planters 
in getting their servants to cultivate and process sugar cane, but also the efforts of English merchants to 
secure their capital overseas.  
The high value of labour on Barbados and the fact that enslaved Africans were the perpetual property of 
their masters (and theoretically could even create more value over time by bearing children) meant that 
English merchants chose to invest their capital in slave trading ventures to West Africa and populating 
their newly-bought plantations with chattel slaves. In his journal Henry Whistler noted in 1655 how on 
Barbados the ‘miserabell Negors [were] borne to perpetuall slavery with thay and thayer seed’, and that 
Englishmen commodified African bodies by purposefully encouraging breeding. According to Whistler, 
male slaves were permitted to have multiple wives, presumably to facilitate reproduction. An enslaved 
child was worth £5 BMC at birth, and because they were seen as a commodity, some planters reportedly 
had ‘30 [slaves] more or less about 4 or 5 years old: they sele them from one to the other as we doue 
shepe’.177 As well as having an inherent value, once they reached maturity enslaved Africans also 
produced extra profit through their labour. Thomas Povey, the colonial bureaucrat and close associate of 
the Barbados plantation owner Martin Noell, stressed how enslaved Africans were worth heavy 
 
176 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 32-36, 45-47; Kenneth Morgan, Slavery and the British Empire: From Africa to America 
(Oxford, 2007), p. 27. For a broader discussion of the reasons behind the transition from servitude to slavery at 
colonies in the British Atlantic World other than Barbados, a demographic transformation which occurred primarily 
in the second half of the seventeenth century, see John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, ‘The Origins of Slavery 
in the Americas’, in Robert L. Paquette and Mark M. Smith, The Oxford Handbook of Slavery in the Americas (Oxford, 
2010), pp. 275-292.  
177 Firth, ed., The Narrative of General Venables, Appendix E., ‘Extracts from Henry Whistler’s Journal of the West 
India Expedition’, pp. 145-7. Despite Whistler’s comments about the efforts of white planters to encourage 
reproduction among their African slaves, it is important to emphasise that brutal labour regimes and the prevalence 
of tropical disease meant that the slave population of the British Caribbean did not see any natural increase until the 
nineteenth century. Before this, the plantation system on Barbados could only be maintained through continual 
inputs of enslaved Africans via the transatlantic slave trade. Stanley L. Engerman, ‘A Population History of the 
Caribbean’, in M. R. Haines and R. H. Steckel, eds, A Population History of North America (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 503-
510; Newman, A New World of Labor, p. 214.    
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investment, observing that the ‘20,000 Negroes who subsist merely of the easye fruits of the Earth who 
by their labour doe rayse 200000lbs sterl. yearly’.178 
Historians have tended to view colonial enterprise in seventeenth-century America as an inherently risky 
venture, due to the high incidence of failure.179 But Barbados was unusual in this regard, as it was a 
location where English planters and merchants could make secure investments in land and enslaved 
Africans. This was due to a variety of intersecting environmental, geographical, and political factors. 
Richard Dunn has suggested that there were a specific set of environmental conditions and geographical 
features present on Barbados which help to explain why this island was the location where large-scale 
sugar cultivation was successfully pioneered in the English empire. This is an argument based around the 
premise of ‘Barbadian exceptionalism’. It proposes that the environment and geography of Barbados was 
ideal for the development of a plantation economy. The combination of a salubrious climate, high levels 
of annual rainfall, and the rich soil found in the uplands of Barbados meant that when Englishmen began 
experimenting with sugar cane in the mid-seventeenth century, their yields were bountiful and of a high 
quality.180 
The geographical location of Barbados was also favourable for the establishment of a stable, secure, and 
profitable English colony in the tropics. Barbados was well situated to receive the vessels which carried 
manpower and supplies to the infant English colonies in the Lesser Antilles, and as their first port of call 
in the Americas, often received the best provisions. Prevailing trade winds and transatlantic currents 
deposited these ships within the proximity of Barbados in the eastern Caribbean, and enabled those 
merchants who sailed from port towns in northern Europe, such as London and Amsterdam, to make a 
swift six-week journey westward across the ocean. Moreover, as an Atlantic-facing island, Barbados was 
the first place in the Caribbean region to become firmly integrated into the slave trading networks forged 
 
178 Quoted in Shaw, Everyday Life in the Early English Caribbean, p. 54.  
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by merchants. It was for this reason, according to Dunn, that planters on Barbados were afforded the 
best and most consistent supply of indentured servants and enslaved Africans.181 
Since the written record began, it appears that the types of natural disasters and foreign invasions which 
repeatedly devastated the societies and economies of other European colonies in the Caribbean region 
were infrequent on Barbados. This is part of the explanation for why the island was safe for merchant 
investment and why the slave-sugar system was able to so quickly develop on Barbados without 
interruption. Earthquakes generated at the Lesser Antilles subduction zone pose a threat to the 
inhabitants of all the islands in the eastern Caribbean, including those on Barbados. However, when 
compared with the tectonic threats created by the Enriquillo–Plantain Garden fault zone, which straddles 
the large islands of the Greater Antilles, Barbados is located in an area of relatively low seismic activity.182 
It has therefore consistently escaped the destructive power of the volcanic eruptions which destroyed 
urban settlements on Montserrat (1995), along with the tremors which intermittently devastate Jamaica 
(1692 & 1907) and Haiti (1770 & 2010). Barbados also lies outside of the principal hurricane belt, and 
consequently the island also tends to avoid the high-intensity tropical storms which sweep across the 
Atlantic every year between June and November. In 1669, one inhabitant of Barbados wrote that ‘heere in 
this Iland it hath not been ever knowne that ever were any Hurrycanes’.183 
As the easternmost island in the Lesser Antilles archipelago, the remote location of Barbados meant that 
the island was highly conducive to the development of a plantation economy, and was a safer site for 
capital investment than some other colonies in the tropics. Barbados is 174km away from the nearest 
island, St Lucia, and in the early modern period was over 500km from the centre of Spanish power in 
mainland South America. Geographical isolation helped to minimise the threat posed by Amerindian 
raids and incursions by other European powers. Such attacks seriously stunted colonial development, and 
 
181 Ibid., p. 18 & 62. 
182 R. D. Koehler et al., ‘Enriquillo–Plantain Garden fault zone in Jamaica: paleoseismology and seismic hazard’, 
Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 103, No. 2A (2013), pp. 971-983. 
183 TNA, CO 1/24, f. 164. A pamphlet produced in 1638 evocatively captured the devastation which such disasters 
could wreak on an infant colony in the Caribbean: Anon., News and strange Newes from the St. Christophers of a tempestuous 
Spirit, which is called by the Indians a Hurrin-cano or whirlewind. Which happeneth in many of those Ilands of America or the West-
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in some cases could even lead to the ruined settlement being permanently abandoned by English 
colonisers. Other promising settlements, such as the Providence Island colony located near Nicaragua, 
were invaded and ultimately destroyed in the early 1640s because they were located within the sphere of 
influence of the Spanish Empire. The unforeseen invasion caused the Puritan grandees who invested 
heavily in the Providence Island scheme to lose large sums of money (the total debt in 1650 was £18,898), 
and the colony was abandoned.184 Imperial contests and warfare were thus crucial to whether a nascent 
colony would endure in the tropics. Jamaica only managed to survive its first few decades deep within the 
Spanish zone of power in the Greater Antilles because the Spanish already had a settlement there which 
the English could garrison with soldiers, and because, as a royal colony, it enjoyed massive military and 
financial support from the Stuart monarchy.185 
The remote geography of Barbados also enabled colonists living there to have a unique relationship with 
local indigenous peoples, known as the Kalinago, which was unparalleled elsewhere in the Caribbean. 
Carolyn Arena has argued that the colony’s isolated location at the edge of the Lesser Antilles island chain 
meant that Barbadians could benefit from the labour and knowledge of enslaved Indians without being 
under threat of violent reprisals for their exploitative actions. Although archaeological evidence confirms 
that the island was once settled by the Kalinago and integrated into their extensive trade routes, by the 
time English colonisers arrived in 1627 the island was uninhabited. This meant that, unlike at other 
islands in the Lesser Antilles such as St. Kitts, Montserrat, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, 
the first English settlers of Barbados did not have to negotiate with existing Indian polities, nor fear the 
prospect of armed conflict with the Kalinago. But Barbados was still close enough to slave-trading 
markets on the North and South American mainland to be able to exploit the local knowledge and labour 
of enslaved Indians. Other colonies were not situated in such a fortunate location. For instance, in a 
 
184 Kupperman, Providence Island, p. 317. For more on the Providence Island Company, see A. P. Newton, The 
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petition written in August 1655 by some of the ‘poore inhabitants of this Island of Antigua’ to the 
Barbadian governor Daniel Searle, Englishmen on Antigua complained about the mismanagement of 
their own governor, Christopher Raynell, whose poor leadership they feared would exacerbate the issues 
surrounding their ‘safetyes against a continuall invadinge enemy the Indians’.186  
Besides these environmental and geographical features, which minimised the threat posed by the usual 
risks to colonial enterprise, the overseas plantations were an ideal location for investing capital because 
they were already familiar to many traders and were supported by the same legal structure that protected 
private property rights in England. The governor of Barbados Phillip Bell also deliberately fostered a 
climate of political security on the island during the tumultuous civil war years. Bell was an experienced 
colonial administrator, and during his time as governor on Bermuda (1626-29) and Providence Island 
(1631-36) had developed ties with prominent members of the puritan aristocracy in England and 
established a close working relationship with London merchants such as Maurice Thomson.187 The 
importance of Phillip Bell’s leadership in stabilising the island’s political affairs is supported by some 
seventeenth-century sources, which state that Barbados did not ‘increase in wealth or trade’ until ‘one 
Capt Phillip Bell was by the Earle of Carlisle appointed Governor’. The fact that Bell had a ‘plentifull 
fortune of his owne’ and managed plantations on Barbados himself led him to appoint ‘men of Estates in 
the Islands’ to sit on his council, eroding the power of the Carlisle proprietors over political affairs on 
Barbados. With the advice of his council, Bell ratified ‘many good lawes’ for the ‘advancement of the 
Trade of the Colinye’. For instance, he dismantled the legal apparatus which enabled proprietary agents to 
collect rent payments from the inhabitants for the Earl of Carlisle.188 
 
186 Arena, ‘Indian Slaves from Guiana in Seventeenth-Century Barbados’. For the negotiations and violent 
interactions Europeans had with indigenous peoples elsewhere in the Lesser Antilles, see Murphy, ‘Kalinago 
Colonizers’, 17-30. For the Antigua quote, see Bodleian Library, MS Rawlinson A. 29, f. 376, ‘The humble petition 
of Benjamin Langham, Joseph Lee, and Richard Hursey one the behalf of themselves and other the inhabitants of 
the island of Antigua’, August 1655. 
187 For more information on Phillip Bell’s role at the Providence Island colony, and his relationship with the London 
merchant Maurice Thomson, see Kupperman, Providence Island, p. 335.  
188 BL, Stowe Ms. 324, f. 4, ‘An account of the English Sugar Plantations’. 
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During his tenure as governor of Barbados between 1641 and 1650 Phillip Bell actively sought to remain 
impartial in the English Civil War. It was the neutral stance adopted by the Barbados government which 
made the island a safe prospect for English merchants to invest their capital. When hostilities were first 
declared, Bell and the colonists tried to play both sides off against each other, claiming that the numerous 
commissions they received from the representatives of the King and Parliament merely supplemented 
those which they had previously been sent. Rumours of the imminent purchase of the proprietary patent 
to the Caribbee isles by the Earl of Warwick, a divisive figure who for some was an ardent 
Parliamentarian and for others a ‘knowne proclaimed rebell and traitore’, made choosing a side in the civil 
war even more pressing. In conjunction with the Barbados Assembly, Bell called a meeting of all the 
freeholders on the island so that they could deliberate on the issue. Following the vote, Bell reported that 
‘every parish declared themselves resolutely for the maintenance of their peace and present government, 
and to admit of no alterations or new comissiones from eyther side’.189  
In 1645, this neutrality pact was articulated in an official declaration, in which the freeholders vowed ‘not 
to receive any alteration of government, until God shall be so merciful unto us as to unite the king and 
Parliament’.190 This did not, however, deter Royalist and Parliamentarian figureheads in England from 
continuing to pressure the Barbados planters into taking a decisive position. By the early summer of 1646, 
James Parker could report to John Winthrop that there had been three commissions sent from England 
to Barbados so far that year, including one from the Earl of Warwick encouraging the assembly ‘to 
profess themselves for the parliament’. But the freeholders refused to ‘lay aside their neutralitie’, 
answering each commission by stating ‘their willingness to be serviceable to the kingdome, their honour 
for the parliament, but their yet allegiance to the King’.191 The inhabitants were so eager to remain 
politically unified that they even promoted a custom in which ‘whosoever named the word Roundhead or 
 
189 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/33, Phillip Bell to Archibald Hay, 21 July 1645. 
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Cavalier, should give to all those that heard of him, a Shot [of liquor] and a Turkey to be eaten at his 
house that made that forfeiture’.192  
According to Carla Pestana the English inhabitants of Barbados pursued a neutral stance in the Civil War 
out of a desire to avert a local conflict of their own. By retaining the current governor and maintaining the 
status quo, the Barbados planter elite hoped to avoid exacerbating political divisions in their own ranks. 
Such discordance could foment insurrection among the island’s growing population of indentured 
servants and enslaved Africans and threaten the planter’s precarious position at the top of the social 
hierarchy.193 This interpretation is probably correct, although we have no primary source evidence which 
offers direct support for the link between neutrality and the fear of internal uprising.  
Another part of the explanation for the position taken by Bell and his government during the 1640s, 
which until now historians have missed, relates to the importance of continued access to credit markets 
and merchants operating out of the City of London. Phillip Bell captured the political impasse Barbadian 
planters found themselves in during the 1640s perfectly when he explained to the Carlisle trustees how 
‘against the King we are resolved never to be, and without the freindshipe of ye Perliaiment and free trade 
of London ships we are not able to subsist’.194 As we will see in Chapter Three, access to the London 
credit market, along with the labourers and provisions offered by merchants in the City, was pivotal for 
planters on Barbados. The stark reality was that unfettered access to the City of London was essential not 
just for the prosperity of Barbados, but for its continued survival as a colony. The lack of interest which 
English merchants had shown in the colony’s tobacco during the 1630s had left the Barbadian economy 
in a depressed state, and the commercial expansion seen during the first half of the 1640s following 
diversification in agricultural production was under threat if the wrong course was taken regarding the 
Civil War. As the governor of Barbados, Phillip Bell was necessitated in taking a pragmatic approach, 
which involved professing loyalty to the King while at the same time ensuring that the trading 
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relationship between Barbados and the Parliamentary stronghold of London remained intact. This neutral 
stance in the Civil War made Barbados, above all other places in the war-ravaged Three Kingdoms, a safe 
location for English merchants to invest capital. 
Before moving on, it is important to highlight how it was not just merchants who invested in the 
Barbados sugar economy due to the Civil War. Several gentry supporters of Charles I, including Richard 
Ligon, Thomas Modyford, and Francis Lord Willoughby of Parham, made the decision to flee the turmoil 
in England and settle on Barbados. These wealthy royalist émigrés arrived on Barbados in increasing 
numbers during the second half of the 1640s as they sought to avoid persecution in England for their 
political allegiance. They reinvested their liquidated English assets into acquiring large plantations, 
constructing sugar refineries, and purchasing indentured servants and enslaved Africans, which helped to 
hasten the development of the plantation system on the island.195 This displays a similar pattern to the 
Irish Adventure of 1642-3, which saw 239 members of the English gentry (or 16% of total investors) 
subscribe £72,996 to the scheme, alongside a larger contingent of merchants.196 Francis Lord Willoughby, 
for example, remonstrated in a letter to his wife that he had come to Barbados after his property in 
England had been confiscated by Parliament ‘all at one clap’.197 Richard Ligon told a similar story in the 
opening passages of his True and Exact History. By the summer of 1647 the war in England, which he 
described as little more than ‘a Barbarous riot’, had left him ‘destitute of a subsistence’. As a follower of 
Charles I, Ligon increasingly saw himself ‘a stranger in my own Country’, and therefore ‘resolved to lay 
hold on the first opportunity that may convoy me to any other part of the World, how far distant soever, 
rather than abide here’.198 Merchants and gentry on both sides of the political divide looked overseas to 
Barbados as a place which offered better security from the violence and social dislocation caused by civil 
war.  
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By the second half of the 1640s, the rapid commercial success of Barbados had convinced an assertive 
group of London merchants with vested interests in the Caribbean plantation system to finance the 
settlement of English colonies in the Indian Ocean using the Barbados model. This represents another 
example of London merchants seeking to invest their capital in property at overseas locations during the 
era of the Civil War. Since the 1630s there had been attempts by members of the landed gentry and the 
East Indies interloper Sir William Courteen, who was also the original merchant financier of the Barbados 
colony, to try to establish a more permanent English presence in the Indian Ocean. By 1642 the Courteen 
association had gone bankrupt, leaving the remnants of his East Indian interloping operation in the hands 
of Maurice Thomson and his business partners. In subsequent years this new interloping group came to 
include many merchants with interests in Barbados sugar production and slave ownership, including, 
besides Thomson himself, Martin Noell, William Pennoyer, Richard Batson, Jeremy Blackman, and 
Thomas Andrews.199 It is striking that the business associates and family members of Maurice Thomson 
were the primary investors in all three of the opportunities which arose for English merchants to invest in 
land overseas during the 1640s: the Irish Adventurers scheme, the Barbados sugar boom, and the effort 
to establish colonies in the Indian Ocean. In 1645 this amorphous group of merchants financed an 
expedition to settle 140 colonists at St. Augustine’s Bay on the south coast of Madagascar, which was 
forced to be abandoned just a year later.200 This failure, similar as it was to other unsuccessful settlement 
efforts in North America and the Caribbean (where the English had later seen success), did not 
discourage these merchants from pursuing their colonial ambitions in the Indian Ocean.  
By 1649 the Thomson association had formulated a new project to establish plantations at Pulau Run (in 
the Banda Islands, Southeast Asia) and Assada (an island, now called Nosy Be, just off the coast of 
northern Madagascar). The Assada adventurers outlined their plan to the directorate of the East India 
Company in November 1649. Having already raised £80,000 to settle a colony at Assada, they intended 
 
199 It is probable that John Wood and Michael Davison (also merchants with Barbados interests) were also part of 
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for the island to function as both a site of plantation production and the nexus of a global trade with 
Africa, Asia, and the Americas.201 Promotional literature commissioned to attract planters to settle in the 
colony drew explicit connections between Barbados and Assada. Robert Hunt’s pamphlet The Island of 
Assada (1650) argued that because both islands lay at thirteen degrees latitude and were of similar size, 
English settlers would be able to use the salubrious climate to cultivate a variety of profitable 
commodities from both the West and East Indies, such as sugar cane, indigo, cotton, tobacco, ginger, 
pepper, and rice. Indentured servants and an enslaved workforce would provide the labour necessary for 
plantation agriculture and the two hundred sugar mills he believed would soon operate on the island. 
While Hunt thought that the cost to transport and provision twenty English servants would total £300 at 
both Barbados and Assada, he also projected that the proximity of Assada to slave trading markets on the 
African coast guaranteed that slaves would be inexpensive. The vast distances and risks associated with 
transporting enslaved Africans across the Atlantic to the English Caribbean meant that one hundred 
‘negroes’ cost planters on Barbados £2700, while at Assada the same number of enslaved labourers would 
cost only £100.202   
Despite this optimism, a lack of institutional support from the East India Company, disease, and violent 
interactions with indigenous communities in the early 1650s quickly rendered the endeavour to establish a 
colony on Madagascar with an economy based around plantation slavery a failure.203 The Assada 
adventurers’ abortive colonisation scheme demonstrates how the rising value of land and enslaved 
Africans on Barbados during the 1640s encouraged merchants to expend huge sums to try to create 
similar investment opportunities elsewhere: even in locations as distant as the southwest Indian Ocean. 
Because of the rapid prosperity it had brought to merchants and planters, the Barbadian system of 
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plantation slavery served as an influential model for colonial development for the duration of the 
seventeenth century.204   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has answered two questions: where did the merchant capital that was invested in Barbados 
sugar production originate, and why did English merchants choose to invest such large sums of money in 
a distant Caribbean island during the 1640s? It began by identifying the 23 most important merchant 
investors in the sugar boom. We then separated them into six categories based on their commercial 
interests during the 1630s (before they invested in Barbados sugar). Most had previously been involved in 
American trade in some form, but others had more diverse career paths. Some were participants in West 
African commerce, the trade to the East Indies and Levant, transnational trade to Brazil, and the cloth 
trade to Northern Europe and France. Others have no recorded background in trade until their 
investments in land and labour on Barbados. It has been argued, therefore, that the merchant capital used 
to finance the expansion of sugar production and African slavery on Barbados came from a broad array 
of sources and had global origins. This has ramifications for our understanding of the origins of 
plantation slavery in the British empire, as it highlights how interconnected the Caribbean plantation 
system was with the other regions of the world touched by England’s overseas expansion from very early 
on.  
We also evaluated the role that investments in sugar and slavery on Barbados played in the careers of 
merchants in early modern England. There were two factors which explain the rapid rise of merchants 
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who were formerly outside of the City elite during the 1640s. First, and most important, their allegiance in 
the Civil War. This could make or break a career, because of the repercussions it had for a businessman’s 
ability to exert political influence and secure government offices. Second, the capital generated through 
investments in the Barbados sugar boom. Those merchants who supported Parliament in the Civil War 
and invested in Barbados sugar during the 1640s were disproportionately represented in the directorate of 
established trading companies and became part of London’s aldermanic elite in the 1650s and 1660s, 
suggesting that these two events stimulated the careers of some London merchants in the mid-
seventeenth century.  
We then moved on to explore why London merchants invested so heavily in Barbados, concluding that it 
was principally due to external political and economic factors unique to the 1640s: the commercial 
opportunity presented by the collapse of the Brazilian sugar industry, and the English Civil War. The 
insecurity produced by civil war drove English merchants to diversify their business portfolios. In normal 
circumstances land ownership in England was the most stable investment option available to merchants 
in the seventeenth century. But the Civil War proved to be transformative in this regard, because it 
suddenly made English land much more insecure due to warfare and the threat of sequestration. The war 
also put overseas trade into an unsettled state. As a result, merchants invested in the war through 
government contracting and tax farming, stored their money with goldsmith-bankers, and increasingly 
looked overseas for a place to tie-up their liquid capital. London merchants poured their money into Irish 
land through the Adventurers scheme in the period from 1642-3. But Parliament’s failure to quell the 
Irish rebellion quickly made investing capital in the future promise of Irish land a less attractive prospect 
by late 1643.  
Across the Atlantic the decline in the Brazilian sugar industry meant that speculating in Barbados sugar 
offered a prime commercial opportunity for English merchants looking to invest their assets overseas. 
Securing capital in plantations and enslaved Africans on Barbados represented a more profitable and 
reliable investment than purchasing land and real estate in England or Ireland during the 1640s. This was 
because the colony’s government articulated an official policy of neutrality in the Civil War. The island 
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also possessed some inherent geographical and environmental advantages which offered enhanced 
protection from many of the usual risks to colonial enterprise. By the late 1640s, merchant success in 
transforming Barbados into a burgeoning centre of plantation production and a commercial entrepot 
inspired a group of London merchants to pool their capital and attempt to create new investment 
opportunities by replicating the Barbados system of plantation slavery in the southwest Indian Ocean. 
Despite raising large amounts of start-up capital to finance several colonising ventures, their efforts were 
ultimately unsuccessful.  
The next chapter will explore in greater detail how English merchants were involved with the Barbados 
sugar economy during the 1640s and 1650s. It will also re-evaluate the argument that local planters 
reinvested the capital they generated through the production of minor staples such as tobacco and cotton 
into the development of sugar plantations.
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Chapter Three. Merchants, Planters, and the Development of the 
Barbados Plantation Economy, 1643-1660 
 
In the previous chapter we saw that Barbados was important for English merchants, as it offered them a 
secure location to invest their liquid capital in the 1640s. This chapter, by contrast, will explore how 
English merchants were important to the economic development of Barbados. More precisely, it will 
analyse how merchants contributed the expansion of the sugar industry and the plantation system. While 
other historians, such as Russell Menard and Larry Gragg, have sketched the role that some English 
merchants played in purchasing land on Barbados and shipping enslaved Africans to the island, they have 
not detailed in full the wide range of commercial activities that merchants trading to Barbados 
participated in during the mid-seventeenth century. Consequently, the significance of these merchants in 
transforming the society and economy of Barbados has been understated.  
This chapter will analyse the involvement of English merchants in the Barbadian plantation economy 
between 1643 and 1660. It argues that English merchants precipitated the sugar boom in four major ways. 
First, they speculated in the sugar industry by directly purchasing tracts of land on the island and 
constructing refineries. Second, they extended generous credit to Barbadian planters, which enabled them 
to afford to construct sugar refineries and acquire enslaved Africans. Third, they supplied the island with 
labour by transporting indentured servants and financing slave trading voyages to West Africa. These 
forced labourers were sold to plantation owners, before being compelled by their masters to cultivate 
tropical commodities which would be later sold in European markets. Fourth, they supplied the raw 
materials necessary for the rapid development of the sugar industry. The plantation system could not have 
functioned without the lumber needed to construct sugar refineries, the clothes used to dress indentured 
servants and enslaved Africans, the oxen and horses needed to drive the sugar mills, and the donkeys to 
transport commodities to storehouses along the coast. An injection of merchant capital into the 
Barbadian economy in the 1640s and 1650s caused changes to the composition of the island’s labour 
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force and the organisation of landed estates into integrated plantations, which had far-reaching 
implications for the future development of the British Atlantic World. 
Ideally, this chapter would evaluate the comparative importance of merchant capital to the development 
of the Barbadian sugar industry by analysing the contributions of those we know invested capital in turn: 
London merchants, merchants in the English outports, Dutch merchants, members of the English gentry, 
and Barbadian planters. Unfortunately, not enough account books and other forms of quantitative 
evidence has survived to be able write an economic history of Barbados with this level of precision for 
the mid-seventeenth century. Nonetheless, the final section of this chapter will go some way towards 
investigating the relative importance of merchant capital by reassessing the argument that Barbadian 
planters reinvested the profits generated from the sale of tobacco into the cultivation of sugar and the 
construction of refineries. The poor-quality tobacco produced on Barbados during the 1630s meant that 
there was little chance for planters to generate enough surplus capital to have been able to afford to set-
up a sugar plantation without external assistance in the 1640s. Moreover, a close reading of the available 
source material reveals that it was trade, not plantation production, which provided most of the start-up 
capital necessary for start-up planters to initiate sugar production. Renowned planters such as James Drax 
and William Hilliard came from a mercantile background, and continued to engage in trade during the 
1640s and 1650s. 
 
1. Merchant investments in Barbadian land  
This section will analyse how English merchants speculated in the Barbados land market during the 1640s 
and 1650s. It will draw upon novel source material to develop a more comprehensive study of merchant 
land purchases than that advanced by Russell Menard. My database reveals how there were 107 English 
merchants, operating alone or in partnership, who obtained a financial interest in Barbadian land between 
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1640 and 1660. The importance of merchants based in the City of London in providing capital 
investment to fund the expansion of the early English empire is highlighted by the fact that 84 percent of 
these 107 persons who purchased plantations on Barbados resided in London (see Table A4, Appendix 
2). By accelerating the process through which land was aggregated in the hands of fewer owners, 
populating plantations with enslaved Africans, and financing the construction of refineries and windmills, 
London merchants increased the productivity of the Barbados sugar industry and paved the way for the 
emergence of the integrated plantation. 
Although we have numerous sources which refer to London merchants owning land on Barbados in the 
mid-seventeenth century, the deeds recording their property transactions have not all survived at the 
Barbados Department of Archives. There is substantial evidence, however, for land transactions involving 
the London merchants Martin Noell and Richard Batson for the 1640s and 1650s (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2, 
below). The evidence shows how, in conjunction with family members on Barbados, Noell and Batson 
purchased large tracts of land on the island in the mid-1640s, invested in the development of the sugar 
industry by constructing sugar mills and purchasing labour and livestock over the course of the following 
decade, before selling many of their properties in the late 1650s and early 1660s. The role of English 
merchants in purchasing plantations on Barbados supports Richard Pares’ argument that there was not a 
pronounced division of labour between merchants and planters in the mid-seventeenth century. 
Merchants who traded to the colonies and marketed colonial goods were often directly involved in 
plantation production too.1  
Scattered across various archives is further evidence for the direct investments made by English 
merchants into Barbadian plantations during the 1640s. We know that the eminent London merchants 
Maurice Thomson and William Pennoyer co-owned plantations on Barbados, because in May 1649 they 
were given license to transport 50 draught horses ‘for the service of their sugar works there’.2 A source 
 
1 Pares, Merchants and Planters, pp. 29-30. Robert Brenner has reached similar conclusions, arguing that there was a 
generational shift in the London merchant community which produced a distinct group of ‘merchant-planters’ in the 
early seventeenth century. Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 116.  
2 CSPC AWI, Vol. 1, p. 329, 22 May 1649.  
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held at the London Metropolitan Archives provides some further details on Pennoyer’s property holdings 
on the island. In February 1643 Charles Stobart, the apprentice of Pennoyer and his current Barbados 
factor, signed over the title to a 60-acre plantation to his master in London. The plantation was ideal for a 
merchant, located as it was near the commercial hub of St. Michael (Bridgetown), and containing a house, 




3 Another former apprentice and Barbados factor for Pennoyer in the 1640s, Michael Davison, gave a deposition 
before the Mayors Court of London in 1654 regarding Pennoyer’s 60-acre plantation. By the 1650s Davison himself 
was a London merchant with close business ties to the island. LMA, MCD Box 6, CLA/024/06/006. 
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Table 3.2 [Redacted]  
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It was common in the 1640s for absentee London merchants to purchase plantations on Barbados and 
dispatch family members or trusted business partners to the island and oversee their investments. The 
London merchant Anthony Hooper, for instance, owned a plantation on Barbados in 1645, which was 
managed by his family relation and business partner Robert Hooper, alongside several other London 
merchants who had relocated to the island. They were early adopters of African slavery, having 
transitioned to a majority black workforce by 1654. That year, 35 white servants and 66 enslaved Africans 
laboured on Robert Hooper’s 200-acre plantation.4 The brothers John Parris and Thomas Parris had a 
similar arrangement. John Parris was a slave-trading New England merchant who developed an extensive 
commercial network in the 1640s that spanned the Atlantic. John Parris arrived in Massachusetts in 1642 
but left for Barbados at the height of the sugar boom in 1647, and with the financial assistance of his 
brother Thomas in London, purchased land and storehouses on the island.5  
The Guinea Company, a corporate entity made up of merchants interested primarily in West African 
trade, also owned land on Barbados in the mid-1640s. John Wood, Nicholas Crispe, and Samuel Crispe 
purchased the plantation using the proceeds of a Guinea company slaving voyage in 1641. When it was 
appraised in 1644, the plot owned by the company spanned 225 acres and was worth £56 5s. The 
plantation was largely undeveloped: 175 acres remained as standing wood, and just 50 acres was under 
cultivation with cotton and provision crops. It is significant that the accounts of the Guinea Company 
reveal that they owned a plantation on Barbados, while at Virginia (their other base of operations in 
America) the company did not own land. The tiny island in the eastern Caribbean was clearly a site which 
London merchants thought possessed great commercial potential in the 1640s when compared to other 
colonies in the English Atlantic world.6 
 
4 LMA, MCD Box 2, CLA/024/06/002; Newman, A New World of Labor, p. 191.  
5 BDA, RB3/2, pp. 778-779; BDA, RB3/3, pp. 465-466; BDA, RB3/3, p. 41; BDA, RB3/3, pp. 205-212; BDA, 
RB3/5, pp. 340-341; BDA, RB3/6, pp. 376-377; BDA, RB3/7, pp. 354-356; BDA, RB3/7, pp. 388-391; BDA, 
RB3/3, pp. 535-537. See also, Gragg, Englishman Transplanted, pp. 138-139.  
6 TNA, SP 16/540/4, f. 389 & 394, ‘Series of documents relating to the affairs of the Guinea Company, from 18th 
February 1642-43 to 8th July 1647, but mostly of the year 1644’. For the initial 1641 purchase of the land, see BDA, 
RB3/1, pp. 202-3. 
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Held at the John Carter Brown Library is an estate plan of a plantation on Barbados produced by the 
surveyor John Hapcott in 1646 (see Figure 3.1, below).7 This map constitutes the earliest visual 
representation we have of land management in the colony, and as such it is a unique source. In an 
innovative study, scholars have recently used GIS software to overlay this estate plan on a modern map, 
and then coordinate an archaeological investigation to explore what material culture can tell us about the 
transition to sugar monoculture and slavery in the Caribbean.8 The estate plan can also yield information 
about merchant involvement with Barbados during the sugar boom. The 300-acre plantation in St. James 
parish was measured by Hapcott on 10 October 1646. The London merchants Andrew Riccard, William 
Williams, and Edwin Browne had just purchased the plantation in partnership through their factor, 
Thomas Middleton, who himself would soon become a merchant of some repute on the island. Riccard, 
Williams, and Browne had been active in the East India and Levant companies throughout the 1630s and 
1640s, which, as noted in the previous chapter, stands as testament to the global commercial interests of 
the merchants who invested in the Barbados sugar boom. The estate was rectangular in shape, and 
stretched from the coast towards the island’s gently sloping uplands. This was ideal. Coastal frontage 
enabled the construction of a storehouse and direct access to shipping, as signified by the English 
merchant vessel depicted just offshore in the bay, while at the same time providing the owners with a 
cross section of alluvial land where they could cultivate tropical commodities.  
Looking more closely at the estate plan we can see that, at the time it was purchased by the London 
merchants, the plantation remained largely undeveloped. Approximately one-third of the plantation was 
‘fallen land’ currently under cultivation. There were provision grounds, referred to on the estate plan as 
‘Potato peece’, along with pastures for grazing animals and several stone-built dwelling houses. This left 
two-thirds of the plantation remaining as standing wood. The number of trees depicted in this parcel of 
land suggests that, even at locations close to the coast, the process of farm-building was not yet complete. 
The island was still wooded (though perhaps not thickly) at the onset of the sugar boom.  
 
7 John Carter Brown Library, Shelf Et647 1 Ms. 
8 Douglas V. Armstrong and Matthew C. Reilly, ‘The Archaeology of Settler Farms and Early Plantation Life in 
Seventeenth-Century Barbados,’ Slavery and Abolition, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2014), pp. 399-417. 




Figure 3.1. The Hapcott Estate Plan (1646). ‘This Plott Representeth the forme of three hundred acres 
of Land part of a Plantation called the Fort Plantation of which 300 acres Capt Thomas Middleton of 
London hath purchased for, and in the names of, Edwin Brown, William Williams, and Andrew 
Riccard of London marchants…the 300 acres measured by October the tenth anno domini 1646. John 
Hapcott surveyor’. Courtesy of the John Carter Brown Library.  
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Farm-building was a time-consuming procedure. Making a plantation fit to be put under cultivation with 
cash crops could take years: it involved felling trees, clearing land using slash-and-burn techniques, tilling 
fields, and constructing outbuildings.9 In the mid-1640s London merchants displayed a preference of 
purchasing plantations from tobacco and cotton planters, because they came with ready-cleared land, 
allowing merchants to forego the prolonged process of farm-building.10 By the 1650s, absentee merchants 
tended to buy fully-functioning sugar plantations (often from other London merchants), or enter into 
partnership with a planter who already possessed one, thus following Ligon’s recommendation that it was 
advisable ‘for a man that had money, goods, or Credit, to purchase a Plantation there ready furnished’.11  
London merchants did not just spend money on acquiring alluvial land on Barbados, however, but also 
invested heavily in improving plantations. As the Guinea Company’s plantation and the Hapcott estate 
plan demonstrate, many of the tracts of land obtained by merchants on Barbados in the 1640s were 
largely underdeveloped at the time of purchase. Only small plots were under cultivation in tobacco, 
cotton, indigo, and ginger, and there was still a considerable amount of standing wood. Merchant capital 
transformed these plantations by increasing the amount of land under cultivation in sugar, financing the 
construction of machinery associated with the refining of sugar cane, and expanding the stock of unfree 
labour and draught animals available to planters on the island. This had far-reaching consequences. 
Menard has used such evidence to persuasively argue that ‘merchant investors played an important role in 
shaping the changing organization of the sugar industry in Barbados’.12  
Prior to the advent of sugar production on Barbados, between 1627 and 1643, land in the interior of the 
island was readily available for new arrivals and time-expired servants, meaning that tenant farming was 
only of limited significance. But during the early stages of the sugar boom land aggregation in the hands 
of fewer and fewer planters was beginning to restrict the opportunities available for free whites to own 
land, causing an increase in cases of tenancy and emigration from the island. By the 1650s entrepreneurial 
 
9 On the farm-building process, see Pares, Merchants and Planters, p. 18; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 12.  
10 For examples, see BDA, RB 3/1, pp. 26-27, 536-538, 946-947. 
11 For examples, see BDA, RB 3/5, pp. 894-896, 906-908; Complete Book of Emigrants, p. 366; Ligon, True and Exact 
History, p. 66.  
12 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 52, 60. 
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sugar planters had realised that increased efficiency and therefore greater profits could be gained by 
augmenting the size of their estates, expanding their stock of unfree labour, and integrating the process of 
cultivating and processing sugar cane within a single site. Rather than sharing access to a central sugar mill 
with various other plantation-owners and tenants, as was common in Brazil under what is sometimes 
known as the ‘dispersed system’, sugar planters on Barbados began to invest in the construction of their 
own mills. The desire to achieve economies of scale in this manner caused mounting demand for land, 
labour, and capital on the tiny island. The ‘integrated plantation’, as this form of semi-industrial 
organisation is often called, was invented on Barbados during the mid-seventeenth-century sugar boom. 
The integrated sugar plantation forever altered the Atlantic system of plantation slavery, and despite some 
further innovations (e.g. the gang system of slave management), would be used throughout the Caribbean 
until Abolition two centuries later.13 
James Drax is the first planter believed to have operated an integrated plantation. In 1654 the Jesuit priest 
Antoine Biet exclaimed how it ‘was quite a sight to see 200 slaves working with sugar’ at the Drax Hall 
plantation.14 While further research is needed at the Barbados Department of Archives to test this 
hypothesis, I suspect that because of their large landholdings, ready access to unfree labour, and extensive 
capital reserves, London merchants were some of the earliest adopters of the integrated plantation in the 
late 1650s and 1660s. In 1654, for instance, (the same year that Drax is believed to have invented the 
integrated plantation) the merchant Robert Hooper possessed a 200-acre plantation with a workforce of 
101 unfree labourers (35 servants, 66 enslaved Africans), satisfying the optimal ratio of two acres to every 
one labourer. By the time of his death in 1669 we can be certain Hooper was working an integrated 
plantation, composed of nearly 350 acres and 150 enslaved Africans. Richard Batson’s 360-acre estate is 
 
13 For the integrated plantation, see Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 91-99; McCusker and Menard, ‘The Sugar 
Industry in the Seventeenth Century’, pp. 295-302; Trevor Burnard, Planters, Merchants, and Slaves: Plantation Societies in 
British America, 1650-1820 (Chicago, 2015), pp. 4-5, 55-58. For a contemporary description of the management of an 
integrated plantation, dating to 1679, see Thompson, ‘Henry Drax's Instructions’, pp. 565-604. 
14 Jerome S. Handler, ed., ‘Father Antoine Biet’s visit to Barbados in 1654’, Journal of the Barbados Museum and 
Historical Society, Vol. 32 (1967), p. 69.  
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another good example, which by 1670 was operating as an integrated plantation with its own sugar mill 
and a stock of 157 enslaved Africans.15  
Merchant capital, in the form of both direct investment and extensions of credit, facilitated the rise of the 
integrated plantation. There were three things needed to set up an integrated plantation: a large estate, 
slave labour, and machinery to process sugar cane. Generous credit provided by London merchants 
enabled planters to make these expensive purchases without needing extensive personal reserves of liquid 
capital. Merchant investment in the 1640s and 1650s also improved Barbadian plantations directly, which 
had a long-lasting financial impact even after they had sold on their properties. By undertaking the capital-
intensive work of aggregating land, acquiring enslaved Africans, and investing in machinery, merchants 
made it much easier for the estate’s new owners to convert it into an integrated plantation at a future date. 
This is because built improvements and the plantation’s existing stock of unfree labour and draught 
animals were almost always included in the purchase price and transferred to the new owners of the 
estate.16 Over several decades, therefore, the interventions of London merchants in the economy of 
Barbados would transform the organisation of the island’s sugar industry. The rise of the integrated 
plantation in the second half of the seventeenth century enhanced the productive efficiency of the 
Barbados sugar industry, maintaining the profitability of this enterprise in the face of mounting 
competition and falling sugar prices in European markets.17 It is important to remember, however, that 
the conversion to the integrated plantation was gradual: even in late seventeenth-century Barbados 
hundreds of small farmers were still growing sugar and producing rum using the dispersed model.18  
 
15 For the composition of the labour force on Hooper’s plantation, see Newman, A New World of Labor, p. 191; 
Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 136. For Richard Batson, see BDA, RB3/8, ff. 58-63 
16 E.g. The agreement signed between Thomas Noell and Edward Bradbourne in September 1659. Noell agreed to 
sell a 2000-acre plantation in Surinam, along with ‘all boyling houses, mill, mill houses, coppers, scummers, slaves 
etc’. BDA, RB3/5, pp. 873-879. See also the deed signed between Phillip Banfield and Thomas Batson in May 1662. 
Along with sale of the plantation came ‘sugar canes and their appertunances’, 8 white servants, and 24 enslaved 
Africans. See BDA, RB3/2, pp. 564-567 
17 For a detailed exploration of the productivity gains achieved by Barbadian sugar planters over the course of the 
seventeenth century, see Menard, Sweet Negotiations, ch. 4.  
18 McCusker and Menard, ‘The Sugar Industry in the Seventeenth Century’, pp. 300-301; Eltis, Rise of African Slavery, 
pp. 202-204. 
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How did English merchants help to precipitate the rise of the integrated plantation on Barbados? First, 
merchant capital accelerated the process of land accumulation on the island in the 1640s. By making 
available large amounts of credit, merchants enabled planters to rapidly increase the size of their estates. 
Direct investment in plantations during the 1640s was also pivotal, which as we saw in Chapter Two was 
partly motivated by the desire of English merchants to secure their money in a safe location during the 
Civil War and to profit from rising land prices. Merchants rarely stopped with purchasing just one 
plantation, but sought to expand their estates by consuming surrounding land. Merchants did not pioneer 
this trend: land consolidation had been underway since the 1630s, with planters such as James Holdip and 
James Drax becoming large landowners by buying up their neighbour’s plantations.19 But London 
merchants certainly invested greatly in the Barbados land market in the mid-1640s, enhancing the frenzied 
land speculation caused by the sugar boom. Whether merchants engrossed plantations to try to achieve 
economies of scale in sugar production or to secure their capital in land (which could then be sold on for 
a profit in the future) is unclear.  
The second way in which merchant capital hastened the emergence of the integrated plantation was by 
populating plantations on Barbados with rising numbers of enslaved Africans. The role of English 
merchants in intensifying the transatlantic slave trade to Barbados during the 1640s will be analysed in the 
next section of this chapter. For present purposes, it is necessary only to mention that in the era of the 
sugar boom London merchants increased the supply of indentured servants and enslaved Africans to the 
colony, and extended planters the credit they needed to purchase these expensive human commodities. In 
the early 1650s plantation-owners on Barbados were beset with a chronic shortage of unfree labour. The 
ratio for achieving optimal efficiency in sugar production was one labourer for every two acres of land,20 
and the plantation inventories we have for this period suggests that most landowners fell well short of 
this ideal ratio. Menard has presented evidence that plantations owned by London merchants and their 
family members were some of the first to address the issue of labour shortages by hiring ex-servants as 
tenants to manage their excess land. Adopting the dispersed system ensured that the owner’s sugar mill 
 
19 For Holdip and Drax’s estates in the 1630s, see Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 27, 99-100, 139-140.  
20 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 69. 
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kept turning and that valuable fertile land was not left fallow. Menard has used the 510-acre Mount 
Clapham plantation, acquired by Thomas Noell in 1650, to illustrate merchant involvement in 
institutional changes in the Barbados sugar industry. In 1654 the plantation was undermanned, with a 
workforce of just fifteen servants and enslaved Africans. Such a chronic lack of workers is probably why 
Martin Noell was so heavily involved in supplying his family’s Barbadian plantations with convict labour 
during the 1650s. Thomas Noell responded to this massive labour deficiency by leasing 179 acres of his 
plantation to 24 tenants for an annual rent of £362 BMC. It was only once such labour shortages had 
been addressed that Mount Clapham could be reorganised as an integrated plantation by its new owners 
in the early 1670s.21 
The third way in which investments provided by London merchants assisted in the emergence of the 
integrated plantation was by financing the construction of sugar mills and other expensive machinery. An 
infusion of merchant capital initiated institutional changes in the processing of raw cane on Barbados, 
easing the transition from animal-powered sugar mills to wind and watermills. Other historians, including 
Menard, have missed how it was London merchants who built the first wind-powered sugar mills on 
Barbados, which secured sugar planters productivity gains. 
Animal mills, driven predominantly by horses and cattle, were used in the mid-1640s at the start of the 
sugar boom. But having to consistently replace the livestock that succumbed to demanding work regimes 
constituted a high annual expense for plantation-owners. Sugar mills powered by the elements (e.g. wind 
and water) eliminated the need to regularly purchase a new stock of draught animals and were more 
efficient than those driven by horses and cattle: they turned with greater force and thereby extracted more 
juice from the raw cane. The central plateau of Barbados was an ideal location from which to make use of 
the prevailing trade winds that blow westward across the Atlantic. A major drawback, however, was that 
that windmills were expensive to construct, requiring an investment of approximately £1000 sterling.22 
 
21 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 91-96; Russell R. Menard, ‘Law, credit, the supply of labour, and the organization of 
sugar production in the colonial Greater Caribbean: a comparison of Brazil and Barbados in the seventeenth 
century’ in John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, eds, The Early Modern Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 
154-162; McCusker and Menard, ‘The Sugar Industry in the Seventeenth Century’, pp. 295-302. 
22 For the greater efficiency and cost of wind-powered sugar mills, see Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp 72-73. 
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Only those who were well-connected to the London credit market or possessed a large pool of liquid 
capital could afford to make this investment. The first reference to windmills on Barbados is in June 
1647, when the London merchant Walter Leave sold a three-quarters share in the ‘Windmill Plantation’ to 
Thomas Matthew (also a London merchant). When windmills and watermills begin to appear more 
frequently in the inventories of large plantations in the early 1660s, they are mostly associated with estates 
owned by London merchants and their relatives. For example, in June 1661 Thomas Batson, the nephew 
and agent of the London merchant Richard Batson, was in possession of a plantation in St. Phillip parish 
with ‘one windmill, cureing house, dwelling house, and boyling house’ which was worth 78,000 lb. of 
sugar.23 By the close of the century animal-powered sugar mills were used only by planters with small 
business operations who lacked the means to finance the construction of this new machinery.  
Theorists and entrepreneurs in England were seeking new and cheaper methods of grinding sugar. 
English polymaths with colonial interests, including William Petty, Benjamin Worsley, and Cressy 
Dymock, played a leading role in experimenting with the sugar refining process. Members of the 
merchant community with interests in the Caribbean, led by Maurice Thomson, offered financial support 
to members of the Hartlib circle to assist in the development of an invention for ‘a better grinding of 
canes of sugar’.24 The first details about these trials appear in 1649, when attempts to develop a 
‘Perpetuus Motus Invention’ for the ‘grinding of sugar canes’ were underway. This machine could 
supposedly deliver power to the rollers of a sugar mill without the need for an external force. These 
efforts were stalled, however, until Petty had discussed with some ‘Barbados men’ knowledgeable about 
the natural resources of the island about whether there was a ‘good store of combustible matter in 
Barbados’.25  
It appears that Cressy Dymock did create a prototype of this new machine, which he sent to leading 
London millwrights for their appraisal.26 Dymock asserted that there would be a variety of private and 
 
23 For the ‘Windmill Plantation’, see BDA, RB3/3, pp. 466-467. For Thomas Batson’s windmill, see BDA, RB3/2, 
pp. 583-585.  
24 Hartlib Papers, Ephemerides 1649 Part 3, 28/1/26B-38B. 
25 Hartlib Papers, Ephemerides 1649 Part 1, 28/1/1A-13B. 
26 Hartlib Papers, Ephemerides 1651 Part 1, 28/2/1A-12A. 
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public benefits if his ‘engine bee made use of in the Barbados for the grinding of sugar’. He claimed that 
by eliminating the need for draught animals in the sugar industry planters on Barbados could convert 
pastures, which were usually left fallow to provide fodder for horses and cattle, into plantations fit for the 
production of cash crops.27 There is evidence to suggest that this machine was actually experimented with 
on plantations in the Caribbean. In October 1659 a financial agreement was signed between Cressy 
Dymock and a syndicate of London merchants regarding ‘an engine invented by the said Cressy 
Dymock’, which was given to the merchants and conveyed to Barbados in exchange for the large sum of 
£1623 15s.28  
It was London merchants who collaborated with members of the Hartlib Circle to improve the efficiency 
of sugar milling. They were also the first to try to implement this new technology on Barbadian 
plantations. Productivity gains were eventually made by plantation-owners on Barbados after they began 
to harness the elements, and especially wind power, to turn their mills. London merchants were at the 
forefront of these efforts to foster innovation in the colonial sphere in the mid-seventeenth century, and 
building upon earlier attempts to develop a ‘Perpettus Motus Invention’, they pioneered the successful 
adoption of wind-powered sugar mills. As Paul Slack has shown, the notion of ‘improvement’ became a 
central part of English discourse and political economy in the 1640s and 1650s.29 But he did not place 
enough emphasis on how the efforts of the Hartlib Circle to improve agriculture and industry extended 
beyond England and Ireland. Hartlib and his associates had similar designs for the American colonies, as 
evidenced by the project to enhance the productivity of the Barbadian sugar industry described here, 
along also by the scheme to settle a Huguenot colony in Carolina and the plan to reform the government 
of Virginia and diversify its economy like had been recently achieved on Barbados.30 
 
27 Hartlib Papers, ‘Memorandum About Engines, Dymock’, n.d., 62/8A-B. 
28 BDA, RB 3/5, pp. 641-642. The partnership of London merchants was comprised of Isaac Legay, Peter Legay, 
and Robert Hooper, who co-owned a plantation on Barbados.   
29 Paul Slack, The Invention of Improvement: Information and Material Progress in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford, 2015), 
pp. 91-128. 
30 For the Huguenot colonisation scheme, see Thomas Leng, ‘“A Potent Plantation Well Armed and Policeed”: 
Huguenots, the Hartlib Circle, and British Colonization in the 1640s’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 1 
(2009), pp. 173- 194. For the project to reform Virginia, see Leng, Benjamin Worsley, pp. 50-52; Peter Thompson, 
‘William Bullock's “Strange Adventure”: A Plan to Transform Seventeenth-Century’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 
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How did merchant plantation ownership on Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s compare to that of other 
colonies? The fact that absentee London merchants owned plantations in an overseas colony was not in 
itself remarkable. The ‘headright’ system of land grants administered by the Virginia Company awarded 
those who brought colonists and servants to the new colony a 50-acre tract per person transported. 
Because it was merchants who assumed most of the responsibility for shipping workers to the colonies, 
men involved in trade to Virginia such as Thomas Stegge quickly began to accumulate large landholdings, 
becoming involved directly in plantation production.31 Elsewhere, Maurice Thomson was co-owner of a 
1000-acre plantation on St. Christopher in 1626, Samuel Vassall and Matthew Craddock owned land in 
New England in the 1630s, and Martin Noell was allotted an enormous 20,000-acre land grant by 
Cromwell in the newly conquered colony of Jamaica in 1655.32 What was exceptional, though, was the 
amount of land bought on Barbados by a variety of different London merchants during a single decade, 
and the volume of investment they poured into the island in such a short period of time. In addition, 
other than on seventeenth-century Barbados, nowhere else did merchant involvement in a colonial land 
market precipitate widespread institutional changes in plantation management.  
This section has provided a more detailed analysis of land transactions on Barbados in the early years of 
the sugar boom than ever before. The amount of land bought by London merchants in the 1640s, and the 
sums of money they invested in the island’s economy as a result, was extraordinary when compared to 
other English colonies. Merchant capital, in the form of direct investment and credit, transformed the 
Barbados sugar industry, expediting the process by which integrated plantations became the dominant 
form of social and economic organisation on the island.  
 
 
Vol. 61, No. 1 (2004), pp. 107-128. For more on the application of ideas about ‘improvement’ in the colonial sphere, 
see Richard Drayton, Nature’s Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the World (New Haven, 2000). 
31 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 104, 120, 140-148. 
32 For Vassall, see Complete Book of Emigrants, p. 83. For Craddock, see Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 137-138. 
For the Noell land grant, see Thurloe Papers, Vol. 4., pp. 634-635, ‘Instructions unto Major General Fortescue, Vice-
Admiral Goodson, Major Robert Sedgwick and Daniel Serle’, [n.d. c. 1656]. 
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2. Transportation of unfree labour  
During the seventeenth century all English colonies in the Americas struggled to procure labourers to 
clear land and cultivate tropical commodities. Access to a cheap workforce was the foundation of secure 
and profitable colonies. One seventeenth-century commentator considered the contributions of ‘Negro 
and Christian servants’ to colonial society to have been so significant that they were best described as ‘the 
nerves and sinews of a plantation’.33 Finding workers was especially important for English colonisers in 
the first half of the seventeenth century, when the population levels of nascent colonies often determined 
whether speculative overseas ventures would go bust or be overrun by rival European powers. Because 
the small island lacked an indigenous population to subdue and enslave, the inhabitants of Barbados were 
forced to satisfy their labour shortages by importing unfree labourers over long distances. In the early 
1640s, just before the onset of the sugar boom, planters had a steady stream of white indentured servants 
arriving from England, and had begun to experiment with the use of Indian slaves from Guiana and black 
slaves from West Africa.  
The demand for labour on Barbados increased exponentially after the sugar boom began to grip the 
island, and as a result English merchants sought to meet this demand by obtaining warrants to transport 
convicts from the British Isles, and by organising expeditions to the Guinea coast to trade in enslaved 
Africans. It has been persuasively argued by several historians, including Carla Pestana and John 
Donoghue, that the revolutionary era of the 1640s was the time when coercion became the main method 
used by English merchants to procure unfree labourers for the American plantations, both in West Africa 
and the British Isles. Given the overwhelming evidence we have for parliamentary sanction of convict 
transportation to the colonies, the unbridled activity of ‘spirits’ in London’s waterfronts, and increased 
English participation in the transatlantic slave trade, it would seem they were correct. The breakdown of 
central political authority in England in the 1640s gave unscrupulous merchants free reign to use 
 
33 BL, Stowe Ms. 324, f. 6, ‘An account of the English Sugar Plantations’. 
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dishonest and coercive recruiting methods to procure labourers for the Barbadian market. By the 1650s, 
the revolutionary state had even begun to sanction these practices.34 
English merchants were pivotal actors in the process by which plantation labour on Barbados became 
racialised, as the composition of the workforce quickly shifted from white indentured labour to African 
slavery after 1645. The Africanisation of Barbados was evident by 1680, when enslaved Africans 
constituted nearly 70 percent of the island’s population. There was a gendered dimension to this 
demographic transformation too: the switch from servitude to slavery can be more precisely described as 
a process by which male servants were replaced by male and female enslaved Africans.35 Estimates 
suggest there were 50,000 enslaved Africans living on Barbados in 1700, even though merchants had 
transported approximately 212,000 enslaved Africans to the island since the founding of the colony: a 
sobering testament to how the Barbadian plantation system required a steady supply of labour to replace 
those who perished from rigorous work regimes and the tropical disease environment.36  
At first glance it would appear English merchants did not display a preference for transporting enslaved 
Africans over indentured servants to Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s. There was a high demand for 
workers in the mid-seventeenth century, and merchants sought to profit from this by shipping to the 
colony whatever unfree labourers they could get their hands on. There were five English merchants, for 
example, who I have identified as participating in both the servant and slave trade to Barbados in the era 
of the sugar boom.37 But a closer look at the quantitative evidence is revealing. Menard’s careful empirical 
work has shown that both the servant and slave trade to Barbados expanded during the 1640s, but the 
 
34 Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, p. 183 & 186; Donoghue, Fire Under the Ashes, p. 214. For 
Parliament’s 1645 ordinance to try to prevent the ‘spiriting’ of children to the American plantations, see Wareing, 
Indentured Migration, pp. 179-184.  
35 Carole Shammas, ‘Black women's work and the evolution of plantation society in Virginia’, Labor History, Vol. 26, 
No. 1 (1985), pp. 5-28; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 47-48. 
36 For these estimates, derived from the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, see Newman, A New World of Labor, p. 
214. In 1679 Henry Drax instructed his plantation manager Richard Harwood to purchase between 10 to 15 slaves 
each year to replace those who had died: ‘I suppose to supply the places of those that shall be deseased or Dy you 
will wantt a yearly Recrute of 10 or 15’. But, according to Drax, in times of disease that number might increase to 
more than 20. His preference was to buy ‘Cormante or gold Cost Negros’, who had ‘always Stood and proved bestt 
in this plantation [,] theirefor you will doe welle to buy of that Nation then any other’. Thompson, ‘Henry Drax’s 
Instructions’, p. 585. 
37 Martin Noell, Maurice Thomson, Robert Lewellin, William Pennoyer, and Thomas Parris. 
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‘number of slaves simply grew at a faster rate’. By the 1650s enslaved Africans ‘thoroughly dominated the 
unfree workforce…outnumbering servants by nearly two to one’.38 My database shows how, between 
1640 and 1660, there were 48 English merchants who invested in at least one slave trading voyage to 
Barbados. By contrast, I have only found evidence that 12 merchants organised shipments of indentured 
servants to Barbados over the same period (see Table A4, Appendix 2).  
There are several potential explanations for this discrepancy. It is possible, for instance, slaving ventures 
went wrong more often than voyages carrying servants, thus increasing the frequency with which slave 
trading merchants deposed in cases heard at the High Court of Admiralty (a major part of my source 
base). The complexities and dangers associated with the transatlantic slave trade when compared to the 
servant trade probably also meant there were more merchants involved with a transatlantic slave trading 
venture, as this helped to spread the risk to invested capital. But we cannot rule out the possibility that 
these data reveal the preferences of English merchants: namely that they preferred shipping enslaved 
Africans to Barbados over white servants from around the year 1645. As I argued in Chapter Two, the 
reason why merchants might have favoured enslaved Africans over servants was not just due to 
internalised prejudices, but also material concerns. The customary status of enslaved Africans on the 
island as permanent and inheritable property meant that, like land on Barbados, enslaved Africans were 
another possession in which merchants could tie-up their money during the disruptive Civil War years of 
the 1640s. Perhaps just as important was that enslaved Africans were an appreciating asset, and therefore 




38 Servant migration to Barbados saw a fourfold increase during the 1640s, and remained high until the early 1660s. 
Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 35, 43-45. See also Newman, A New World of Labor, p. 75.  




Prior to the advent of the sugar boom, the indenture system was the main method used to bring workers 
to Barbados. During the 1630s, for instance, there were regular pleas for the Hay proprietors to ‘send 
over men servants or maid servants’, and to ‘bind them by indenture to serve four yeares a peace’.39 To 
encourage landless members of the English population to make the long journey to the Caribbean, 
plantation owners promised to cover the steep costs associated with the transatlantic voyage, and 
sometimes also to pay for food, clothing, and lodging. In return, these migrants would sign a contract 
which compelled them to enter the service of a planter upon their arrival at Barbados. The time span over 
which servants would be forced to work for their masters varied, but usually fell between three and ten 
years. In May 1649, for example, Thomas Hutchin entered the service of the Barbados planter Archibald 
Hay for the term of five years. As the new master of Thomas Hutchin, Hay was contractually obliged ‘to 
pay for his passing and to finde and allow him meate, drink, apparel and lodging with other necessaries 
during the said terme’.40 Indentured servants had always been treated like commodities by merchants and 
planters on Barbados. But historians usually make the distinction that it was the indenture contracts 
which were being bought and sold: in particular the time which the servant in question had left before the 
completion of their service. A servant with four years left to serve was more valuable than a servant who 
had just one year until securing their freedom.41 Nonetheless, the unequal power relations between 
masters and servants on Barbados were radically different to traditional forms of apprenticeship in 
England. Barbadian labour management practices, referred to as the ‘custom of the country’, were 
codified in 1661 under the ‘Act for the Good Governing of Servants’.42 
The commodification and exploitation of labourers from the British Isles took a new turn during the 
Interregnum. The period from 1642 to 1660 saw rising demand for labourers due to the expansion of the 
 
39 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/924/9, Letter from Peter Hay, 2 October 1637. 
40 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/949/1, Indenture of Thomas Hutchin, 16 May 1649.   
41 This can be demonstrated by comparing the value of two servants listed in the 1640 inventory of the Rendezvous 
plantation, owned by Lancelot Pace. The labourer John Robinson, who had 9 months left to serve, was deemed to 
be worth only 80 lb. of cotton, while Edward Spurloe was appraised at 700 lb. of cotton due to the 6 years he had 
left on his contract. BDA, RB3/1, pp. 13-15. 
42 Newman, A New World of Labor, p. 68, 94-95.  
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sugar industry, and merchants were given permission to meet this demand by forcefully transporting 
political prisoners, vagrants, and other ‘undesirable’ elements of the English population to the American 
plantations (especially Barbados). Following the siege of Colchester in the summer of 1648, for example, 
18 prisoners of war were taken by the New Model Army under the command of Sir Thomas Fairfax, and 
subsequently given to Richard Arnold to ‘become his servant[s] and to be for that purpose transported to 
the Barbadoes’. Similarly, in October 1654, the Council of State ordered that ‘English, Scotch, or Irish 
pirates, prisoners in Dorchester gaol’ were to be ‘forthwith sent to Barbadoes, Bermudas, or some other 
of the English plantations in America’.43 Martin Noell used his appointments to various Parliamentary 
committees, especially those relating to poor relief and colonial proceedings, to deliver regular shipments 
of servants, vagrants, and captive prisoners to his sugar plantations on Barbados.44 The Lord Protector 
granted Noell multiple warrants to transport to Barbados a large number of men and women who were 
imprisoned in England.45 Other merchants with vested interests in Barbados sugar plantations also 
profited from the trade in convicts. In May 1654, Thomas Parris was permitted to transport 500 Scottish 
prisoners to Barbados. Two months later Thomas Kendall, the business partner of the planter Thomas 
Modyford, was given a warrant to ship a further 300 of these incarcerated Scotsmen to the island.46 After 
the conquest of Ireland in the early 1650s, Catholic Irishmen made up an increasingly large proportion of 
the indentured workforce on Barbados, which has led Hilary Beckles to suggest that there may have been 
an ethnic and religious dimension to the maltreatment of servants.47 
Insights into the lived experience of forced labourers, and by extension the human impact of the policies 
instituted by powerful merchants such as Martin Noell, are difficult to recapture. The surviving source 
material provides historians with detailed information about the business activities and political offices 
held by merchants and planters, but does not usually record the voices of enslaved Africans and 
 
43 LMA, MCD Box 2, CLA/024/06/002; CSPC AWI, Vol. 1., pp. 418-419, 19 October 1654.  
44 Donoghue, Fire Under the Ashes, pp. 214-216. For further information on the increased supply of vagrant and 
convict labour to the American colonies during the Interregnum, see Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire, pp. 20-28; 
Newman, A New World of Labor, pp. 76-79. 
45 CSPC AWI, Vol. 1., pp. 421-423 & pp. 427-428, 1 March 1655, 30 March 1655, 14 August 1655. 
46 Bodleian Library, MS Rawl A. 328, f. 46 & f. 92.  
47 Hilary McD Beckles, ‘A “riotous and unruly lot”: Irish Indentured Servants and Freemen in the English West 
Indies, 1644-1713’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1990), pp. 503-522; Newman, A New World of 
Labor, pp. 81-83. 
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indentured servants. Nevertheless, there are some written sources, including printed petitions from 
indentured servants pleading for redress from their ordeal on Barbados, which give an impression of what 
it was like to labour on a tropical sugar plantation in the mid-seventeenth century. A well-known example 
is the pamphlet Englands Slavery, or Barbados Merchandize, which details the experiences of Marcellus Rivers 
and Oxenbridge Foyle, two members of the English gentry who were transported to Barbados as servants 
in the 1650s.48 According to their account, Rivers and Foyle became prisoners of the revolutionary state 
in 1654 after they were unfortunate enough to be in the proximity of a Royalist uprising near Salisbury. 
They were incarcerated in Devon for around a year before being ‘snacht out of their prisons…and so 
hurried to Plymouth aboard the ship, John of London’. Alongside 79 other captives, Rivers and Foyle 
were forced to endure a torturous five-week journey, during which the ‘captive petitioners’ were ‘kept 
under decks (and guards) among horses’. When they arrived on Barbados, the convicts were sold at a rate 
of 1550 lb. of sugar per servant.49  
The prisoners, including Rivers and Foyle, were sold as the ‘goods and chattels’ of three English 
merchants working in partnership in this venture: Martin Noell, Thomas Alderne, and Henry Hatsell. A 
hitherto unknown letter from these merchants to John Cole, captain of the John, was produced as 
evidence during litigation in the Mayor’s Court of London in 1661. It reveals how Noell and his co-
partners instructed Cole to sell the servants ‘at the best rate you can, for ready Comodityes, theire time 
according to the Custome of the Island’.50 Rivers and Foyle interpreted events differently. In their 
pamphlet, they condemned these ‘merchants that deal in slaves and souls of men’ for ignoring the social 
structures which stratified early modern England. As individuals who had enjoyed a privileged upbringing 
in England, Rivers and Foyle were shocked when confronted with the values and habits held by planters 
on Barbados and merchants such as Martin Noell, who spared neither ‘Divines, nor Officers, nor 
 
48 Marcellus Rivers and Oxenbridge Foyle, Englands slavery, or Barbados merchandize; represented in a petition to the high court 
of Parliament, by Marcellus Rivers and Oxenbridge Foyle gentlemen, on behalf of themselves and three-score and ten more free-born 
Englishmen sold (uncondemned) into slavery: together with letters written to some honourable members of Parliament (London, 1659). 
The Monmouth rebel, Henry Pitman, wrote a similar pamphlet in the 1680s about his experiences of forced 
transportation and labour on Barbados. Henry Pitman, A relation of the great sufferings and strange adventures of Henry 
Pitman, chyrurgion to the late Duke of Monmouth (London, 1689).  
49 Rivers and Foyle, Englands slavery, or Barbados merchandize, pp. 2-6; LMA, MCD Box 12, CLA/024/06/012. 
50 LMA, MCD Box 12, CLA/024/06/012. 
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Gentleman, nor any age or condition of men’ from an ‘insupportable captivity’. On Barbados, labourers 
endured a daily routine of exhausting manual work, such as ‘grinding at the mills, attending the fornaces, 
or digging in this scorching island’, regardless of their class or age.51   
In the spring of 1659 several petitions detailing the grievances of servants sent from the British Isles to 
labour on Barbadian plantations were debated in the House of Commons.52 The Parliamentary hearings 
over the complaints of Marcellus Rivers and Oxenbridge Foyle give historians a rare glimpse into how 
some powerful and wealthy members of English society viewed indentured servitude and slavery in the 
mid-seventeenth century. During the proceedings there was protracted and heated discussion of the case 
of Rivers and Foyle, especially their assertion that Martin Noell had sold Englishmen into ‘slavery’. As an 
MP, Noell was able to respond to their claims in person. He began by detailing how he regularly acted as 
an agent for other merchants, who ‘send to me to procure such artificers to be sent over [to Barbados] as 
I might think fit for them’, and that he sourced some of these persons ‘out of Brideswell and other 
prisons’. He then, somewhat insincerely, proceeded to insist that he had sent none of the prisoners to the 
Caribbean without first having them sign an indenture and give their consent. Although Noell admitted 
that the work regimes on Barbados were hard, he claimed that servants on the island were all ‘civilly used’. 
Indeed, he suggested that because servants in the Caribbean only laboured from six in the morning to six 
in the evening, that the intensity of work on Barbados was not so different to ‘the common husbandman’ 
in England. And besides, the hardest work was ‘mostly carried on by the negroes’.53 Although some MPs 
sitting in the House of Commons assumed that this pamphlet was written to undermine the parliamentary 
regime, and therefore rejected any criticism of London merchants involved in the servant trade as a mere 
‘Cavalier’s petition’, there were a few dissenting voices who were rightly more sceptical of Noell’s defense. 
Sir Henry Vane, for instance, exclaimed that he did not ‘look upon this business as a Cavalierish business: 
but as a matter that concerns the liberty of the free-born people of England’.54 After the Restoration 
matters remained unresolved. A deposition from 1661 was recorded in the Mayor’s Court of London by 
 
51 Rivers and Foyle, Englands slavery, or Barbados merchandize, pp. 2-6.  
52 Proceedings and Debates, pp. 247-263.  
53 Ibid., p. 250.  
54 Ibid., p. 251, 252 & 256.  
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Marcellus Rivers on behalf of himself and the other prisoners transported against their wills to Barbados 
in 1655, in which they recounted their experiences on Barbados and demanded compensation. I have not 
been able to ascertain whether they received any compensation from Noell, but future research in the 
records of the Lord Mayor’s Court may help to reconstruct this court case in full.55 
Historians such as Hilary Beckles, John Donoghue, and Simon Newman have argued that the cruel 
treatment of indentured servants on Barbados rendered them effectively ‘white slaves’ or ‘bond slaves’.56 
Servants were, however, accorded rights which made their servile status on Barbados distinct from 
enslaved Africans. As has already been mentioned, servants were obliged to work for their masters 
because they had signed a written contract of indenture, which stipulated that they would be freed after a 
fixed time, usually five to seven years. Some servants were forcefully transported to the Caribbean after 
falling victim to the exploitative actions of ‘spirits’ operating in the squalid waterfronts of English port-
towns, especially during the 1640s and 1650s, although the surviving evidence indicates that this was the 
exception rather than the rule during the entire span of the seventeenth century. Once their contracts had 
expired, ex-servants were accorded the status of freeman on Barbados, and could purchase land and 
unfree labourers of their own. They were permitted to ‘employ their times according to their abilities, and 
capacities, either to get a small Plantation, or to work at day-labour in other Plantations, or else to exercise 
their Trades, if so capacitated.’57 Enslaved Africans living on Barbados were, by contrast, afforded no 
such opportunities. They were subject to greater controls and more brutal punishments. As Richard 
Blome stated in 1678: ‘The Negro Slaves are never out of their Bondage and the Children they get, are 
likewise perpetual slaves’.58 
 
55 LMA, MCD Box 12, CLA/024/06/012. 
56 Hilary McD. Beckles, ‘Plantation Production and White “Proto-Slavery”: White Indentured Servants and the 
Colonization of the English West Indies, 1624–1645’, The Americas, Vol. 41 (1985), pp. 21-45; Donoghue, ‘Out of 
the Land of Bondage’; Newman, A New World of Labor, ch. 4 & p. 246. The characterization of indentured servants 
as ‘white slaves’ has generated criticism in recent years. E.g. Jerome S. Handler & Matthew C. Reilly, ‘Contesting 
“White Slavery” in the Caribbean: Enslaved Africans and European Indentured Servants in Seventeenth-Century 
Barbados’, New West Indian Guide, Vol. 91 (2017), pp. 30–55. 
57 Richard Blome, A Description of the Island of Jamaica; With the other Isles and Territories in America, to which the English are 
related, viz. Barbadoes, St Christophers, Nievis, Antego, St Vincent, Dominica, Montserat, Anguilla, Barbada, Bermudes, Carolina, 
Virginia, Maryland, New York, New England, NewFoundland. Together with the Present State of Algiers (London, 1678), pp. 
36-37.   
58 Ibid., pp. 36-37.   





Debate over the origins of slavery in Anglo-America has produced a richly detailed body of 
interdisciplinary scholarship.59 Some scholars contend that the concept of race was an ideological catalyst 
for the emergence of African slavery in the Americas. Others have approached the topic from a 
materialist standpoint, arguing that the exploitation of enslaved Africans was a rational economic choice 
for English merchants and planters, and that entrenched racial prejudices developed over time as a by-
product of this decision.60 Barbados has played a central role in these discussions, because this was the 
English colony where African slavery first became a large-scale institution.  
Recent work has helped historians to explain how and why men and women from West Africa were 
reduced to permanent and inheritable slavery by colonists in early America. Jerome S. Handler contends 
that the very first Africans who came to Barbados after being taken as a prize by the party who founded 
the colony in 1627, were seen as ‘slaves’ in the eyes of those Englishmen.61 Due to their familiarity with 
slavery in the Iberian world and their belief in the inferiority of Africans, English colonisers in the early 
seventeenth century believed that ‘enslaving Africans was socially acceptable’.62 Even though there was no 
 
59 For the scholarship which inspired the ‘origins debate’, see Oscar & Mary Handlin, ‘Origins of the Southern 
Labor System’, William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 7 (1950); Winthrop D. Jordan, White over Black, American Attitudes 
Toward the Negro, 1550–1812 (Chapel Hill, 1968); Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of 
Colonial Virginia (New York, 1975); William M. Wiecek, ‘The Statutory Law of Slavery and Race in the Thirteen 
Mainland Colonies of British America’, William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1977), pp. 258-280. 
60 For more recent treatments of the ‘origins debate’, see Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery; Betty Wood, 
The Origins of American Slavery: Freedom and Bondage in the English Colonies (New York, 1997); Eltis, The Rise of African 
Slavery; April Lee Hatfield, ‘A “Very Wary People in Their Bargaining” or “Very Good Marchandise”: English 
Traders’ Views of Free and Enslaved Africans, 1550–1650’, Slavery & Abolition, Vol. 25 (2004); John C. Coombs, 
‘Beyond the “Origins Debate”: Rethinking the Rise of Virginia Slavery’, in Douglas Bradburn and John C. Coombs, 
eds, Early Modern Virginia: Reconsidering the Old Dominion (Charlottesville, 2011), pp. 239-278. 
61 Jerome S. Handler, ‘Custom and law: The status of enslaved Africans in seventeenth-century Barbados’, Slavery and 
Abolition, Vol. 37, No. 2, (2016). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., p. 236. Michael Guasco has made a similar argument, emphasising how educated early modern Englishmen 
were familiar with slavery because they had read the Bible, classical works, and travel literature. This gave them a 
comprehensive understanding of slavery in the classical world, galley slavery in the Mediterranean, and Iberian 
slaveholding practices. See Guasco, Slaves and Englishmen, ch. 2, 3, 4.   
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written precedent for slavery in English law and the Barbados slave codes were not formalised until 
1661,63 Handler provides documentary evidence to show that certain social practices on Barbados, 
especially those involving conduct towards Africans, were developed through custom. The slave status 
ascribed to Africans on Barbados meant that from the very beginning of English settlement on the island 
they were treated as chattel property and endured a lifetime of servitude. Another feature of slave status 
involved the stipulation that black mothers always passed on their inferior position in society to their 
children.64 There is considerable evidence to support the argument that these practices were common on 
Barbados long before they were enshrined in law. Richard Ligon explained how ‘the slaves and their 
posterity’ were ‘subject to their Masters for ever’.65 By treating Africans as human merchandise, that could 
be bought on the Guinea coast and sold to planters on Barbados, London merchants played a crucial role 
in reinforcing the status of Africans as private property. 
Building on Handler’s work, I seek to provide a more detailed analysis of the early English slave trade to 
Barbados. Historians originally presumed that the Dutch, who dominated European commerce with West 
Africa and controlled the Caribbean carrying trade in the early seventeenth century, provided the 
inhabitants of Barbados with most of their enslaved Africans in the 1640s and 1650s.66 This was because 
some contemporary accounts described the Dutch as major participants in the slave trade to Barbados. 
For instance, Sir Robert Harley, who was appointed Keeper of the Seal of Barbados in 1663, explained 
how ‘the Dutch being ingaged on the coast of Giney in Affrick for negros Slaves having lost brasille, not 
knowing where to vent them they trusted them to Barbadoes’. Harman Barrentz, captain of the Peace of 
Amsterdam, is a good example of one of these Dutch merchants who sold enslaved Africans on 
 
63 For the Barbados slave codes, see Edward B. Rugemer, ‘The Development of Mastery and Race in 
Comprehensive Slave Codes of the Greater Caribbean during the Seventeenth Century’, The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 3 (2013), pp. 429-458. 
64 Handler, ‘Custom and law’, p. 234. There was a purported ruling made by Governor Henry Hawley and the 
Barbados Council in 1636 which stated how ‘Negroes and Indians that came here to be sold, should serve for Life, 
unless a Contract was before made to the contrary'. Handler has raised doubts over the veracity of this quotation, 
however, by demonstrating that the provenance of the source material is uncertain and arguing that therefore the 
ruling may not have even existed. See Handler, ‘Custom and law’, p. 243-244. 
65 Ligon, True and Exact History, p. 93. 
66 E.g. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 65-66 & 230-231; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, p. 130; Puckrein, Little England, p. 71. 
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Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century. In February 1655, his vessel was captured by an English 
warship near Carlisle Bay with ‘240 negroes’ on board.67  
More recently, however, a body of research has accumulated which has helped to overturn what John 
Appleby called the ‘accepted view that the English slave trade was of “small proportions” before 1660’.68 
Even historians of the Dutch Atlantic have observed that there is little evidence of extensive Dutch 
involvement in the slave trade to Barbados during the 1640s: there are just three such voyages 
documented for the mid-1640s, for instance.69 The West India Company possessed monopoly rights over 
the Dutch slave trade, and in the crucial early years of the Barbadian sugar industry the company 
struggled to supply even its own colony of Brazil with an adequate number of enslaved Africans.70 
Calculations made using the surviving evidence for the slave trade to Barbados suggest that the Dutch 
imported just 13 percent of enslaved Africans recorded between 1641 and 1660.71 As Wim Klooster has 
recently observed: ‘the English slave trade to Barbados must have been more significant than most 
historians have realised’.72 
It was Englishmen operating out of London, Bristol, the Caribbean colonies, and New England who 
organised regular trading ventures to the West African coast in search of slaves for the Barbadian 
plantation system between 1640 and 1660. There are 17 slave voyages to Barbados under the English flag 
recorded in the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database for the 1640s.73 By conducting research in the High 
Court of Admiralty papers and the Mayor’s Court Depositions, archives which historians of early America 
tend not to consult, I have found evidence of 35 English slave trading ventures to Barbados in the 1640s, 
 
67 BL, Add. Ms. 70063, ff. 10-12, ‘Toucheing Barbados’, [n.d.]; TNA, CO 1/66, f. 33. 
68 John C. Appleby, ‘“A business of much difficulty”: A London Slaving Voyage, 1651-1654’, Mariner’s Mirror, Vol. 
81 (1995), pp. 4-7. Besides Appleby’s article, several other pieces of research have made important contributions to 
our understanding of the early English slave trade: Larry Gragg, ‘“To procure Negroes”: The English slave trade to 
Barbados, 1627–60’, Slavery and Abolition, Vol. 16, No. 1, (1995), pp. 65-84; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, ch. 2 & 3; 
Blakemore, ‘West Africa in the British Atlantic’; Roper, Advancing Empire, ch. 3. 
69 Boogaart and Emmer, ‘The Dutch Participation in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1596-1650’; Koot, Empire at the 
Periphery, pp. 57-58; Klooster, The Dutch Moment, pp. 168-169. 
70 Klooster, The Dutch Moment, p. 168. 
71 Koot, Empire at the Periphery, pp. 57-58.  
72 Klooster, The Dutch Moment, p. 169.  
73 www.slavevoyages.org (Accessed 30/09/2019). 
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doubling the number of known slaving voyages dispatched by English merchants to the island in that 
decade (see Table 3.3., below). This enriches our understanding of the dimensions of early English slave 
trading, as it was during the 1640s that English participation in the transatlantic slave trade first began to 
intensify, and most of this traffic was directed towards Barbados. It also provides tangible evidence for 
what many historians have begun to suspect: that the English slave trade to Barbados was more 
important than that driven by the Dutch in the 1640s, and that it was English merchants who were 
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Table 3.3 [Redacted]  
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A closer look at the data in Table 3.3 provides several insights. The importance of London to the early 
English slave trade is evident, as the overwhelming majority of slaving ventures to Barbados in the 1640s 
began there. There were 86 unique English merchants who invested in slave trading ventures to Barbados 
in the 1640s. 14 of these merchants financed two or more voyages, and we can therefore identify them as 
the most important English slave traders in the 1640s: Peter Andrews, Richard Batson, Jeremy Blackman, 
Benjamin Cranley, Richard Cranley, William Fletcher, Richard Hill, Richard Parr, William Pennoyer, 
Maurice Thomson, Samuel Vassall, John Wadloe, Rowland Wilson Sen., and John Wood. Most of these 
merchants had prior involvement in West African commerce and the American tobacco trade during the 
1630s. The database also supports what other scholars have gleaned from demographic data on Barbados, 
namely that deliveries of enslaved Africans into Barbados began to increase sharply after 1645. I have 
found evidence of two English slave trading voyages to Barbados in 1644, and eight in 1645, which 
suggests that inputs of enslaved Africans into Barbados may have seen as much as a fourfold increase in 
the space of a year. The demand for unfree labour generated by the emergence of a commercial sugar 
industry on the island in 1643 clearly provided a significant stimulus to slave trading traffic, which began 
to have an impact that is noticeable in the historical record several years later. 
Due to the type of source material used to create this database there are some limitations to the 
conclusions we can draw from Table 3.3. The High Court of Admiralty dealt with legal cases between 
merchants, and as such is by its very nature a record of trading ventures which went awry. This means 
that while all of the ventures listed in Table 3.3 had a charterparty which specified they were to voyage to 
the West African coast before then proceeding to Barbados, a proportion of these journeys were never 
completed. The voyage of the Phillip in 1646, which ran aground in the Caribbean with its cargo of 
enslaved Africans while en route to Barbados, is a good example. Consequently, we cannot make reliable 
approximations about the true volume of slave trading to Barbados in the 1640s. What the data in Table 
3.3 does provide us with is a sense of the scale of English slaving voyages to Barbados in this decade 
when compared to other nations, such as the Dutch. Estimates drawn from Table 3.3 about the number 
of enslaved Africans imported into Barbados in the 1640s also have a high margin of error. Around half 
of the slave trading voyages listed in Table 3.3 do not have information about the number of enslaved 
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Africans transported to Barbados, only that ‘divers negroes’ were disembarked at the colony. But if we 
were to fill in the gaps, and use the imputed data of 188 slaves disembarked for an average slave trading 
voyage in this period, then the database would show that approximately 6522 enslaved Africans reached 
Barbados in the 1640s.74 But this is, of course, an estimate made only from recorded slave trading voyages 
to Barbados: the fragmentary historical record for early English slave trading means it is highly likely that 
the number of enslaved Africans actually imported in this decade was much higher, and approaches 
Menard’s estimate of 18,000.75 
How were English merchants able to rapidly expand their participation in the transatlantic slave trade in 
the mid-1640s? Englishmen had been exposed to Atlantic slavery since the sixteenth century, when 
Elizabethan privateers had captured Portuguese and Spanish vessels carrying enslaved Africans to the 
New World.76 But despite this familiarity, organising a successful slave trading venture was still a complex 
undertaking. The logistical difficulties associated with carrying an unruly human cargo on a journey across 
the Atlantic, and then generating a profit from their sale in the Caribbean, should not be underestimated. 
Reliable mercantile contacts were necessary for Englishmen to conduct cross-cultural exchange in West 
Africa. It took time, and repeated visits to the Guinea coast, for the trust necessary for successful business 
relationships to develop.  
Once they had purchased a consignment of enslaved Africans, which sometimes numbered in the 
hundreds, English merchants and mariners were then required to keep their human cargo alive during the 
transatlantic voyage, while at the same time making sure the enslaved Africans were kept in a subjugated 
condition by restraining them with shackles and making liberal use of the whip.77 The horrific conditions 
endured by enslaved Africans during the Middle Passage exemplifies the devastating human cost 
associated with the profiteering of English merchants who traded to West Africa and Barbados in the era 
of the sugar boom. The demand for labour in the Caribbean colonies was high even before the transition 
 
74 The imputed data of 188 slaves is part of the algorithm used in the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, 
www.slavevoyages.org (Accessed 30/09/2019). 
75 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 47. 
76 Guasco, Slaves and Englishmen, pp. 7-8. 
77 For more on some of these difficulties, see Appleby, ‘A business of much difficulty’. 
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to sugar, always surpassing the supply of servants coming from the British Isles. Therefore, it must not 
have been until the mid-seventeenth century that Englishmen possessed the knowledge and experience 
necessary to make large-scale slave trading voyages a viable commercial undertaking. The large number of 
merchants involved in slave trading ventures to Barbados during the 1640s suggests that, despite this 
accumulation of experience, the dangers associated with slaving voyages and the amounts of capital tied-
up in these ventures were still significant, and that a large pool of investors was required to spread the risk 
(see Table 3.3, above). 
The triangular trade within the British Empire, which brought enslaved Africans to the Caribbean and 
tropical goods such as sugar back to England for nearly two centuries, developed from English trade to 
West Africa for gold and ivory in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. English commercial 
activity on the West African coast was formalised with the creation of the Guinea Company in 1618. The 
London merchants who received the legal patent from Charles I to trade with West Africa after the 
company’s reincorporation in 1631 were Sir Nicholas Crispe, Humphrey Slaney, John Wood, and William 
Cloberry.78 It was alluring commodities, especially gold, ivory, redwood, wax, and hides (but not enslaved 
Africans) which first attracted Englishmen to trade along the Guinea coast. Interloping merchants did 
seek to break the Guinea Company’s monopoly and consign cargoes of enslaved Africans to markets 
across the Atlantic. In 1626, for example, Maurice Thomson dispatched ‘about sixty slaves’ to his 
plantation on St. Christopher, in what constitutes the first recorded English slave trading venture to an 
English colony.79 While in 1637 the Guinea Company submitted a formal complaint about how the 
interloper John Crispe had outfitted the Talbot ‘to trade upon the Coasts of Guinea, and to take Nigers, 
and to carry them to other forraigne ptes’.80 
The business relationships the Guinea Company forged with indigenous merchants in West Africa when 
conducting their gold and ivory trade in the 1620s and 1630s were fundamental to the expansion of 
 
78 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 163-164. For further information on these traders see, Porter, ‘The Crispe 
Family’. 
79 Quoted in Roper, Advancing Empire, p. 33.  
80 TNA, CO 1/9, f. 169. 
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English participation in the transatlantic slave trade in the 1640s. This is because it was London 
merchants working under the remit of the Guinea Company who pioneered English involvement in the 
transatlantic slave trade to Barbados. The first cargo of enslaved Africans that is recorded to have been 
sold in the colony was transported on a vessel belonging to members of the Guinea Company. In 1641 
the Star of London, a ship owned by Sir Nicholas Crispe, Samuel Crispe, and John Wood, arrived at 
Barbados with a consignment of ‘divers negroes’.81 Guinea Company merchants who had organised 
voyages to West Africa to transport slaves to Barbados, along with gold and ivory to England, continued 
to trade in enslaved Africans on their own accounts after the company was stripped of its monopoly by 
Parliament in the mid-1640s. John Wood, for example, was part-owner of the Merchant Frigott and her 
pinnace the Speedwell, which ventured to the Jambo River in modern-day Ghana in the early 1650s, before 
journeying to Barbados and Santa Cruz.82  
We cannot be certain how the Guinea Company first became aware of the high demand for labour on 
Barbados, but it probably relates to the fact that voyages to West Africa often stopped at Barbados on the 
homeward bound journey for refreshment. Prevailing winds and ocean currents run clockwise in the 
Atlantic, meaning that the quickest way to sail back to Europe from West Africa in the early modern 
period was via the eastern Caribbean. Therefore, English ships trading in West Africa often made stops at 
Barbados to resupply before returning to Europe. One example is the voyage of the Darnell in 1661. The 
vessel journeyed to the Gold Coast, where the crew traded for ‘82 Negroes, a parcell of Elephants Teeth, 
and some Gold’. The charterparty specified that the ship’s captain should go ‘from Guinny, to the 
Barbadoes there to have refreshed his Negroes and soe to have gone to Cadiz in Spaine, there to have 
sould them’.83 It may have been in this way that London merchants trading under the remit of the Guinea 
Company first became aware of the high demand for labour on Barbados in the 1630s, and therefore 
began transporting enslaved Africans to the island in the early 1640s.  
 
81 BDA, RB3/1, pp. 202-203.  
82 LMA, MCD Box 4, CLA/024/06/004. 
83 Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade, Document 38, pp. 154-156. 
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Historians have tended to assume that, after 1640, all voyages to Barbados via West Africa were primarily 
slave trading ventures. But a careful reading of the available source material reveals that this was not 
always the case, particularly in the period before the incorporation of Royal African Company in 1672. 
Even after the 1640s, when the demand for enslaved Africans in colonial markets exploded, the trade in 
gold, ivory, and redwood remained important for Englishmen trading to West Africa. When English 
vessels en-route to Barbados chose to trade in West Africa, slaves were often only part of the 
merchandise they bought. In the early period of English participation in the slave trade, valuable 
commodities such as gold and ivory were transported across the Atlantic to Barbados alongside human 
cargo. The enslaved Africans were usually sold at English colonies in the Caribbean in exchange for sugar 
and other tropical goods, but the gold and ivory remained stored in the hold and were brought back to 
Europe.  
One example is the voyage of the Seville Society, a vessel owned by Samuel Wilson and Company, which 
departed London for Guinea in February 1649. In West Africa the merchants picked up a cargo of ‘250 
negers and about 3000 lbs of elephants teeth’. The vessel stopped at Barbados, Nevis, and Curacao, but 
being unable to find a good market, eventually sold the enslaved Africans at Guaranaro on the northern 
coast of Venezuela in early June 1650. The ivory was stored below deck while the vessel stopped at 
various islands in the Spanish Caribbean to trade for other commodities, including salt, tobacco, and 
hides. The Seville Society was seized by a marauding French warship before these goods could be returned 
to England, leading to litigation in the Mayor’s Court of London. A similar case is that of the Eagle, part-
owned by Richard Batson, which took in ‘a great quantity of Gold upon the Gold coasts of Guiney’ along 
with a cargo of ‘140 Negroes’, before leaving for Barbados in August 1650.84 Even in 1652, when the 
‘Adventurers for Guinny’ petitioned the Council of State for increased protection from Dutch aggression 
against their vessels, the merchants highlighted the importance of their trade in ‘Gold, hides, wax, 
 
84 For the Seville Society, see LMA, MCD, Box 4. For the Eagle, see TNA, HCA 13/65, ff. 45-46. 
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Elephants teeth, Redwood, Guinny graine’, but neglected to mention the slave trade to the Caribbean 
colonies.85  
Between the 27 July and 17 August 1644, Captain George Richardson, in partnership with the merchants 
Richard Parr and John Parris, of the Marie Bonadventure sold 251 enslaved Africans on Barbados. Around 
six months later the Mary of London, owned by the merchant John Wadloe, carried a smaller cargo of 26 
enslaved Africans to Barbados.86 Source material relating to these slave trading ventures has survived at 
the Barbados Department of Archives, providing historians with unprecedented amounts of detail about 
the methods English merchants used to sell enslaved Africans in the early stages of the sugar boom. Slave 
traders would probably have preferred to receive pounds sterling in exchange for their merchandise, but 
due to the limited availability of specie on Barbados, also accepted the equivalent value in tropical 
commodities or property on the island. Known to Englishmen in the seventeenth century as a transaction 
involving ‘ready goods’, 33 enslaved Africans from the Marie Bonadventure (or 13% of the total number 
sold) were bought in exchange for a set quantity of tobacco, cotton, indigo, or pork. A Barbados planter 
named Lawrence Price, for example, bought ‘three negroes sold at 2500 lbs of tobacco per head’ from the 
slave traders. Other commodities were more valuable and had greater purchasing power on Barbados. 
This is demonstrated by the transaction involving George Nore and his business partner, who by 
comparison paid just 200 lb. of indigo for two enslaved Africans.87 
Because slave labourers were an expensive investment it was typical for merchants to extend credit to 
Barbadians to help them afford to purchase enslaved Africans. A bill of exchange was written up by the 
representatives of the two parties, often in the presence of several witnesses. This written agreement 
detailed the value of the enslaved Africans sold in either pound sterling or equivalent commodities, the 
time over which repayment would occur, and identified a source of security (usually landed property or 
forced labourers already owned by the buyer) to act as collateral in case the planter was unable to repay 
 
85 TNA, CO 1/11, f. 186. The signatories of this petition were Samuel Vassall, William Pennoyer, John Wood, 
George Brett, Thomas Walter, and Nathaniel Andrewes. 
86 BDA, RB 3/1, pp. 419-422, 436-439, 589-594. 
87 Ibid.; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 63, Table 12. 
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the merchant on schedule. All the enslaved Africans transported on the Mary were sold on credit, while 
211 enslaved Africans from the Marie Bonadventure (or 84% of the total number sold) were purchased 
using credit.88 The richest and most well-connected inhabitants of Barbados stored a proportion of their 
money with goldsmith-bankers or scriveners in the City London. In some cases, therefore, bills of 
exchange entitled the bearer to draw pounds sterling from the London accounts of Barbados planters in 
exchange for an advanced supply of enslaved Africans. Christopher Thompson, for instance, bought ten 
enslaved Africans by promising to draw three bills of exchange totalling £220 ‘upon his brother Stephen 
Thompson of London’, which was payable to ‘alderman William Ashwell of London’ eight months after 
the date the bill was signed.89  
It was most common, however, for those on Barbados who bought enslaved Africans using credit to 
promise to deliver a fixed quantity of tropical commodities to a coastal storehouse at an arranged time in 
the near future. In the case of the enslaved Africans sold by the Marie Bonadventure, this date was the last 
day in April 1645, or just after the next harvest in nine months’ time. A good example of this form of 
transaction involved the Barbados-based merchant Edward Pye, who received ‘12 negroes’ after 
promising to deliver 12,000 lb. of tobacco and 12,000 lb. of cotton to a storehouse owned by Richardson 
and Parr before the 31 April 1645.90 Other planters settled their debts to slave traders by agreeing to 
freight a proportion of their next crop to England under the merchant’s account. They sometimes 
facilitated this deal by paying the administrative freight costs associated with shipping too. James Drax, 
who bought 35 enslaved Africans in August 1644 for £726 BMC, the largest consignment sold by the 
owners of the Marie Bonadventure, repaid his debt by promising to ship to England ‘soe much suger or 
other merchantable commodities as shall amount to the value of the said some of 726 sterling’ under the 
account of Richardson and Parr.91 Most bills of exchange clearly stipulated that the commodities provided 
for must be ‘merchantable’, or of adequate quality to fetch a good price on the London market. 
Merchants demanded that the tobacco they received was ‘well made up in role’, that cotton was ‘well 
 
88 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 63-64, Table 12 & Table 13. 
89 BDA, RB 3/1, pp. 419-422, 436-439, 589-594. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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cleared from the seeds’, and that sugars were ‘well cured’.92 Disputes over the quality and weight of the 
commodities sold by planters to merchants caused new regulations to be drafted in 1650. The Barbados 
assembly highlighted how there had previously been no provisions made to ensure that the ‘severall 
Comodities of this Island given and received in payment, that is to say Cotton wooll, Sugar, Indicoe, and 
Tobacco, should be of such goodness as the same ought to be’. Because they feared that this would lead 
to ‘the greate discouragement of all as well Marchants and others trayding in and to this Island’, the 
legislators nominated several men in each parish to deliver an impartial judgement when differences of 
opinion arose between merchants and planters over the quality and relative value of tropical goods.93 
This section has argued that English merchants were the most important suppliers of indentured servants 
and enslaved Africans to Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s. By using new source material to create a 
database of every known English slave trading voyage to Barbados in the 1640s, I have deepened 
historical understanding of early English involvement in the transatlantic slave trade. Credit arrangements 
between merchants in the City of London and planters on Barbados were central to the operation of the 
slave trade in the 1640s and 1650s, and without these written agreements to delay repayments, it is 
probable that only the wealthiest planters could have afforded to purchase enslaved Africans. By 
extending credit to planters to enable them to buy slave labourers, London merchants played a crucial 
role in rapidly increasing the population of enslaved Africans on Barbados. This expedited the 
Africanisation of the island’s population, facilitating the emergence of the first slave society in the 




92 For tobacco and cotton, see BDA, RB3/1, pp. 419-422, 436-439, 589-594. For sugar, see BDA, RB3/3, p. 628. 
93 TNA, CO1/11, f. 37, ‘An Act for the better Encouragement of trade’, 9 August 1650.  
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3. The provisioning trade 
As they purchased land on the island and populated burgeoning plantations with ever increasing numbers 
of indentured servants and enslaved Africans (most of whom were sold on credit), merchants in the City 
of London helped to create a new and dynamic consumer market in the Caribbean. But the sugar boom 
also precipitated an ecological catastrophe on Barbados. Intensive farming techniques damaged soil 
fertility and drastically reduced species richness as flora and fauna succumbed to the destruction of their 
natural habitats.94 As a small tropical island with limited natural resources, sustaining a large population 
on Barbados had always been precarious. When woodlands and provision grounds began to be rapidly 
converted into sugar plantations in the mid-seventeenth century, however, the inhabitants of Barbados 
were forced to look overseas for their fuel and staple foods more than ever before. Planters became 
almost wholly dependent on merchants for imports of lumber, food, clothes, tools, horses, oxen, cattle, 
and asses if they were to keep their sugar mills turning. One merchant captured this commercial 
relationship perfectly when he wrote that ‘without reliefe from England the Island of Barbados, a 
plantation belonging to England, is not able to subsist’.95  
There were 97 English merchants who participated in the Barbados provisioning trade during the 1640s 
and 1650s. Of this number, 21 also owned land on the island, and were therefore probably concerned 
with supplying their plantations with the commodities needed to maintain sugar production. Roughly 
two-thirds of these 97 merchants, however, were solely involved in the provisioning trade (see Table A4, 
Appendix 2). The fact that so many English merchants with no other business links to Barbados drove a 
trade in provisions to the colony in the mid-seventeenth century attests to the great demand for raw 
materials and manufactured goods produced by the sugar boom, and suggests that large profits could be 
 
94 Richard H. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-
1860 (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 63-71. 
95 TNA, CO1/12, f. 107.   
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made in the provisioning trade. Ligon marvelled at how £1000 spent on a cargo of clothes, assorted 
textiles, foodstuffs, and tools in England could be ‘doubled at the Barbados’ in the late 1640s.96 
Due to the newfound prominence of Barbados sugar to England’s overseas commerce, in the mid-1650s 
Parliament made a concerted effort to enact special regulations over trade with the island. These 
distinctive measures can be interpreted as a supplement to the Navigation Act passed several years earlier, 
and were therefore part of a broader legislative agenda to restrict Dutch participation in the carrying trade 
to the American plantations. In February 1656 the members of a committee convened ‘to take into their 
consideracon the trade and navigacon of this Commonwealth’ passed legislation placing controls over the 
Barbados provisioning trade. English merchants who wished to profit by shipping shoes, boots, horses, 
firearms, and ammunition to Barbados now had to obtain a formal license from Cromwell. The 
transportation of foodstuffs, alcohol, and tools were, however, exempt from such restrictions. Certain 
foods and clothes could even be shipped to the colony custom free. English shipmasters seeking to 
transport goods which were subject to the new controls were required to enter into bond at the customs 
house before their voyage, and would be heavily penalised if they chose to sell their merchandise 
somewhere other than Barbados. They also had to return to England within 18 months and present the 
commissioner of the customs with a valid certificate from the governor of Barbados (or his subordinates) 
confirming that their wares had been delivered to the island as agreed. Otherwise ship’s captains risked 
forfeiting their collateral payment.97 
One unforeseen consequence of this legislation is that it produced a great deal of source material for 
historians interested in English commerce with Barbados. During the Interregnum, it was a practical 
necessity for merchants and shipmasters who conducted lawful business operations to submit regular 
petitions to the Lord Protector pleading for warrants to supply Barbados with provisions. There are 61 
surviving petitions for the period from May 1649 to December 1657 (Table 3.4, below). This dataset 
 
96 For Ligon’s description of the profits that could be made by shipping provisions to Barbados, see Ligon, True and 
Exact History, pp. 183-186. 
97 TNA, CO1/12, ff. 144-145 , ‘At the committee appointed to take into their consideracon the trade and navigacon 
of this Commonwealth’, 11 February 1656; TNA, CO1/13, ff. 30-31, ‘A Report touching the transporting Horses 
&c to the Barbados’, 2 September 1656. 
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provides insights into which merchants were participating in the provisioning trade, and indicates which 
commodities were most coveted by planters in the Caribbean. Over two-thirds of the petitions were 
requests for warrants to transport draught horses, which were integral for keeping the sugar mills 
functioning. Furthermore, merchants repeatedly wrote to the Lord Protector for permission to supply 
Barbados with large shipments of shoes and boots that had been manufactured in England. Footwear for 
planters and indentured servants seems to have been constantly in demand in the Caribbean, probably 
because leather materials tend to perish rapidly in humid conditions. While the petition dataset is useful 
for making inferences about the nature of the provisioning trade to Barbados in the mid-seventeenth 
century, there are some major limitations with this body of source material which make it unsuitable for 
measuring the volume of trade with the colony. The most glaring issue with the dataset is that a 
significant proportion of the warrants granted by Cromwell permitted merchants to transport a smaller 
number of goods to Barbados than they had originally requested. For example, on multiple occasions 




98 For examples, see CSPC AWI, Vol. 1., pp. 428-431 & pp. 436-437, 6 September 1655 & 8 February 1656. 
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Table 3.4. [Redacted] 
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English merchants profited by shipping to Barbados the raw materials required to construct sugar mills, 
along with the manufactured goods and draught animals necessary to ensure that the industry operated at 
full efficiency. The mill, boiling house and other structures used to process sugar cane were usually built 
from timber, and firewood was also used as the main source of fuel for the furnaces of the boiling house. 
The deforestation of Barbados over the course of the seventeenth century had major repercussions. It 
necessitated imports of wood, and merchants profited by supplying the island with lumber from Surinam, 
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St. Lucia, Virginia, and New England. Over time, plantation owners on Barbados managed to reduce their 
expenditure on imports of firewood by using a waste by-product of the milling process, called burgasse, as 
fuel for the boiling house.99  
The conversion of farmland and grazing pastures into sugar plantations forced the inhabitants of 
Barbados to become increasingly reliant on merchants to import staple foodstuffs. One of the results of 
the economic boom on Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s was that the population of the island exploded. 
The business of sugar production attracted increasing numbers of people to travel to the Caribbean and 
live on the island. These new inhabitants participated in the plantation economy and worked in the 
bustling ports of Bridgetown and Speightstown. The unfree population also saw striking levels of growth 
in this era, as thousands of indentured servants and enslaved Africans were forcefully brought to the 
colony to provide the labour which kept the sugar industry in operation. Although quantifying 
demographic changes in the seventeenth century is fraught with uncertainty, various estimates suggest 
that the population of Barbados increased from 10,000 to as many as 53,300 people over a twenty year 
period between 1640 and 1660.100 Henry Whistler captured the general trend when he wrote in 1655 how 
the ‘Illand is but small: but it maintains more soules then any peese of land of the bignis in the wordell’.101 
To meet the subsistence needs of this growing population, small quantities of cassava and maize, often 
referred to as ‘Indian corne’ in the historical record, was raised in marginal land on the island.102 But it 
soon became evident that the tiny island of Barbados, with its sprawling sugar estates and expanding 
urban areas, could not provide enough food to satiate this rising population. Supplies of beef, pork, fish, 
 
99 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 79. In 1679 Henry Drax instructed Richard Harwood that ‘Wood will be much 
wanting therefore you should take a Convenient time when Shipps ariue from St Lucea & its Cheape to store 
yourselfe there with’. Thompson, ‘Henry Drax’s Instructions’, p. 598. 
100 For population estimates, see Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, p. 32, 229; McCusker and Menard, 
The Economy of British America, p. 153.  
101 Firth, ed., The Narrative of General Venables, Appendix E., ‘Extracts from Henry Whistler’s Journal of the West 
India Expedition’, pp. 145-147.  
102 Ligon, True and Exact History, pp. 75-78; Anon., Certain Inducements to well-minded People, Who are here straitned in their 
Estates or otherwise: or such as are willing out of Noble and publike Principles, to transport Themselves, or some Servants, or Agents 
for them into the West Indies, for the propagating of the Gospel, and increase of Trade (n.d., c. 1643?), Huntington Library, San 
Marino, 221847 (repro), p. 2 & 8-9. 
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flour, oatmeal, dried peas, butter, cheese, rapeseed oil, linseed oil, beer, and wine were imported to the 
island by English merchants to meet this demand.103  
As well as providing indentured servants and enslaved Africans with a basic level of sustenance, 
plantation owners also had to ensure that their labourers had adequate supplies of clothing and footwear. 
The climate of Barbados meant that workers toiling for long hours in hot and humid conditions did not 
require clothing for warmth. Nevertheless, early modern social mores dictated that servants from England 
had to wear appropriate attire, even in tropical conditions. Differences in apparel also helped to reinforce 
race and gender distinctions on the plantation.104 Due to high levels of wear and tear caused by 
performing gruelling labour in the fields, felling sharp sugar canes, and operating dangerous machinery, 
planters were obligated to replace the apparel of their workers every year.  
The growing demand for manufactured goods from England, especially clothes and shoes, prompted the 
colonial legislature to pass laws improving market conditions for merchants. To further stimulate the 
provisioning trade to the island, the Barbados assembly repealed an act ‘for the rating of Shirts, Smocks, 
Shoes, and Drawers at certain prices’ in August 1650. The assembly believed this legislation, which fixed 
prices for clothing items at below the market rate to make them more affordable for planters, was stifling 
the supply of clothes and shoes to the colony, thereby leading ‘Marchants [to] bringe fewe of them over 
hether but lay out theire moneys in such comodities by which they may make far greater profitt’.105 The 
petition dataset demonstrates that the Barbados Assembly was successful in achieving this outcome, for 
in the years following the passage of this act there were 19 requests from merchants living in London and 
Bristol for permission to supply the colony with large numbers of shoes and boots.  
 
103 TNA CO1/13, f. 29, ‘A particular of the Provisions humbly prayed to be annually sent to Barbadoes with the 
Reasons thereof’, 23 July 1656. 
104 On the annual allotment of clothing to unfree labourers on Barbados, which differed by gender and race, see 
TNA CO1/13, f. 29; Ligon, True and Exact History, p. 190-191; Blome, A Description of the Island of Jamaica, p. 38. 
105 TNA, CO1/11, f. 39, ‘A repeale of part of an act formerly made for the rateing of Shirts, Smocks, Shooes and 
Drawers’, 9 August 1650. 
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English merchants also generated money by provisioning Barbados with draught animals. Horses, cattle, 
and donkeys played an integral role in the sugar industry. They brought raw cane from the fields to the 
mill, supplied the power necessary for driving the sugar mills, and also transported refined sugar to 
storehouses along the coastline. The strenuous work associated with grinding cane and carrying heavy 
loads caused the deaths of large numbers of horses, keeping demand high. Between 1649 and 1660, when 
the sugar boom was at its height, there are over 42 surviving petitions to the Lord Protector related to 
merchants seeking sanction to transport horses to Barbados. Merchants and planters frequently 
clamoured for an improved supply of these animals, which were sometimes known in the seventeenth 
century as ‘draught nags’.106 During his brief stay on Barbados in 1655, Henry Whistler commented on 
the significance of horses to the functioning of the sugar industry. He observed that the animal-powered 
mills used by plantation owners to grind their sugar cane ‘destroy so many horses that it begors the 
planters, a good hors for the mill being worth 50li starling mony’.107 With the sale price of a good horse on 
Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century being double that of an enslaved African, it is no surprise that 
London merchants were keen to profit from this inflated demand, and supply sugar planters with hardy 
draught animals from a variety of locations, including England, Virginia, the Cape Verde Islands, and 
Norway.108 Competition with military contractors for the New Model Army over access to a supply of 
horses may have been part of the reason why English merchants had to dispatch their vessels to such a 
variety of overseas markets to procure horses for the Barbados plantation system in the 1640s and 
1650s.109 
 
106 So important was a regular supply of cattle and horses to the sugar industry, that when a group of exiled 
Barbados planters submitted a petition to the Council of State in November 1650 pleading for their lands to be 
reinstated, they included a provision relating to the granting of licenses ‘for the transportation of Cattle and horses, 
for the supply of the Island, free of impositions and customs’. TNA, CO 1/11, f. 65.  
107 Firth, ed., The Narrative of General Venables, Appendix E., ‘Extracts from Henry Whistler’s Journal of the West 
India Expedition’, pp. 146-147. Henry Drax specified to his overseer Richard Harwood ‘to be very Carefull of 
horses’. He had previously been ‘A greatt Suffrer thorow the Carelesnes and Rogrey of Carters’ who did not heed 
his instructions to only use horses to transport sugar from the plantation to Bridgetown in the late afternoon and 
early hours of the morning. ‘[B]y which means they will awoyde the heate of the day in theire traveling[,] which 
Certainly is destructive both to horses and horned Beastt’. Thompson, ‘Henry Drax Instructions’, p. 584. 
108 The sale price of an enslaved African in 1644 was £22 BMC. See Gragg, ‘To Procure Negroes’, p. 74.  
109 On military contractors supplying the New Model Army with horses, see Edwards, Dealing in Death; Robinson, 
‘Horse Supply and the Development of the New Model Army’.  
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The great demand for draught animals in the English Caribbean meant that licenses to transport horses to 
Barbados were granted to all the leading London merchants who owned property and sugar mills on the 
island (see Table 3.4, above). Martin Noell, Maurice Thomson, William Pennoyer, and Richard Batson 
were each granted multiple warrants between 20 and 50 horses on the island between 1640 and 1660.110 
Richard Batson was particularly important in provisioning the island with horses during the era of the 
sugar boom. The extant records of a court case heard in the High Court of Admiralty in 1659 reveals that 
a vessel owned by Richard Batson & Co., known as the Tankervale, ventured to Norway to acquire horses 
for the sugar mills in the English Caribbean. The supply of horses from Norway to Barbados, carried by 
Dutch and English traders, provides evidence for how the global networks of merchants contributed to 
developments in the Caribbean, and that during the seventeenth century the North Sea region was firmly 
integrated into wider Atlantic currents of commerce and exchange. According to the testimony of William 
Tickell, a shipmaster who supervised the voyage, the journey took the vessel ‘from this Port of London to 
Norway and there to take in horses; and was from thence to have gone to the Barbados and so back 
agayne to this Port’.111 The Norwegian Fjord horse is well known for being a small, hardy, and agile 
breed: the perfect attributes for a draught animal working in the cramped conditions of an early 
Barbadian sugar mill. It is probable that English merchants learnt from their Dutch counterparts about 
the utility and value of Norwegian livestock, as there is earlier evidence of Dutch mariners making the 
journey from Norway to Barbados with horses.112 Tickell explained that ‘att the sayd shipps arrivall in 
Norway’ Richard Batson’s factor there ‘did putt on board the sayd shipp forty five horses or thereabouts 
for their use and accompt to be carryed and transported from thence to the Barbadoes’. Unfortunately, 
while making the treacherous return voyage across the North Sea the vessel encountered rough seas. 
Nicholas Hamond, the barber surgeon on board the Tankervale, affirmed to the court that ‘upon the 
working and rolling of the sayd shipp in the sea’, the wooden stanchions in which the horses were 
 
110 Proceedings and Debates, pp. 196-197, ‘The humble petition of William Pennoyer’, 14 October 1647; Proceedings and 
Debates, p. 197, ‘The humble petition of Maurice Thompson and Company’, 23 October 1647; CSPC AWI, Vol 1., 
pp. 403-405, 11 June 1653; CSPC AWI, Vol 1., p. 421, 14 February 1655. 
111 TNA, HCA 13/71, f. 167.  
112 TNA, HCA 13/70, f. 411; TNA, CO 1/66, f. 29. In July 1654 the Dutch-owned vessel the Swan sailed from 
Holland to Norway, where they ‘tooke in a ladeing of horses’. These animals were successfully transported across 
the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, before being sold to English planters on Barbados. According to a deposition 
submitted by the ship’s captain (Symon Peterson), 74 Norwegian horses were sold in the colony. Perhaps after 
learning about the great demand for draught animals on the island, the Dutch ship proceeded to make a trip to Cape 
Verde to purchase 30 asses and salt, which were then also sold on Barbados.  
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supported buckled and broke, causing them to fall ‘one upon another…so as all of them dyed’. Out of 45 
horses which boarded Batson’s ship in Norway, only one stallion managed to survive when the stricken 
vessel arrived at Newcastle.113 Another example of ‘a losing voyage’ involved the Bristol merchant 
Abraham Lloyd, who picked up 176 assenegoes at the Cape Verde islands, but lost 134 to disease and 
rough seas during the 20-day journey to Barbados.114 
Although the focus of this section has been on the role played by English merchants in the Barbados 
provisioning trade, we must not presume therefore that Caribbean commerce operated as an orderly 
mercantilist system in the mid-seventeenth century. Foreign merchants, and especially those from the 
Low Countries, played an integral role in the provisioning trade to Barbados. Transnational commerce 
gave colonists improved access to enslaved Africans, foodstuffs, tools, and draught animals.115 Provisions 
supplied by merchants at other English colonies, such as New England, Virginia, and Surinam, were 
another means by which the subsistence needs of Barbados and the material demands of the sugar 
industry were fulfilled.116 The importance of transnational and intercolonial commerce to the Barbadian 
sugar economy will be given sustained attention in Chapter Five.  
 
4. Local Planters and the Financing of the Barbados Sugar Boom: A 
Reappraisal  
We have seen how English merchants, and especially those in London, were pivotal to the development 
of a sugar industry on Barbados. They directly invested in plantation development, organised the supply 
of indentured servants and enslaved Africans, and drove a provisioning trade to the island. Before moving 
 
113 TNA, HCA 13/71 f. 170. 
114 Huntington Library, HM 648, ff. 22-23, ‘The Journal of Abraham Lloyd’. 
115 Jonathan I. Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740 (Oxford, 1989), p. 206, 239-240; Koot, Empire at the 
Periphery, pp. 53-68. Klooster, The Dutch Moment, pp. 164-172. 
116 Roberts, ‘Venturing Out’; Roberts, ‘Surrendering Surinam’.  
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on it is important to put into comparative perspective merchant contributions to the development of the 
Barbadian plantation economy by considering one other argument that has been advanced by historians 
who have studied how the expansion of sugar production in the early modern Caribbean was financed. 
David Eltis and Kenneth Morgan contend that the transition to sugar in the seventeenth-century 
Caribbean was funded locally, as the returns of tobacco cultivation and other minor cash crops were 
‘ploughed back’ into the construction of refineries and the purchasing of stock.117 Menard and Puckrein 
have made a similar argument for Barbados. They suggest that large tobacco farmers were in the best 
position to experiment with sugar production in the early 1640s. This is because they had bought-up large 
estates when prices were low in the 1630s, had already cleared these plots for cultivation, were generating 
a steady stream of income by renting out land to tenants, and already owned a stock of indentured 
servants (and possibly a few enslaved Africans) that they could use to begin planting sugar cane. Menard 
and Puckrein have argued, therefore, that part of the capital needed to kick-start the sugar boom was 
generated locally by these planters, who reinvested the profits they had made through the production of 
tobacco, cotton, ginger, and indigo into the construction of sugar mills and the purchasing of enslaved 
Africans.118  
It is true that some of the tobacco farmers who had lived on Barbados since the founding of the colony 
managed to consolidate their landholdings and expand their business operations. In his analysis of the 
1680 census return for Barbados, Richard Dunn has calculated that nearly 40 percent of sugar magnates 
in that year had family members living on the island in the 1630s, before the transition to a sugar 
economy.119 Some tobacco planters who had owned land on the island since the 1630s managed to make 
a fortune by venturing in the sugar industry. The career of the renowned planter James Drax is the most 
impressive example of this. Drax is reported to have arrived on Barbados with only £300, but after 
continually improving his annual profit through good plantation management, enjoyed a life of luxury on 
 
117 Eltis, Rise of African Slavery, 217-18; Kenneth Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade, and the British Economy, 1660-1800 
(Cambridge, 2001), pp. 54-5. 
118 Puckrein, Little England, pp. 64-65; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 11, 61. 
119 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 97.  
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the island, and was said to be reluctant to return to England until he was able to afford an estate worth 
£10,000.120  
The process by which some planters achieved this was outlined by George Downing. In August 1645 
Downing wrote to his cousin John Winthrop Jr. in New England to explain how to establish a successful 
plantation on Barbados from scratch. A ‘man that will settle ther’ must first ‘looke to procure servants’. 
From experience, Downing knew that ‘with good husbandry’ a planter would be able to expand his 
operations, and ‘procure Negroes…out of the encrease of your owne plantation’. In the last year alone, 
colonists on Barbados had reportedly purchased ‘no lesse than a thousand Negroes’. The profits planters 
made from the cultivation and sale of tropical commodities meant that the more enslaved Africans ‘they 
buie, the better able they are to buye, for in a yeare and halfe they will earne (with God's blessing) as 
much as they cost’.121 With an increased labour stock came increased agricultural productivity, and 
thereby revenue growth.  
Tobacco farmers with large estates and a few enslaved Africans, such as James Drax, were certainly in the 
best position to experiment with sugar cultivation. It was the agricultural trials undertaken by these 
entrepreneurs, as part of the effort towards diversifying the colony’s export crops in the early 1640s, 
which lay the foundations for the island’s sugar industry. But were reinvestments of profits generated by 
tobacco planters significant in financing the transition to sugar on Barbados in the 1640s? It does not 
necessarily follow that because these planters were the first to trial sugar cultivation that they were also 
the group which provided most of the funding necessary for the rapid expansion of the sugar industry on 
the island. While it was cheap to experiment with growing sugar using a few labourers on a smallholding, 
as James Parker’s observation in 1646 that an investment of just £200 could ‘quickly gaine an estate by 
sugar which thrives wonderfully’ reveals, that crop was largely useless without the industrial machinery 
needed to convert the raw cane into sugar crystals. What made the entry costs to sugar production so 
 
120 Ligon, True and Exact History, p. 168. 
121 Winthrop Papers, Vol. 5, p. 43, George Downing to John Winthrop, Jr., 26 August 1645. Also published in 
Donnan, Documents Illustrative of the Slave Trade to America Vol. 1., pp. 125-126. 
Michael D. Bennett 
197 
 
high was the expense associated with the construction of sugar mills and the acquisition of enslaved 
Africans.122 It would be wrong, therefore, to characterise Drax’s experience as anything other than 
exceptional. The low price fetched by Barbados tobacco in the 1630s and 1640s offered little chance for 
the average planter to accumulate the capital needed to finance these purchases.  
Barbadian planters encountered considerable difficulties when trying to establish a sugar plantation in the 
1640s, because without external assistance from English merchants they lacked the financial means 
necessary to support their business endeavours. For instance, when planning his second attempt to 
become a successful plantation-owner on Barbados in the late 1640s, Samuel Winthrop wrote to his 
brother in New England and complained that his greatest difficulty would be ‘my first Setling, my stock 
being verrie small’. Another New England man, Richard Vines, struggled to raise enough capital to make 
the successful transition from being a tobacco and cotton planter to cultivating sugar on Barbados. In a 
letter to John Winthrop, Vines bemoaned how he was finding it tough to turn a profit by reason of ‘my 
great payments for my plantations and negroes and other necessary disbursments already paid to the value 
of 40000 lbs of tobacco’.123 William Powrey experienced similar difficulties. He wrote to Archibald Hay in 
September 1645 to report how those ‘that are upon the design of sugar here prosper well and make 
exceeding good sugar’, but that his own attempts to begin sugar production were being hindered by a lack 
of servant labour and the cost of 50,000 lb. of tobacco required to construct his ‘ingenio’.124 To be 
entirely clear, I think that the proceeds generated by the cultivation of minor crops such as tobacco were 
enough to meet the annual working capital demands of a Barbadian plantation. But I am not at all 
convinced that the sale of poor-quality Barbados tobacco and other commodities in the 1630s generated 
enough surplus revenue to meet the capital requirements needed to set up a functional sugar plantation, 
especially with the speed seen on Barbados. 
 
122 Winthrop Papers, Vol. 5, p. 84, James Parker to John Winthrop, 24 June 1646. On the capital requirements of a 
sugar plantation, see Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 264-266. 
123 Winthrop Papers, Vol. 5, p. 254, Samuel Winthrop to John Winthrop, Jr., 18 September 1648; Winthrop Papers, Vol. 
5, pp. 171-172, Richard Vines to John Winthrop, 19 July 1647.  
124 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/945/3, William Powrey to Archibald Hay, 10 September 1645.  
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How did planters living on Barbados fund the transition to sugar, if not through reinvesting the profits of 
plantation production accumulated during the 1630s? The primary source evidence suggests there were 
two options open to planters. First, planters could seek external assistance from a merchant who would 
extend them a line of credit. This delayed repayment of the start-up costs for several years, after which it 
was expected that sugar production would be underway, thus enabling the planter to satisfy his creditor. 
Second, prospective sugar planters could become involved in trade directly, using the high mark-up on 
goods shipped to the American colonies to quickly generate the capital needed to speculate in the sugar 
industry. 
Credit was the foundation of the economy in early modern England. Craig Muldrew’s detailed analysis of 
the trading centre of King’s Lynn and Stephen Guscott’s study of the Manchester textile merchant 
Humphrey Chetham have illuminated how networks of debt and obligation were integral to both the 
household and market economies in seventeenth-century England, and that the intricacies of long chains 
of credit were mostly stored in people’s minds rather than written down in account books.125 Due to a 
lack of specie circulating in the colonial economy, credit relationships were also the foundation of 
transatlantic trade in the seventeenth-century English empire. Access to credit supplied by merchants was 
the main method through which planters on Barbados financed the transition to sugar production. 
Indeed, I have yet to find an example of a successful sugar planter on mid-seventeenth-century Barbados 
who was not working in partnership with one or more English merchants. This was an interdependent 
business relationship. Planters were reliant on merchants for credit to fund the construction of sugar mills 
and to access supplies of unfree labour and provisions, while merchants needed tropical commodities 
cultivated by planters to sell for a profit in European markets. In July 1645, for instance, the Barbados 
planter William Hilliard and the Bristol merchant Samuel Farmer entered into five-year partnership. As 
part of the deal Farmer received a one-third share in the proceeds of Hilliard’s plantation, and in return 
 
125 Muldrew, Economy of Obligation, ch. 3; S. J. Guscott, Humphrey Chetham 1580-1653: Fortune, Politics and Mercantile 
Culture in Seventeenth-Century England (Manchester, 2003), pp. 23-29, 38-43. 
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promised to ‘putt upon ye estate in partnership…ninety sufficient and able Negro slaves’ before 30 
September 1646.126 
The importance of credit to Barbadian market transactions is highlighted by surviving merchant accounts. 
35 percent of the provisions transported on the Abraham in 1638 were sold on credit. Extensions of credit 
took on special significance when high-value goods were being exchanged: 84 percent of the enslaved 
Africans sold by the owners of the Marie Bonadventure in 1644 were sold on credit, for instance.127 The 
huge volume of litigation in the Mayor’s Court of London during the 1650s and 1660s regarding financial 
obligations made between English merchants and Barbadian planters is another testament to the crucial 
role which credit played in financing the sugar boom.128 Proposals in 1661 to create an internal loan 
market on Barbados through the formation of a land bank, which would have lent money on landed 
security at a rate of 6 percent per annum, also speaks to the incessant demand for access to credit on the 
island.129 A treatise from the 1690s, which laments the difficulties faced by English merchants when trying 
to collect debts in the colonies, provides a succinct description of the importance of merchant credit to 
the Barbadian economy in the mid-seventeenth century, and is worth quoting at length: 
On the first settlement of the Plantations particularly in the island of barbados they planted 
Tobacco, Ginger, and Cotton, and then any man that had instruments for digging and clearing 
the ground could manage a small plantation himself, without any stock or other help…but since 
the setting up of sugar works in that Island (about 50 years since), the planting of Tobacco, 
Cotton, and Ginger, is in a great measure disused as improfitable, and no sugar work can be 
managed without a considerable stock. Such a work with Negro’s and other things sufficient to 
imploy one windmill only (which is the smallest sort of sugar work) will not cost much less than 
£5000 sterling. Since therefore the plantation of sugar cannot be managed without imploying 
 
126 BDA, RB 3/2, pp. 220-222. For examples of similar partnerships between planters and merchants on Barbados 
in the 1640s, see BDA, RB 3/3, pp. 574-577, 579-585. 
127 For the Abraham, see TNA, HCA 30/636/2, ‘Abraham Barbados Accounts’; TNA, HCA 30/636/4, ‘Ledger for 
Shippe Abraham’. For the Marie Bonadventure, see Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 63-64, Table 12 & Table 13. 
128 LMA, MCD Boxes 1-12.  
129 Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, p. 279.  
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great summes therein, whatsoever is done to secure the certain profession of purchasers, or 
reimbursement of sumes advanced by adventurers, would best promote that trade which like all 
others must in a great measure be carried on by Credit.130 
The amount of money loaned by English merchants to Barbados planters in the era of the sugar boom 
was large: Menard estimates that £1 million sterling was spent on enslaved Africans alone between 1640 
and 1660. Most of these sales involved market exchanges based around credit.131 Why did English 
merchants extend so much credit to planters on a distant Caribbean island, which most of them had 
never visited and was over a month’s sail away? How could they be sure they would be repaid? The 
answers to these questions hinge upon security. Loans offered to planters on Barbados in the 1640s were 
more secure than elsewhere in the English empire because of a variety of intersecting geographical, 
environmental, and political factors, which were described in detail in Chapter Two. The legal apparatus 
of English colonies such as Barbados was also favourable to creditors, especially when compared to that 
which prevailed in the Iberian empires. Loans offered by English merchants to colonial planters were 
made secure by legal agreements to mortgage plantations and enslaved Africans if money was not repaid 
in a timely manner, and creditors operating in the English Atlantic world had extensive powers to use the 
colonial courts to seize these collateral assets if necessary.132 
What Muldrew has termed the ‘currency of reputation’ was the mediating factor in early modern credit 
transactions. The creditworthiness of an individual was a social judgement made by a creditor about the 
character and financial competency of their client, which was used to determine whether the client could 
be trusted to repay their debts in the future. Credit relations were thus founded upon reputation and 
familiarity.133 Menard has argued that the primary reason why English merchants were willing to extend 
 
130 BL, Add. Ms. 27382, f. 193. For a similar account, written in 1659, which also demonstrates the importance of 
merchant credit to the development of the Barbados sugar industry, see TNA, CO 1/13, f. 148, ‘Peticon and papers 
of Robert Knightly Sr Merchants Barbados’. 
131 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 49.  
132 Ibid., pp. 55-56. For the Iberian comparison, see Jacob M. Price, ‘Credit in the Slave Trade and Plantation 
Economies’, in Barbara L. Solow, ed., Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System (New York, 1991), pp. 293-340; 
Menard, ‘Law, Credit, the Supply of Labour’. For examples of mortgages involving merchant creditors on Barbados 
in the 1640s, see BDA, RB 3/2, p. 402, 519, 547-549, 605-607.  
133 Muldrew, Economy of Obligation, pp. 2-3.  
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credit to prospective sugar planters in the 1640s was because Barbadian farmers had demonstrated their 
competency in the cultivation of tropical commodities such as tobacco in the preceding decade. This is a 
logical argument, because having a reputation as an effective plantation manager would have helped to 
foster the trust needed for merchants to be sure that loans would be repaid on time.134 Unfortunately, 
however, there is no primary source evidence to support Menard’s assertion. His argument also depends 
upon the economy of Barbados being dynamic and prosperous in the pre-sugar era. But as we saw in 
Chapter One, Barbados tobacco was frequently described as the ‘worst of all tobaccos’ during the 1630s, 
and merchants deliberately ventured to Virginia and St. Christopher to secure higher-grade leaf.  
Based on such evidence, I am not convinced that planters on Barbados had shown the English merchant 
community that they were particularly effective plantation-owners during the 1630s and early 1640s. 
Furthermore, Menard’s argument would only make sense if it was solely merchants who were involved in 
the American tobacco trade who financed the growth of the sugar industry on Barbados. Some important 
merchant financiers of the sugar boom did have a background in the tobacco trade, and their existing 
business relationships with Barbados planters provided a platform for future investment. Though, as we 
saw in Chapter Two, not all of the leading merchant financiers of the sugar boom were participants in the 
American tobacco trade, and therefore did not have connections to planters on Barbados in the 1630s 
and early 1640s. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that they would have had much knowledge about the 
competency of Barbadian tobacco farmers, nor that this could have informed their decision-making 
process about whether to extend prospective sugar planters with generous credit.  
Studying merchant accounts helps us to come to a better understanding of the rationale behind merchant 
business practices, as it permits an analysis of who in Barbadian society was being extended the most 
credit in the era sugar boom. A high social standing and reputation on Barbados and in England appears 
to have been the key to securing a loan from a merchant in the mid-seventeenth century. Appointment to 
a prominent office within the colonial administration was the most important means by which planters 
 
134 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 11, 61. 
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could improve their reputation and creditworthiness in the eyes of English merchants. For example, 
Governor William Hawley, President Pierce, and the councillor Edward Cranfield were given first pick of 
the indentured servants transported on the Abraham in 1638. The two planters who purchased the largest 
number of enslaved Africans on credit from the owners of the Marie Bonadventure in 1644, James Drax and 
William Hilliard, were both men of lofty social standing on Barbados due to the numerous public offices 
they held within the colonial council, assembly, militia, and parish vestries.135 An inventory of the Guinea 
Company’s stock taken in 1644 reveals that the company was also owed 39,613 lb. of cotton from 13 of 
the inhabitants, presumably due to the sale of enslaved Africans advanced to planters on credit. Governor 
Phillip Bell owed the company 19,846 lb. of cotton, around half their total debts on Barbados.136  
Also significant was whether planters on Barbados had a personal connection with merchants. As we will 
see shortly, many of the early plantation-owners on Barbados had come from mercantile families in 
England, and it is probable therefore that some planters were still well-connected within merchant circles. 
The regular trips which many Barbadian planters made back to London during the 1640s and 1650s 
would have solidified these personal ties. Documents recording the details of those who arrived in 
London from ‘beyond ye Seas’ and presented themselves before the Council of State reveal how at least 
ten planters and merchants who resided in the Caribbean returned to England between 1655 and 1657 to 
conduct business in the metropole.137 
Prospective sugar planters in the 1640s could also participate in trade to raise the capital necessary to fund 
the construction of sugar mills and the acquisition of enslaved Africans. According to Richard Ligon, the 
 
135 For the Abraham, see TNA, HCA 30/636/2, ‘Abraham Barbados Accounts’; TNA, HCA 30/636/4, ‘Ledger for 
Shippe Abraham’. For the Marie Bonadventure, see Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 63-64, Table 12 & Table 13. For the 
composition of the Barbados council in 1641 and 1643, see Library of Congress, Charles Pinfold Papers, ‘Extracts 
from the Council Books in Barbados’, 13 October 1641; NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/38, ‘Letter from the 
Inhabitants of Barbados to the Earle of Carlilse touching the three pound per acre’ 13 September 1643. 
136 TNA, SP 16/540/4, f. 389 & 394, ‘Series of documents relating to the affairs of the Guinea Company, from 18th 
February 1642-43 to 8th July 1647, but mostly of the year 1644’. 
137 BL, Add. Ms. 34015, f. 2, 6, 11, 20, 21, 25, 32, 39, 40, ‘A Booke containing the names as well of all such persons 
as have come from beyond ye Seas and made their psonall appearances at this Office of ye places from whence hey 
came and where they intend to lodge together with their business and the correspondents of such of ye said persons 
as are foraigners’. The ten Caribbean residents who were recorded as having visited London from 1665-1657 were: 
James Watson, Thomas Carter, Thomas Knapton, Henry Howman, Charles Rich, John Knight, Peter Colleton, 
Thomas Crispe, Robert Walker, and Thomas Norton. 
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‘most knowing men of the Island’ reported that it was sensible to purchase a ‘ready furnished’ 
plantation.138 But the price for a fully functioning sugar plantation, complete with indentured servants, 
enslaved Africans, draught animals, a mill, boiling house, and curing house, stood at £14,000.139 Only the 
most affluent and creditworthy members of English society, such as the gentry or London merchants, 
could afford to purchase a lavish estate outright. Ligon did, however, provide helpful instructions for how 
entrepreneurs with as little as £1000 of liquid capital could expand their business operations on Barbados 
to the point where they would be able to pay for a 500-acre sugar plantation.  
Ligon was writing for an English audience, not for established Barbadian planters. But it is crucial to note 
that nowhere in this lengthy set of instructions does he specify that purchasing a plantation and 
reinvesting profits generated through the production of tobacco, cotton, indigo, or ginger were an 
effective method for men of modest means to get started in the Barbados sugar industry. Based on his 
experience on Barbados in the late 1640s, it was trade which was the best way to quickly raise the capital 
necessary to speculate in the sugar industry. Ligon began by stating that £1145 of start-up capital should 
be used to purchase commodities, which while relatively cheap in England, were in high demand on 
Barbados and could therefore be sold at excessive rates. As we saw in Chapter One, it was clothes, shoes, 
foodstuffs, alcohol, and tools, which fetched the highest price at English colonies in the Caribbean. This 
cargo was to be dispatched to Barbados, along with a trustworthy ‘correspondent’ (or, in other words, a 
factor) to oversee the sale of these goods in exchange for tropical commodities, which would then be 
shipped back to England for resale over the space of eighteen months. According to Ligon’s calculations:  
this Cargo being doubled at the Barbados, that returned back, will produce at least 50 per cent. And 
then your Cargo, which was 1,145£ at setting out, and being doubled there to 2,290£ will be at 
your return for England 3,345£ of which I will allow for freight, and all other charges 335£ so 
there remains to account 3,100£ clear. 
 
138 Ligon, True and Exact History, p. 66.  
139 Ibid., p. 183. 
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At this point the factor on Barbados should begin the process of bargaining for a fully furnished 500-acre 
sugar plantation worth £14,000. This was to be purchased on credit and paid for in installments spread 
out over three years. The proceeds from the first voyage should be used to fund additional trading 
ventures on the same model, which along with the sugar grown on the plantation, would make it possible 
to meet the annual debt repayments. After just three years, then, ‘you have your Plantation clear, and 
freed of all debts’.140 
The available evidence indicates that reinvestments of profits generated by plantation production were 
not as pivotal to financing the transition to sugar on Barbados in the 1640s as scholars would have us 
believe. It was not proceeds from tobacco plantations, but mercantile activity and extensions of credit by 
merchants, which provided most of the capital necessary for planters to speculate in the Barbados sugar 
industry. Part of the reason why this has not been highlighted by other historians is because of the 
historiographical tendency to distinguish merchants from planters. Divisions of labour between 
merchants and planters were not as pronounced in the first half of the seventeenth century as they would 
become in the eighteenth century. As we have already seen, it was common for London merchants such 
as Martin Noell to cut out the middleman in the 1640s, and directly purchase sugar plantations 
themselves, becoming ‘merchant-planters’ in the process.  
Furthermore, Richard Dunn has shown how many core members of the Barbadian planter oligarchy in 
1638, including prodigious figures such as Reynold Alleyne, Benjamin Berringer, William Bulkely, 
Christopher Codrington, James Drax, Samuel Farmer, Thomas Frere, Richard Guy, William Hilliard, 
James Holdip, Thomas Hothersall, John Pears, Edward Pye, Thomas Rous, William Speight, George 
Standfast, and John Yeamans, all came from merchant families. Out of 62 ‘charter members of the 
Barbados elite’, 45 (just over two-thirds) have surnames which appear in T. K. Rabb’s list of 6,000 
 
140 Ibid., pp. 183-187.  
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persons who invested in overseas commercial ventures from 1575 to 1630. These surnames are 
sufficiently unusual to make it likely that they were members of the same family.141  
This suggests, therefore, that mercantile capital was important in financing the clearing of the land and 
establishing of tobacco plantations on Barbados in the late 1620s and 1630s. Given their backgrounds in 
merchant families, it should not come as a surprise that many of these men also continued to engage in 
mercantile activity while managing their plantations in the Caribbean. James Drax, for instance, continued 
to maintain extensive business connections in London and Amsterdam while managing his plantation on 
Barbados. He organised a ‘voyage for negroes to or upon the Coaste of Affrica’ in 1654, and upon his 
return to England towards the end of his life, sat on the Court of Committees of the East India Company 
as a director between 1659 and early 1661.142 Like most planters on Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s, 
Drax was primarily interested in making money, and consequently his business portfolio encompassed 
both trade and plantation production. The distinction between merchants and planters will continue to be 
used in this study as a matter of convenience. But it is important to remember such divisions are 
inadequate in capturing the diverse business interests of plantation owners in the Caribbean during the 
early seventeenth century.   
Despite not being as important on Barbados in the 1640s as previously thought, reinvesting the profits of 
plantation production was nevertheless a method used by colonists elsewhere in the English Caribbean to 
start-up their own sugar industries in the period between 1650 and 1690. This was outlined by the 
merchant-turned-planter Cary Heylar, who in 1671 described how on Jamaica it was ‘the custom of the 
country’ to set up a new plantation by starting with a couple of enslaved Africans and an overseer, and to 
use them to begin planting commodities which had low entry costs, such as tobacco and ginger. The 
proceeds of the first year’s crop were then ‘employed to buy a Negro or two more, and they will beget 
others, so that in 7 years time it will produce a hopefull business’.143 I contend that the lack of heavy 
 
141 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 58; Theodore K. Rabb, Enterprise and Empire: Merchant and Gentry Investment in the 
Expansion of England, 1575-1630 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 234-410; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 140.  
142 For Drax’s slave trading voyage, see BDA, RB3/2, pp. 629-630 & 634-635. For Drax as a director of the EIC, see 
BL, IOR, E/3/85, ff. 225-229, London to Fort Cormantine and St. Helena, 23 June 1659. 
143 Somerset Record Office, Heylar MS, Cary Heylar to William Heylar, 25 January 1671. 
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capital investment into Jamaica and the Leeward Islands by English merchants goes a long way towards 
explaining why the advent of a commercial sugar industry there was so slow when compared to Barbados. 
Without outside assistance local planters needed to reinvest their annual revenue from plantation 
production into the construction of sugar mills and the purchase of enslaved Africans. The transition to 
sugar on these islands was therefore a more gradual process than that which occurred on Barbados at 
mid-century. 
This section has argued that merchants were more significant than tobacco planters in providing the 
capital necessary to precipitate the sugar boom. However, it must be emphasised that this conclusion 
should not detract from the fact that planters did make central contributions to the development of a 
plantation economy based around sugar monoculture on Barbados. The emergence of integrated 
plantations and the slave gang system on Barbados are good examples of how enterprising planters 
developed brutal, but nonetheless pioneering, management techniques in their effort to extract maximum 
profits from their unfree workforce.144 The initiative taken by Barbadian planters to conduct agricultural 
experiments with sugar and learn from Brazilians already skilled in growing tropical goods, along with the 
financial support and supply of unfree laborers provided by merchants in the City of London, combined 
to produce an extremely profitable plantation economy on Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s. 
 
Conclusion 
London merchants played a central role in financing the expansion of plantation agriculture and sugar 
cultivation on Barbados. The most important contributions they made to this process were investing 
capital into improving plantations and extending credit to planters. Crushing and refining sugar cane was 
 
144 On the slave gang system, which emerged on Barbados in the wake of the sugar boom, see Menard, Sweet 
Negotiations, pp. 96-97; Thompson, ‘Henry Drax’s Instructions’, pp. 578-579; Newman, A New World of Labor, pp. 
203-210. 
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a capital-intensive business in the mid seventeenth century, but by supplying the large sums of money 
needed to develop a functioning industry on Barbados, English merchants were able to take advantage of 
the spike in sugar prices caused by warfare between the Dutch and Portuguese in northern Brazil. The 
plantation system also required an expendable and malleable labour force to perform the exhausting work 
of planting and cultivating the sugar cane. London merchants deployed their political connections in the 
Interregnum government and made use of their existing overseas commercial networks to satisfy the 
insatiable demand for labour on Barbados. Martin Noell, Thomas Kendall, and John Parris, all received 
multiple warrants from Cromwell to transport indentured servants from the British Isles, while other 
London merchants, such as John Wood and Richard Batson used their extensive experience in West 
African trade to conduct successful slave trading expeditions.  
By devoting their resources to the production of cash crops, London merchants helped to convert the 
island into an economy based around sugar monoculture. As the landscape of Barbados was rapidly 
transformed from dense forest to vast plantations of sugar, neatly divided into land parcels by surveyors, 
the inhabitants of the island quickly became dependent on imports of foodstuffs, lumber, manufactured 
goods, and draught animals to subsist. Many of the same merchants who had stimulated the growth of 
the sugar industry on Barbados by developing plantations on the island also wrested control of the 
colony’s provisioning trade, and generated further profits by supplying planters with raw materials and 
staple commodities. Horses were some of the most valued commodities that merchants shipped to the 
island, due to their role in driving animal-powered mills and carrying merchandise to coastal storehouses. 
By detailing the wide range of commercial activities undertaken by English merchants on Barbados, this 
chapter has deepened historical understanding about the role of these traders in precipitating economic 
transformations on Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century.  
We then proceeded to investigate the significance of local planters in financing the Barbados sugar boom. 
Previous historians have suggested that these planters played a prominent role in supplying needed capital 
during the 1640s, because they reinvested the profits generated from the sale of tobacco and cotton into 
the construction of sugar mills and the purchase of enslaved Africans. But a reappraisal of the available 
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evidence reveals that this assertion is not entirely accurate. First, the low-quality tobacco cultivated by 
Barbados planters in the 1630s would have afforded the average planter little opportunity to accumulate 
the large amounts of capital necessary to speculate in the sugar industry without external assistance, which 
mostly took the form of extensions of credit by London merchants. Second, a close reading of Ligon’s 
history, the most detailed contemporary source we have for understanding the sugar boom, reveals that it 
was trade, not plantation production, which was the recommended method for quickly raising the capital 
needed to invest in a Barbadian sugar plantation. Distinctions between merchants and planters were less 
pronounced in the early seventeenth century. Most of the entrepreneurs who settled on Barbados and 
ventured in the sugar industry, including James Drax, began their careers as merchants, and their business 
portfolios encompassed both trade and the cultivation of tropical commodities. Most of the capital used 
to finance the Barbados sugar boom in the 1640s, therefore, was not raised locally through plantation 
production. It was generated through trade and extensions of credit by merchants in the City of London. 
But we must not assume that this was also true elsewhere. London merchants were less enthusiastic in 
extending credit and speculating in sugar production on Jamaica, St. Kitts, Nevis, Montserrat, and 
Antigua between 1660 and 1690. Future research may reveal that the more gradual process of reinvesting 
profits generated through plantation production provides an explanation for why the transition to sugar 
in these colonies was less rapid when compared to Barbados.    
The next chapter will investigate whether the commercial influence wielded by the merchant financiers of 
the sugar boom translated into political power in Westminster and Barbados.
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Chapter Four. London Merchants and the Governance of 
Barbados, 1640-1672 
In September 1659, merchants and planters who traded to Barbados gathered for a meeting at the 
Cardinal’s Cap, a tavern in London situated at the meeting point of Cornhill and Lombard streets.1 
Powerful men with political connections within Westminster and business interests in the English 
Caribbean, including Martin Noell, Thomas Povey, and James Drax, were in attendance. The purpose of 
their meeting was to interview a new candidate for the position of governor on Barbados. Vincent 
Gookin, an MP and colonial bureaucrat who had been involved in the Down Survey of Ireland, was in 
advanced talks with the Council of State to secure appointment to the office.2 Although the details of 
their conversation are now lost, the merchants ended their meeting impressed with Gookin’s 
qualifications, and gave him their ‘full approbation’. It was resolved, however, not to lobby for his 
admission to the government of Barbados until the Council of State had decided the future of the current 
governor, Daniel Searle. However, any plans to alter the governor of Barbados were quickly halted when 
the tragic news that Vincent Gookin had taken ill and died of a fever reached Parliament just weeks later.3 
The meeting convened at the Cardinal’s Cap in 1659 suggests that London merchants did not just 
purchase plantations and establish trade routes to Barbados, but also sought to exert political influence 
over the colony in the era of the sugar boom.  
 
1 For the remainder of the seventeenth century the Cardinal’s Cap tavern (sometimes known as the Cardinal’s Hat) 
was an important location where merchants and planters with Caribbean interests gathered to consume intoxicants 
and discuss business. By the early eighteenth century it had been supplanted by the Jamaica Coffee House, also in 
Cornhill ward. Lilian M. Penson, ‘The London West India Interest in the Eighteenth Century’, The English Historical 
Review, Vol. 36, No. 143 (1921), pp. 376-377; Lilian M. Penson, The Colonial Agents of the British West Indies: a Study in 
Colonial Administration, mainly in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1924), p. 183. For the location of the Cardinal’s Cap, 
see John Stow, 'Cornehill warde', in A Survey of London, reprinted from the Text of 1603, ed. C L Kingsford (Oxford, 
1908), pp. 187-200. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/survey-of-london-
stow/1603/ pp. 187-200 (Accessed 21 June 2019). 
2 Vincent Gookin’s family was heavily involved in Puritan colonisation schemes in the Atlantic world. His brother, 
the soldier and merchant Daniel Gookin, first settled in Boston in 1644. He soon became an authority figure in the 
Massachusetts colony, serving on the governing council for several decades, and in the 1650s even worked for 
Cromwell to persuade New England colonists to relocate to Jamaica. Wendy Warren, New England Bound: Slavery and 
Colonization in Early America (New York, 2016), p. 172; Karen Ordahl Kupperman, ‘Errand to the Indies: Puritan 
Colonization from Providence Island through the Western Design’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 
(1988), p. 96.  
3 BL, Egerton MS 2395, f. 177 & ff. 179-181, Thomas Povey to Daniel Searle, 20 October 1659. 
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This chapter will investigate whether the dynamism of the Barbadian economy in the 1640s caused 
London merchants to become increasingly attentive to the island’s political affairs. It will demonstrate 
how merchants who had poured money into purchasing land, constructing sugar mills, and acquiring 
enslaved Africans wanted Barbados to be governed in a way that suited their investments: they could not 
afford to let political crisis in the colony threaten the security of their assets. But how successful were 
London merchants in their lobbying? Were merchants who had invested in the sugar boom well 
represented in the institutions formed in London to administer England’s empire? And did the reach of 
London merchants extend all the way to the Caribbean, enabling them to govern the island in a way 
which suited their investments? Such questions have not figured prominently in previous studies, as 
historians have usually made colonists, rather than English merchants, the focal point of their analyses.4  
 
1. The Councils of Trade and Plantations in Westminster, 1640-1664 
The first section of this chapter investigates the power wielded by merchants in the councils, committees, 
and boards formed in London to govern trade and colonial affairs between 1640 and 1664. In doing so, it 
highlights two broad trends. First, that merchant representation within these organisations, and thus their 
influence over policy formation, increased over time. Of course, merchants never wholly dominated the 
councils and committees which dealt with trade and plantations, but if we compare the composition of 
these administrative bodies at the start and end of our period, it is noticeable that the numbers of 
merchants appointed to serve on them increased at the expense of aristocrats and MPs. Second, that in a 
process which began in 1653, but became most pronounced after 1660, the power of merchants who had 
invested in the Barbados sugar boom within these institutions expanded. It is important to bear in mind 
 
4 E.g. Pestana, English Atlantic in An Age of Revolution; Donoghue, Fire Under the Ashes. Notable exceptions to this 
trend are Robert Brenner and Robert Bliss, who have examined in detail the political activities of the London 
merchant community in this period. But the focus of Bliss’ study was not the Caribbean, and Brenner ended his 
analysis with the demise of the Commonwealth government in 1653. This has left a lot of unanswered questions 
about the political power wielded by London merchants with Caribbean investments between 1640 and 1672. 
Brenner, Merchants and Revolution; Bliss, Revolution and Empire.    
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that these merchants had diverse business portfolios: they profited from tax-farming offices and other 
overseas ventures such as the East India and Levant Companies. We must be careful, therefore, not to 
overemphasise the importance of Barbados. But it is striking how many leading investors in the Barbados 
sugar boom sat on the Council of Foreign Plantations between 1660 and 1664. I argue that the growing 
representation of London merchants with business interests in the Caribbean in advisory committees in 
Westminster was another product of the wealth generated by sugar and slavery. However, direct merchant 
influence over the bodies formed to administer the empire at the imperial centre was not long-lasting. By 
the 1680s, civil servants such as William Blathwayt had taken command of the colonial bureaucracy in 
London.5 But the fact that there were familial connections between these career bureaucrats and the 
merchant investors in the sugar boom (Blathwayt, for instance, was the nephew and protégé of the 
Barbadian investor Thomas Povey), suggests there was some continuity from the 1660s in terms of 
personnel and the heavy representation of those with Caribbean interests within these administrative 
councils.  
It is also worth emphasising from the outset what this section is not. It is not intended to be a detailed 
analysis of the involvement of merchants with investments in Barbados in popular politics and 
Parliamentary debates on the model of other studies by historians such as David Underdown, Blair 
Worden, Keith Lindley, and Robert Brenner.6 Here we are solely concerned with exploring which 
merchants held power in the committees formed by various English governments to administer trade and 
plantations, and how that changed over time. As Ian K. Steele has observed, it is crucial to study who was 
serving on these committees, because in the seventeenth century such organisations ‘should be viewed as 
a changing group of individuals rather than a bureaucratic institution’: the influence of these councils in 
 
5 Stephen Saunders Webb, ‘William Blathwayt, Imperial Fixer: From Popish Plot to Glorious Revolution’, The 
William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1968), pp. 3-21; Stephen Saunders Webb, ‘William Blathwayt, Imperial 
Fixer: Muddling Through to Empire, 1689-1717’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1969), pp. 373-415. 
6 David Underdown, Pride’s Purge: Politics in the Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1971); Worden, Rump Parliament; Lindley, 
Popular Politics; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution.  
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‘Whitehall and the colonies was related to [their] membership’.7 Steele’s comments relate specifically to 
the Board of Trade formed in 1696, but his analysis is equally applicable to its predecessor institutions.    
In the early years of England’s overseas expansion a variety of means were used to govern the American 
colonies. Joint-stock companies were given royal charters to settle overseas territories. The Stuart 
monarchs also granted courtiers proprietary patents to establish colonies.8 It was generally left to 
corporate bodies and proprietors to govern their colonial holdings, although the Privy Council sometimes 
formed temporary committees to offer advice and legislate on issues related to colonial affairs. More 
permanent bodies to oversee England’s commercial and colonial interests began to be formed in the 
1630s. The Committee for Trade was appointed in 1630 and dealt with issues related to England’s 
domestic and foreign commerce. The first administrative body to consider the affairs of all the American 
colonies, the Commission for Foreign Plantations, was established in 1634 (recommissioned 1636) and 
was chaired by Archbishop William Laud. The membership of these bodies was overwhelmingly 
aristocratic in composition, although merchants were sometimes called in to impart their expertise by 
serving on special subcommittees revolving around questions relating to colonial commerce.9  
 
The English Civil War and Parliamentary government (1642-48) 
Seismic political events in London in the early 1640s enabled a group of merchants to have direct access 
to the corridors of power and thereby exert influence over the formation of domestic, foreign, and 
colonial policy over the course of the next decade. A network of aristocrats, merchants, and clerics who 
sought further reformation of the Protestant religion played a prominent role in popular politics at a 
critical juncture in the early 1640s. The political polarisation generated by their mass petitioning 
 
7 Ian K. Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, 1696-1720 (Oxford, 1968), p. xiii. 
8 One example is the proprietary patent to the Caribbee Isles given to the Earl of Carlisle in 1627. Williamson, 
Caribbee Islands under the Proprietary Patents, ch. 2.   
9 Andrews, British Committees, pp. 9-23. 
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campaigns and their mobilisation of the London crowd precipitated England’s slide into Civil War. The 
role played by London merchants in popular politics in the early 1640s has been described 
comprehensively by Valerie Pearl and Robert Brenner, and therefore does not need repeating in detail 
here.10  
Maurice Thomson and his associates, a group which Brenner has styled as ‘new merchants’, acted as an 
intermediary between puritan aristocrats in Parliament and the section of the populace who gave them 
their growing political power: the London crowd. According to Brenner’s analysis, it was due to their 
social origins that these merchants were intimately connected with the shopkeepers, mariners, and artisans 
who made up the City’s radical movement.11 This enabled them to play a key role in organising 
demonstrations and delivering mass petitions which publicised the citizenry’s grievances against the 
current administration.12 It is notable that very few merchants with ties to Barbados were involved in the 
tumultuous political events of 1641-2. There are twelve merchants with business interests in Barbados 
who appear on Tai Liu’s list of prominent London puritans: Marmaduke Rawdon, William Perkins, 
Nicholas Crispe, John Wood, Isaac Le Gay, Maurice Thomson, Martin Noell, Thomas Noell, James 
Noell, Thomas Andrews, Andrew Riccard, and Richard Ford.13 But only the American tobacco traders 
Craddock, Thomson, Vassall, and Pennoyer can be counted among those with business ties to the island 
who were highly active in London’s popular politics during the early 1640s. And even then, these four 
merchants had far deeper connections with other Atlantic colonies such as Virginia, New England, and 
St. Christopher (Barbados, it will be remembered, was only of marginal interest to most of London’s 
colonial traders in the 1630s and early 1640s due to the poor-quality tobacco grown there).  
The merchants who assisted in the capture of the English state in 1642 tended to be those who were 
handed government offices in subsequent years due to the political influence it gave them within the new 
 
10 Valerie Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City government and national politics, 1625–43 (Oxford, 
1961); Brenner, Merchants and Revolution. 
11 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 395. 
12 Ibid., pp. 312-314, 324-325, 337-338, 340-341, 362-373. 
13 Liu, Puritan London, Appendix B.  
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regime.14 As we have seen in Chapters Two and Three, over the course of the 1640s there were new 
opportunities for merchants in London to accumulate wealth by profiteering from civil war and investing 
in the Barbados sugar boom. But because merchants with links to Barbados were not heavily involved in 
the events of 1641-2, and appointment to government offices was largely determined through personal 
connections within the Parliamentary administration, merchant investors in the sugar boom could not 
easily access the corridors of power until after the demise of the Commonwealth in 1653. This was 
despite the increasing wealth of merchants like Martin Noell, who were funnelling the profits of civil war 
into sugar plantations and African slavery on Barbados. 
The institutions charged with oversight of the American colonies experienced changes in form and 
personnel in the 1640s. Parliament declared in November 1643, without the King’s assent, that it was 
assuming responsibility over the colonies, and passed an ordinance instituting a new commission for the 
‘Government of the Plantations in the West Indies’. The Earl of Warwick was at the head of this 
administrative body, receiving the title of ‘governor in chief and lord high admiral’ of the American 
plantations, while 18 further members were chosen out of MPs currently sitting in the House of 
Commons. Several of Warwick’s associates in the Providence Island colonising scheme were selected to 
serve on the commission, including the Earl of Manchester, Lord Saye and Sele, Sir Gilbert Gerrard, 
Cornelius Holland, and John Pym. But only one merchant, Samuel Vassall (who was also an MP), was 
among those appointed. It appears the overriding concern was to have MPs sympathetic to the agenda of 
radical Parliamentarians heavily represented, which accounts for why men with no prior involvement in 
the affairs of the American colonies constituted more than half of those sitting on the new commission.15  
Because the attention of its members was firmly focused on the Civil War the Warwick Commission did 
not exercise the full extent of its powers over the American plantations during its four-year tenure.16 This 
 
14 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 389, 428-435. 
15 For the powers accorded to the Warwick Commission, see Acts and Ordinances, Vol. 1., pp. 331-333 and Proceedings 
and Debates, pp. 147-150. See also Andrews, British Committees, p. 23; Bliss, Revolution and Empire, p. 49. 
16 The Warwick Commission did intervene in some issues: it submitted commissions to various colonies ordering 
them to recognise Parliament’ authority, and corresponded with colonial governors. For the commissions see, NRS, 
Hay Papers, GD34/924/34, The Earl of Warwick to the Governor and Council of Barbados, 27 March 1646. For 
the letters, see BL, Stowe Ms. 184, ff. 123-127. 
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has led historians to conclude that colonies such as Barbados enjoyed virtual independence from the 
mother country during the 1640s, deciding to trade instead with the Dutch.17 But this argument, which 
reveals a tendency among historians to interpret earlier periods of colonial revolt in the light of later 
events occurring in 1776, is not compatible with the evidence presented in the previous two chapters of 
this dissertation. While the religious radicals and members of the landed gentry who served on the 
Warwick Commission may have been distracted from colonial affairs because of the domestic conflict, 
the City of London’s merchant community was not. English merchants escalated their commercial 
involvement with Barbados between 1643 and 1649. It is therefore difficult to accept that the inhabitants 
of Barbados were entirely free from metropolitan influence at the same time as planters were becoming 
heavily reliant on the London credit market to purchase land, machinery, and enslaved Africans. 
Barbadians may have enjoyed increased political autonomy in the 1640s, but this did not cause them to 
sever their commercial ties to the mother country and trade primarily with Dutch merchants.  
 
The Commonwealth (1649-53) 
The regicide and the establishment of the Commonwealth of England in 1649 were ushered in by a broad 
alliance of radicals in the New Model Army, the Rump Parliament, and the City.18 As the faction in the 
London merchant community most sympathetic to the new republic’s political agenda, it should come as 
no surprise that Maurice Thomson and his associates were among those regularly selected to serve on 
committees related to the militia, navy, and finance between 1649 and 1653. Indeed, Brenner has argued 
that it was under the Commonwealth that these ‘new merchants’ reached their political ascendancy and 
 
17 For examples, see J. H. Bennett, ‘The English Caribbees in the Period of the Civil War, 1642-1646’, The William 
and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1967), p. 373; Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, p. 159; Puckrein, Little 
England, ch. 6. 
18 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 558. 
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implemented legislation to suit their private business interests, which over the course of the 1640s had 
now also become commercial concerns borne by the entire nation.19  
The effective governance of England’s commerce was an issue of special significance to the 
Commonwealth. Rapid economic and commercial expansion in the second half of the 1640s, in large part 
because of the demands of civil war and the wealth generated from slave-grown sugar on Barbados, had 
led supporters of the new republican regime to extol the benefits of a political economy based principally 
around commercial wealth.20 Commonwealth polemicists firmly believed that England’s national strength 
could be enhanced if the country was governed as a commercial society, and as such they advocated for 
the development of banking institutions and praised the virtues of an increasingly influential merchant 
class.21 Accordingly, there were two organisations formed by the Commonwealth government which were 
given powers to oversee trade and the American plantations. The first was the Council of State, which 
was appointed by an act of the Rump Parliament in February 1649 to replace the Privy Council. The 
Council of State underwent yearly changes in membership, although for the most part it was dominated 
by MPs and army grandees.22 Most important for our purposes is that it superseded the Warwick 
Commission and assumed executive control over colonial policy-making.23 The Council of State formed 
temporary committees and consulted specialists when they were answering petitions and formulating 
legislation relating to trade and the American plantations.24 More often than not, these experts came from 
 
19 Ibid., pp. 550-557 & ch. 12. 
20 According to Steve Pincus, apologists for the Commonwealth such as Marchamont Nedham learned from the 
recent example of the Dutch Republic, along also from Classical and Renaissance texts, that a dynamic commerce 
was the source of national strength and wealth. Steve Pincus, ‘Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive 
Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth’, The American Historical Review, 
Vol. 103, No. 3 (1998), pp. 705-736. 
21 Ibid., pp. 720-721. 
22 Out of the 41 members nominated to form the first Council of State in February 1650, 34 were MPs. Out of the 7 
remaining members 5 were peers, and the regicide John Bradshaw and the judge John Rolle made up the full 
membership. Other than a few MPs with merchant backgrounds, merchants were hardly represented on the Council 
of State. See Worden, Rump Parliament, pp. 177-178; David L. Smith, ‘The Struggle for New Constitutional and 
Institutional Forms’, in John Morrill, ed., Revolution and Restoration: England in the 1650s (London, 1992), pp. 16-19; 
Michael Lynch, The Interregnum, 1649-60 (London, 1994), p. 16; Sean Kelsey, ‘The Foundation of the Council of 
State’, in Kyle and Peacey, eds, Parliament at Work, pp. 129-148. For the legislation which created the Council of 
State, see Acts and Ordinances, Vol. 2, pp. 2-5, ‘An Act of this present Parliament for Constituting a Counsell of State 
for the Comonwealth of England’, 13 February 1648/49. 
23 Seven men who sat on the Warwick Commission also served on the Council of State when it was formed: the Earl 
of Pembroke, Sir Henry Vane the younger, Sir Arthur Heselrige, Oliver Cromwell, Dennis Bond, Miles Corbet, and 
Cornelius Holland. Andrews, British Committees, p. 23.  
24 Ibid., pp. 30-36. 
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the London merchant community, and especially those in the City who shared the regime’s radical 
political agenda. In 1650, for example, Maurice Thomson and his associates were invited to assist the state 
in formulating its response to the royalist rebellions in the American colonies.25 This informal system for 
governing trade and empire gave London merchants who possessed personal connections with the 
Commonwealth government more power than ever before over policy-making. 
A Council of Trade was formed in August 1650, which although a short-lived organisation and not an 
executive body, was a crucial instrument through which England’s commercial fortunes at home and 
abroad were restored after nearly a decade of civil war. The fifteen-man council was purposefully 
designed to represent the diverse commercial interests of the new republic. Traders whom Brenner would 
describe as ‘new merchants’ were certainly a powerful voice within this organisation, but there is little 
evidence to support Brenner’s argument that the committee was wholly devoted to furthering the 
interloping agenda of this mercantile elite.26 The 12 directives issued to the Council of Trade when it was 
created in August 1650 reveals that a wide range of commercial topics fell under the purview of the 
committee, including the manufacture and distribution of domestic trade goods, coinage, the value of 
customs placed on imported and exported commodities, and freedom of trade. The last provision, which 
instructed the Council of Trade to consider ‘the English Plantations in America…and to advise how 
those Plantations may be best managed’, was never implemented in practice.27 As we have already seen, it 
 
25 TNA, SP 25/123, f. 228; Leng, Benjamin Worsley, pp. 49-58. 
26 Only three ‘new merchant’ traders to the Americas, Levant, and East Indies served on the Council of Trade 
during its short lifespan. They were Maurice Thomson, Thomas Boone, and John Fowke. Of these men, only 
Thomson had invested in the Barbados sugar boom of the 1640s. The rest of the fifteen-man committee possessed 
expertise in various other commercial matters relevant to the whole of England, such as the cloth trade and coinage. 
J. P. Cooper, ‘Social and Economic Policies under the Commonwealth’, in G. E. Aylmer, ed., The Interregnum: The 
Quest for Settlement, 1646-1660 (London, 1972), pp. 131-138; Leng, Benjamin Worsley, pp. 60-61. Moreover, the idea to 
form a standing committee to administer England’s commerce did not originate with men like Maurice Thomson. 
Authors advocating for better governance of England’s trade had been circulating proposals for such an 
administrative body in pamphlets since the early 1640s. For examples, see Lewes Roberts, The treasure of trafficke, or a 
discourse of forraigne trade (London, 1641); Henry Robinson, England’s safetie in trade’s encrease (London, 1641).  
27 Acts and Ordinances Vol. 2, pp. 403-406, ‘An Act for the Advancing and Regulating of the Trade of this 
Commonwealth’, 1 August 1650; Leng, Benjamin Worsley, pp. 62-63.  
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was generally left to the Council of State to formulate colonial policy, and besides, for most of the 
seventeen-month lifespan of the Council of Trade the plantations were still in rebellion.28  
The most important matter for the Commonwealth to resolve regarding the American colonies were the 
royalist rebellions which had broken out in Virginia, Barbados, Antigua, and Bermuda after word had 
spread about the execution of Charles I. Conversations between leading members of the London 
merchant community and Benjamin Worsley - a polymath, civil servant, and secretary to the Council of 
Trade - played an integral part in the formulation of the Commonwealth’s strategy for reducing the 
rebellious plantations. In January 1650, for example, Maurice Thomson, William Pennoyer, and William 
Allen, along also with their associate Benjamin Worsley, were called before the Council of State’s 
Admiralty Committee to offer formal guidance to the government on the reduction of Virginia.29 The role 
played by London merchants in formulating the Commonwealth’s strategy for reducing Barbados will be 
explored in detail in the next section of this chapter.  
On 3 October 1650, ‘An Act for Prohibiting Trade with the Barbadoes, Virginia, Bermuda, and Antego’ 
was signed into law by Parliament. This piece of legislation, known to historians as the Plantation Act, 
was intended primarily to facilitate the reduction of the recalcitrant plantations by restricting access to 
their main source of income, but it also contained several other provisions which had wider ramifications 
for the future administration of the English empire. First and foremost, the act dictated that inhabitants 
of the disobedient colonies were ‘not to be permitted any maner of Commerce or Traffique with any 
people whatsoever’. For the duration of the embargo, any merchant vessels originating from England 
which did not have a license from the Council of State to voyage to Barbados, Virginia, Bermuda, or 
Antigua could be lawfully seized. Moreover, foreign ships were now required to obtain a license to trade 
with any of the English plantations in America, not just those which were in rebellion. If caught 
conducting trade without express permission from the English state, foreign vessels were to be brought 
 
28 Andrews, British Committees, pp. 30-36; Leng, Benjamin Worsley, pp. 62-63. For a detailed analysis of the commercial 
matters debated, and rulings issued, by the Council of Trade, see Andrews, British Committees, pp. 24-30; Cooper, 
‘Social and Economic Policies under the Commonwealth’, pp. 131-138; Leng, Benjamin Worsley, pp. 64-70, 73-79. 
29 Leng, Benjamin Worsley, pp. 49-58. 
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into a port belonging to the Commonwealth, and have legal proceedings initiated against the owners in 
the Admiralty Court. The final provision revoked the proprietary patents given by the King to aristocrats 
such as the Earl of Carlisle, and gave the Council of State the authority to install their own allies from 
England as colonial governors.30  
The provisions contained within the 1650 Plantation Act were more significant for the colonies than the 
first Navigation Act, which would be passed the following year. This is because the Plantation Act was 
more sweeping in its measures and had the potential to transform the pre-existing relationship between 
centre and periphery in the English empire. It signified the Commonwealth’s intention to govern the 
American colonies directly and implement new commercial policies beneficial for the English state and its 
merchant supporters. As Carla Pestana notes, ‘this decision inaugurated a new era, creating for the first 
time the prospect of a centralized administration of all colonies’.31 But it is important to remember that 
the ability to implement this ambitious imperial programme was well beyond the reach of the English 
state at this time.  
The following year the Commonwealth government hurried another piece of legislation through 
Parliament which outlined its mercantilist vision for the governance of England’s commerce. The first 
Navigation Act, as it is commonly known, was ratified on 9 October 1651. It contained several clauses 
which built upon the provisions relating to foreign trade within precedent statutes such as the Plantation 
Act. The Navigation Act specified how commodities produced in Asia, Africa, and America could only be 
imported into England and her colonies in vessels owned and manned by Englishmen. Licenses 
permitting foreign shipowners to conduct commerce with the American colonies would no longer be 
offered by the Council of State. Regulations were slightly less stringent for European commodities, which 
could be imported into England and the colonies either in English ships or in vessels owned by the 
country in which the goods were produced.32 The overall intention was to increase the nation’s wealth by 
 
30 TNA, CO 1/12, ff. 88-92. The October 1650 Plantation Act is also published in Acts and Ordinances, Vol. 2., pp. 
425-429. 
31 Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, p. 100.  
32 Acts and Ordinances, Vol. 2., pp. 559-562, ‘An Act for increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation 
of this Nation’, 9 October 1651. 
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promoting English shipping and protecting it from mounting Dutch competition. Though the passage of 
the Navigation Act demonstrates that the English state was taking an increased interest in exerting direct 
control over commerce, it was generally unable to enforce the dictates of this restrictive legislation in the 
colonies and effectively combat inter-imperial trade, which continued unabated.33 
As a foundational ordinance in the history of the British Empire, there has been considerable interest 
among historians in identifying who authored the Navigation Act. Taking J. E. Farnell’s analysis as his 
point of departure, Brenner has reasoned that his ‘new merchants’ were some of the act’s main 
proponents because it accomplished their long-term goals of limiting foreign access to English markets 
and making London the entrepot of Western European trade.34 I am more inclined to agree with the 
argument made by Robert Bliss, however, that the Navigation Act cannot be interpreted as a piece of 
interest-group legislation secured by interloping merchants. The act was a response to general agitation 
among English merchants dating back several years that something needed to be done to revive 
England’s trade and stymie Dutch commercial competition.35 In The Advocate, a pamphlet justifying the 
Commonwealth’s decision to sanction the Navigation Act, Benjamin Worsley emphasised how the Dutch 
maintained a competitive advantage over English merchants in all theatres of overseas trade, and that the 
English government was therefore adopting Dutch strategies to promote shipping.36 As the pamphlet 
demonstrates, politicians, bureaucrats, and diplomats in the Commonwealth government had also come 
to share the anti-Dutch outlook espoused by most English merchants. This was partially because they 
also recognised the importance of commercial power in maintaining national strength; but was more 
immediately due to the humiliating fashion in which negotiations to form a Protestant union with the 
United Provinces had broken down in 1651.37 It was contingent and short-term political circumstances 
 
33 For transnational trade at Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s see Chapter Five of this dissertation and Koot, Empire 
at the Periphery. 
34 Farnell, ‘The Navigation Act’; Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 625-628.  
35 Bliss, Revolution and Empire, p. 58. There does not seem to have been coherent support for the Navigation Act 
among all English merchants, however, as evidenced by the several complaints penned by merchants who disliked 
certain provisions. The Merchant Adventurers, who were reliant on Dutch shipping, would probably have been less 
than pleased about the new and restrictive regulations. Leng, Benjamin Worsley, p. 75 
36 Philopatris [Benjamin Worsley], The Advocate (London, 1652). 
37 For a summary of the Commonwealth’s diplomatic mission to the Hague to propose the formation of an Anglo-
Dutch political union in 1651, see Steve Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign 
Policy, 1650-1668 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 11-12 & ch. 3.  
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which caused the Commonwealth to take an especially assertive approach to the longstanding issue of 
Dutch commercial competition. This aggressive commercial stance would have significant repercussions, 
because it was a primary cause of the first Anglo-Dutch war (1652-54). 
We have seen how merchants who had been highly active in London’s popular politics in the 1640s were 
incorporated into the Commonwealth government between 1649 and 1653. While Brenner is correct that 
merchants such as Maurice Thomson were at their most influential under the Commonwealth, he does 
exaggerate the power they exerted over the formulation of national commercial policy.38 Blair Worden’s 
argument that ‘the Rump worked closely with merchants who were prepared to assist it, but negotiations 
were conducted strictly on the government’s terms’, is broadly correct, and explains why trading 
companies were not stripped of their monopoly privileges by the new republic.39 But it is nonetheless 
crucial to emphasise that the Commonwealth was collaborating more closely with merchants than any 
prior English government. This was an important departure, and was a trend which would continue into 
the Protectorate and Restoration. 
 
The Protectorate (1653-1659) 
England’s experiment with republican government under the Commonwealth came to an abrupt halt in 
the spring of 1653 when Cromwell stormed into the House of Commons with armed guards and 
forcefully disbanded the Rump Parliament. This allowed Cromwell, as the most powerful officer in the 
army, to assume executive power as Lord Protector of the entire nation later that year.40 A petition 
demanding the recall of the Rump was signed by 40 London citizens, who were mostly political 
independents, and presented to Oliver Cromwell by the alderman and merchant Thomas Andrews on 21 
 
38 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, ch. 12.  
39 Worden, Rump Parliament, p. 258.  
40 Ibid., p. 335; Austin Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate (Oxford, 1982). 
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May 1653. Several merchants who had enjoyed a privileged position under the Commonwealth and had 
benefitted from its commercial policies, including Maurice Thomson, his brothers William and Robert, 
William Pennoyer, and Michael Davison, were among the signatories. Cromwell summarily ignored the 
petition, demonstrating how it was the army and its prominent officers who were the most significant 
powerbrokers in English politics at this critical juncture. According to William Clarke, Cromwell ‘tooke itt 
ill that they should goe about to obstruct the proceedings for the good of the people, that himself and 
those about him (turning to the officers) would make good what was done with their bloods &c’.41 In 
retaliation to this affront, the Rump debated excluding disaffected persons from the government on 30 
May, and shortly after Cromwell abruptly dismissed all those who had subscribed to the petition from 
public office. Maurice Thomson, for instance, was disbarred from his position as a commissioner of the 
navy and customs. Though most remained significant figures in the City’s mercantile community and 
were ultimately allowed to continue occupying positions of power, the ability of Thomson and his close 
associates to command the attention of the Lord Protector and influence the formation of policy was 
strictly limited for the remainder of the Interregnum.42  
The disjuncture which occurred with the demise of the Commonwealth government allowed an 
increasingly wealthy and prestigious network of London merchants, most of whom had invested in the 
sugar boom, to become more involved in government and exert political influence themselves. This 
group was not nearly as cohesive as Brenner’s ‘new merchants’, nor from what I can tell was it as deeply 
involved in the City’s popular politics. But even though these merchants were not a unified group with a 
clear set of shared beliefs and aims, what linked them was a shared background in Barbados sugar. It was 
the profits generated from sugar and slavery which propelled several merchants to ascendancy in the City 
in the 1650s, a position which they retained until the mid-1660s. 
There are several reasons why London merchants who had invested in Barbados sugar in the 1640s came 
to occupy prominent positions in government offices and the directorate of overseas trading companies 
 
41 Sir William Clarke, ed., The Clarke Papers. Selections from the Papers of William Clarke, Vol. 3 (London, 1899), p. 6. 
42 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 635-637; Worden, Rump Parliament p. 310.  
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in the 1650s and early 1660s. The disposition of Cromwell, the nation’s Lord Protector and head-of-state 
between 1653 and 1658, was significant. As has already been noted, the group of merchants with most 
influence under the previous Commonwealth administration (Maurice Thomson and his associates) had 
fallen into short-term disfavour with Cromwell in May 1653 due to their support for a petition imploring 
the restoration of the Rump Parliament. This provided an opportunity for a different set of merchants to 
step in, command Cromwell’s attention, and thereby influence government policy.  
These other merchants were those with Caribbean business interests, and in particular men who had 
financed the Barbados sugar boom and were connected with its leading investor, Martin Noell, who had 
succeeded Maurice Thomson as the most politically powerful merchant in the City of London by the 
mid-1650s. Noell was personally associated with Cromwell through prominent figures in the Protectorate 
government. His brother-in-law was the secretary of state John Thurloe, and he had been engaged in 
sugar trading ventures to Barbados and Montserrat with Cromwell’s personal secretary Robert Spavin.43 
Also crucial was how in the mid-1650s the Lord Protector himself developed an obsession with what he 
perceived as a providential mission to conquer Spanish America. It is unsurprising, therefore, that he 
began to surround himself with those in London most knowledgeable about the Caribbean: merchants 
and planters with financial interests in Barbados. The clearest manifestation of Cromwell’s preoccupation 
with the Caribbean was the Western Design, which as we will see shortly Noell and his associates helped 
to organise and provision. 
There were other long-term transformations which help to explain why merchants with investments in 
Barbados rose to a position of ascendancy in London’s merchant community and were increasingly 
represented in the councils and committees formed to administer England’s colonies. Most important was 
how merchants who had invested in the Barbados sugar boom were generating massive wealth. This had 
a twofold impact. First, it increased the amount of liquid capital available to these merchants for use in 
moneylending, government contracting, and investing in joint-stock companies. A new English political 
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economy, which first emerged under the Commonwealth, stressed the importance of national 
‘improvement’ as a means of achieving economic advancement and the betterment of the human 
condition. Wealth created through commerce was therefore deemed to be central to the national 
interest.44 The rapid economic development seen on Barbados in the 1640s and 1650s epitomised the 
ideal of ‘improvement’ which members of the Hartlib Circle and successive Interregnum regimes valued 
so highly. For instance, the riches accumulated by Caribbean planters was admired by Samuel Hartlib, 
who noted in 1655 that ‘Col. Drakes [Drax] of Hackney hath a Plantation in Barbados which yeelds him 
yearly 10 or 8 thousand lbs [pounds sterling]’.45 Moreover, Richard Ligon’s True and Exact History of 
Barbados (completed in 1653, first published in 1657) is a text thoroughly influenced by mid-seventeenth-
century ideas about ‘improvement’, and functions partly as a practical business manual for instructing 
readers in how they could get rich by speculating in the Barbadian sugar industry.46 Because the merchant 
investors in Barbados had rapidly made money through sugar, slavery, and overseas trade they typified 
this new political economy, and some of them were therefore incorporated into the Protectorate and 
Restoration governments to impart their expertise on the most effective means of governing colonies and 
trade.  
Second, the newfound prosperity of those who had invested in the sugar boom vastly improved their 
reputations. By 1650 Barbados was England’s most financially successful colony. The private wealth 
created on Barbados and the growing importance of sugar to the state’s customs revenue was lauded in 
the 1650s and 1660s. Perhaps the best example of the work this did to improve reputations is how several 
planters and merchants who had made fortunes on Barbados were knighted by both Cromwell and 
Charles I: Richard Peers, James Drax in 1658 (knighted again by Charles II in 1660), Andrew Riccard in 
1660, John Colleton in 1661 (and his son Peter, also a Barbados plantation-owner), Martin Noell in 1662 
(and his son James, who had lived on Barbados, in 1665), Peter Lear, Christopher Codrington, John 
 
44 Pincus, ‘Neither Machiavellian Moment’; Slack, Invention of Improvement, pp. 91-128.  
45 Hartlib Papers, Ephemerides 1655 Part 2, 29/5/15A-28B. 
46 David Chan Smith, ‘Useful Knowledge, Improvement, and the Logic of Capital in Richard Ligon’s True and 
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Yeamans, and Thomas Modyford who was made a baronet in 1664.47 Of course, the wealth generated on 
Barbados is not the only reason why these men were knighted and made baronets: several of them were 
longstanding royalists and some lent money to the Crown soon after the Restoration. But the prestige 
enjoyed by Barbados merchants and planters in London is part of the explanation behind their 
knighthoods and repeated appointments to government office in the late 1650s and early 1660s. 
The structure of the Protectorate government was laid out in a new written constitution called The 
Instrument of Government (1653). Under the new constitution the personality and statesmanship of the Lord 
Protector was fundamental to the governance of the nation. It was proximity to and personal connections 
with Cromwell and his council which gave merchants access to government office and political power 
between 1653 and 1659.48 Much like how experts from outside of the House of Commons had been 
appointed to Parliamentary committees in prior years, the Protector’s Council often consulted with 
external specialists when drafting legislation.49 When it came to trade and colonial affairs London 
merchants and planters with investments in Barbados were often called upon to impart knowledge and 
offer advice. In February 1656, for example, Martin Noell, James Drax, William Williams, Luke Lucie, 
Thomas Kendall, and Anthony Hooper represented the interests of the ‘Barbados Merchants’ during a 
meeting at Grocer’s Hall in London to discuss the ‘preserving of the trade of this nation and secureing of 
Merchants ships and goods’.50 But, for the most part, the standing committees formed to govern trade 
and plantations under the Protectorate were large, unwieldy, and inefficient. A Trade Committee made up 
of seventy members was established in November 1655, which drafted reports for consideration by the 
 
47 For Richard Peers see Barbados Council Minutes, p. 84; E. M. Shilstone, ‘The Thirteen Baronets’, Journal of the 
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Protector’s Council.51 For the plantations, various committees with overlapping jurisdictions including the 
Committee for Jamaica and the Committee for America made drafting colonial policy an incoherent and 
cumbersome procedure.52 
Due to the ineffective management of trade and the colonies under the Protectorate, two merchants 
whose overseas business interests revolved around the Barbadian sugar economy, Martin Noell and 
Thomas Povey, began to present reports to Cromwell about reorganising the central administration of the 
Caribbean colonies. Centralising power over the supervision of England’s Caribbean colonies so that 
merchants could govern them in a way which suited their investments was a feature common to all these 
proposals, and therefore appears to have been of paramount importance to some of London’s leading 
investors in the Barbados sugar boom.  
The first proposal penned by Povey and Noell was an ‘Overture for the regulating the Affaires of his 
Highnesse in the West Indies’ (1654), which argued for the creation of a seven-man standing council with 
extensive powers over England’s sugar islands.53 Their proposed West India Council would be 
subordinate only to the Protector, and thus establish a more uniform and ordered colonial administration. 
It would be empowered to distribute public justice in the Caribbean, receive and draft all official 
correspondence between Westminster and the colonies, debate how to improve England’s trade, and be 
in a better position to enforce the dictates of the Navigation Act in the Caribbean colonies by ‘shutting 
out all strangers from that Trade’. The composition of the council had been carefully thought out. A 
small number of members were considered the most expedient way to deal with colonial affairs and 
 
51 Martin Noell, Andrew Riccard, Maurice Thomson, ‘Mr Legay of Southampton’, and Henry Hatsell are the only 
members of the committee with any identifiable links to Barbados. It seems the intention, like with the 
Commonwealth’s Council of Trade, was to have all the commercial interests of the nation represented. TNA, SP 
18/101 f. 179; Andrews, British Committees, pp. 36-43.  
52 Five people constituted a quorum on the Committee for America. Thomas Povey served as the secretary of the 
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The other three men who most commonly served on the committee were Tobias Bridges (later commander of the 
West India regiment), Stephen Winthrop (the son of the New England puritan John Winthrop and former Barbados 
tobacco planter), Richard Sydenham, and Robert Bowes (both commissioners for Jamaica). Andrews, British 
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ensure the secrecy of their plans. Especially significant was how the council purposefully designed not to 
be dominated by merchants, but carefully balanced among those of ‘different professions and 
qualificacons’.54 Though it is nonetheless evident that Noell and Povey’s ‘overtures’ clearly favoured 
London merchants and other metropolitan interests, as there was no room on their projected council for 
a representative of colonists in the English Caribbean. For the time being these detailed plans were 
ignored by Cromwell. But immediately after the Restoration the 1654 ‘overtures’ were amended by Povey 
and reproduced almost word for word as the instructions which created the Council of Foreign 
Plantations in 1660.55  
The best example of the role played by merchant investors in the sugar boom in directing West India 
policy during the Protectorate was their heavy representation on the committees for the Western Design. 
With the conclusion of the Anglo-Dutch war in April 1654, which ended in victory for England, over a 
decade of warfare had resulted in the creation of a professional standing army and naval build-up. The 
expense required to maintain such a large military force meant that it would either have to be disbanded 
or dispatched overseas to wage a war of aggression against England’s enemies. Just five days after the 
Treaty of Westminster was signed, formally ending conflict with the United Provinces, this topic was 
debated at length in a meeting of the Protector’s Council. As longstanding religious rivals, Catholic 
France and Spain were perceived to be appropriate targets. Consultation with two ship’s captains named 
Henry Hatsell and William Limbrey, both of whom had lived in Hispaniola, confirmed that the thinly 
defended but mineral rich islands of the Spanish Caribbean were the best option. Cromwell defended this 
decision at a further meeting of his council convened in July, where he argued that ‘this designe would 
cost little more then laying by the shipps, and that with hope of greate profitt’. Religious considerations 
were also at the forefront of these discussions, because Cromwell firmly believed it was his providential 
mission to advance ‘the Protestants’ cause’ in America.56 According to David L. Smith, spiritual 
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55 Andrews, British Committees, pp. 68-70.  For the other proposals about reforming the central administration of the 
Caribbean colonies, which were penned by Povey and Noell in the second half of the 1650s, see BL, Egerton Ms. 
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geopolitics underpinned Cromwell’s decision to pursue a programme of Protestant imperialism in the 
Caribbean.57 Cromwell had been heavily influenced by Thomas Gage, whose recent publication The 
English-American, his travail by Sea and Land (1648) emphasised the atrocities inflicted upon indigenous 
populations in the Americas by Spanish Catholics, and appealed to godly Englishmen to attack this sinful 
and corrupt empire.58  
It is doubtful that everybody in London’s merchant community was pleased with the decision to attack 
the Spanish Empire: those English merchants who traded to the Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean 
would almost certainly have anticipated that their profits would be severely dented by war with Spain. 
One group of London merchants does seem to have been enthused by the prospect of conquering the 
Spanish Caribbean, however, and due to their longstanding experience trading in the region were even 
appointed to help organise and execute the Design. By August 1654 an eight-man committee had been 
appointed to oversee the logistics of the amphibious invasion of Hispaniola.59 Five of these committee 
members were leading merchant investors in the Barbados sugar boom during the 1640s: Martin Noell, 
Maurice Thomson, Andrew Riccard, William Williams, and William Vincent.60 The other three, John 
Limbrey, Thomas Alderne, and William Rider, all had prior involvement in overseas trade to the 
Caribbean and connections within the Protectorate government.61 In subsequent months this committee, 
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important to highlight the Western Design was part of a longer history of Puritan privateering and colonising 
schemes in the Caribbean, financed by aristocrats and merchants. Kupperman, ‘Errand to the Indies’. 
58 Thomas Gage, The English-American, his travail by sea and land, or, A new survey of the West-India's (London, 1648). 
59 BL, Stowe MS 185, ff. 83-85, ‘Instructions unto Generall Penn, Collonell Venables, Aldr Ricard, Collonell Haines, 
Mr Maurice Thomson, Capt John Lymberry, Capt William Rider, Capt Thomas Alderne, Mr William Williams, Capt 
Goodson, Mr William Vincent. Capt John Brookhaven and Mr Martin Noell, for manageing the Southerne 
Expedicon’, 18 August 1654. 
60 By now the involvement of most of these merchants with the Barbadian sugar economy should be familiar, as it 
has been described at length in Chapters 2 and 3. The only person who hasn’t received as much treatment is the 
merchant William Vincent. Though primarily a Levant Company trader, William Vincent also co-owned the 
Friendship plantation on Barbados with his brother John (also a merchant) who lived on the island and managed 
their sugar works. See BDA, RB3/5, pp. 510-513. 
61 John Limbrey was the brother of the ship captain William Limbrey, who traded to Spanish America and gave 
advice to the Protector’s Council on the viability of Hispaniola as a military target. John Limbrey was most likely 
chosen to serve on the commission for the Western Design due to this family connection and because he had 
previously sat on a Commonwealth committee to provision the navy. Thomas Alderne was a trader to New England 
and the Caribbean, and was also the son-in-law of the colonial trader and regicide Owen Rowe. William Ryder was a 
Southwark-based sea captain who had served on the directorate of the East India Company’s Second General 
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dominated as it was by merchants with a background in Barbados sugar, reported on the ‘nature and 
quantity of victuals to be put on board the fleet’, the number and types of weapons required for the 
invasion, selected William Penn and Robert Venables as the fleet’s commanding officers, and nominated 
trustworthy commissioners on Barbados and several other English islands to assist the expedition when it 
reached the Caribbean. Predictably, many of the same merchants appointed to offer the government 
advice about the Western Design were also handed lucrative contracts to supply the naval force currently 
being prepared. Living up to his reputation as a prominent financier of the Protectorate regime, Martin 
Noell advanced £16,000 ‘at instance of the Protector and Council for two fleet and forces’, demonstrating 
his willingness to support the scheme in both an advisory and financial capacity.62  
The Western Design and the passage of mercantilist legislation such as the Navigation Act underscores 
how the English state was becoming more actively involved in empire-building during the 1650s.63 David 
Armitage has even suggested that the period from 1654 to 1656 was a distinctive ‘imperial moment’ in 
English history.64 If this was indeed an ‘imperial moment’, then it was only a fleeting one. The inability of 
the invasion force to topple Spanish dominance in the Americas meant that the English state’s interest in 
empire-building receded after 1656. It was generally left to private merchants with existing interests in the 
Caribbean to supply Jamaica, to the extent that a group of 19 merchants and seamen trading there were 
 
Voyage in 1647, and had ties to Brenner’s ‘new merchant’ leadership. See Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 176, 
179, 194, 517, 531, 554; Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire, p. 39. 
62 For government contracts, see Thurloe Papers, Vol. 2., p. 542, ‘Mr Andrew Riccard &c. to the protector’, 14 August 
1654; Thurloe Papers, Vol. 2., pp. 571-574, ‘A list of the ships provisions, presented to his highness’, [n.d. c. 1654-55]. 
For the Jamaica petition, see TNA, CO 1/25, f. 227; Thurloe Papers, Vol. 3., pp. 203-204, ‘Commissioners for the 
southern expedition to the protector’ and ‘Provisions to be made for the West Indies’, 7 March 1654/55. For the 
committee appointment of Penn and Venables, see Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire, p. 41. For Noell’s loan, see 
Andrews, British Committees, p. 50. 
63 This is a contentious point of historiographical debate. Disagreement has centred on the long-term significance of 
the Western Design within the broader history of England’s colonial expansion. Pestana, Swingen, and Donoghue 
argue that because the Western Design was a state-backed enterprise it marked an important departure from 
England’s prior efforts at colonial expansion, the energy and funding for which was provided mostly by private 
associations of aristocrats and merchants. Pestana, The English Conquest of Jamaica, passim; Donoghue, Fire Under the 
Ashes, pp. 228-237; Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire, pp. 37-55. But Steve Pincus and L. H. Roper have 
downplayed the imperial significance of the Design. For Pincus, the Protestant foreign policy pursued by Cromwell 
was much more limited than territorial conquest, and was focused more instead on opening up commerce in the 
Caribbean to prevent the Habsburgs from ‘monopolizing the resources necessary to gain a universal monarchy’. 
Whereas Roper interprets the Western Design as not being a state-backed imperial initiative, but more in line with 
earlier forms of colonial expansion orchestrated by private agents. See Steve Pincus, ‘England and the World in the 
1650s’, in John Morrill, ed., Revolution and Restoration: England in the 1650s (London, 1992), pp. 141-142; Roper, 
Advancing Empire, pp. 154-157, 160. 
64 David Armitage, ‘The Cromwellian Protectorate and the Languages of Empire’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 35, No. 
3 (1992), p. 533.  
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forced to petition the Protector’s Council to implore the state to help in fortifying the recently seized 
colony and to appoint their delegate William Watts as governor.65  
The sugar wealth pouring in from Barbados, along also with the new colonial gains made in the Greater 
Antilles, persuaded some merchants with Caribbean business interests that the administration of the 
English islands in the Caribbean needed further reform. Projective plans for the formation of West India 
Company, which would have concentrated power over the governance of the Caribbean colonies into the 
hands of London merchants, were drawn up by Thomas Povey from 1658-59. Those with a background 
in the Barbados sugar trade were the chief backers of this scheme: Martin Noell, Francis Lord Willoughby 
(governor of Barbados for two terms, 1650-52 and 1660-1666), William Watts (a ship captain and 
merchant involved in Caribbean trade), and Povey himself. The failure of the state to conquer large 
swathes of the Spanish Caribbean through Cromwell’s Western Design appears to have convinced these 
men that corporate forms of organisation, dominated by merchants rather than diverse and competing 
interests, were a better means of expediting the settlement of Jamaica, furthering public and private 
interests in the region, and ‘checking the pride of the Spanyards’. Merchants who traded with Barbados 
had good reason to favour such an arrangement. Securing a trade monopoly through an Act of 
Parliament would protect them from commercial competition, while pooling their capital in a joint-stock 
promised to spread the risk of assaulting Spanish colonies in the region.66 Thomas Povey was optimistic 
about the scheme when he wrote to Governor Daniel Searle of Barbados in October 1659, although he 
mused that ‘this Designe (almost perfectly ripened) will bee disappointed or retarded by public troubles’.67 
 
65 BL, Egerton Ms. 2395, f. 171, ‘The Humble Peticon of diverse Merchants, Seamen and others trading into the 
West Indias’, 24 April 1660.  The petitioners included many investors in the Barbados sugar boom. The full list of 
signatories is: Martin Noell, Edward Bushell, William Birde, Thomas Rash, Robert Brooke, Alex Howe, Edward 
Barnard, Isaac Vivian, John Parker, Thomas Rodbard, Hugh Forth, D Skyimer, Henry Boyer, John Warner, John 
Harris, Henry Richards, John Blake, George Webber, John French.  
66 BL, Egerton Ms. 2395, ff. 87-89, 91-92, 103-110. The plan was for the state to lend the West India Company 20 
frigates, which they would equip using £12,000 of capital raised through a joint-stock, and dispatch to attack the 
Spanish dominions in Florida and elsewhere in the Americas. The proposed West India Company would possess a 
monopoly over trade with any regions they conquered. The Dutch West India Company and the English East India 
Company (which as we will see in Chapter Five had recently seen an influx of Barbados merchants into its 
directorate) appear to have been the models which Noell and his associates drew upon when formulating their plans.  
67 BL, Egerton Ms. 2395, ff. 178-179, Thomas Povey to Daniel Searle, October 29 1659. 
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He was proved correct: it was the instability of domestic politics caused by the death of Oliver Cromwell 
and the brief return of the Commonwealth which scuppered plans to form a West India Company. 
 
The Restoration (1660-1664) 
With the return to power of the monarchy in May 1660 new administrative bodies to oversee England’s 
trade and colonies were created. A Privy Council committee was appointed on 4 July 1660 to consider 
these matters. Despite being made up of mostly aristocrats and other powerful statesmen within the new 
government, the committee sat irregularly during its fifteen-year lifespan, and the only issue of 
importance it dealt with before the mid-1660s was whether to void the Carlisle patent over the Caribbee 
Isles.68 Two advisory bodies were formed in December 1660 to sound out the opinion of London 
merchants on the topics of trade and plantations.69 A Council of Trade, consisting of 62 members, sat 
semi-regularly between 1660 and 1664. It was designed to represent the opinions of the entire merchant 
community, but this meant that, like many of its predecessors, it was too large to be effective.70  
More interesting for our purposes is the Council of Foreign Plantations, which met in Grocer’s Hall and 
was composed of 49 unsalaried commissioners. It was most active between 1660 and 1664, and as has 
already been mentioned its instructions were closely based upon Thomas Povey’s 1654 overtures agitating 
for the formation of a West India Council.71 When compared with earlier committees and councils 
 
68 APCC, no. 484, p. 295; Andrews, British Committees, pp. 61-64; A. P. Thornton, West-India Policy Under the Restoration 
(Oxford, 1956), pp. 5-6, 12. The Privy Council Committee was made up of ten members. Many of these men had 
prior involvement with the American plantations, but only Anthony Ashley Cooper had invested in the Barbados 
sugar boom (having purchased a plantation there in 1646).  
69 Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy, p. 4.  
70 There were nine men with business ties to Barbados sitting on the Council of Trade: Francis Lord Willoughby of 
Parham, Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper, Sir Andrew Riccard, Sir James Drax, Thomas Povey, Martin Noell, William 
Williams, Thomas Kendall, and John Colleton. 'Councils of trade 1660-72', in J. C. Sainty, Office-Holders in Modern 
Britain: Volume 3, Officials of the Boards of Trade 1660-1870 (London, 1974), pp. 18-19. British History Online 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/office-holders/vol3/pp20-22 (Accessed 31 May 2019). See also Andrews, British 
Committees, pp. 64-68; Thornton, West-India Policy, pp. 8-10; Brian Weiser, Charles II and the Politics of Access 
(Woodbridge, 2003), pp. 137-146. 
71 Andrews, British Committees, pp. 68-74. 
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formed to govern colonial affairs (such as the Warwick Commission convened in the 1640s, for example), 
it is clear that the representation of merchants had increased markedly at the expense of MPs. The 
number of men with Barbados business ties appointed to the Council of Foreign Plantations far 
outnumbered that for any other American colony. There were thirteen Barbadian experts selected: 
Francis Lord Willoughby, Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper, William Willoughby, Sir Peter Lear, Sir Andrew 
Riccard, Sir James Drax, Thomas Povey, John Colleton, Edward Walrond, Martin Noell, William 
Williams, Thomas Kendall, and Thomas Middleton.72  
The Council of Foreign Plantations’ large membership conceals the extent to which merchants with 
financial ties to Barbados dominated its day-to-day affairs, especially when the topic of debate was related 
to the formation of West India policy. Laxity in enforcing rules regarding attending Parliamentary 
committees and councils and the small number of attendees needed to constitute a quorum sometimes 
enabled certain lobby groups to exert disproportionate influence over proceedings.73 When the Council of 
Foreign Plantations first met on the 7 January 1661, for example, the Barbadian plantation-owner Sir 
Anthony Ashley Cooper was the only Privy Councillor and politician present. Almost all others who 
attended had Caribbean interests, and most were merchants with investments in Barbados: Sir James 
Drax, Sir John Colleton, Sir Peter Lear, Martin Noell, Thomas Povey, Thomas Kendall, and Thomas 
Middleton.74  
 
72 Several others who had Caribbean business interests, but not specifically ties to Barbados, were appointed to the 
Council of Foreign Plantations: Capt. John Limbrey, Capt. William Watts, and Capt. Alexander Howe. Sir Nicholas 
Crispe sat on both the Council of Trade and Council of Foreign Plantations. For the full list of members of the 
Council for Foreign Plantations, see 'Councils of plantations 1660-72', in J. C. Sainty, ed., Office-Holders in Modern 
Britain: Volume 3, Officials of the Boards of Trade 1660-1870 (London, 1974), pp. 20-22. British History Online 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/office-holders/vol3/pp20-22 (Accessed 31 May 2019). 
73 Chris R. Kyle and Jason Peacey, ‘“Under cover of so much coming and going”: Public Access to Parliament and 
the Political Process in Early Modern England’, in Kyle and Peacey, eds, Parliament at Work, p. 22.  
74 The other attendees not mentioned above were: Thomas Jeffries and William Watts (both of whom had had 
financial interests in St. Christopher and Nevis), General Venables (who had conquered Jamaica through Cromwell’s 
Western Design five years earlier), Robert Boyle (President of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New 
England), Edmund Digges, and Edmund Waller. Andrews, British Committees, pp. 76-79; Thornton, West-India Policy, 
p. 11. 
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A. P. Thornton has argued that the Council of Foreign Plantations only dealt with ‘minor matters’, such 
as the ‘difficulty of collecting bad debts in Barbados’.75 However, for the Barbados merchants and 
absentee planters who dominated the daily affairs of the Council this was actually an issue of pressing 
importance. The attention given by the Council to topics such as debt collection on Barbados reveals the 
extent to which merchants with business ties to the island were using this administrative body as a 
mechanism for furthering their own interests, even though the purview of the Council was technically 
supposed to extend to all the American colonies. The increased effectiveness of the ‘Barbados merchants’ 
in securing favourable outcomes to the petitions they submitted was due in large part to their improved 
representation on advisory bodies such as the Council of Foreign Plantations. This is something which 
will now be explored in greater detail in the next section of this chapter. 
 
2. The ‘Barbados Merchants’ and the Origins of London’s West India 
Interest 
The previous section detailed how merchants with investments in the sugar boom were increasingly 
represented on the committees and councils created to govern England’s colonies after 1653. What 
follows will now explore whether this translated into influence over the formation of colonial and 
commercial policy in Westminster relating to Barbados. There has been growing interest in recent years in 
investigating how Britain’s imperial expansion was affected by metropolitan politics. Scholars have found 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries particularly fertile ground for answering these sorts of 
questions. William Pettigrew has analysed the political debates surrounding the dismantling of the Royal 
African Company’s monopoly by independent slave traders, while Abigail Swingen has traced how 
ideological debates in the metropole over ‘competing visions of empire’ fostered the expansion of African 
 
75 Thornton, West-India Policy, p. 12.  
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slavery in the colonies.76 This section focuses on the mid-seventeenth century, a period which has been 
given less attention by historians interested in how metropolitan politics shaped the development of 
England’s empire. It explores the formation of an informal pressure group which adopted the identity of 
the ‘Barbados merchants’, and submitted petitions to the government in support of their business 
interests in sugar production and Caribbean trade. 
After the expansion of the island’s sugar industry in the mid-1640s, London merchants with business 
interests in Barbados (sometimes in collaboration with ship captains and absentee planters) began to craft 
petitions airing their opinions about how the colony should be administered. 104 different persons signed 
a petition under the appellation of the ‘Barbados merchants’ at least once between 1640 and 1665 (see 
Table A4, Appendix 2). When the petitions they submitted are viewed collectively, the overall impression 
they give is that merchants wanted the colony to be governed in a way which suited their investments. 
Continued political and commercial stability on Barbados was their main objective. Merchants petitioned 
the English government fervently when conflict in London regarding competing claims to the proprietary 
patent over the Caribbean Islands flared, when the political situation in Barbados was rendered unstable 
by factionalism among the inhabitants, and when the commercial dynamic of debt and credit (the 
foundation of the Barbadian economy) was thrown off balance and began to favour planters rather than 
merchants. More often than not the signatories of these petitions included leading merchant investors in 
the sugar boom. But it would be incorrect to suggest there was an organised lobby of ‘Barbados 
merchants’ with a consistent set of politics in the mid-seventeenth century: this was an informal 
association of merchants with shared interests, who sometimes petitioned together to give added strength 
to their complaints. Moreover, there was not always consensus about how the colony should be governed 
among all English merchants who traded with Barbados. There were divisions within London’s 
community of colonial traders about the best strategy to reduce Barbados during the 1650-52 royalist 
rebellion, for instance. While not the focus of this study, it is also important to remember that some 
 
76 Pettigrew, Freedom’s Debt; Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire. See also Holly Brewer, ‘Slavery, Sovereignty, and 
“Inheritable Blood”: Reconsidering John Locke and the Origins of American Slavery’, The American Historical Review, 
Vol. 122, No. 4 (2017), pp. 1038-1078. For an older study which takes a similar approach, see Bliss, Revolution and 
Empire. 
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prominent inhabitants of Barbados itself had a vastly different perspective to London merchants about 
how the colony should be governed, and petitioned in the 1650s and 1660s to try to secure increased 
autonomy from the metropole.   
Another consequence of the sugar boom, therefore, is that it led to the emergence of an informal interest 
group of self-described ‘Barbados merchants’ in London, who sought to influence the direction of trade 
and colonial policy relating to the island. I argue that this was a progenitor of the now-infamous West 
India Interest, the most powerful colonial lobby in London in the mid-eighteenth century, which 
campaigned to preserve the interests of slaveholders in the face of mounting Abolitionist pressure.77 Both 
the ‘Barbados merchants’ of the mid-seventeenth century and the eighteenth-century West India Interest 
sought to further the commercial welfare of Londoners with investments in the Caribbean sugar colonies, 
and used similar tactics, such as petitioning, to exert political pressure. There were also important 
differences between the two groups, however. Unlike affiliates of the highly organised West India 
Interest, the ‘Barbados merchants’ did not have many members elected as MPs to campaign on their 
behalf in Westminster, nor did they hire professional lobbyists to develop sophisticated economic 
arguments in support of their cause.78 But I would argue that the similarities outweigh the differences, and 
that a consistent thread of political lobbying on behalf of the Caribbean sugar colonies links the 
‘Barbados merchants’ to the later West India Interest.  
Despite their loud voices, the ‘Barbados merchants’ and the petitions they submitted in the 1640s and 
1650s were often ignored by the English government. This is because, for the most part, the merchants 
who signed these petitions did not possess formal political power through office-holding themselves, nor 
 
77 There is a large body of literature on the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century West India Interest. For essential 
reading, see Penson, ‘The London West India Interest in the Eighteenth Century’; Penson, The Colonial Agents; 
Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 68-71, 426-433; Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, ‘The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: 
The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 40, No. 1 
(1997), pp. 71-95; David Ryden, ed., The Abolitionists Struggle: Promoters of the Slave Trade (London, 2003); Morgan, 
Slavery and the British Empire, pp. 50-53, 162-164; Perry Gauci, ‘Learning the Ropes of Sand: The West India Lobby, 
1714–60’, in Perry Gauci, ed., Regulating the British Economy, 1660–1850 (Farnham, 2011), pp. 107-21. 
78 The use of paid agents who worked full time in London to promote the interests of Caribbean planters was an 
innovation of the 1670s, and a by-product of the ‘commission system’ that was increasingly being used to organise 
the sugar trade. The rise of the commission system of merchandising will be discussed in Chapter Five.  
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have personal connections with those who did. For example, Richard Batson, who is the only merchant 
who signed every petition explored below, never held a government office during his business career. 
Those merchants with investments in Barbados who did hold government office, including Martin Noell, 
Thomas Povey, and Maurice Thomson, did not sign petitions as regularly as some of their counterparts. 
This is probably because they could influence the formation of policy through different channels. 
Although after the Restoration, when several merchants who petitioned under the identity of the 
‘Barbados merchants’ were appointed to serve on the Council of Foreign Plantations, this lobby group 
did enjoy slightly more success in getting Westminster to follow their guidance, principally because they 
now had an institutional mechanism for airing their grievances. 
The first record of London merchants petitioning about Barbadian politics dates to October 1643, shortly 
after the onset of sugar cultivation on the island. Unfortunately, only an abridged summary of the petition 
has survived, and the names of those who signed it are not included. The document provides the first 
iteration of a common theme running through all the petitions submitted by ‘Barbados merchants’ in the 
mid-seventeenth century: that their most important desire was the continued stability of the colony’s 
government. Apprehensive that the appointment of a new governor by the King could encourage the 
colonists to ‘joyne to the popishe partie’, the ‘merchantes adventurers of the Barbadoes’ petitioned the 
House of Commons to make MPs aware that ‘Phill: Bell, a captyne, is desired by the merchantes to 
contynewe a governor’.79 Whether this recommendation helped Phillip Bell to secure his office is 
unknown. But what is certain is that he remained governor of the island for another seven years and 
proved to be an effective public servant. Backed as he was by members of the London merchant 
community, Bell was able to stabilise the island’s political affairs and stimulate the sugar economy during 
his tenure as governor between 1641 and 1650.80  
 
79 Proceedings and Debates, pp. 145-146, ‘The humble petition of divers merchants trading to the island of Barbados, 
and of divers inhabitants there’, 20 October 1643. 
80 Gragg, Englishman Transplanted, pp. 62-63. Alison Games has even suggested that Phillip Bell may have been 
responsible for encouraging the growth of African slavery on the island, primarily due to his prior experiences on 
Bermuda and Providence Island, where he owned a contingent of enslaved Africans. Games, Web of Empire, pp. 175-
176.  
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The petition of October 1643 also emphasised how London merchants believed that the proprietary 
system ‘hath hindered the plantation’.81 Uncertainty about the entitlement of private individuals to own 
land on Barbados was a grave concern among London merchants who had invested heavily in the island’s 
plantation economy during the 1640s. The King’s proprietary grant to the Earl of Carlisle in 1627 meant 
that it was unclear if land on Barbados could be legally owned with freehold tenure, or only leased from 
the proprietor. Merchants who had invested their capital in land, machinery, and enslaved Africans on 
Barbados wanted clarity about this issue as a matter of priority. In fact, the next time English merchants 
intervened in the political affairs of Barbados was when land occupancy on the island was thrown into 
dispute.  
In January 1647 a request from James Hay, the second Earl of Carlisle for permission to travel to 
Barbados was submitted to the House of Lords.82 The proposal sent Carlisle’s creditors and a group of 
London merchants with financial interests in the colony into uproar. The merchants warned that ‘the 
whole plantation would in likelihood perish’ if deliberations over competing political claims to govern 
Barbados caused the people there to cease ‘labouring the ground’. They believed such disruption could 
have an adverse impact on trade and the continued productivity of their sugar estates.83 On 2 March 
1647, a petition from the ‘merchants and planters adventuring to the island of Barbadoes’ was read in the 
House of Lords by Robert Rich, 2nd Earl of Warwick. With a bold opening statement that placed them in 
direct opposition to the inherited proprietary privileges claimed by Carlisle, the merchants argued that ‘the 
island of Barbados, in the West Indies, was either totally, or at least principally, planted and settled’ by 
themselves.84 The merchants probably felt justified in making this case because they had escalated their 
commercial involvement in Barbados in recent years, while courtiers with proprietary patents such as the 
 
81 Proceedings and Debates, pp. 145-146 
82 Ibid., p. 184. For an analysis of a contemporary document offering advice on how Carlisle could successfully 
transplant his interests to the Caribbean, see Carla Gardina Pestana, ‘A West Indian Colonial Governor's Advice: 
Henry Ashton's 1646 Letter to the Earl of Carlisle’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2003), pp. 382-
421. 
83 Proceedings and Debates, pp. 187-188.  
84 Ibid., pp. 188-189, ‘The humble petition of the merchants and planters adventuring to the island of Barbadoes’, 8 
January 1646/7. The 29 signatories of the petition were: Thomas Andrewes, Elias Roberts, Maurice Thomson, 
Jeremy Blackman, Rob’t Wilding, Tho. Peade, Roger Peele, George Pasfield, James White, John Rowe, Thomas 
Walker, John Webster, Nicho. Butler, Rich’d Lee, Thomas Walkinge, Tho. Frere, Wm. Pennoyer, Ric’d Batson, John 
Worsam, Michaell Davison, Michaell Spencer, Stephen Thompson, James Cooke, Lawrence Chambers, Martin 
Noell, Tho. Cooke, John Vincent, Henry Williamson, Henry Quintyne. 
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Earl of Carlisle had been more concerned with the civil war in England than colonial affairs. Because the 
island had been ‘brought to some maturity’ at their great risk and expense, the petitioners wanted 
guarantees from Parliament about the continued tenure of their lands on the island, which they hoped in 
the future would be held in ‘free and common soccage’, rather than leased from the proprietor.85 Despite 
several lengthy responses penned by the Earl of Carlisle answering the claims made by his critics, it 
appears that the arguments advanced by the creditors and merchants were persuasive, and in March 1647 
his request to leave for Barbados was refused.86 A constitutional crisis on Barbados was averted, but only 
for the time being. Parliament had not resolved the merchants’ main grievance: the Earl of Carlisle’s 
proprietary patent and the threat this posed to the future security of their landed investments.  
The next time we see a self-described group of ‘Barbados merchants’ seeking to exert pressure over the 
formation of policy was during the tumultuous events which occurred in the colony between 1650 and 
1652, a period which is sometimes described as the ‘Barbadian Civil War’.87 This political crisis provoked 
an informal association of ‘Barbados merchants’ with financial interests in the sugar industry, but whose 
members did not possess significant political influence within the Commonwealth government, to submit 
a flurry of petitions to the Council of State in which they offered several strategies for reaching a peaceful 
resolution to the royalist rebellion. By trying to avoid outright hostilities these merchants hoped they 
could prevent the destruction of their property and resume trade. Warfare in northern Brazil between the 
Dutch and Portuguese just a decade prior had devastated the sugar economy of Bahia and Pernambuco, 
and probably served as a stark warning that it was better to seek reconciliation with the rebels on 
Barbados than place their investments in the sugar industry at risk.88 Other London merchants who were 
powerful within the Commonwealth regime, however, are notable absences from these petitions, and 
based on circumstantial evidence it appears that Maurice Thomson and Martin Noell supported the more 
forceful approach proposed by the exiled Barbadian planters, which involved instituting a disruptive trade 
 
85 Ibid., pp. 188-189.  
86 Ibid., pp. 191-194.  
87 E.g. Davis, The Cavaliers and Roundheads of Barbados; Gary A. Puckrein, ‘The Acquisitive Impulse: Plantation Society, 
Factions, and the Origins of the Barbadian Civil War (1627-1652)’ (PhD dissertation, Brown University, 1985).  
88 For further information about the warfare in northern Brazil and its damaging impact on the sugar industry there, 
see Schwartz, ‘A Commonwealth within Itself’, pp. 166-167. 
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embargo and launching a military operation against the colony. Opinions were divided among London’s 
colonial traders over the best way to quash the revolt on Barbados. This has not been appreciated by 
Robert Brenner in his own analysis of these events.89 
Some background information about the origins of the factional violence on Barbados in the early 1650s 
is necessary at this point. From 1647 to 1650 an influx of new planters and servants who had supported 
the royalist cause in England had begun to generate friction between the inhabitants of Barbados. This 
meant that the political balance which Governor Philip Bell had tried so hard to maintain on Barbados 
during the early years of the English Civil War was in danger of unravelling. For Parliamentarians living 
on the island, it presented the alarming prospect that broad support for the King among members of 
both the free and unfree classes could trigger an island-wide royalist revolt. It was within this tense 
political climate that the shocking news of Charles I’s execution reached the shores of Barbados in the 
summer of 1649.90 Pre-existing divisions between Royalists and Parliamentarians meant that Barbados 
was already at the edge of internal conflict. The radical steps taken by the regicides in London simply lit 
the fuse.  
Outraged at the execution of the king and the proposals by the new government to limit the 
independence of the American colonies, leading royalists on Barbados began to convene secret meetings 
in the spring of 1650.91 Faced with the prospect of bloodshed, on 3 May 1650, Phillip Bell abandoned 
political accommodation and subscribed to a settlement which proclaimed Charles II as the rightful King 
of England.92 In a remarkable twist of fate, Francis Lord Willoughby of Parham was anchored in Carlisle 
Bay, and had been quietly observing events unfold on the island. A parliamentary sympathiser turned 
 
89 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 591. 
90 Unlike for Virginia and Bermuda, the records of precisely when colonists in Barbados heard about the death of 
the King have not survived. Pestana suggests that because ‘winter weather and the seasonal shipping demands 
brought departures to the colonies to a near standstill in December and January’, definitive news could only have 
reached the Caribbean colonies between the midsummer and early autumn of 1649. I am inclined to agree. Pestana, 
English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, pp. 88-89.  
91 Foster, A Brief Relation of the Late Horrid Rebellion, pp. 6-8.  
92 Other historians have summarised the complicated political situation on Barbados in April and May 1650 in much 
more detail. Davis, The Cavaliers and Roundheads of Barbados, pp. 137-160; Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of 
Revolution, pp. 93-99; Puckrein, Little England, pp. 104-113; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 46-47; Liam Seamus 
O’Melinn, ‘The English West Indies and the English Civil War’ (PhD dissertation, Yale University, 1991).  
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royalist, Willoughby had fled England in 1647 after his property was confiscated by Parliament ‘all at one 
clap’.93 He did, however, manage to retain what was possibly his most important possession: a patent 
leased from the Earl of Carlisle constituting him as the ‘Lieutenant-Governor of the Caribbee Isles’.94 
With this document in hand, Willoughby came ashore on the 7 May 1650, and proclaimed to the 
inhabitants that he had authority from the Earl of Carlisle and King Charles II to be the new Governor of 
Barbados. Swift and decisive action was taken to consolidate royalist control over the island. Punitive 
legislation to sequester the estates of Parliamentarians on Barbados was hurried through the Assembly, 
and in late May another act was passed which ordered 98 Parliamentary sympathisers to depart the island 
by 2 July.95  
The exiled Barbadian planters arrived in England in the late summer of 1650, and immediately set to work 
lobbying Parliament to adopt an aggressive stance against the rebellious colony. A pamphlet detailing 
their version of events, titled A Briefe Relation of the Late Horrid Rebellion Acted in the Island Barbadas, was 
written by Nicholas Foster and published in September 1650. The planter’s account was circulated widely, 
and their description of the ‘Tyranny and Cruelty’ of the ‘Antichristian People’ who had dispossessed 
them proved influential. They urged that the military strength of the new Commonwealth should be 
unleashed on the island to restore their confiscated estates and reinstate religious toleration.96  
The inflammatory language used by the exiled planters disturbed some of the London merchants who 
owned plantations on Barbados and regularly traded to the island. The merchants’ primary aim was to 
ensure that their business operations on Barbados continued to run smoothly. Further violence on 
Barbados could cause the destruction of valuable property and foment an uprising of enslaved Africans 
and indentured servants, while a naval blockade would severely disrupt trade. Profits from the next year’s 
sugar crop, which would be ready for harvest in the spring of 1651, were under threat if a compromise 
could not be reached. Conducting trade with Barbados was already perceived as having become far more 
 
93 Cary, ed., Memorials of the Great Civil War, pp. 314-315.  
94 For Willoughby’s lease of the Carlisle proprietary grant in 1647, see Williamson, Caribbee Isles, pp. 121-125. 
95 ‘An Act for Present Banishment’, 23 May 1650, in Foster, A Brief Relation of the Late Horrid Rebellion, pp. 65-70.  
96 Foster, A Brief Relation of the Late Horrid Rebellion, p. 104. 
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hazardous following the colonist’s pronouncement to support the King. In September 1650, for instance, 
the London merchant John Paige wrote to his business associate William Clerke to inform him that ‘the 
Barbadians have about 3 months since declared for King Charles II and will not be subordinate to any 
officer that our State shall send over’. Paige believed that until Parliament had reduced Barbados to 
obedience, ‘there wil be no safe trading for you to that island, they being now in a tumultuous way, 
everyone his own master’.97  
Due to their desire to resume trade and avoid armed conflict, a group of London merchants co-operated 
with George Marten, Willoughby’s agent in Westminster, to try to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the 
political standoff on Barbados. In response to the exiled planters’ influential publication, they drafted a 
rival pamphlet to prove Willoughby’s credentials as a moderate and balanced governor.98 This pamphlet 
was never published, and the sole surviving copy at the Newberry Library is anonymous and undated.99 
But the document’s content indicates strongly that George Marten and a group of London merchants 
played a leading role in its creation in the late summer of 1650. Due to many similarities in content it is 
highly likely that the ‘Barbados merchants’ who signed several petitions to the Council of State in the 
autumn of 1650 pleading for a peaceful resolution to the conflict on Barbados, also had a hand in drafting 
this anonymous pamphlet.100 It might be that this was the document presented to the Admiralty 
Committee on 30 August 1650, outlining the merchant’s objections to the proposals advanced by the 
exiled Barbadian planters about the best way to reduce Barbados.101  
 
97 Steckley, ed., The Letters of John Paige, Source 25B, pp. 26-27, John Paige to William Clerke, 20 Sept 1650.  
98 Newberry Library, Ayer MS 276, ‘An Essay Evenly Discussing the Present Condition and Interest of Barbadoes. 
And considerations for the Rendring Peaceable to it selfe and usefull to this common Wealth, without the Hazard & 
the Charge of sending a Fleet to reduce it’, [c. 30 August 1650]. 
99 I am uncertain how this manuscript found its way into the Ayer Collection at the Newberry Library rather than 
the Colonial Office records at the British National Archives, but it might relate to the fact that the advice offered in 
the pamphlet was not followed by the Council of State, and so remained in private hands.   
100 For this later petition, see TNA, CO 1/11, f. 62. The merchants who signed this later petition, which bears many 
similarities to the anonymous and unpublished pamphlet in the Newberry Library, included Richard Batson, William 
Pennoyer, Andrew Riccard, Michael Davison, Thomas Applewhaite, John Wood, Thomas Kendall, and George 
Pasfield. 
101 For the minutes of the meetings convened by the Admiralty Committee when they were working out their 
strategy to reduce Barbados, in consultation with both merchants and the exiled Barbadian planters, see TNA, SP 
25/123, ff. 223-224.  
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The unpublished pamphlet went to great lengths to emphasise how Willoughby had arrived at the shores 
of Barbados only after the tumultuous events on Barbados had first begun, and that it would therefore be 
wrong to hold him accountable for the escalating partisan violence on the island and the banishment of 
the pro-Parliament planters to England. With Willoughby’s innocence asserted, the authors proceeded to 
lay out their case for using ‘more gentle proceedings’ to reduce the island to obedience.102 The main 
thrust of their argument was that banning trade with Barbados and initiating the process of reducing the 
island by force would likely cause the inhabitants to ‘be driven upon Extreames’, and lead to several 
undesirable consequences for the English state.103 It is here that the position of the London merchants 
who helped to draft this pamphlet becomes clearer, and it was far more self-interested than their rhetoric 
of preserving ‘publick ends’ would suggest. Almost all the reasons given to reject launching a naval assault 
against Barbados were related to the negative commercial repercussions this would have on absentee 
merchants living in England, rather than the inhabitants of the island itself. There was concern that if 
Barbados continued its descent into internecine conflict the merchant’s sugar estates would be seized, 
their allies and family members banished, their servants freed and armed to fight Parliament’s forces, their 
enslaved Africans sold in Spanish America, and that their position in the carrying trade to Barbados 
would be usurped by the Dutch. Such developments would be highly undesirable for London merchants. 
They argued that while the ‘Industery of the Planters’ had made Barbados rich and fertile, it was the 
‘venturous Merchants’ who had financed the nascent sugar industry and had since ‘been drawne on to 
expend continually vast Summes upon it’. It was deemed highly likely that their capital investments 
(which they valued at approximately £300,000) would ‘vanish from them forever if a Civill Warre [were 
to] enter upon that Land’.104  
The Admiralty Committee, however, had a different opinion on how best to quell the colonial revolt. 
With the political situation in Virginia, Barbados, Antigua, and Bermuda rapidly descending into chaos, 
powerful members of the new regime did not believe that offering diplomatic overtures to Willoughby 
would be an effective enough solution. Less than a month before the Plantation Act was enacted by 
 
102 Newberry Library, Ayer MS 276, f. 3.  
103 Ibid., f. 4.  
104 Ibid., ff. 4-5.  
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Parliament the Admiralty Committee was working closely with the exiled Barbadian planters and radical 
merchants such as Maurice Thomson to formulate a response to the royalist rebellions. On 10 September 
1650, for instance, the committee agreed to forward ‘proposicons brought in by Mr Maurice 
Thomson…concerning the reducing that Island [Barbados]’ to the Council of State.105 The royalist 
rebellions in the colonies, which threatened the new regime’s legitimacy, forced Parliament to pass radical 
new legislation. In the same meeting of 10 September, the Admiralty Committee drafted a copy of the 
Plantation Act, which was ratified by the Rump Parliament less than three weeks later.106  
When the Plantation Act of September 1650 was first published in the London Exchange, it likely evoked 
a mixed reaction from the City’s merchants. While undoubtedly delighted with the state’s commitment to 
increase their trading privileges by restricting foreign merchants from accessing colonial markets, the 
restrictions placed on commerce with Barbados and the other rebellious colonies were troubling. This 
was a pressing issue which needed to be resolved swiftly and decisively. Yet rather than offering their 
support for an invasion of Barbados, some members of the London merchant community with financial 
interests in the colony remained steadfast in their commitment to finding a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict.  
Between November 1650 and February 1651, the ‘Barbados merchants’ summarised their plan to use 
‘more soft and mercifull meanes for the reduceing [of] those Islands’ in a series of petitions.107 The 
strategies they proposed to reduce Barbados bear close similarities to those outlined in the anonymous 
and unpublished pamphlet at the Newberry Library described earlier.108 In order to re-establish trading 
relationships with Barbados, 38 London merchants and Willoughby’s agent George Marten petitioned the 
Council of State on 20 November 1650.109 There are just eight names common to the petitions of March 
 
105 TNA, SP 25/123, f. 228.  
106 Ibid.  
107 TNA, CO 1/11, f. 78, ‘The Motives and Reasons which have incouraged the Marchants to make their humble 
addresses to the Parlyament for the present divertion of the Fleete prepared and designed against the Caribian 
Islands’ [n.d. c. November 1650].  
108 Newberry Library, Ayer MS 276, ff. 6-8.  
109  TNA, CO 1/11, f. 62, ‘The humble desires of diverse Merchants of London and Planters interessed in the Iland 
of Barbadoes, whose names are Subscribed, upon occasion of the late violent actings there against them and others’, 
20 November 1650. 
Michael D. Bennett 
244 
 
1647 and November 1650: Michael Davison, William Pennoyer, Richard Batson, Roger Peele, Stephen 
Thompson, Thomas Frere, and Henry Williamson. This highlights the amorphous nature of the group 
which petitioned under the name of the ‘Barbados merchants’.110   
In their petition the merchants sought permission to despatch six ships to Barbados. Similar in design to 
the 1642 ‘sea adventure’ to Ireland, the charge of furnishing and maintaining these vessels would be 
covered by the merchants, and they would only be permitted to trade with Barbados if the islanders freely 
submitted to the authority of the Commonwealth. To resume friendly relations the Governor, Council, 
and Assembly would have to ‘publiquely renounce and disclaime all obedience and subjection to Charles 
Stuart’, repeal anti-Parliamentary legislation, banish the ‘most Active Incendiaries in the late troubles’ 
from the island, and restore the estates of those planters forced to flee for supporting Parliament. If the 
Barbadians refused to subscribe to these four propositions, then the six merchant vessels would help to 
enforce the embargo of the colony, and when reinforcements arrived ‘joine with the State to reduce them 
by force to the obedience of this Comon Wealth’.111  
It is telling that the names of conspicuous London merchants with financial interests in the Barbados 
sugar industry, including Martin Noell and Maurice Thomson, are entirely absent from the petition of 20 
November 1650. Circumstantial evidence suggests Noell and Thomson agreed with the exiled Barbadian 
planters, and preferred to quash the royalist rebellions using Parliament’s newfound military strength. 
This put them into disagreement with the ‘Barbados merchants’ in London. Perhaps we can speculate 
that because Martin Noell’s brother, Thomas Noell, was among those fined and banished from Barbados 
for supporting Parliament he preferred a confrontational solution. We can be more certain that Maurice 
Thomson favoured aggressive tactics: his brother, George Thomson was the chair of the Admiralty 
 
110 The full list of merchants who signed the petition are as follows: ‘Nicholas Blake, Tho: Jauncys, Ri: Oakley, Tho: 
Bell, Robt: Lewellin, Wm: Yeamans, Michell Davison, Chrisson Hooper?, Tho: Murthwaite, William Penoyre, And 
Riccard, Francis Healey, Richard Nettmaker, John Worsam, Roger Peele, Stephen Thompson, Tho: Applewhaite, 
James Townesend?, John Wood, Samuell Sambers?, Edward Wood, Gervais Locke, James Hayes, Robert Beney, 
James Jenkins, George Martin, Richard Batson, Jona: Andrewes, Thomas Kendall, George Pasfield, Issac Pay, Tho: 
Frere, Edmund Keysar, John Arnett, Henry Williamson, Robert Kirkham, William Williams, Joseph King’. TNA, 
CO 1/11, f. 62. 
111 TNA, CO 1/11, f. 62. For the 1642 ‘sea adventure’ to Ireland, which was designed and funded by London 
merchants, see Lindley, ‘Irish Adventurers and Godly Militants’, pp. 8-9. 
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Committee, which drafted the Plantation Act and co-ordinated Parliament’s hostile strategy against the 
recalcitrant plantations.112 Considering the power that merchants such as Thomson wielded within the 
Commonwealth government more broadly, it should not come as a surprise that it was the course of 
action they endorsed which Parliament legislated in favour of.    
The recommendation to take a forceful approach was persuasive for the Council of State, who deemed 
the four propositions suggested by the merchants in their petition of 20 November to be 
‘dishonourable’.113 Adopting an authoritative stance on the issue of reducing the rebellious colonies would 
demonstrate to England’s European rivals that the new Commonwealth was a capable state, and could 
project its military power overseas. On 27 November a committee was formed to consider ‘the most 
speedy means to reduce Barbadoes’, and only five days later a consensus was reached to launch a fleet to 
the Caribbean and compel the colony to submit.114 Sir George Ayscue, an experienced naval commander 
who had served the revolutionary state as Admiral of the Irish Seas in 1649, was appointed as 
Commander-in-Chief of the squadron to reduce Barbados.115  
The ‘Barbados merchants’ had failed in their efforts to convince Parliament to take a lenient approach 
towards the rebellious colony, principally because those who signed the petition did not wield significant 
power within the Commonwealth government. There were others working behind the scenes, including 
the exiled Barbadian planters and radical merchants like Maurice Thomson, whose lobbying to encourage 
the government to adopt aggressive tactics was more successful. This was partly because they were more 
organised: Nicholas Foster was quick off the mark in publishing the exiled planters’ version of events, 
thus establishing the narrative of the debate early on. They also had powerful allies who sat on the 
 
112 For George Thomson, see Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 128-129, 590-591. 
113 TNA, SP 25/13, f. 67.   
114 CSPC AWI, Vol. 1, p. 347, 27 November 1650; CSPC AWI Vol. 1, p. 347, 2 December 1650.  
115 For Ayscue’s service in Ireland, see TNA, SP 25/87, f. 83; TNA, SP 25/123, f. 76. For Ayscue’s appointment as 
commander of the Barbados fleet, see CSPC AWI, Vol. 1, pp. 347-348, 349-350, 16 December 1650, 27 December 
1650, 1 February 1651. For an account of Ayscue’s career and life, see J. D. Davies, ‘Ayscue, Sir George (c. 1615–
1672), naval officer’, ODNB (23 September 2004), 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-956 
(Accessed 8 November 2019). 
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Admiralty Committee and Council of State, and were therefore in a better position to exert influence over 
the formation of policy.  
Despite this disappointment, the ‘Barbados merchants’ were still resolved to influence the course of 
events. Shortly after Ayscue was granted his commission to command the Barbados squadron in February 
1651, six traders to Barbados outlined their thoughts on how to limit damage to the island’s economy 
once the fleet arrived in the Caribbean: Jonathan Andrewes, George Pasfield, William Williams, Thomas 
Kendall, Richard Batson, and Isaac de Gay.116 These London merchants and ship captains had all signed 
the previous petition of November 1650, and in this new petition of February 1651 reiterated their deep 
concern about the dire consequences an invasion would have on the sugar industry, and that it would lead 
to the ‘probable ruine of the most famous and improving plantacon of the world’. A military assault 
would have very little chance of success, they argued, because the island was well fortified, and the 
rebellious colonists possessed a numerical advantage. They therefore advised that ‘Reason and pollicie 
without the Sword may with lesse charge and more certynty’ resolve the royalist insurgency on 
Barbados.117 Their suggestions were again ignored. Officials in Westminster were committed to making 
an example of the rebellious colonies, and especially Barbados.  
After eleven weeks at sea, Sir George Ayscue and his fleet arrived at Barbados on 16 October 1651 and 
anchored in Carlisle Bay.118 Parliament’s forces announced their arrival by capturing 14 Dutch vessels that 
were trading at the island against the dictates of the embargo passed by the Council of State the year 
before.119 Ayscue appealed for Governor Willoughby to submit to Parliament. But Willoughby remained 
defiant, and Barbados soon became paralysed in a diplomatic standoff that would last for nearly three 
months. In the meantime, Parliament’s ships lay menacingly just offshore, besieging the island and stifling 
 
116 TNA, CO 1/11, f. 76, ‘Petition of the Merchants tradeing to Barbadoes [who] desire they may send a person to 
the Barbadoes before the Fleet goes’, 11 February 1650/51. 
117 Ibid., f. 76 & f. 78.  
118 For an account of Ayscue’s campaign to reduce Barbados in 1651-52, see J. R. Powell, ‘Sir George Aysuce’s 
Capture of Barbados in 1651’ The Mariner's Mirror, Vol. 59, No. 3, (1973), pp. 281-290; Puckrein, Little England, pp. 
120-123; Pestana, English Atlantic in An Age of Revolution, pp. 104-108; Gragg, Englishman Transplanted, pp. 50-51.  
119 TNA, CO 1/11, ff. 145-147; Anon., A true and exact Narrative of the Proceedings of the Parliaments Fleet, against the Island 
of Barbadoes (London, 1650), p. 4.  
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trade. After a few small skirmishes, Willoughby capitulated and a peace treaty was signed on 13 January 
1652. The Commonwealth’s reduction of Barbados was complete.120 In the end, the merchants’ worst 
fears were not realised: plantations and sugar mills on Barbados would not be destroyed by warring 
armies like had recently occurred in northern Brazil. 
Between 1652 and 1660 sixty petitions related to commercial matters were submitted to the 
Commonwealth and the Lord Protector by merchants with business ties to the Barbadian sugar economy. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, permission to ship set quantities of horses, armaments, and clothing to the 
colony were the most common requests. Most of these petitions were granted by the government without 
much hesitation, although sometimes the warrants were for fewer commodities than were originally 
requested by the supplicants. Another noticeable development was how, in the mid-1650s, London 
merchants began to deploy the science of political arithmetic to quantify the nature and value of their 
Barbadian investments.121 For example, merchants were beginning to gather estimates for the population 
of Barbados, which illustrated the varied demographic makeup of the colony. According to their 
calculations, 5000 families of freeholders from the British Isles and a further 5000 freemen whose 
indenture contracts had expired exploited a servile population of 28,000 thousand indentured servants 
and enslaved Africans.122 Historians are rightly sceptical of these census figures, which are almost certainly 
too high. But the overall conclusion of the merchant’s analysis, which indicated that it would be 
extraordinarily difficult ‘to keepe these severall interests peaceably composed under one Government’, 
was broadly accurate.123  
By using political arithmetic to better understand Barbadian demography, merchants perceived that their 
investments in the island’s sugar economy were at risk if they did not radically alter the composition of 
 
120 Ibid. 
121 The phrase ‘political arithmetic’ refers to the compiling of social statistics to inform the formation of government 
policy. It is usually attributed to William Petty, who applied such methodologies in his Down Survey of Ireland. For 
more on political arithmetic, see Paul Slack, 'Government and Information in Seventeenth-Century England', Past & 
Present, Vol. 184 (2004), pp. 33-68; Ted McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic (Oxford, 
2009); Slack, Invention of Improvement, pp. 116-128.   
122 BL, Egerton Ms. 2395, ff. 625-627, ‘An Estimate of the Barbadoes and of the now inhabitants there’. 
123 Ibid, f. 625. 
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the colony’s government. Unless measures were taken in London towards the ‘regulating and composing 
the many disorders and discontents of the said Island’ then the colony was ‘ready to bee ruined within 
ittselfe by the misgovernment thereof’.124 It is no coincidence, therefore, that in the mid-1650s we see 
several groups of London merchants with business ties to Barbados drawing-up plans to increase central 
control over the colony. London merchants deployed political arithmetic to justify their vision of colonial 
state formation. 
In January 1654, after the demise of the Commonwealth regime in England had once again thrown the 
constitution of the colony’s government into dispute,125 an association of ‘Barbados merchants’ submitted 
a petition to the Lord Protector in which they offered suggestions about how to better govern the island. 
Because these merchants had ‘beene great sufferers by the discouragements and distraccons which have 
been upon the Charibbee Islands more especially the Island of barbados’, they argued that the 
government of Barbados should be balanced between Westminster and the island itself. In London, a 
council of seven men (presumably merchants) would have delegated powers to supervise the affairs of all 
the Caribbean colonies.126 On Barbados, a council of seven freeholders with ‘good interests and 
experience of the place’ and proven loyalty to the Protectorate regime would be handed patents from 
Cromwell authorising them to govern the colony. This council was to be accorded powers to vote one of 
their members into the position of governor, who would hold office until new elections a year later.127 If 
it had been implemented, the merchant’s plan would have drastically increased the power emanating from 
the imperial centre over the administration of the distant island.128 
 
124 TNA, CO 1/12, f. 42.  
125 The political tumult following dissolution of the Rump Parliament in April 1653 gave the Barbados Assembly 
new pretext to agitate for increased powers. See TNA, CO 1/12, ff. 22-25, Daniel Searle to the Council of State, 28 
August 1653.  
126 TNA, CO 1/12, f. 42, ‘Petition of the Merchants of London interested in & traders to the Island of Barbados’, 
14 January 1654. The signatories of his petition were: Thomas Cooper, Michell Daiuson, Nicholas Blake, Wm 
Williams, Tho: Frere, Miyles Goodycan?, Geo: Smith, Will Penoyre, John White, Edwin Browne, Andrew Riccard, 
Richard Batson, Lu: Sowdon, Issac de Gay.   
127 BL, Egerton Ms. 2395, f. 625; TNA, CO 1/12, f. 42. 
128 Rough notes produced by the London merchants when they were formulating their plan for reforming the 
government of Barbados have survived. These drafts suggest that James Drax was being considered for the position 
of governor, presumably due to his personal connections with powerful merchants in the City of London and loyal 
stance to Parliament throughout the recent troubles. Other prominent plantation owners were listed by the 
merchants as suitable candidates for sitting on a new Barbados council, including Thomas Modyford, William 
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When we analyse the names of those who signed the petition of January 1654 several patterns emerge. 
Richard Batson, William Williams, and Isaac de Gay signed all three of the extant petitions relating to 
Barbados politics in the 1650s (Nov. 1650, Feb. 1651, and Jan. 1654), and we can therefore identify them 
as some of the most politically active merchants who traded to Barbados. There are five other merchants 
whose names are common to both the November 1650 and January 1654 petitions: Michael Davison, 
Nicholas Blake, Thomas Frere, William Pennoyer, and Andrew Riccard. These eight men were the core 
group of London merchants who petitioned using the identity of ‘Barbados merchants’ in the 1650s. 
They shared a conviction that promoting political stability on Barbados was crucial for the future security 
of their investments in the sugar industry.  
There are some notable absences from the petition of January 1654, however, of whom Martin Noell and 
Thomas Povey are among the most conspicuous. It is interesting to note, therefore, that 1654 was the 
same year that Noell and Povey first presented a proposal about the formation of their own West India 
Council to Cromwell. These plans, which were described in the previous section of this chapter, differed 
in important respects to those suggested by the ‘Barbados merchants’ in their petition: Povey and Noell 
did not recommend that a council of freeholders be formed on Barbados to give planters a say in their 
own administration, for example. But what does seem to be the case is that in 1654 plans were in motion 
to centralise control over the governance of Barbados and the other Caribbean sugar colonies, and that 
several groups of London merchants were lobbying to achieve this goal. Unlike the ‘Barbados merchants’, 
Povey and Noell possessed formal political power through office-holding in the Protectorate regime (e.g. 
on the Committee for America), meaning they did not need to supplicate through petitioning to have a 
platform for airing their opinions, and instead probably submitted their proposals to Cromwell and his 
Council of State directly. Noell and Povey’s extensive political influence was responsible for eventually 
getting their plan implemented, because as we have seen the Council for Foreign Plantations was 
modelled on their proposals for a West India Council.  
 
Hilliard, John Birch, Thomas Middleton, Edward Thompson, and the former governor Henry Hawley. TNA, CO 
1/12, f. 44. 
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The Restoration of the monarchy put colonial charters and the commissions of governors on uncertain 
footing, and thus sparked an explosion of petitioning activity by London merchants in the summer of 
1660.129 The return of the King revived uncertainty surrounding land tenure on Barbados, because it 
presented the possibility that the proprietary patent granted to the Earl of Carlisle would be reinstated. 
The Governor and Council of Barbados had anticipated this development as soon as they received word 
about the Restoration in July 1660. The following month they dispatched an embassy led by the planter 
Peter Watson who, armed with a monetary gift for the King, was instructed to lobby to prevent the re-
imposition of the proprietary grant.130 But the Barbadian planters could not have foreseen how Francis 
Lord Willoughby, who had leased the patent from the Carlisle estate in 1647 and was deposed from his 
office of governor of Barbados by the Commonwealth in 1652, would be quick off the mark in pressuring 
the King to allow him to resume his proprietorship over the Caribbee Isles. Some of London’s traders to 
the Caribbean, several of whom had petitioned against the proprietary grant 13 years before, were taken 
aback when they saw a commission stamped with the King’s seal which commanded all to ‘to receive and 
obey the Lord Willobey as the Proprietor’. Although by mid-century merchants and planters were 
clashing more frequently over their divergent visions for the governance of England’s empire, they were 
in broad agreement that reinstating the Carlisle proprietary would be anathema to the security of their 
landed investments on Barbados.131  
The merchants presented a petition on 2 August in which they beseeched the King to reconsider granting 
letter’s patent to Willoughby in such a hasty manner, especially before the ‘parties concerned [had been] 
fully heard and the right in question [had been] determined by his Majesty and the Laws of his 
Kingdome’.132 A few days later another petition, arguing for the same outcome, was signed by a similar 
 
129 For examples, see TNA, CO 1/14, f. 29, 31. 
130 The Governor and Council of Barbados ordered that the embassy of Peter Watson was to be ‘Joyntly presented 
[to the King] by John Colleton, James Drax, Thomas Kendall, Jonathan Andrews, Tobias Frere, Edward Walrond, 
and Peter Watson Esqrs or to many of them as are willing’. This suggests that the Governor and Council of 
Barbados envisioned that planters and merchants in London would work together to lobby against the reinstatement 
of the Carlisle proprietary. TNA, CO 31/1, ‘Minutes of the Council in Assembly of Barbados’, 2 August 1660, ff. 
14-15; Penson, The Colonial Agents, pp. 27-30.  
131 TNA, CO 1/14, f. 64. 
132 Ibid. The signatories of this petition were: Thomas Middleton, Thomas Matthew, Wm Williams, Gabriell 
Goodman, Robt Wilding, Richard Batson, John Robert, Richard Kemble, Alex Pollington, Mar: Mortimer, John 
Colleton, Thomas Kendall, Charles Everard, Wm Willet?, Edward Lewis, Tobias Frere. 
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group of merchants and presented to the King.133 Leading merchant investors in the Barbados sugar 
boom offered their support to these two petitions, including Andrew Riccard, William Williams, John 
Colleton, Thomas Kendall, Thomas Parris, Thomas Middleton, Richard Batson, Peter Lear, Robert 
Wilding, and Giles Silvester. A few of these merchants, most notably Riccard, Williams, and Batson, had a 
history of petitioning together as the ‘Barbados merchants’ during the 1650s. But it appears that John 
Colleton and Thomas Kendall, the brother-in-law of Thomas Modyford who was himself also vying to 
secure the position of governor of Barbados permanently, were co-ordinating the merchants’ protest in 
London.  
As per the merchants’ request, a hearing before the Privy Council’s Committee for Plantations was 
arranged in early August. Depositions from those involved in the first settlement of the Caribbean 
colonies were used to provide support for the merchants’ claim that the Carlisle proprietorship was 
illegal.134 The committee came to a decision on 30 August, but it was not good news for the ‘Marchants 
adventurers for the Barbadoes’. The Committee for Plantations was wholly dominated by aristocratic 
privy councillors, and it therefore cannot have come as much of a surprise that the body legislated in 
favour of Lord Willoughby, who they recommended ‘ought to be restored to the Government of that 
Island and to be there placed in the same condition as when he was dispossessed of it by the illegall 
power of Cromwell’.135  
Dispute over the Caribbean proprietary was not resolved by the Plantation Committee’s ruling in favour 
of Willoughby. Other interested parties entered the fray and also sought financial gain from the eventual 
settlement. For example, creditors such as William Latham believed the profits that would soon accrue 
from the proprietary could act as a means of repayment for the debts they had been owed by the Carlisle 
 
133 TNA, CO 1/14, f. 66. The signatories of this petition were: And Riccard, Robt Wilding, Thomas Middleton, J: 
B?hall?, Jona: Andrews, Gabriall Goodman, Anthony Sadler, Peter Lear, Henry Batson, Row: Seafield, Mar: 
Mortimer, Richard Batson, Ben: Skutt, Tho: Fer, Jno Pennell, Walter Sike?, Henry Spurstowe, Wm Sewster, Edward 
Swester, Thomas Gott, James Watling?, Jno Goodin, Thomas Parris, Thomas Kendall, Jno Colleton, James Shtry?, 
Giles Silvester, Abraham Moore, John Robinson, John Koothey?, John Hill.   
134 TNA, CO 1/14, f. 85.  
135 TNA, CO 1/14, f. 99 & 104.  
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estate for over thirty years.136 Beginning in February 1661 the Crown carried out a more detailed enquiry 
into the issue, during which each stakeholder had the opportunity to present evidence to support their 
case. This investigation took over a year to complete.137 The merchants’ position was reiterated in a 
petition of 1 March 1661. They urged that ‘fresh letters may be sent to the said Island intimating your 
Majesty’s resolucon of takeing the English plantacons in America and particularly Barbadas into a more 
immediate dependencie on the Crowne’. The merchants tried to facilitate this deal by proposing that, in 
return for dismantling the proprietary and confirming legal ownership of their land, plantation-owners 
would agree to ‘pay your Majesty some Rate percent, on the Comodityes in the Island, as well as the 
custome here’.138  
This offer alienated planters on Barbados from continuing to work with the London merchants, even 
though both parties sought to secure the same ends. Humphrey Walrond wrote on 29 March from 
Barbados that he had heard ‘reports that Mr Kendall and Mr Colleton, the more powerfully to oppose the 
Lord Willoughby, take up on them in our names to act, and propose four on ye hundred in kind for all 
commodities here to bee paid his Matie if hee will take into his hand the Earle of Carlisles interest’. But 
he disavowed the merchant’s proposal, stressing how ‘those gents have no power from us to act so’.139 As 
soon as the Governor and Council of Barbados had received formal conformation from James Drax 
about the merchants’ plan in July 1661 they immediately instructed the Assembly to petition the King 
‘against the propositions of four per cent’.140  
Planters on Barbados had good reason to be angry. Although titled the ‘Humble Peticon of divers 
Planters of Barbadas Inhabiting in and about London’, the 13 signatories of the March 1661 petition were 
 
136 For the other interested parties in the profits of the Carlisle proprietary, see Sarah Barber, The Disputatious 
Caribbean: The West Indies in the Seventeenth Century (London, 2014), pp. 67-68, 71-72. Carlisle’s creditors (William 
Latham, Andrew Beech, Godfrey Havercamp, Samuel Baker, and John Johnson) submitted a petition on 20 
February 1661 stating that they wanted the revenue of the sugar colonies to be used to repay their debts, see TNA, 
CO 1/15, f. 41.  
137 TNA, CO 1/15, f. 43; Thornton, West-India Policy, p. 32.  
138 TNA, CO 1/15, f. 46, ‘The Humble Peticon of divers Planters of Barbadas Inhabiting in and about London’, 1 
March 1660/61. 
139 TNA, CO 1/15, f. 71. 
140 TNA, CO 31/1, f. 28, ‘Minutes of the Council of Barbados’, 4 July 1661. For more on the duty of 4 ½ per cent, 
see Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 48-49; Barber, Disputatious Caribbean, pp. 73-75.   
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in fact mostly absentee merchants who owned property on the island.141 Some of the petitioners had a 
prior history of lobbying under the name of the ‘Barbados merchants’ in the 1650s: familiar figures such 
as Richard Batson, Andrew Riccard, William Williams, and Thomas Frere are among the names appended 
to the document. All but three (William Chamberlain, Jonathan Andrews, and Martin Noell) had also 
signed the previous petitions about abolishing the proprietorship which were presented to the King in 
August 1660.142 Most important, however, was that seven of the petitioners were also represented on the 
recently established Council of Foreign Plantations: Andrew Riccard, Williams Williams, Thomas Kendall, 
Peter Lear, John Colleton, Thomas Middleton, and Martin Noell. It was because more than half of the 
merchants who signed the petition wielded formal political power in an institution recently created to 
govern England’s empire that the legal settlement relating to the Carlisle proprietary followed their advice 
almost completely. 
The London merchants who signed the petition of March 1661 engineered the compromise which ended 
the dispute over the Carlisle proprietary and inaugurated the infamous 4 ½ per cent duty on exports from 
the Caribbean. After much debate the intricacies of the settlement were laid out in a patent of June 1663. 
Like the merchants had requested, the Earl of Carlisle’s proprietary patent was voided. Barbados and the 
Leeward Islands were now royal colonies, and consequently also brought under increased supervision of 
the English state. With the abolition of the proprietorship, planters and merchants who had invested in 
the Caribbean plantation economy would never again have to worry about the legal status of their land. 
Information that Charles II would assume control over the proprietorship was communicated to the 
Barbados planters in an act of the Privy Council on 28 March 1661. This decision had therefore been 
made early on in the negotiating process, and less than a month after the merchant’s petition of 1 March 
had been presented.143 The King, once again following the merchant’s advice, also imposed a new export 
duty of 4 ½ per cent on all ‘dead Comodityes of the Groweth or Produce of this Island’, which was 
 
141 The thirteen signatories were: Andrew Riccard, Richard Batson, William Williams, Thomas Kendall, John 
Roberts, Peter Lear, John Colleton, Tho: Middleton, Tobias Frere, Will Chamberlaine, Martin Noell, Jona: Andrews, 
and Thomas Parris. 
142 Three of those who signed the petition of March 1661 had signed the petition of March 1647, which also 
condemned the proprietary: Thomas Frere, Richard Batson, and Martin Noell. 
143 APCC, no. 509, pp. 305-306. 
Michael D. Bennett 
254 
 
ratified by the Barbados assembly on 12 September 1663.144 By first suggesting and helping to implement 
the levy of 4 ½ per cent, merchant investors in the sugar boom had created a longstanding grievance for 
sugar planters. The customs duty was a major point of contention for planters in the Caribbean for 
effectively the entire duration of the 175 years it remained in place.145 
In the early 1660s London merchants with business interests in the Barbados sugar industry also 
submitted petitions related to commerce, and used the Council for Foreign Plantations as a mechanism 
for seeking advantage in trade. In July 1661 a petition of the ‘Planters, Merchants, Mariners, and Traders 
in the Island of Barbadoes’ was submitted to the King, who having heard its contents in a meeting of the 
Privy Council, proceeded to forward it to the Council for Foreign Plantations. The petitioners began by 
highlighting how they had ‘layed out the greatest part of their fortunes and estates for the raising and 
improveing of Trade and Plantacon in the said Island’. Their investment had been worthwhile, they 
argued, because of the numerous private and public benefits that had been accrued by the commercial 
success of the colony.146 But the petitioners warned how the whole trade of the colony would ‘sodainly 
and unavoidably be ruined and discouraged’ without new regulations to better control the quality of the 
sugar exported from Barbados. They claimed that not enough care had been taken by planters to ensure 
that the sugar shipped from the island was cleaned of impurities. The petitioners therefore requested that 
the King impose a heavy duty of ‘thirty shillings per hundredweight’ on unpurged Barbadian sugar to 
discourage planters from selling merchants such an ‘unmerchantable’ commodity in the future.147  
 
144 For the 13 June 1663 settlement see APCC, no. 598, pp. 355-361; no. 599, pp. 362-365. See also Williamson, 
Caribbee Isles, pp. 198-214; Thornton, West-India Policy, pp. 36-38; Bliss, Revolution and Empire, pp. 145-146. For the act 
of the Barbados Assembly see: TNA, CO 30/1, ff. 36-37, ‘An Act for settling an Impost on the Commodities of the 
growth of this Island’. See also Thornton, West-India Policy, p. 38.   
145 The most eloquent protest against the export duty was Edward Littleton’s Groans of the Plantations (1689). Littleton 
used fiery rhetoric to express his indignance about how ‘upon the King’s Restauration we were in effect made 
Forainers and Aliens… the Duty of four and a half percent was extorted from us in barbados, full score against our 
Wills’. Edward Littleton, The Groans of the Plantations: or A True Account of their Grieves and Extreme Sufferings By the Heavy 
Impositions Upon Sugar, And other Hardships. Relating more Particularly to the Island of Barbados (London, 1689), pp. 1-2. 
146 According to the petitioners, Barbados ‘hath for some time yearly imployed two hundred saile of shipping’, and 
by expanding sugar production in the colonies had made the commodity more affordable for Englishmen. They also 
emphasised how the island maintained a fighting population of ten thousand men, and in recent years had 
functioned as a ‘nursery’ for the planting of other English colonies in the Caribbean. 
147 ‘The humble peticon of the Planters, Merchants, Mariners, and Traders in the Island of Barbadoes’, TNA, CO 
1/15, ff. 61-62. 
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Unfortunately, there are no signatures appended to the manuscript, and so it remains uncertain who 
among the London merchant community supported the petition. What is clear, however, is that the 
petition was received favourably by the Council for Foreign Plantations, made up as it was by numerous 
planters and merchants with Barbadian connections. Francis Lord Willoughby, James Drax, John 
Colleton, Thomas Kendall, Thomas Povey, and Thomas Middleton were appointed to a select committee 
of the council to consider how best to deal with the issue. Although it is likely that the case made by the 
merchants in their petition was exaggerated, the select committee were convinced by their argument, and 
by the 19 August had already drawn up a letter to be sent to Barbados instructing the colonial 
administration to revise existing laws ‘for making good and merchantable sugars’.148 Remarkably, the 
letter has survived at the British Library. It reveals how the Council of Foreign Plantations required the 
Governor, Council, and Assembly of Barbados to consult a set of papers about regulating the 
manufacture of sugar which had been enclosed within the letter, and to ‘Dejest [them] into Lawes to bee 
enacted’. Only once a ‘standard for the goodness and Marchantableness of sugars’ was settled would 
‘Certaine Marchants of London…enter into a Contract with good securitie for performance to buy 
yearely all the uncleyed muscovados of that Island’.149 It is here, within an official letter drafted by 
numerous merchant investors in the sugar boom, that we begin to see the origins of the commission 
system of organising trade with the Caribbean colonies.  
In the early 1660s London merchants also petitioned the King for redress from the difficulties they were 
encountering with collecting debts on Barbados. A group of seventeen ‘Planters, Merchants, and Traders 
to the Island of Barbadoes’ signed a petition in 1660 which claimed that ‘the Lawes of this Nation have 
not been fully put in execucon for the recovery of debts in that Island’.150 This problem, they argued, had 
been ‘occasioned through the want of knowledge of the said Lawes in the former Governors of the said 
 
148 For the deliberations conducted by the Council of Foreign Plantations and its select committee on this issue, see 
TNA, CO 1/14, ff. 159-160. 
149 BL, Egerton Ms. 2395, f. 642, ‘Letter prepared by the Councill of Plantations to the Governor Councill and 
Assembly of Barbados concerning the manufacture of sugar’ [n.d. c. August 1661].  
150 TNA, CO 1/15, f. 47, ‘The humble Peticon of the Planters, Merchants, and Traders to the Island of Barbadoes’. 
The 17 signatories of the petition were: Andrew Riccard, William Williams, Richard Batson, Thomas Middleton, 
Tobias Frere, David Skynner, Richard King, Jonathan Keate, Henry Batson, Thomas Oveall, John Berwick, Thomas 
Frere, John Pennell, Jonathan Andrews, Seth Rowley, William Beale, and George Keate. 
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Island’. The petitioners therefore requested that Thomas Modyford, a Barbadian planter who was by 
training a lawyer, be continued as governor of Barbados.151 Merchants with a track record of petitioning 
about issues related to Barbados in the 1650s, including Andrew Riccard, William Williams, Richard 
Batson, Thomas Frere, and Thomas Middleton, were among the signatories. The issue of bad debts 
resurfaced in May 1663 following reports that the deputy governor of Barbados and the council, who 
themselves were heavily indebted to merchants, were ‘obstructing all proceedings at Lawe against any 
Planters there for their debts’.152  
The Council for Foreign Plantations appointed Martin Noell, John Colleton, and Thomas Middleton as a 
select committee to coordinate a response to this ‘stoppe of Justice’, which threatened England’s entire 
trade with the colony. The report they drafted advised the King to intervene by repealing the deputy-
governor’s order and encouraging merchants ‘to take their legal remedy’ against planters who had been 
evading their creditors. Both the King and Francis Lord Willoughby, the latter of whom was in the 
process of preparing to depart for Barbados, were given a copy of this report.153 As we will see in the next 
section, exercising greater control over debt collection in the American colonies was a longstanding issue 
for merchants, and was a primary reason why London merchants engineered appointments of their 
relatives and allies to the office of Provost Marshal on Barbados. 
Most of the London merchants who invested in the 1640s sugar boom and petitioned as the ‘Barbados 
merchants’ had died by the 1670s. The mantle of petitioning Westminster on behalf of issues related to 
Barbados and the other sugar colonies was taken up by a new generation of absentee planters and 
London merchants. Some of these newcomers were relatives of those who had pioneered sugar 
production on Barbados in the 1640s, having inherited property on the island after the death of their 
fathers or uncles. It was these men who formed the first formal West India lobby groups in the early 
 
151 A note at the bottom of the petition reads ‘appointed Gov. by Council of State 24 April 1660’. It appears that the 
King and his Privy Council heeded the merchants’ advice and appointed Modyford governor. Unfortunately for the 
merchants, the machinations of Willoughby to reinstate the proprietary meant that Modyford’s tenure as governor 
was short-lived.  
152 TNA, CO 1/14, f. 166-167. See also TNA, CO 1/66, f. 183. 
153 Ibid. 
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1670s: the ‘Committee of Gentlemen Planters in London’ and the ‘Committee for the Public Concern of 
Barbadoes’. These committees, which were mostly made up of absentee merchants, lobbied vehemently 
to prevent the imposition of new import duties on sugar produced in the colonies, and were the first to 
appoint salaried agents as permanent representatives in London.154 Because most of the original investors 
in the sugar boom were already deceased, there is little crossover between the members of these 
committees and those who had petitioned using the identity of the ‘Barbados merchants’. The only 
survivor is Thomas Middleton, who was a member of the Committee of Gentleman Planters in 1671. But 
the surnames of those who served on these committees are broadly familiar. We see Francis Lord 
Willoughby Jr., Peter Colleton, Henry Drax, Edward Pye, and Jacob Lucy, all of whom were relatives of 
the original investors in Barbadian sugar during the 1640s, serving on either one or both of these pressure 
groups formed in London to further the interests of Caribbean merchants and planters.155 
Historians have not previously traced the origins of London’s West India Interest to the period between 
1643 and 1663. In her study of the colonial agents of the British Caribbean, Lilian Penson suggested that 
the committees of ‘Gentleman Planters’ and ‘Public Concern of Barbadoes’ formed in the early 1670s 
were the starting point of the lobby. More recently, Andrew J. O’Shaughnessy has argued that a 
professional and organised West India lobby first emerged in response to the challenges of the American 
Revolution, and that it did not even exist as a formal body before the 1760s.156 In this section I have 
argued that we can detect a consistent pattern of political lobbying on behalf of Caribbean interests to as 
early as the middle decades of the seventeenth century, when an informal association of merchants and 
plantation-owners who had financed the sugar boom began to petition using the identity of the ‘Barbados 
merchants’.  
As the first English colony to reap the full benefits of commercial sugar production, it should not come 
as a surprise that London’s West India Interest originated with investors in Barbados. The ‘Barbados 
 
154 Penson, ‘The London West India Interest in the Eighteenth Century’, pp. 374-375; Thornton, West-India Policy, p. 
135, 142-144; Penson, The Colonial Agents, pp. 46-59, 182-185. 
155 For the membership of these committees, see CSPC AWI, Vol. 7, p. 228, 15 June 1671. 
156 Penson, The Colonial Agents, ch. 3; O’Shaughnessy, ‘The Formation of a Commercial Lobby’, pp. 71-75. 
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merchants’ were an amorphous group, with the signatures of various members appearing, disappearing, 
and then sometimes reappearing over time. But we can identify that there were some ‘Barbados 
merchants’ who were highly politically active because they frequently signed petitions: Richard Batson, 
Andrew Riccard, William Williams, Thomas Frere, Michael Davison, William Pennoyer, Thomas 
Middleton, Isaac de Gay, and, to a slightly lesser extent, Thomas Kendall, John Colleton, Nicholas Blake, 
Martin Noell, Maurice Thomson, and Peter Lear. These merchant investors in the Barbados sugar 
industry were moved to petition the English government when political uncertainty on the island 
threatened the security of their assets.  
As well as being responsible for social and economic transformations on Barbados, therefore, the sugar 
boom also precipitated political changes in England by encouraging absentee merchants and planters in 
London with shared business interests to lobby the government. The ability of this informal lobby to 
influence the formation of government policy increased over time. In the 1640s and 1650s the majority of 
traders who signed petitions as the ‘Barbados Merchants’ did not possess political power themselves 
through appointment to government office. Most of the time, therefore, their petitions were simply 
ignored. But by the Restoration, and particularly after the formation of the Council of Foreign Plantations 
in December 1660, merchants who had formerly petitioned as the ‘Barbados merchants’ were now 
serving on institutions in London used to govern England’s plantations. Hence, they began to see more 
success in having the advice they proffered in their petitions turned into legislation.  
The ‘Barbados merchants’ never came anywhere close to the level of political influence enjoyed by the 
organised West India lobby groups that would emerge in the eighteenth century and guide legislation such 
as the Molasses Act (1733) through Parliament.157 This is partly because the group of businessmen 
resident in London with interests in the sugar colonies was much smaller in the mid-seventeenth century. 
Absenteeism, the use of commission agents, and the employment of salaried lobbyists (developments 
which greatly increased the population of men with Caribbean interests in London) were all in their 
 
157 For the Molasses Act, see Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, p. 68; Morgan, Slavery in the British Empire, p. 51. 
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infancy in the middle decades of the seventeenth century. Also important was how the representation of 
Caribbean businessmen in Parliament was minor when compared to later decades.158 Historians such as 
O’Shaughnessy are correct, therefore, to argue that the West India Interest was at its most organised and 
powerful in the eighteenth century. The point of this section has been to show that this same interest 
group also existed in the mid-seventeenth century, immediately following the sugar boom, in a 
rudimentary and less influential form.  
 
3. The Influence of London Merchants in the Local Government of 
Barbados 
The final section of this chapter will investigate whether the political reach of London merchants 
extended across the Atlantic, enabling merchants to exert influence within the local administration of 
Barbados itself. Did absentee London merchants try to exert political and commercial authority on 
Barbados? And if so, were their efforts successful? This section will answer these questions by delineating 
the structure of the colony’s government in the mid-seventeenth century, and analysing whether the 
family members and business agents sent overseas on behalf of London merchants were able to control 
the various offices which made up the island’s government. Previous historians have outlined in detail the 
political structure of Barbados in the seventeenth century.159 Our focus here, therefore, will be on the 
importance of merchant interests within these institutions.  
 
158 For the representation of Caribbean businessmen in Parliament during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
see Barry Higman, 'The West India Interest in Parliament, 1807-1833', Historical Studies, Vol. 13 (1967), pp. 1-19; 
Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 60-71; O’Shaughnessy, ‘The Formation of a Commercial Lobby’, pp. 72-74. 
159 E.g. BL, Add. Ms. 27382, ff. 191-196, ‘The Present State of Justice in the American Plantations, and particularly 
in the Island of Barbados’, [c. 1690]; Frederick G. Spurdle, Early West Indian Government: Showing the Progress of 
Government in Barbados, Jamaica, and the Leeward Islands, 1660-1783 (Palmerston, New Zealand, 1960), ch. 1-3; Gragg, 
Englishmen Transplanted, ch. 4. 
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The Barbadian government in the mid-seventeenth century was a unicameral legislature, and consisted of 
a governor, council, and assembly. A hierarchical pattern of officeholding prevailed, with the most 
powerful and prestigious political office being the position of governor. The governor was appointed by 
commission in England before being dispatched overseas. In the era of the Carlisle proprietary the 
prerogative to appoint a new governor was reserved to the proprietor. But during the Interregnum the 
Council of State assumed this responsibility, and after Barbados was made a royal colony in 1663 it passed 
to the King. The governor was delegated extensive powers through a commission drawn up by one of 
these higher authorities in England. In the early years of the colony’s history all executive, legislative, and 
judicial power was concentrated in the governor and his council, who were by him appointed and 
therefore subservient to his authority. Until the emergence of a representative Assembly between 1639 
and 1641, the governor and council could pass legislation, levy taxes, declare martial law, appoint 
commissioned officers, and convene courts without any input from the wider population.160 
The prevailing merchant attitude towards the office of governor was that they wanted continuity in 
personnel so as not to encourage factionalism and political division among the colonial inhabitants, which 
could threaten the security of their investments. The petition from 1643 in which the ‘Barbados 
merchants’ desired Phillip Bell to ‘contynewe a governor’ and the petitions submitted by merchants 
immediately following the Restoration regarding the governors of St. Christopher and Nevis are good 
examples.161 None of the London merchants who invested in the sugar boom ever had a family member 
or business partner appointed governor of Barbados during our period of enquiry.162 But they often threw 
their weight behind a preferred candidate by petitioning the English government, and deliberately sought 
to cultivate a close working relationship with those who were serving in the position.163 To make sure the 
governor remained amenable to their interests, for example, merchants offered those occupying the office 
 
160 Spurdle, Early West Indian Government, p. 10. 
161 For the 1643 Phillip Bell petition, see Proceedings and Debates, pp. 145-146. For the St. Christopher and Nevis 
petitions, see TNA, CO 1/14, f. 29, 31. 
162 There are examples of merchant representatives securing the highest political office on Barbados in the latter part 
of the seventeenth century. For instance, the Royal African Company’s chief factor on Barbados, Edwyn Stede, 
served as governor of the colony from 1685-1690. See Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 101. 
163 See, for example, the meeting convened at the Cardinal’s Cap in 1659, which was described in the introduction to 
this chapter. BL, Egerton Ms. 2395, f. 177 & ff. 179-181,  
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gifts and extended them more generous credit than the rest of the colony’s inhabitants. As I argued in 
Chapter Three, the enhanced reputation associated with serving in such a prestigious office probably also 
played a part in why merchants decided to extend governors extra credit. 
There are numerous examples which could be used to illustrate the close relationship between London 
merchants and Barbadian governors in the era of the sugar boom. Only one will be described here. 
During the late 1650s the absentee Barbadian plantation owners Martin Noell, Thomas Povey, and James 
Drax were working in London to preserve the position of Daniel Searle as the island’s governor in the 
face of mounting pressure from other factions calling for his immediate replacement. Their 
correspondence with Searle demonstrates how absentee merchants and planters applied pressure in 
Westminster and the London Exchange to secure commissions for their favoured candidates to the 
governorship. Governor Searle was, in the words of Thomas Povey, ‘almost wholly defended and kept up 
by Mr Martin Noells interests and dexteritie’.164 The methods used to maintain Searle’s position were 
revealed in a letter dated October 1659, when Povey wrote:  
I shall watch closely for anything that may bee stirring to your prejudice att Whitehall and shall as 
Comissionated by you take upon mee to answer for you. And if I can keepe you secure in the 
Capacitie you now are (which I deeme to bee effectuall enough considering your letters of 
confirmation from the Councell of State) I shall not unreasonably press for the renewing of your 
Comissions.165 
Serving as a member of the council was the second most powerful office on Barbados, and was therefore 
generally available to only the most dignified inhabitants of the colony. The council was nominated by the 
governor, and in the mid-seventeenth century the number of councillors varied from as many as thirteen 
members in 1641, to as few as six in the second half of the 1650s.166 The head representative of the 
council was known as the President. One member held the office of secretary, a position which conferred 
numerous civic responsibilities including taking minutes during council meetings, issuing tickets of leave 
 
164 BL, Add. Ms. 11411, ff. 55-57, Thomas Povey to William Povey, 3 April 1658. 
165 BL, Egerton Ms. 2395, ff. 176-181, Thomas Povey to Daniel Searle, 29 October 1659. 
166 Spurdle, Early West Indian Government, p. 12. 
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to give people formal permission to leave the island, and assisting in the drafting of official 
correspondence from the governor to political authorities in England.167 The Barbados council had a dual 
function in our period: it handled the administrative business of government by serving as an advisory 
body to the governor, and before the formation of the Assembly also had the ability to pass legislation 
itself. When in session with the governor present the council could also function as a Court of Chancery, 
a Court of Appeals, and a Court of General Sessions.168 Sitting on the council was a big commitment for 
those who served, as it obliged them to journey to Bridgetown an average of three days each month to 
carry out their duties. There was a high turnover in council membership on Barbados until the mid-1650s, 
after which there was more stability in officeholding.169  
In October 1641, a few years before the island’s sugar industry began in earnest, there were no 
representatives or family members of London merchants serving on the Barbados council. Only William 
Povey, the brother of the businessmen and civil servant Thomas Povey, had a seat on the council as its 
secretary. Otherwise the body was wholly made up of wealthy and important plantation owners who lived 
on the island.170 Detailed minutes of the Barbados council have survived for the period from 1654-58, 
allowing us to analyse the number of merchants who were represented at the height of the sugar boom. 
In 1654, two out of five members of Daniel Searle’s council had strong connections to the London 
merchant community: Edward Thomson (the brother of Maurice Thomson) and Thomas Middleton 
(who would later sign petitions in London as a ‘Barbados merchant’). By 1658 John Colleton was the only 
person on a six-man council who can be described as having close familial connections to merchants in 
England, and by this point he is probably more aptly described as a planter anyway.171 This is suggestive 
of a wider trend. Out of the sixty men who served on the Barbados Council between 1630 and 1660, I 
 
167 For the duties of the secretary, see Minutes of the Council of Barbados, 1654-1658, p. 63, pp. 84-85, p. 142; Thurloe 
Papers, Vol. 3., pp. 157-159, Mr. J. Berkenhead to secretary Thurloe, 17 February 1653/54.  
168 Spurdle, Early West Indian Government, p. 29; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 66-67.  
169 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 67-68. 
170 Library of Congress, Charles Pinfold Papers, ‘Extracts from the Council Books in Barbados’, 13 October 1641. 
The thirteen members of Governor Phillip Bell’s council in October 1641 were: Capt. James Browne, Capt, James 
Holdip, Capt. Thomas Gibbes, Capt. George Boyer, Capt. John Reade, Capt. Edmond Reade, Capt. Phillip 
Woodhouse, Capt. William Hilliard, Capt. Edward Whelley, Mr. Phillip Tilney, Mr. Edward Cranfield, Mr. Thomas 
Trott, Mr. William Kirton. The secretary was William Povey Esqr.  
171 For examples, see Barbados Council Minutes, p. 5, 320.  
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have been able to identify just seven who were family members and business partners of London 
merchants: Edward Cranfield, Edward Thomson, Thomas Middleton, John Colleton, Edmund Read, 
John Read, and Constant Sylvester.172 Although in the mid-1650s Thomas Noell, the brother and business 
partner of Martin Noell, did occupy the position of secretary to the council.173  
There were, of course, others who served on the council that maintained close business relationships with 
London merchants, but it would be a push to suggest that men such as James Drax were actively seeking 
to further merchant interests in the colony’s political institutions. Also important to note is that 
merchants who lived on Barbados itself and whose main base of business operations were also on the 
island served on the council. A good example is Henry Sweet, described as a London merchant in 1647 
when he was dealing in the production of Barbadian indigo in partnership with fellow merchant Oliver 
Read, but by the mid-1650s was a permanent resident of the colony and served as a member of the 
council during the years 1654-58.174 Those merchants who relocated to Barbados were a group distinct 
from the absentee London merchants who financed the sugar boom but never visited the Caribbean. 
Their significance to the island’s history will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Five. Overall, the 
underrepresentation of absentee merchants and their representatives on the Barbados council did not 
change after 1660.175 An oligarchy of planters, not London merchants, dominated this institution in the 
era of the sugar boom. 
A similar pattern prevailed in the other chamber of Barbadian government. The Barbados Assembly was 
first convened by Governor Henry Hawley in 1639. The assembly was an elected body of the island’s 
plantation-owners: all freeholders (propertied men who owned over ten acres of land) were eligible to 
vote and stand for election. Two planters from each of the island’s eleven parishes were elected to serve, 
meaning that when full the assembly consisted of twenty-two members. Over time specialised roles 
 
172 For a list of the sixty men who served on the Barbados council between 1630 and 1660, see Gragg, Englishmen 
Transplanted, p. 65, fn. 30. 
173 For Thomas Noell as secretary to the Barbados Council, see Barbados Council Minutes, p. 80.  
174 Sometimes spelt ‘Henry Sweete’. For the 1647 reference see BDA, RB 3/3, pp. 195-196. For Sweet as a member 
of the Barbados Council, see Barbados Council Minutes, p. 173, 176.   
175 TNA, CO 31/1, ‘Journal of the Proceedings of the Governor and Council of Barbados, from the 29 May 1660 to 
the 30 November 1686’. 
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within the assembly emerged, including a speaker and clerk. In its early years the assembly functioned 
merely as an advisory body to the council. It was not until 1641 that the new governor Phillip Bell gave 
the assembly powers to initiate legislation itself, so long as the laws passed were not ‘repugnant’ to those 
of England. This was a decision of constitutional significance, because it gave the local inhabitants the 
ability to have a greater say in their own government. The Barbadian model of popular participation in 
government through an elected assembly would be emulated at other islands in the English Caribbean 
over the next twenty years.176  
There is little evidence to suggest that London merchants held sway over the Barbadian assembly 
between the 1640s and 1660s. No minutes of the assembly have survived before the mid-1660s, and so 
the only way we can understand which interests were represented within this institution beforehand is by 
analysing its membership. The earliest source we have which lists the members of the assembly dates to 
the eve of the sugar boom in September 1643.177 When we investigate the backgrounds of the 26 men 
who served on the assembly in 1643 it becomes clear that, like the council, planters far outnumbered the 
agents of absentee London merchants. Just four members had familial connections to London merchants 
or were their agents: Edmund Read, John Read, Robert Jennings, and Thomas Le Gay.178 Out of the 
sixteen sitting members of the assembly of 5 November 1651 there were two men with familial ties to 
absentee merchants: Robert Hooper and William Heathcott.179 John Wadloe, Thomas Read, and Symon 
Lambert were merchants living on the island who served in this assembly.180 In July 1655 there were two 
agents of London merchants sitting on the assembly: William Vassall and Benjamin Keyzar. Also 
 
176 Antigua in 1644; St. Christopher in 1647; and Montserrat by 1660. Spurdle, Early West Indian Government, p. 11. 
177 NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/38, ‘Letter from the Inhabitants of Barbados to the Earle of Carlilse touching the 
three pound per acre’, 13 September 1643.  
178 Edmund and John Read were the relation of Thomas Read, a London merchant involved in sugar production 
with both Martin Noell and Thomas Applewhaite in the 1640s. See BDA, RB 3/3, pp. 529-31; BDA, RB 3/5, pp. 
680-81; BDA, RB 3/3, pp. 873-74. In 1646 John Jennings, alongside George Bowen, was a factor for Thomas 
Preston ‘citizen and skinner of London’ and Philip Streethay ‘citizen and ironmonger of London’, see BDA, RB 3/3, 
pp. 79-80. Thomas Le Gay (sometimes spelt Gaye or Legay) was almost certainly a relation of the English 
merchants Peter and Isaac Le Gay who were heavy investors in the sugar boom. BDA, RB 3/5, pp. 329-331. 
179 For the list of assemblymen, see TNA, CO 1/11, ff. 103-104. For Hooper, see LMA, MCD Box 2, 
CLA/024/06/002. For Heathcott, who was the brother of the Bristol merchant Thomas Heathcott, see BDA, RB 
3/3, p. 697. 
180 For evidence that these three assemblymen were merchants living on Barbados, see BDA, RB 3/3, pp. 585-88; 
BDA, RB 3/2, p. 265; BDA, RB 3/5, pp. 680-81. Thomas Read, formerly a London merchant, had relocated to 
Barbados by 1651. 
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significant is that the representatives for St. Michael parish, which contained the commercial hub of 
Bridgetown, were both merchants: William Vassall and John Wadloe.181 By 1666 Constant Silvester was 
the only agent of a merchant investor in the mid-century sugar boom who sat on the assembly. There is 
no evidence in the minutes of the assembly for 1666 that either London merchants or merchants living 
on Barbados itself used the body’s legislative powers to further their private business interests at the 
expense of planters.182 
The overall impression given by the composition of the Barbados council and assembly is that London 
merchants either struggled to control, or perhaps did not even attempt to control, institutions of colonial 
government in which appointment was determined locally. Their distance from the Caribbean meant that 
this was beyond their reach. Absentee London merchants were more successful, however, in placing their 
representatives in offices appointed by commission from England, because they could more immediately 
use the political influence they wielded in Westminster to further their efforts.  
The position of Provost Marshal was most significant in this regard. Originally a Tudor military office, by 
the late sixteenth century the Provost Marshal was increasingly being used by the English state as a means 
of deploying martial law against its own citizens, such as to discipline vagrants.183 In its seventeenth-
century colonial manifestation the Provost Marshal was a full-time salaried office which gave extensive 
powers to oversee law enforcement and the administration of justice.184 Absentee merchant investors in 
the sugar boom believed that a Provost Marshal sympathetic to their interests was necessary for providing 
favourable conditions for the operation of colonial trade. This was because there was no legal apparatus 
 
181 Barbados Council Minutes, pp. 84-85. The assembly had not changed much in membership when they petitioned the 
Lord Protector in March 1657. This source provides historians with another list of names of assemblymen. See 
Thurloe Papers, Vol. 4, p. 651, ‘The assembly at Barbados to the protector’, 27 March 1656.  
182 TNA, CO 1/20, ff. 4-10.  
183 For the Provost Marshal as a martial law office in early modern England and its role in managing vagrancy, see 
Lindsay Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638 (Abingdon, 1967), p. 150, 250, 295; A. L. Beier, Masterless Men: 
The Vagrancy Problem in England, 1560-1640 (London, 1985), pp. 152-153; Paul Slack, The English Poor Law 1531-1782 
(London, 1990), p. 23. 
184 For the colonial uses of martial law and military government, see Stephen Saunders Webb, The Governors-General: 
The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681 (Chapel Hill, 1979). The duties of the Provost Marshal on 
Barbados are outlined in a document in the Colonial Office Records: ‘The Provost Marshalls place is in nature of 
sherife of a County regard he keeps the Goale [jail] and by himself or Deputies Executes all Writts and Execucons’. 
TNA, CO 1/18, f. 87. 
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on Barbados itself which allowed absentee merchants to easily and swiftly collect the debts they were 
owed from planters. As we have already seen, extensions of credit from London merchants were crucial 
for the expansion of the sugar industry and enabled trade with Barbados to function efficiently. Credit 
was the foundation of the Barbadian economy. It was an intricate web of debt and obligation which tied 
planters living in the colony to merchants based in the metropole.185 With almost every planter indebted 
to English merchants, courts on the island tended to treat delinquent debtors with leniency, meaning that 
by the mid-1650s absentee merchants were struggling to collect debts, and deemed it essential to have an 
amenable government which would uphold their right to do so.186 Placing allies in the position of Provost 
Marshall was particularly important for English merchants, therefore, as this office gave the holder the 
power to imprison and seize the estates of planters who were indebted.  
Prior to 1657 the perquisite to appoint a new Provost Marshal was controlled locally by the Governor and 
Council of Barbados.187 But that year, largely as a result of the lobbying efforts of the London merchants 
Martin Noell and Thomas Povey, this customary right was revoked. Against the wishes of the governor 
and inhabitants of Barbados, Noell and Povey successfully obtained a commission from the Lord 
Protector granting their ally William Povey the office of Provost Marshal.188 As Carla Pestana has 
observed, this decision was controversial precisely because it had broad implications. It altered the island’s 
unwritten constitution, and thereby ‘disturbed the accepted relationship between the periphery and the 
center’ in the English empire.189 This decision also constituted a major victory for English merchants who 
traded to Barbados, because it promised to install a judicial system more amenable to their interests.  
 
185 For a contemporary description of the importance of merchant credit to the Barbadian economy, see TNA, CO 
1/13, f. 148. 
186 For examples, see Barbados Council Minutes, p. 37; TNA, CO 1/14, f. 167; TNA, CO 1/15, f. 47; APCC, no. 595, 
pp. 351-355.  
187 For examples, see NRS, Hay Papers, GD34/923/19, ‘James Hay from Barbados touching the Governor’s harsh 
dealing with him in deposing him from this place’, 14 February 1641; GD34/923/16, James Hay to Archibald Hay, 
6 October 1638; Barbados Council Minutes, p. 81. For the Provost Marshal’s Oath, see BDA, RB 3/1, f. 2.  
188 For William Povey’s first patent to be provost marshal of Barbados, see BL, Egerton MS 2395, f. 131. For his 
second patent, dated 1657, see BL, Add. Ms. 11411, ff. 35-38. 
189 Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, p. 168.  
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William Povey’s rapid career advancement in the island’s administration was entirely down to his personal 
connections with powerful merchants in the City of London through his brother Thomas. Thomas 
Povey, a sugar boom investor and important figure in London’s expanding colonial bureaucracy, 
capitalised on his political influence with Cromwell to secure offices for family members in the 
Caribbean, including that of Barbados Provost Marshal for William Povey.190 Noell wrote to William 
Povey in November 1655 to explain how his brother in London ‘hath made it his continuall business to 
prevent any prejudice which might befall you here and to gaine you a confirmation from his Highness’.191 
From Thomas Povey’s perspective, it was impossible for William ‘to stand unless you have one foot in 
England, as well as in Barbados’.192  
Securing the appointment of a family member to the office of Provost Marshal was intended support the 
Noell syndicate’s sugar trading business. What Thomas Povey and Martin Noell did not anticipate 
though, was how intransigent and negligent William would be. Thomas Povey sought financial 
compensation for helping his brother to secure confirmation of his office from Cromwell. He believed 
that he deserved a proportion of the monetary proceeds from his brother’s lucrative new position in the 
colonial administration. But William ignored these requests and refused to pay. Their dispute got so bad 
that communication between the two brothers eventually broke down. Letters were dispatched to 
Governor Searle imploring him to intervene, and in 1659 Martin Noell and Thomas Povey were forced to 
send Edward Bradbourne to the island as their new agent.193 The vast distances separating Barbados and 
England, and the opportunities this afforded local inhabitants to pursue their private interests, had once 
again hampered the efforts of London merchants to run the colony in a way which suited their trading 
businesses.  
 
190 Thomas Povey also secured the office of Commissary General of Provisions on Jamaica for his other brother 
Richard Povey in 1657. See BL, Add. Ms. 11411, ff. 16-17.  
191 BL, Add. Ms. 11411, f. 7, Martin Noell to William Povey, 22 November 1655. 
192 BL, Add. Ms. 11411, f. 8, Thomas Povey to William Povey, 10 November 1655. See also BL, Add. Ms. 11411, ff. 
6-7, Thomas Povey to Daniel Searle, [n.d. November 1655?]. 
193 For examples, see BL, Add. Ms. 11411, ff. 38-41, Thomas Povey to William Povey, 20 August 1657; BL, Add. 
Ms. 11411, f. 43, Martin Noell to William Povey, 27 August 1657; BL, Add. Ms. 11411, ff. 45-47 Martin Noell to 
Daniel Searle, 27 August 1657; BL, Egerton MS 2395, f. 239, Letter of Attorney by Thomas Povey, 9 February 
1659/60; BL, Egerton Ms. 2395, f. 240, ‘Instruction to Thomas Noell Esq concerning the settling some matters in 
difference between Mr Thomas Povey and Mr William Povey’, [n.d. February 1659/60?]. 
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The desire of London merchants to control the office of Provost Marshal on Barbados did not subside 
after the Restoration. Francis Craddock, another man with close ties to the London merchant community, 
secured a commission for the position in August 1660.194 In 1670 Edwyn Stede, who would later become 
the Barbados factor for the Royal African Company and Governor of Barbados (1685-90), succeeded 
Craddock as Provost Marshal.195 Disagreement over whether appointment to the office should be made 
locally or by commission from the King also persisted.196 
Below the Provost Marshal were locally appointed judges and justices of the peace (JPs) who ran the 
Barbadian judicial system on a day-to-day basis and assisted in safeguarding law and order. In the era of 
the sugar boom we see the representatives of London merchants serving in these public offices, again 
primarily because of their commercial utility in aiding with debt collection. By the early 1650s the island 
had been divided into five precincts to share the ever-mounting pile of litigation. The Court of Common 
Pleas on Barbados, which like its English equivalent used case precedent as a means of meting out justice, 
dealt with debt suits, contested land titles, and disputes over the inheritance of estates.197 Both John 
Colleton and William Vassall, the brother of London merchant Samuel Vassall, appear in the council 
minutes as a judge in the Common Pleas court for the precinct of St. Michael in 1654.198 Thomas Noell 
was a judge for the precinct of Christchurch in 1654, a region on the southern coast of the island where 
his brother Martin owned a 300-acre plantation. By July 1655 he had taken up the position of judge for 
St. Michael precinct. This office was almost certainly secured through the political influence of his brother 
Martin in London, because Thomas was promoted following a ‘Governor’s Pattent from His Highness ye 
Lord Protector’.199 It is significant that three men with close ties to the London merchant community 
served as judges in St. Michael at the height of the sugar boom, because this precinct contained 
Bridgetown, the commercial hub and political centre of Barbados, and was therefore where a lot of debt 
cases involving merchants were heard. With regard to JPs, a lesser office which gave high standing 
 
194 For his commissions, see TNA, CO 1/14, ff. 73-83; TNA, CO 1/16, f. 98. 
195 TNA, CO 1/25, f. 73; TNA, CO 1/27, f. 86. See also Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 101.  
196 For examples, see TNA, CO 1/16, f. 201; TNA, CO 1/18, f. 87; TNA, CO 1/25, f. 14.  
197 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 59.  
198 Barbados Council Minutes, p. 19, 31-32.  
199 Ibid., p. 63, 80, 84-85, 142, 244; Thurloe Papers Vol. 5., p. 43, ‘Mr. J. Berkenhead to Secretary Thurloe’, 17 February 
1654/55. 
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members of the community powers to maintain public order at local level, we see John Colleton, John 
Parris, and Constant Silvester all being nominated to serve between 1654 and 1658.200  
We have some evidence which indicates that the relatives of London merchants used their appointments 
to the Barbados judiciary to assist merchants in collecting debts. In 1654, for example, when the merchant 
Ralph Woorye specifically requested to be adjudicated by a jury of merchants rather than planters, the 
presiding judge and merchant John Colleton acquiesced without hesitation.201 While in September 1655 
the complaints of ‘severall Judges’ and ‘Merchants trading hither’ were voiced regarding the ‘unsufferable 
procrastinations and delaye of Justice’ on the island, which they argued was to the ‘prejudice of ye 
creditor’. As a result of their protests, Governor Searle ordered that the colony’s judicial system should 
henceforth ‘carry a nearer resemblance and consonacy with ye practice of ye Lawes of England for ye 
expediateing of Justice’, and for the martials of the court to be more proactive in arresting delinquent 
debtors.202 Moreover, because merchants and their representatives were deeply involved in law 
enforcement and presiding over court proceedings in the era of the sugar boom, they played a role in the 
implementation of the rigorous Barbados slave codes. In 1655, for example, a special court of Oyer and 
Terminer was formed for the ‘hearing, examination and tryall of all negroes that shall be brought before 
them either for murther or any other crime’. The ship captain John Wadloe, who regularly traded to West 
Africa for slaves in the 1640s and 1650s, was one of five men appointed to sit on the new court.203 
We have seen how London merchants cultivated a close working relationship with successive governors 
of Barbados, and also successfully installed their family members and representatives to the office of 
Provost Marshal and positions in the colonial judiciary. But did this enable absentee merchants to exert 
political and commercial authority over the colony in the mid-seventeenth century? When it comes to 
politics, the answer is a resounding no. Appointment to the two law-making institutions on Barbados (the 
council and assembly) was determined locally. Although merchant-dominated establishments at the centre 
 
200 Barbados Council Minutes, pp. 257-259.  
201 Ibid., p. 34.  
202 Ibid., p. 99.  
203 Ibid., p. 90.  
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of the empire, such as the Council of Foreign Plantations, could send strongly worded instructions to the 
Governor, Council, and Assembly to alter laws, the power implement legislation remained firmly in the 
hands of planters living overseas. The colonial inhabitants of Barbados vehemently defended their 
customary privileges to elect their own representatives and fashion their own laws, often claiming that 
civic participation was their right as ‘freeborn Englishmen’.204 The inability of the representatives of 
London merchants to prevent planters from driving a profitable provisioning trade with the Dutch and 
French provides further evidence that merchants were mostly unsuccessful in their endeavour to leverage 
political and commercial influence on Barbados itself.205 Although beyond the remit of this dissertation, it 
would be interesting to explore in a future project how influential the factors of the Royal African 
Company were in the political institutions of Barbados after 1672, and whether this deviated from the 
pattern described here. 
Evidence from the turn of the eighteenth century that merchants were still struggling to collect their debts 
from planters on the island suggests that the efforts of merchant investors in the sugar boom to use the 
position of Provost Marshal and the judiciary to secure themselves commercial advantages failed in the 
long run. For example, in a lengthy diatribe about the ‘present state of justice in the American plantations, 
and particularly in the Island of Barbados’, an anonymous author explained how ‘severall English 
merchants have heretofore imployed great summes on plantations in that Island, but many of them 
having been great sufferers and many others ruined for want of justice in the Island’. The author even 
placed part of blame on the untrustworthiness of the factors and relatives that merchants sent overseas to 
manage their investments: 
It is grown a proverb with the English Merchants, that if a man goes over never so honest to the 
plantations, yet the very air there does change him in a short time; and it is certain they have too 
 
204 Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, pp. 163-170. 
205 BL, Add. Ms. 11411, f. 13, Thomas Povey to Daniel Searle [c. 1655?]. 
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much ground for this complaint, tho not occasioned by the air, but by the universall corruption 
of justice among them.206 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that absentee English merchants, and especially those in the City of London, did 
not just forge a commercial relationship with Barbados in the era of the sugar boom. To preserve their 
financial investments in the island, London merchants also sought to influence the political direction of 
the colony, and make its government amenable to their interests. The ability of these merchants to affect 
policy change in Westminster increased over time, as the representation of investors in the sugar boom 
within institutions to govern trade and plantations improved after 1653. By the early 1660s merchant 
financiers of the sugar boom were heavily represented on the Council of Foreign Plantations. One result 
of this development was that the advice offered by an association of ‘Barbados merchants’ in their 
petitions began to be implemented more often by the English government. I have argued that the 
‘Barbados merchants’ were an informal pressure group formed by absentee merchant investors in the 
sugar boom, and was a progenitor of the eighteenth-century West India Interest. The reason why the 
‘Barbados merchants’ were more successful in their lobbying after 1660 was principally because many of 
their affiliates were now sitting on the Council of Foreign Plantations, and could use that body as an 
institutional mechanism for airing their opinions and implementing policy change in the metropole. 
Despite securing increased political power in Westminster during our period of enquiry, absentee 
merchant investors in the sugar boom were not able to exert similar levels of authority on Barbados itself. 
This was despite the concerted efforts of London merchants to place allies in the office of Provost 
Marshall, which would have helped them to collect the debts they were owed from planters.   
 
206 BL, Add. Ms. 27382, f. 193, ‘The present state of justice in the American plantations, and particularly in the 
Island of Barbados’, [c. 1700]. 
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This speaks to wider debates surrounding centre and periphery in early modern empires. London 
merchants and the English state were never able to govern Barbados directly in the mid-seventeenth 
century: the vast distances separating England from the Caribbean and the resistance of colonists to 
metropolitan authority meant that planters retained power over the law-making process through their 
control of the local institutions of colonial government. These factors scuppered the plans drawn up by 
merchant investors in the sugar boom to increase the English state’s central control over Barbados after 
1650. As Jack P. Greene has correctly observed, the early English empire was a negotiated one: 
metropolitan merchants and colonial planters had very different opinions about what constituted the 
nature of empire, and had conflicting visions for its future.207 Tension in the relationship between colony 
and metropole turned out to be productive, as by the mid-eighteenth century the British American 
colonies enjoyed great prosperity, which some contemporary observers such as Adam Smith and 
Montesquieu suggested was down to the degree of political autonomy they possessed.208 For the absentee 
merchant investors in the sugar boom who are the subject of this study, however, the inability to impose 
centralised governance over Barbados and to govern the colony in a way which suited their investments 
was a source of continual frustration. In fact, in the next chapter I will argue that it was one of the main 
reasons why we see them pulling their investments out of Barbados in the late 1650s and early 1660s. 
 
207 Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the 
United States, 1607–1788 (Athens, GA, 1986). See also Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, eds, Negotiated 
Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820 (Abingdon, 2002). 
208 Jack P. Greene, ‘Transatlantic Colonization and the Redefinition of Empire in the Early Modern Era’, in Daniels 
and Kennedy, eds, Negotiated Empires, pp. 274-275.  
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Chapter Five. Merchants and Barbados in the Restoration Empire, 
1660-1672 
The fifth and final chapter of this dissertation investigates how the relationship between merchants and 
Barbados changed after the Restoration. In the first section we will begin by considering why London 
merchants withdrew their investments from Barbadian land in the 1650s and early 1660s, and what the 
implications of this were. We will then proceed to examine where this merchant capital went after it was 
removed from Barbados. By tracing the careers of the merchant investors in the sugar boom beyond the 
Restoration, it will be shown how some of the profits English merchants generated from sugar and 
slavery on Barbados were reinvested in the Jamaican economy, used to purchase stock in overseas trading 
companies like the EIC, and deposited with goldsmith-bankers in England such as Edward Backwell. The 
second section of this chapter will explore how, following the withdrawal of merchant capital from 
Barbados, the role of the island within the structure of England’s seventeenth-century empire changed. 
Rather than acting as a site for wealthy London merchants to invest their capital, by 1672 the colony had 
become significant as both a centre of plantation production and as a regional centre of trade. The 
process through which Barbados was transformed into a hub of imperial, intercolonial, and transnational 
commerce began around the year 1650, in the immediate aftermath of the initial stages of the sugar 
boom.  
The island’s own merchant community expanded in importance and size in the 1650s, as foreign traders 
relocated to the colony and the factors of English merchants increasingly began to trade on their own 
accounts. Barbadian merchants were particularly assertive participants in Atlantic commerce: they drove a 
direct trade with other Caribbean islands, the Guianas, New England, and West Africa. Partly as a result 
of the rise of the Barbadian merchant community, Barbados also took on some more specialised roles in 
the English empire during the 1660s. The island functioned as a commercial entrepot in the slave trade to 
Spanish America and became a nursery for further colonial expansion in the Greater Caribbean. By 1672 
the port town of Bridgetown had become a bustling commercial hub, and the tiny island of Barbados had 
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been transformed into a pivot point in world trade. Indeed, in 1676 one author described Barbados as 
‘the most flourishing colony the English have in the World’.1  
 
1. The Withdrawal of Merchant Capital  
In the 1650s and early 1660s we begin to see London merchants withdrawing the investments they had 
made in Barbadian land during the tumultuous civil war years of the 1640s. William Pennoyer was one of 
the first to sell up: in 1653 he sold his sugar plantation to William Johnson for the tidy sum of 65,000 lb. 
of sugar.2 William Williams, the Levant and East India Company trader who had speculated in Barbados 
sugar production in 1646, also sold his share in a plantation in 1653.3 George Standfast sold much of his 
land and enslaved Africans in 1658 before returning to Bristol.4 Martin Noell, the biggest merchant 
investor in the sugar boom, soon followed suit. Beginning with the sale of the enormous 510-acre Mt. 
Clapham Plantation to Governor Daniel Searle in June 1657, which involved the transfer of 328,000 lb. of 
muscovado sugar, Noell and his brothers began to sell off their properties in Bridgetown and plantations 
in the rural parishes of Barbados. By 1661 Martin Noell had even auctioned off his share of the lucrative 
270-acre Spring Plantation in St. Joseph Parish.5 The fragmentary nature of the deed records at the 
Barbados Department of Archives means that we do not know the specific dates on which every London 
merchant sold up their landholdings. But we can say with some degree of certainty that Maurice 
Thomson, Andrew Riccard, and Edwin Browne did not retain a direct financial interest in sugar 
production beyond the Restoration, although they did continue to trade with the colony and remained 
 
1 Anon., Great newes from the Barbadoes, or, A True and faithful account of the grand conspiracy of the Negroes against the English 
and the happy discovery of the same with the number of those that were burned alive, beheaded, and otherwise executed for their horrid 
crimes: with a short discription of that plantation (London, 1676), p. 1. 
2 BDA, RB3/2, pp. 806-808. 
3 Complete Book of Emigrants, p. 366. 
4 Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 136.  
5 BDA, RB 3/3, pp. 109-114; BDA, RB 3/2, pp. 534-537. Martin Noell did retain a half share in the Homehall 
Plantation, which he renounced control of while on his deathbed and drafting his will on 23 September 1665. For 
Noell’s will, see BDA, RB6/10, ff. 499-507. 
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involved with marketing and finance. There were some London merchants, however, who bucked the 
trend by continuing to maintain absentee proprietorship over their plantations into the 1660s: Richard 
Batson, Thomas Frere, Jonathan Andrews, and Luke Lucie. Others travelled across the Atlantic to set up 
permanent residence on the island and manage their sugar estates themselves, in the process founding 
some of the major Barbadian planter dynasties: Thomas Kendall, Thomas Applewhaite, John Colleton, 
Samuel Farmer, and John Worsam.6 But we can be fairly confident that the general trend was towards 
English merchants relinquishing control over their Barbadian plantations in the 1650s and 1660s. 
Why did so many of the absentee merchants who had financed the expansion of the Barbados sugar 
industry during the 1640s sell off much of their landed investments in the 1650s and early 1660s? Russell 
Menard has suggested it was principally because ‘running a complex sugar-making enterprise at the edge 
of empire from its metropolitan center was a difficult and troubling business’. Complications associated 
with absentee plantation-ownership are well known to historians of the eighteenth-century empire. 
Menard was thus correct to argue that when sugar prices on Barbados began to dip in the 1650s (from 
50s. per hundredweight in 1646 to 15s. in 1661) some London merchants decided that managing 
plantations through untrustworthy attorneys was more trouble than it was worth.7  
There may have been a more specific reason too. As we saw in Chapter Four, there were concerted 
efforts made by London merchants in the second half of the 1650s to centralise the governance of 
Barbados through the formation of a West India Council or West India Company. This was in response 
to the fractious political situation in the colony earlier in the decade which, as the admonitions of the 
‘Barbados merchants’ in their petitions demonstrate, was perceived as posing a risk to invested capital. 
The inability of London merchants to implement their reform projects and govern the colony in a way 
which suited their interests was a major blow, and I do not think it is a coincidence that they began to 
withdraw their investments from Barbadian land in the years immediately following the failure of these 
 
6 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 60-61, 147-148.   
7 Ibid., pp. 60-61, 69. On the difficulties and inefficiencies of absentee plantation ownership in the eighteenth 
century, see Lowell J. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763–1833 (New York, 1928), p. 44; 
Pares, Merchants and Planters, pp. 42-44; Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p 200; Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: 
The American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia, 2000), pp. 4-5.  
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centralisation schemes. It is important to highlight that there were also positive reasons for absentee 
merchants to sell their landholdings when they did. By selling up in the early 1660s London merchants 
were following the business tradition of ‘buying low, selling high’, because one of the consequences of the 
sugar boom was that alluvial land on Barbados was now worth much more than ten years previously.8 
The capital merchants had poured into improving their plantations through the construction of sugar 
refineries and the purchasing of enslaved Africans, indentured servants, and draught animals meant that 
their plantations were especially valuable. The decision made by many London merchants to sell up in the 
late 1650s and early 1660s was probably due to an assortment of interrelated factors, therefore, including 
the difficulties associated with managing a plantation from afar, the failure to implement their programme 
for centralising the colony’s government, a recent fall in sugar prices which made being involved in its 
production a less attractive proposition, and the profits that could be generated from the sale of their 
plantations.   
The significance of London merchants selling off their land on Barbados was that they were no longer 
directly involved in plantation production. This underscores how, beginning in the 1660s, we start to see a 
more defined division of labour between planters and merchants in the Barbadian commercial system. In 
the first stages of England’s overseas expansion the distinctions between planters and merchants were not 
always clear. As we saw in Chapter Three, many of the first planters on Barbados were entrepreneurs with 
a mercantile background, who continued to engage in trade while managing their plantations. Moreover, 
English merchants tended to operate as independent traders in the Atlantic and, like planters, 
accumulated land in the American colonies through ‘headright’ policies or by directly purchasing 
plantations, the latter of which was the case on Barbados in the 1640s.  
The indistinct margins between merchants and planters which had existed in prior years began to change 
on Barbados in the 1660s due to the economic impact of the sugar boom. As several historians have 
observed, planters used their newfound wealth to modify the way they conducted business: rather than 
 
8 For changing Barbadian land prices, see McCusker and Menard, ‘The Sugar Industry in the Seventeenth Century’, 
p. 299. 
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selling their crops to the factors of English merchants on Barbados for immediate pay, in the 1660s 
planters instead began to bear the risk of the Atlantic crossing themselves and to consign their goods to 
commission agents in London. Although this delayed when they received payment, it enabled planters to 
focus their attention on sugar cultivation and plantation management, while also squeezing more profit 
out of their crop by retailing their sugar in London where prices were higher. There were two contextual 
reasons why affluent planters began to change their business practices. First, was the steep fall in sugar 
prices in colonial markets that occurred in the late 1650s, which meant it made financial sense for planters 
to dispatch their tropical commodities for sale in London where there were superior market conditions. 
Second, were the mercantilist reforms initiated by the Crown through the passage of the second 
Navigation Act (1660) and the Staple Act (1663). By listing sugar as an enumerated commodity that could 
only be exported to English ports, and by specifying that manufactured commodities from Europe 
destined for the American colonies had to be transhipped through England, these pieces of legislation 
both restricted the market options available to planters and helped to funnel customs revenue into the 
state’s coffers. As part of their effort to prosper within the confines of these new limitations planters 
chose to concentrate their attentions on the London market, which was the most competitive in England 
and proximate to the nation’s financial centre. They also hired agents to represent their interests there, 
who formed the nucleus of the formal West India Interest which emerged in the 1670s.9 
In a turn of events which happened more or less simultaneously, merchants in London who had financed 
the sugar boom began to retreat from direct involvement in plantation production on Barbados. The fact 
that merchant investors in the sugar boom were chief backers of the proposal to implement the 4.5 
percent duty on Barbadian exports in the early 1660s, which acted as a major disincentive for planters, 
provides further evidence for how London merchants were moving away from being directly involved in 
sugar production in this period.10 This set a precedent for subsequent generations of merchants who 
 
9 Davies, ‘Origins of the Commission System’, pp. 102-104; Pares, Merchants and Planters, pp. 33-37; Penson, The 
Colonial Agents, pp. 10-12; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 282-285, 328-329; McCusker and Menard, Economy of British 
America, pp. 161-162; Nash, ‘The Organization of Trade and Finance’, pp. 98-99, 106-108; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, 
pp. 102-103. The growth of absenteeism among Barbadian sugar magnates, who relocated to England to live a life 
of luxury, also enlarged the population of men with Caribbean connections in London willing to become paid 
agents. 
10 See Chapter Four of this dissertation.  
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tended to specialise in the finance and marketing side of plantation business, often as commission agents 
for planters. These developments had far-reaching significance for the future organisation of trade in the 
British Empire, as they facilitated the emergence of the commission system of merchandising. My 
interpretation differs from the historiographical consensus, as historians have tended to view Barbadian 
planters as the main innovators of the commission system.11 But I argue that the business decisions made 
by London merchants in the 1660s to retreat from plantation production played a greater role in this 
process than has been previously understood. A more pronounced division of labour between planters 
and merchants was crucial to the development and operation of the commission system, which by the 
eighteenth century provided the structural basis for trade between London and all the American colonies. 
Seventeenth-century commission agents performed a variety of duties in London for their Caribbean 
clients. First and foremost, the agent supervised the marketing and sale of sugar. In return for a cut of the 
profits (usually between 2.5 and 4%), the agent received consignments of sugar from his client at the port 
of London, paid all fees associated with customs, freight, insurance, wharfage, and warehousing, before 
finally organising the sale of the sugar, either by himself or through brokers. The proceeds of this sale 
would then either be sent to his client in the Caribbean or, depending on instructions, arrangements 
would be made for setting some capital aside for purchasing plantation supplies, indentured servants, and 
consumer goods to be sent over on the return voyage. Commission agents also functioned as bankers by 
maintaining a current account of their client’s debits and credits. This enabled planters in the Caribbean 
to draw bills of exchange on their London agent, which creditors could then deposit to secure payment.12 
Kinship and business connections to the Caribbean planter class were usually required to succeed as a 
commission agent. This meant that absentee planters and London merchants were those most commonly 
employed in this capacity. Indeed, some of the first London commission agents have identifiable links to 
 
11 E.g. Ralph Davies, ‘The Origins of the Commission System’; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 283-283; Menard, 
Sweet Negotiations, pp. 102-103. The only exception is Nuala Zahedieh. She has argued that falling commodity prices 
convinced London merchants to let planters shoulder a greater share of the risk in the sugar trade. Zahedieh, Capital 
and the Colonies, pp. 79-80. 
12 Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 282-288, 328-332; Hancock, Citizens of the World, pp. 123-131; Menard, Sweet 
Negotiations, pp. 102-103.  
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merchant investors in the sugar boom and the Barbadian merchant community. John Bawden, the leading 
commission agent in Restoration London, began his career as a merchant on Barbados in the 1660s, 
before returning to London around the year 1670 where he operated as an agent for numerous planters in 
the Caribbean.13 Another example is Jacob Lucie, the younger brother of Luke Lucie (a London merchant 
who had invested in the sugar boom), who in February 1672 was acting as a commission agent for Samuel 
Winthrop on Antigua.14  
The rise of the commission system had one other long-term impact on the structure of commerce in the 
English Caribbean. It led to a decline in the role of ‘merchant credit’ in financing plantation development 
in the Caribbean colonies. When combined with the withdrawal of merchant capital from Barbados, this 
represented a major disjunction, because as we saw in Chapters Two and Three, the settlement of the 
English islands in the Caribbean and the beginnings of the sugar industry on Barbados were financed 
predominantly by direct investment and credit supplied by English merchants.  
The volume of merchant credit extended to planters in the sugar colonies began to drop off markedly in 
the 1670s. This decade was when the commission system of merchandising became firmly entrenched as 
the means of organising Barbadian trade. Historians have found little evidence to suggest that 
commission agents extended long term credit to their planter-clients in the Caribbean between 1670 and 
1730.15 Nuala Zahedieh, for instance, has persuasively argued that the capital needed to fund the 
development of the plantation system on Jamaica was mostly raised from local sources. She has used 
inventories and deeds to demonstrate how it was unusual for Jamaican planters to owe debts to creditors 
outside of the island. An internal credit market, through which wealthy planters offered loans to their less 
prosperous neighbours, proved more important than credit extended by London merchants to the 
financing of plantation development on Jamaica in the late seventeenth century.16 Moreover, the Royal 
 
13 Bawden was named as drawee on 136 bills of exchange drawn up between Caribbean planters and the Royal 
African Company. Davies, ‘Origins of the Commission System’, p. 105 fn. 1; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 286-287. 
14 Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, p. 287.  
15 Davies, ‘Origins of the Commission System’; Nash, ‘Organization of Trade and Finance’, p. 122.  
16 Zahedieh, ‘Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development’, p. 213. See also Pares, Merchants and Planters, p. 47; 
Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 294-295; Burnard, Planters, Merchants, and Slaves, pp. 198-202. 
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African Company (RAC) was incorporated in 1672 and given the monopoly over the transatlantic slave 
trade. The RAC was the largest external creditor of Caribbean sugar planters in the late seventeenth 
century. The company supplied planters with their most expensive and desired commodity, African slave 
labour, which the majority of planters could only afford to purchase using bills of exchange drawn on 
their commission agents in London. Around the year 1700 the debts owed to the RAC peaked at between 
£160,000 and £170,000 sterling.17 But it would be wrong to characterise the credit extended by the RAC 
as a form of ‘merchant capital’. Although some merchant financiers of the sugar boom invested in the 
joint stock of the RAC’s predecessor company in 1663, historians agree that, on the whole, the company’s 
capital was supplied by the Stuart monarchy, courtiers, members of the English gentry, businessmen not 
involved in colonial trade, and money borrowed from London goldsmith-bankers.18  
We have seen that merchant financiers of the sugar boom began to withdraw their investments in 
Barbadian land in the 1650s and early 1660s, and that this had implications for the organisation of 
imperial commerce with the island, as it played a part in the expansion of the commission system of 
merchandising. There was also a corresponding decline in the importance of merchant credit to financing 
plantation development in the Caribbean colonies between 1670 and 1730. A related question, which 
other historians have not posed, is what London merchants did after withdrawing their investments from 
land on Barbados. Or more specifically, where did they reinvest the profits they had generated through 
sugar and slavery over the past decade and a half? A lack of surviving account books means it is 
impossible to trace the movement of capital with precision, but some tentative conclusions can be made 
by analysing merchant careers. It is evident that some of the capital was used to purchase and renovate 
landed estates in the English countryside. In 1660, for instance, Sir Peter Lear used Barbadian sugar 
profits to buy the Lindridge estate, a lavish but now-demolished manor house in South Devon.19  
 
17 Davies, ‘Origins of the Commission System’; Sheridan, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 285-286. Data quoted in Nash, 
‘Organization of Trade and Finance’, p. 122. 
18 Nash, ‘Organization of Trade and Finance’, p. 122. 
19 http://www.lostheritage.org.uk/houses/lh_devon_lindridge.html (Accessed 29/09/2019).   
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Capital generated via the Barbados sugar boom also went to Jamaica, an island with cheap and abundant 
land, and therefore full of potential for developing a plantation economy and expanding the frontier of 
sugar production. The conquest of Jamaica, though a far more limited accomplishment than the 
projectors of the Western Design had originally hoped for, still represented a new commercial 
opportunity for London merchants. Between 1655 and 1670 merchants with investments in Barbados, 
including familiar figures such as Martin Noell, Andrew Riccard, and Edward Bushell, had begun to 
accumulate land there and integrate the new English colony within their commercial networks.20 Noell 
was a particularly aggressive investor in the early Jamaican economy. He was instrumental in supplying 
Jamaica with necessary provisions soon after it had been conquered from the Spanish. In July 1656 he 
dispatched six ships to the colony, and as a reward for his assistance in executing the Western Design, 
Cromwell accorded Noell a huge 20,000-acre land grant on the island.21  
It was not just London merchants who took Barbadian capital and expertise to Jamaica, however. 
Wealthy sugar planters, such as Thomas Modyford, were also pivotal to this process. Modyford, a royalist 
exile who had fled to Barbados in 1647, had by the late 1650s become rich through sugar production and 
a significant political player on the island, having served as speaker of the assembly and played a part in 
the co-ordination of the Western Design as a commissioner. Following the Restoration, he served as the 
chief African company factor on Barbados, before being appointed governor of Jamaica by the King in 
1664. That year Modyford left Barbados for Jamaica with approximately 700 fellow planters and their 
enslaved Africans.22 Emigrants such as these were part of a wider ‘Barbadian diaspora’, which tentative 
estimates suggest numbered at around 10,000 people between 1650 and 1680.23 This intercolonial 
migration flow disseminated capital, ideas, and institutions generated on Barbados during the sugar boom 
 
20 For Noell, see TNA, SP 25/77, f. 221. For Riccard, see TNA, CO 1/25, f. 227. For Bushell, see BL, Egerton Ms. 
2395, f. 171; LMA, MCD Boxes 10 & 12.   
21 TNA, SP 25/77, f. 221; TNA, CO 1/19, f. 42. For the 20,000-acre land grant on Jamaica, see Thurloe Papers, Vol. 
4., pp. 634-635, ‘Instructions unto Major General Fortescue, Vice-Admiral Goodson, Major Robert Sedgwick and 
Daniel Serle’, [n.d. c. 1656].  
22 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 68-69, 154-155; Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery, pp. 75, 210-212. 
23 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 112.  
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elsewhere in the Caribbean basin and beyond, having an important influence on the historical trajectory 
of British America.24  
Given the sustained interest in Jamaica displayed by planters and merchants who had prospered through 
the Barbados sugar boom, one might expect that the island would have been rapidly transformed into a 
sugar producing colony. This was not the case: it took until the 1680s for a large-scale plantation 
economy and a commercial sugar industry to emerge on Jamaica. Historians have long wondered why the 
pre-eminent British sugar colony of the eighteenth century did not develop a plantation economy based 
around sugar production straight after its conquest from the Spanish in 1655.25 Merchants and planters 
had bemoaned the lack of arable land on Barbados since the early 1650s, and were actively looking for 
more spacious alternatives for sugar cultivation at locations as far away as northern Madagascar.26 The 
seizure of an island with a tropical climate which possessed abundant alluvial land should have generated 
frenzied speculation in the cultivation of sugar. Indeed, sugar cane had been grown in small plots by the 
Spanish long before the English conquest, and men who were well acquainted with the cultivation of the 
crop and the exploitation of large groups of enslaved Africans were either members of the invasion force 
or some of the earliest English settlers of Jamaica. 
There are several reasons why the transition to a plantation economy on Jamaica was slow. There was a 
distinct lack of interest in clearing land and planting cash crops among the first English inhabitants of 
Jamaica. This disinclination to experiment with the cultivation of sugar was because there were profitable 
pursuits outside of the plantation sector which proved more attractive for most of the enterprising men 
living on the island. Wealth could be generated by organising privateering missions and participating in 
the entrepot trade with Spanish America, for example.27 Moreover, when compared to Barbados, the 
 
24 Chandler, ‘The Expansion of Barbados’; Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, pp. 110-116; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, ch. 6; 
Burnard, Planters, Merchants, and Slaves, pp. 36-37; Roberts, ‘Surrendering Surinam’.  
25 Zahediah, ‘Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development’, pp. 205-222; Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery, pp. 205-
207; Burnard, Planters, Merchants, and Slaves, pp. 23-27; Roberts, ‘Surrendering Surinam’, pp. 248-254.  
26 E.g., Hunt, The Island of Assada. 
27 Nuala Zahedieh, ‘The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655-1692,’ The 
William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1986), pp. 570-593; Nuala Zahedieh, ‘“A Frugal, Prudential and Hopeful 
Trade”: Privateering in Jamaica, 1655-89,’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1990), pp. 
145-168. Carla Pestana contends that the role of privateers on Jamaica remained insignificant until the early 1660s, 
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longer distances required to transport slaves from West Africa to the Greater Antilles made acquiring 
unfree labour a more troublesome and expensive proposition for planters on Jamaica.28  
This situation was further compounded by the fact that merchants in the City of London were, for the 
most part, unwilling to provide the credit necessary for prospective sugar planters on Jamaica to rapidly 
expand their business operations. Immediately after the seizure of Jamaica, it seemed probable that the 
tenuous English foothold in the Greater Antilles could not be sustained, and that the colony would either 
be recaptured or given back to Spain during diplomatic negotiations. This made most London merchants 
reluctant to finance the development of a plantation economy in a colony which seemed more like a 
temporary military garrison than a reliable source of long-term profits. A report signed by Martin Noell 
and Thomas Povey in June 1656 which stated how ‘Jamaica looks only like a garrison, and rather as an 
Army then a colony’, reflects the frustrations of some merchants about this state of affairs.29 It was not 
until the 1680s when the inhabitants of Jamaica had turned their attention firmly towards the cultivation 
of cash crops, had received an injection of expertise from Surinamese sugar planters, and had begun to 
reinvest the capital generated locally through piracy, trade, and plantation production into the 
construction of sugar mills and the purchase of large numbers of enslaved Africans, that the sugar 
industry became the dominant form of economic activity on the island.30 
Another outlet for the capital generated from Barbados sugar was the joint stock of overseas trading 
companies. As we saw in Chapters Two and Four, the profits of the sugar boom played a major role in 
catapulting a cluster of merchants to the top of the London merchant community in the 1650s and early 
1660s. Part of my evidence for this development is how merchant investors in Barbados diversified their 
business portfolios in the 1650s and 1660s by purchasing shares in the joint stock of overseas trading 
 
see: Carla Pestana, ‘Early English Jamaica without Pirates,’ The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 3 (2014), pp. 
321-360. 
28 Eltis, The Rise of African Slavery, pp. 205-207. 
29 Zahedieh, ‘Trade, Plunder and Economic Development’, 210-213. Noell and Povey’s observation is quoted in 
Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire, p. 51.  
30 Zahedieh, ‘Trade, Plunder and Economic Development’, 213-222. For the argument that English sugar planters 
from Surinam, who departed the colony after its cession to the Dutch under the terms of the Treaty of Breda in 
1667, played an integral role in the development of the Jamaican sugar industry, see Roberts, ‘Surrendering Surinam’, 
pp. 248-254.  
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companies such as the East India Company, Levant Company, and Royal Adventurers Trading into 
Africa. The size of their investments along with their prodigious reputations in London meant that some 
prominent financiers of the sugar boom even served on the directorate of these companies.31  
The East India Company deserves detailed attention, because in 1657, at around the same time London 
merchants began pulling their investments out of Barbados, the company saw a rapid influx of merchants 
with investments in the sugar boom into its directorate. This had ramifications for the policies the 
company developed in subsequent years. The East India Company secured a new charter in October 
1657: a subscription of £500 to the new joint stock was required secure a vote in the election for the 
directorate, while to be eligible to serve on the Court of Committees itself a minimum investment of 
£1000 was compulsory.32 Due to the wealth they were generating from sugar and slavery, merchants with 
investments in Barbados were poised to subscribe heavily to the EIC’s new joint stock. Out of 26 
merchants elected to the executive board of the reconstituted East India Company, eight had identifiable 
links to Barbados, and were some of the leading investors in the sugar boom of the 1640s: Maurice 
Thomson, Thomas Andrewes, James Drax, Andrew Riccard, Martin Noell, William Williams, William 
Vincent, and John Wood. Within this group were the new governor of the company (Thomson), and his 
deputy (Andrewes). At least four other directors also had experience trading to North America and the 
Caribbean: William Thomson, Samuel Moyer, William Ryder, and Richard Ford.33  
The fact that several traders whom Brenner would describe as ‘new merchants’ served on the directorate 
of the East India Company in the 1650s, most notably Maurice Thomson, undermines Brenner’s thesis 
that these merchants subscribed to an ideology of free trade. Men like Thomson were far more pragmatic 
than Brenner allows, sometimes organising interloping voyages in contravention of corporate 
 
31 See Chapter Two of this dissertation. 
32 CCMEIC, Vol. 5, pp. 173-175.  
33 CCMEIC, Vol. 5, pp. 197-199. As has already been mentioned, it is important to highlight that these merchants 
also had a variety of trading interests beyond Barbados. Some of the men listed above, including Andrew Riccard, 
William Williams, and William Vincent, all had ties to the East India Company dating back to the 1630s, and it 
should not come as a surprise therefore that they had risen to sit on the Court of Committees by the late 1650s. But 
I remain convinced that profits from Barbados sugar played a hitherto unrecognised and important role in 
precipitating the rapid ascendancy of these merchants into the upper echelons of London’s merchant community, 
and that there was a distinctive injection of Barbadian expertise into the East India Company after 1657. 
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monopolies, and at other times working within trading companies when shielding themselves from 
outside competition was preferable.34 Several merchants with financial ties to Barbados also invested in 
the new joint-stock, but were not elected to the company’s directorate: Thomas Bell, William Drax, 
Michael Davison, Thomas Kendall, James Leaver, Peter Lear, John Paige, and William Watts (only the 
latter of whom subscribed less than £1000).35 The injection of Barbadian expertise and capital into the 
directorate of the EIC was unprecedented, and caused an immediate shift in the company’s policy, as the 
EIC began to take a greater interest in Atlantic trade. On the 18 December 1657, one day after the 
elections to the new Court of Committees had finished, Governor Maurice Thomson confirmed that the 
EIC had leased the Guinea Company’s monopoly over West African commerce.36 The EIC retained 
control over this patent until 1668, and in the interim had begun to integrate the gold and ivory trade at 
Fort Cormantine on the Gold Coast with their existing Asian commerce.37 Due to his expertise in the 
process of colonial development, James Drax was conspicuous in meetings related to the planting of St. 
Helena, an island in the South Atlantic which in the 1680s the EIC would try to develop as a plantation 
economy, explicitly using Barbados as a model.38  
Merchant financiers of the Barbados sugar boom were also depositing the profits from their overseas 
investments with goldsmith-bankers in the City of London. These bankers provided a variety of financial 
services for their clients: they offered current accounts for day-to-day expenses, accepted capital deposits 
upon which they paid interest, discounted bills of exchange, issued promissory notes, offered loans to 
private individuals and the English government, and exchanged foreign currencies.39 The survival of the 
customer account ledgers of Edward Backwell, the leading goldsmith-banker in Restoration London, 
allows us to investigate the extent to which merchants with connections to the Caribbean were making 
 
34 For the ‘new merchant’ ideology, see Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, pp. 169-161, 168-181.   
35 Anon., A List of the names of all the adventurers in the new general stock to East-India, who have taken the last oath agreed on by 
the generality, December the 8, 1657 (London, 1657).  
36 CCMEIC, Vol. 5., p. 199. For a recent treatment of the merger between the EIC and Guinea Company, see 
Svalastog, ‘Mastering the Worst of Trades’, pp. 137-147. Svalastog does not emphasise the importance of Barbadian 
merchants in causing the EIC to turn towards Atlantic commerce.  
37 Margaret Makepeace, ‘English Traders on the Guinea Coast, 1657-1668: An Analysis of the East India Company 
Archive’, History in Africa, Vol. 16 (1989), pp. 237-284; Bennett, ‘The East India Company, Transnational 
Interactions, and the Formation of Forced Labour Regimes’, pp. 32-39. 
38 E.g. BL, IOR E/3/90, f. 178, London to St. Helena, 5 April 1684; Bennett, ‘The East India Company, 
Transnational Interactions, and the Formation of Forced Labour Regimes’, pp. 29-30, 71-72, ch. 3.  
39 Kerridge, Trade and Banking in Early Modern England, pp. 76-77; Melton, Sir Robert Clayton, pp. 18-20. 
Michael D. Bennett 
286 
 
use of the financial services offered by goldsmith-bankers.40 An analysis of Backwell’s client base reveals 
how 23 of the London merchants who had invested in the Barbadian sugar economy during the 1640s 
were depositing their capital with Backwell in the 1660s: Thomas Andrewes, Richard Batson, Thomas 
Batson, Thomas Bell, William Bird, Edward Bushell, Thomas Bushell, Sir John Colliton [Colleton], 
Michael Davieson [Davison], Sir Richard Ford, Thomas Kendall, Sir Peter Leare, Isaac Legay, Thomas 
Middleton, Sir Martin Noell, James Noell, William Pennoyer, Thomas Povey, Sir Andrew Riccard, Giles 
Silvester, Maurice Thompson [Thomson], William Williams, and John Wood.41 I have identified 21 others 
that appear in Backwell’s list of clients who also had business ties with the Caribbean sugar economy as 
either merchants or planters.42 Even the Royal African Company, East India Company, Muscovy 
Company, and the short-lived Canary Company made use of the financial services offered by Backwell.43  
After the Stop of the Exchequer in 1672 private goldsmith-bankers such as Edward Backwell no longer 
lent large sums of money to the Crown due to fears they would not be repaid.44 But the English 
government was still in desperate need of loans, and so in 1694 a joint-stock of £1.2 million was raised to 
form the Bank of England, a key institution in the ‘financial revolution’ of the late seventeenth century.45 
Historians have observed how the Bank of England ‘came to undertake everything the goldsmith-bankers 
did or had done’, and that Backwell’s bank was therefore ‘a prototype of the Bank of England’.46 Given 
 
40 On Backwell, see R. D. Richards, ‘A Pre-Bank of England English Banker-Edward Backwell’, Reprinted from The 
Economic Journal - Economic History, Supplement No. 3 (1928), pp. 335-355; G. E. Aylmer, ‘Backwell, Edward (c. 
1619–1683), goldsmith and banker’, ODNB (23 September 2004), 
https://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-986 
(Accessed 8 November 2019). 
41 Royal Bank of Scotland Archives, EB/1/1-4. See also the index of Backwell’s customer account ledgers. This 
document provides a list of all of Backwell’s clients between 1663 and 1672. See ‘Customer account ledgers of 
Edward Backwell, 1663-72’, available at https://www.rbs.com/heritage/people/edward-backwell.html (Accessed 
09/04/2019).  
42 They were: Benjamin Bathurst, John Bawdon [Bawden], Capt. Richard Beckford, Sir Tobias Bridges, Anthony 
Ashely Cooper, Sir Nicholas Crispe, Thomas Crispe, Seger de Hem, William Drax, William Freeman, Ferdinando 
Gorges, Charles Hilliard, James Leaver, Edward Littleton, Jacob Lucie, Luke Lucie, John Paige, Marmaduke 
Rawdon, William Watts, Sir Charles Wheeler, and Francis Lord Willoughby. Royal Bank of Scotland Archives, 
EB/1/1-4.  
43 Royal Bank of Scotland Archives, EB/1/1-4; Richards, ‘A Pre-Bank of England English Banker-Edward 
Backwell’, pp. 338-339; On the Canary Company, see Caroline A. J. Skeel, ‘The Canary Company’, The English 
Historical Review, Vol. 31, No. 124 (1916), pp. 529-544. 
44 Kerridge, Trade and Banking in Early Modern England, pp. 78-80.     
45 On the financial revolution, see P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of 
Public Credit, 1688–1756 (New York, 1967); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English 
Financial Revolution (Princeton, NJ, 1996); Carl Wennerlind, Casualties of Credit: The English Financial Revolution, 1620-
1720 (Cambridge, Mass., 2011). 
46 Quoted in Kerridge, Trade and Banking in Early Modern England, p. 77, 80. 
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how many merchant investors in the sugar boom banked with Edward Backwell, one might be tempted 
to use his customer account ledgers to try to draw some preliminary conclusions about whether the 
profits generated from overseas commerce, empire, and slavery played any role in precipitating the 
‘financial revolution’.  
But, in my opinion, this would be a mistake. London merchants and American planters formed just a 
small section of Backwell’s client base. Backwell held deposits from 1,372 clients in 1664-5.47 
Independently wealthy people at all levels of London society took advantage of the financial services 
offered by Backwell, including other goldsmiths, holders of government office, farmers of various 
customs and excises, members of the gentry (e.g. Prince Rupert and the Earl of Clarendon), leading 
ecclesiastical figures (e.g. the Bishop of Durham), and the Queen of England Catherine of Braganza. 
Various parts of the English government in Westminster, including the Exchequer office and the Council 
of Trade, also held customer accounts with Backwell and borrowed money from him.48 Considering how 
44 men with business connections to the English Caribbean were clients of Edward Backwell, it is clear 
that some capital generated by sugar and slavery must have passed through his hands. We can therefore 
conclude that goldsmith-bankers were one of the locations where merchant investors in the Barbados 
sugar boom deposited capital. But much more detailed research in the account books of goldsmith-
bankers, scriveners, and banking institutions in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries would 
be necessary before broader conclusions could be made about whether the profits generated by the sugar 
boom had any bearing on the ‘financial revolution’.  
The second section of this chapter will trace how the role of Barbados within the structure of England’s 
empire changed following the sugar boom. 
 
 
47 Braddick, The Nerves of State, p. 39.  
48 Royal Bank of Scotland Archives, EB/1/1-4; Richards, ‘A Pre-Bank of England English Banker-Edward 
Backwell’, pp. 338-339; Aylmer, ‘Edward Backwell’, ODNB. 
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2. The Role of Barbados in the Restoration Empire and the Rise of the 
Local Barbadian Merchant Community, c. 1650-1672 
Using a rigid mercantilist framework for understanding the structure of early modern empires, many 
scholars of  imperial history have argued that the Caribbean colonies acted as captive markets for 
manufactured goods exported from the metropole, with slave-grown sugar and other tropical 
commodities sent in the other direction.49 However, this does not allow for variations in local conditions 
between colonies and the transnational dimensions of early modern empires. As I argued in Chapter Two, 
during the 1640s the tumult of domestic civil war and the commercial opportunities presented by the 
decline in the Brazilian sugar industry encouraged English merchants to invest their capital in land and 
enslaved Africans on Barbados. In this decade, therefore, the primary function of Barbados was as a site 
for capital investment for English merchants. This provided the funding needed to expedite the 
emergence of a sugar industry in the colony. These conditions were unique to the 1640s, however, and by 
the close of the decade Barbados’ importance as an outlet for merchant capital had ended.  
In a trend which began in the immediate wake of the sugar boom around the year 1650, and became even 
more noticeable after the Restoration, Barbados’ role within the imperial structure of England’s empire 
changed. The main function of Barbados was as a site of plantation production and as a regional centre of 
trade. But, as we will see below, the island also took on some more specialised roles during the 1660s, 
which were linked to the expansion in size and importance of the colony’s own merchant community. 
For a brief time, Barbados functioned as a commercial entrepot for the transatlantic slave trade to 
Spanish America, and even provided the energy and capital needed to initiate the expansion of the empire 
in the Greater Caribbean.  
The significance of Barbados as a pre-eminent site of plantation production within the English empire 
has been given considerable attention by historians. Until the mid-1680s, the tonnage of sugar from 
 
49 E.g. George Louis Beer, The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754, Part I: The Establishment of the System, 1660-1688 (New 
York, 1912); Harper, The English Navigation Laws, pp. 240-245. 
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Barbados imported into England per annum was more than that of all the other colonies in the English 
Caribbean combined. In 1669, for instance, 9,525 tons of Barbados sugar was imported, far outstripping 
the 500 tons from Jamaica and the 1,679 tons from the Leeward Islands.50 But much less consideration 
has been given to the role of Barbados as a centre of trade in the Caribbean. This is somewhat 
understandable, as we do not have reliable data for imports and exports on Barbados before the 1680s. 
We will therefore investigate this topic from a different angle, principally by exploring the expansion of 
the local Barbadian merchant community after 1650, and how this helped Barbados to become a centre 
of trade during the 1660s. We will begin by analysing two changes which occurred on Barbados at mid-
century and led to the growth of the island’s merchant population. First, the prolific nature of 
intercolonial and transnational trade on Barbados, which was spurred on in the 1650s by the consumer 
demand created by the sugar boom. This helped to create a commercial culture on Barbados which 
enshrined the right of the island’s inhabitants to freedom of trade, and thus encouraged merchants of 
varied nationalities to relocate to the colony. Second, the rise of the commission system and the 
withdrawal of merchant capital around the year 1660 led the factors who represented English merchants 
on Barbados to increasingly trade on their own accounts and become merchants themselves, thus 
forming the core of the local Barbadian merchant community. 
Sugar cane is an incredibly destructive crop for the environment. As more and more wooded land and 
provision grounds were set aside for sugar cultivation over the course of the 1640s and 1650s, planters on 
Barbados struggled to meet their subsistence needs. The inhabitants of the island eventually became 
dependent on imports of food, livestock, and lumber. This necessitated Barbadian merchants and planters 
to develop a mutable and pragmatic approach to trade and their place within the empire. As we saw in 
Chapter Three, the inhabitants of Barbados sometimes embraced their position within the mercantilist 
system of empire espoused by London merchants, and were keen to secure credit, indentured servants, 
enslaved Africans, and provisions from merchants in the metropole. But due to their incessant demand 
for the raw materials needed to keep their sugar mills turning, Barbadians were also more than willing to 
 
50 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 203; David Eltis, ‘New Estimates of Exports from Barbados and Jamaica, 1665-1701’, 
The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1995), pp. 631-648; David Eltis, ‘The Total Product of Barbados, 
1664-1701’, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 55, No. 2 (1995), pp. 321-338.  
Michael D. Bennett 
290 
 
obtain provisions through contraband forms of intercolonial and transnational commerce. In his True and 
Exact History of Barbados, Richard Ligon described how colonists were supplied with foodstuffs from a 
wide variety of locations, demonstrating how the island had become a dynamic consumer market with 
connections across the Atlantic world by the late 1640s. Besides commodities brought from England, the 
inhabitants of Barbados enjoyed butter from Holland; wine from France, Spain, Madeira, and the Azores; 
beef from Virginia, New England, Holland, and Russia; fish from New England; wax from Africa; 
clothing from Holland; and draught animals from Holland, Virginia, New England, Cape Verde, Curacao, 
and the Azores.51 
Intercolonial trade with merchants and planters in New England, Virginia, Carolina, and Surinam was an 
important means through which Barbadians obtained the provisions and raw materials needed to sustain 
the sugar industry. The Caribbean plantation system was bound together with other colonies in the 
Atlantic world by a web of commercial linkages and family ties. This interconnectedness was vital to the 
success of nascent plantation economies in the Lesser Antilles during the seventeenth century. Indeed, 
Wendy Warren has persuasively argued that merchants, fishermen, and farmers in New England 
provisioned the sugar colonies with cereals and fish, providing the basic nutrition necessary for enslaved 
Africans to conduct plantation work in the Caribbean.52 Her interpretation is supported by a 1661 report 
to the Council of Foreign Plantations, in which one ship captain remarked how the New England 
colonies were ‘the key to the Indies, without which Jamaica, Barbadoes and ye Charriby Islands are not 
able to subsist’.53  
Barbados was also sufficiently close to ‘satellite colonies’ which could be exploited for raw materials. 
Barbadian planters relied on the mainland colony of Surinam and the thinly settled islands of St. Lucia, 
Tobago, Dominica, and St. Vincent for their stocks of wood, for example. Stripping the natural assets of 
 
51 Ligon, True and Exact History, p. 77, 80, 85-86, 111; Handler, ‘Father Antoine Biet’s Visit’, p. 62. On the Atlantic 
wine trade, see David Hancock, Oceans of Wine.  
52 Warren, New England Bound, 53-58. See also Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1955), pp. 84-85.  
53 Quoted in Larry Gragg, ‘Puritans in Paradise: The New England Migration to Barbados, 1640-1660’, The Journal of 
Caribbean History, Vol. 21, No. 2, (1988), pp. 155-156. 
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nearby landmasses aided colonists on Barbados in undertaking the resource-intensive process of 
transitioning their economy to a sugar cane monoculture.54 By the 1660s, Barbadian planters and 
merchants had also begun to trade in enslaved Indians procured by fellow Englishmen in New England, 
Carolina, and the Guianas, using their bodies to satisfy the voracious appetite of the plantation economy 
for unfree labor.55   
Transnational commerce also helped meet the consumer demand on Barbados created by the sugar 
boom. Collectively, a growing body of recent scholarship has highlighted the ‘entangled’ nature of early 
modern empires and has stressed how transnational cooperation contributed to the commercial success 
of the Atlantic economy.56 Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century was no exception. The United 
Provinces dominated the Atlantic carrying trade in the middle decades of the seventeenth century. 
Consequently, Dutch traders who regularly plied the waters of the Caribbean sought to profit from the 
newfound consumer demand on Barbados, stopping off at the island for short periods of up to three 
months to sell their wares in exchange for tropical commodities. But, unlike English merchants, Dutch 
traders visiting the island did not usually conduct business using long-term financial arrangements based 
around extensions of long credit.57  
The passage of the first Navigation Act in October 1651 imposed restrictions on colonial commerce by 
banning foreign ships from trading with England’s overseas holdings.58 But the inhabitants of Barbados 
were more than willing to contravene its prohibitions, and continued to meet local demand for provisions 
 
54 Justin Roberts and Ian Beamish, ‘Venturing Out: The Barbadian Diaspora and the Carolina Colony, 1650-1685’, 
in Michelle LeMaster and Bradford J. Wood, eds, Creating and Contesting Carolina: Proprietary Era Histories (Columbia, 
SC, 2013), pp. 49-72. 
55 For how Indian slave imports from New England were restricted after 1676 due to fears about slave rebellion on 
Barbados, see Linford D. Fisher, ‘“Dangerous Designes”: The 1676 Barbados Act to Prohibit New England Indian 
Slave Importation,’ The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 1 (2014), pp. 99-124; Warren, New England Bound, ch. 
3. For Carolina, see Allan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717 
(New Haven, CT, 2005), 299-300. For the Guianas, see Arena, ‘Indian Slaves from Guiana’. 
56 For entangled empires, see Eliga H. Gould, ‘Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking 
Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 112, No. 3 (2007), pp. 764-786; Jorge Cañizares-
Esguerra, ed., Entangled Empires: The Anglo-Iberian Atlantic, 1500-1830 (Pennsylvania, 2018). Recent scholarship has 
shown that in some cases there was peace and cooperation ‘beyond the line’. For examples, see Wim Klooster, 
‘Anglo-Dutch Trade in the Seventeenth Century: An Atlantic Partnership?’, in Macinnes and Williamson, eds, 
Shaping the Stuart World, pp. 261-282; Koot, Empire at the Periphery. 
57 Koot, Empire at the Periphery, pp. 55-57; Klooster, The Dutch Moment, pp. 167-169.   
58 Farnell, ‘The Navigation Act of 1651’. 
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by trading with ships of any nationality which happened to pass the island.59 Throughout the 1650s, 
between 10 and 30 Dutch vessels traded with the colony annually.60 There were 14 Dutch merchant 
vessels riding in Carlisle Bay when Sir George Aysuce reached Barbados with the Commonwealth’s fleet 
in October 1651. A further 11 Dutch vessels were captured while Ayscue’s fleet was stationed at 
Barbados, which when combined with the seizures made when they first arrived, generated £100,000 of 
prize money.61  
After the passage of the Navigation Act transnational trade with foreign merchants became a politically 
charged issue for the inhabitants of Barbados. Two decades of unfettered access to Dutch traders and 
their cheap merchandise had fostered the development of a commercial culture among colonists which 
enshrined their right to freedom of trade.62 Barbadian planters had published a declaration in February 
1651, for example, which articulated how they would never deny foreign merchants ‘the freedome of our 
Ports’.63 They believed they had legal justification for their actions too, arguing that the articles of peace 
signed with the reduction of the colony in January 1652, which guaranteed their right to free trade, was 
their charter and therefore superseded the October 1650 embargo act and the October 1651 Navigation 
Act.64  
It was the pragmatic approach to commerce taken by Daniel Searle, the governor of Barbados between 
1652 and 1660, which allowed transnational trade to continue to flourish on the island after the passage 
of the Navigation Act. In October 1652 he wrote to the Council of State to explain how ‘the trade of this 
Iland Formerly…was most of all carried on by the Dutch’, but that the ‘the late Act of parliament for the 
 
59 Koot, Empire at the Periphery, pp. 57-63.  
60 Ibid., p. 60. 
61 TNA, CO 1/11, ff. 145-147; CSPC AWI, Vol. 1., pp. 362-364, 31 October 1651; Koot, Empire at the Periphery, pp. 
59-60.  
62 Christian J. Koot, ‘A ‘‘Dangerous Principle’’ Free Trade Discourses in Barbados and the English Leeward Islands, 
1650–1689’, Early American Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2007), pp. 132-163. 
63 Anon., A Declaration Set forth by the Lord Lieutenant General Gentlemen of the Councell & assembly occasioned from the view of 
a printed paper (The Hague, 1651). 
64 For the 1652 articles of surrender being perceived as the new charter of Barbados, see John Jennings, Acts and 
Statutes of the Island of Barbados made and enacted since the reducement of the same unto the authority of the Commonwealth of 
England, unto the Authority of the Common-Wealth of England...Together with the Charter of the said island, etc. (Barbados, 
1654). For the belief that they superseded the 1650 embargo and the 1651 Navigation Act, see Thurloe Papers, Vol. 3., 
pp. 249-252, Edward Winslow to Secretary Thurloe, 16 March 1655. See also Bliss, Revolution and Empire, pp. 89-91. 
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Encrease of the navigation and trade of our nation…hath in a great measure take them off from it’. Only 
a few English merchant vessels had visited the island in recent months, leading to a scarcity of staple 
commodities. Probably out of necessity, Searle inquired whether ‘all merchant ships bounde to this Iland 
of any nation maight be free from any stop or Imbargoe, if the State In theire wisdom shall soe judge it 
fit’.65 Searle’s conviction that freedom of trade was a natural right probably owed something to the fact he 
began his career as a merchant based at the trading entrepot of St. Malo in France.66  
As the decade wore on, Governor Searle became even more flagrant in his disregard of the Navigation 
Act. He began to operate a policy of welcoming traders of other nations to the island, especially those 
from Holland and France.67 Nicholas Florinson, captain of the King David of Amsterdam was put on trial 
in February 1655 to explain why he had been selling horses from Holland and Curacao at Barbados. 
Florinson protested that it was only with ‘the Governor’s leave’ that he sold the horses, a claim which was 
later supported by Jacob Albrertz, the steersman of the vessel, who affirmed that ‘Governour Searle 
bought one of the 15 horses they brought from Holland to Barbadas’.68 One Bristol mariner named 
George Hellier, who was disgruntled with Searle’s lenient attitude towards foreign traders, deposed in 
January 1654 that Searle had dismissed his protests by saying that even ‘if a Turke had brought’ in goods 
to Barbados he would still protect it. According to this informant, Searle was convinced that ‘his 
Comission did extend soe farr as to trade with all those places as were in Amity with him’, even though 
this conflicted with the instructions given by the English state.69  
The inhabitants of Barbados deemed transnational commerce important enough to warrant the 
development of sophisticated economic and legal arguments supporting their right to free trade with 
foreign merchants. Through this ‘free trade discourse’ colonists articulated their own vision of empire and 
commerce, rejecting the control metropolitan authorities were increasingly trying to exert over colonial 
 
65 TNA, CO 1/11, f. 188, Daniel Searle to the Council of State, 8 October 1652. 
66 TNA, HCA 13/62, ‘Deposition of Mary Searle, the wife of Daniel Searle of St Malos in France merchant’.  
67 Searle apparently stated that if foreign merchants wanted to ‘trade against the laws of England, at their peril and 
fortune be it’. Thurloe Papers, Vol. 3., pp. 249-252, Edward Winslow to Secretary Thurloe, 16 March 1655. 
68 TNA, CO 1/66, f. 47. 
69 Nott and Ralph, eds, The Deposition Books of Bristol, Vol. 2, pp. 135-136.  
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affairs through legislation such as the Navigation Acts.70 Debates between Barbadian colonists and 
London merchants over the nature and extent of free trade reflected a clash of vested interests between 
these two interest groups over the structure of the empire and its economy. Who was to be the primary 
beneficiary from the profits of sugar and slavery, the English state and its merchant supporters, or the 
colonists who had themselves ploughed the soil of the Caribbean islands?  
Legal pluralities and divergent interpretations of the law made metropolitan rulings prohibiting Anglo-
Dutch trade in the colonial sphere almost impossible to enforce. When ordered by the commissioners for 
the Western Design to prosecute foreign merchants trading at Barbados, for instance, Governor Searle 
pointed to a common law trial heard in the colony’s court as his legal justification for permitting the 
Dutch to trade at the island. During this trial, representatives of the English merchants had tried to use 
metropolitan commercial legislation, such as the October 1650 embargo and the 1651 Navigation Act, to 
dismantle the colonist’s trade with Dutch merchants. But the jury, filled as it was with planters and 
merchants living on the island who were keen to continue trading with foreign nations, ‘found for the 
strangers against parliament and state, grounding all upon the articles of Barbadoes’.71 The representatives 
of English merchants were understandably discouraged following this ruling. On the contrary, ‘the Dutch 
were courted, and highly prized, and sent home in a triumphant manner, to invite them freely to the trade 
of Barbados’.72 
Expanding consumer demand due to the sugar boom, the prevalence of transnational trade on the island, 
and the development of a ‘free trade discourse’ among the inhabitants of Barbados, were all factors which 
encouraged merchants with various backgrounds to relocate to the colony in the late 1640s and 1650s. 
Merchants such as John Turner, John Parris, William Vassall, Nathaniel Maverick, and Samuel Winthrop 
were among those who departed New England to settle on Barbados, where they speculated in sugar 
 
70 Koot, ‘Free Trade Discourses in Barbados and the English Leeward Islands’; Swingen, Competing Visions of Empire, 
passim; Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, p. 158, 170-173. 
71 Thurloe Papers, Vol. 3., pp. 249-252, Edward Winslow to Secretary Thurloe, 16 March 1655. The ‘articles of 
Barbadoes’ were the articles of surrender agreed when the colony was reduced in January 1652.  
72 Ibid. 
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production and acted as factors for their business partners in port towns such as Boston.73 Moreover, 
after the fall of Dutch Brazil in 1654, Sephardic Jewish merchants with business interests in the sugar 
trade moved in substantial numbers from Brazil to Barbados, integrating the island into their diasporic 
trading networks.74 The Sephardim had maintained business connections with Barbados since the onset 
of sugar production. Luke Lucie, a London merchant who came from a cosmopolitan family of Sephardic 
businessmen with mercantile ties across the Atlantic world, purchased a plantation on Barbados in 1645, 
for example. By 1658, Lucie had aggregated enough surrounding land to expand his plantation to 700 
acres.75  
In the mid-1650s there was an influx of Sephardic merchants into Barbados to profit from the island’s 
expanding sugar economy. The London-based rabbi Menasseh ben Israel facilitated the Sephardic 
emigration to Barbados by securing passes for them from Cromwell in 1655.76 Two of the most well-
documented Sephardic merchants living on Barbados were the brothers Simon and Benjamin de Caceres. 
The earliest mention of these merchants in the primary source record dates to 1653, when Governor 
Daniel Searle wrote a certificate confirming that Simon de Caceres enjoyed the same rights as other 
English freeholders on Barbados, because he owned a plantation and a storehouse in Bridgetown.77 Yda 
Schreuder has presented evidence from the Amsterdam notarial archives to demonstrate how, by the early 
 
73 Gragg, ‘Puritans in Paradise’, pp. 156-158. 
74 Yda Schreuder, Amsterdam’s Sephardic Merchants and the Atlantic Sugar Trade in the Seventeenth Century (London, 2019), 
pp. 138-155, 176-196; Yda Schreuder, ‘A True Global Community: Sephardic Jews, the Sugar Trade, and Barbados 
in the Seventeenth Century’, Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society, Vol. 50 (2004), pp. 174-181; Yda 
Schreuder, ‘Evidence from the Notarial Protocols in the Amsterdam Municipal Archives about Trade Relationships 
between Amsterdam and Barbados in the 17th Century’, Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society, Vol. 52 
(2006), pp. 54–82; Martyn J. Bowden, ‘The Three Centuries of Bridgetown: An Historical Geography’, Journal of the 
Barbados Museum and Historical Society, Vol. 49 (2003), pp. 40-47. The order of the Barbados council in January 1655 
that permitted the Sephardic refugees from Brazil to remain on the island can be found in, Barbados Council Minutes, 
p. 60. For more on trading diasporas, see Philip Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge, 1984). 
75 Campbell, Some Early Barbadian History, p. 54; Otremba, ‘Inventing Ingenios’, pp. 132-133. BDA, RB3/2, pp. 474-
75. 
76 Klooster, The Dutch Moment, pp. 226-227; Schreuder, Amsterdam’s Sephardic Merchants, pp. 164-172. 
77 TNA, CO 1/66, f. 12. Simon de Caceres regularly petitioned the Lord Protector, offering his advice on Caribbean 
affairs. In the aftermath of the Western Design he provided instructions about how best to fortify Jamaica, and also 
suggested that a new invasion force be dispatched to Chile to seize Spanish gold mines on the west coast of South 
America. In 1658 he submitted a document to Cromwell outlining his thoughts on the best way to enforce the 
Navigation Act on Barbados. See Thurloe Papers, Vol. 4., pp. 61-63, ‘A note of what things are wanting in Jamaica by 
Simon de Casseres’ and ‘The humble proposition of Simon de Casseres’, [n.d. c. 1655]; Bodelian Library, MS Rawl 
A. 60, f. 131, ‘Proposals for the protection of British commerce, and excluding strangers from trading with 
Barbadoes’.  
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1660s, there was a community of Sephardic merchants resident in Bridgetown as denizens, who flouted 
the Navigation Acts by contracting with Dutch and English ship captains to export Barbadian sugar to 
refineries in London and the Low Countries.78 By 1665, the trading activities of Sephardic merchants on 
Barbados had begun to raise the ire of English-born Barbadian merchants. They lodged formal 
complaints regarding how the ‘Jews were numerous and engrossing the whole trade to the great 
discouragement of the English merchants, their dealings being principally with those of their own tribe in 
Holland’.79 
Changes in the structure of imperial commerce after 1660 also played an important role in the expansion 
of the Barbadian merchant community. From the 1630s to the 1660s English merchants dispatched 
trusted representatives (often called factors) to administer their business affairs on Barbados. A factor had 
numerous responsibilities which, broadly conceived, encompassed receiving trading vessels sent by 
English merchants, keeping an accurate account of debits and credits, maintaining a regular 
correspondence with their employer, collecting outstanding debts from planters, and sometimes even 
presiding over the purchase or sale of plantations on behalf of merchant syndicates. From their position 
working in Barbadian port towns such as Bridgetown and Speightstown, the factors of English merchants 
who had invested in the sugar boom were afforded the opportunity to conduct private trade and 
accumulate property, and many subsequently became prosperous members of colonial society. When the 
absentee merchant investors in the sugar boom began to withdraw their investments from Barbadian 
plantations there was more time available for their factors on the island to trade on their own accounts. 
The rise of the commission system of merchandising in the 1660s and 1670s, which saw planters co-
ordinate the delivery of sugar to London markets themselves, further reduced the workload of factors on 
Barbados. Consequently, private trading ventures started to become the major form of business activity 
they conducted. This could potentially be very lucrative, because by becoming an entrepreneur factors 
 
78 Schreuder, Amsterdam’s Sephardic Merchants, pp. 150-154. The members of Bridgetown’s Sephardic merchant 
community in the early 1660s included: Abraham de Mercado, Isaac Aboab de Fonseca, Simon and Benjamin de 
Caceres, Manuel and Jeronimo Rodrigues, Moyses Aron, Isaack Levy Resios, Moyses Ramias, Elyas Burgos, David 
da Costa, and Moses Hamesgago. For more on the Jewish community of seventeenth-century Barbados, see Eustace 
M. Shilstone, Jewish Monumental Inscriptions in Barbados (London, 1956). 
79 Quoted in Schreuder, Amsterdam’s Sephardic Merchants, p. 180.  
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were poised to generate profits which far exceeded what they had formerly received by doing business on 
someone else’s behalf. The factors of the English merchants who had financed the sugar boom formed 
the nucleus of the Barbadian merchant community, which began to expand in size and importance in the 
1660s.80  
The argument that the factors of English merchants adapted their business practices and turned into 
Barbadian merchants in the 1660s can be evidenced by the careers of Edward Bradbourne and John 
Bushell. Edward Bradbourne first arrived on Barbados in 1658 as a ‘servant and Factor to Mr Noell’. He 
was a replacement for William Povey, who had previously served as Martin Noell and Thomas Povey’s 
factor on the island until the breakdown in communication between the two Povey brothers in 1657-8.81 
Edward Bradbourne continued to reside on Barbados after the death of Martin Noell in 1665, and by the 
second half of the 1660s was increasingly being described as a ‘Barbados merchant’ of significant standing 
in the colony, offering loans to fellow merchants and planters. In 1666, for instance, the Barbadian 
merchant Alexander Comingham confessed that he was indebted to ‘Edward Bradbourne Bdos mercht’ 
the enormous sum of 800,000 lb. of sugar and £250 sterling. In order to satisfy his creditor, Comingham 
was forced to mortgage his 560-acre sugar plantation, complete with 90 enslaved Africans.82 With legal 
decisions such as these ruling in his favour, Bradbourne soon became a landowner in the colony on top 
of his trading activities. He owned the Hilcots plantation through an attorney, for example, which in 1668 
he supplied with ‘48 pipes of Madera wine, Ellephants Teeth, Gould dust, negroes, and other 
Merchandises of a very great value’. The fact Bradbourne was dealing in these commodities suggest that 
his trading networks reached out from Barbados to West Africa and the Atlantic islands.83  
 
80 Richard Pares observed this process occurring at English and French colonies in the Caribbean: ‘by 1670 or 
thereabouts, the factors in the colonies were turning into merchants’. Pares, Merchants and Planters, p. 31. But, unlike 
in my analysis, Pares did not identify the reasons why this transformation occurred on Barbados.  
81 For letters dispatched by Thomas Povey mentioning how Edward Bradbourne was Martin Noell’s Barbadian 
factor, see BL, Add. Ms. 11411, ff. 51-57, 78-79, 82. In his capacity as a factor for the Noell merchant syndicate 
Bradbourne facilitated the sale of the 2000-acre Noellia plantation at the Surinam colony in 1659. BDA, RB3/5, pp. 
873-879. 
82 BDA, RB 3/2, pp. 948-50. For another example where Edward Bradbourne is described as a ‘Barbados 
merchant’, see BDA, RB 3/6, pp. 549-51. 
83 TNA, CO 1/23, f. 121, ‘The humble peticon of Edward Bradbourne of Barbados Merchant’. 
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Another example is John Bushell, the brother of the London-based sugar trader Edward Bushell, who 
was dispatched to Barbados to manage the family’s sugar trading business there as a factor after the death 
of their kinsman Thomas in the early 1660s.84 If we cast our minds back to Chapter Two, it will be 
remembered that John Bushell had previously served as Edward’s factor in Lisbon, trading from there to 
Brazil and Angola. Operating in partnership with Francis Bond, John Bushell became one of 
Bridgetown’s leading merchants over the course of the 1660s and 1670s.85 Surviving deed records at the 
Barbados Department of Archives reveal how, between 1668 and 1670, Bushell and Bond purchased real 
estate in Bridgetown, including a house and storehouse in the desirable Cheapside neighbourhood, along 
also with a contingent of 79 enslaved Africans.86 As well as accumulating Barbadian property, John 
Bushell and Francis Bond were also deeply involved in regional trade within the Caribbean. They were 
part-owners and freighters of the William & Nicholas, for instance, which in February 1670 was 
undertaking a trading mission in the Greater Caribbean for logwood when the ship became leaky and was 
forced to put in at Anguilla for repairs.87 Bushell and Bond even published a pamphlet in 1668 detailing 
the devastating impact of a fire in the commercial district of Bridgetown, which came two years after a 
similar fire had levelled London.88  
It is possible to gauge the degree of expansion of the Barbadian merchant community between 1640 and 
1670 by abstracting names of merchants from the deed records at the Barbados Department of Archives. 
When deeds of sale were drawn up by notaries in early Barbados, the names of the parties involved were 
almost always followed by a short description of their place of residence and profession. In the era of the 
sugar boom the descriptors most commonly used were ‘Barbados planter’, ‘Barbados gent’, ‘London 
 
84 Thomas Bushell, who had served as Edward Bushell’s factor on Barbados since at least the mid-1650s, began to 
be described as a ‘Barbadoes merchant’ in the Barbados deed records around the year 1661, shortly before his death. 
BDA, RB3/5, pp. 252-253. For Thomas Bushell’s 1659 will, see Complete Book of Emigrants, p. 450.  
85 Francis Bond was a member of the Barbados council in the 1680s. He was said to be ‘as good as Edward Bushell 
or Maurice Thompson’, and was also reported to be a preacher. See CSPC AWI, Vol. 12., p. 643, 'Addenda: May 
1683'. For a brief time, from 1696-1697, Francis Bond served as the acting governor of Barbados, further 
demonstrating his prominence on the island. 
86 BDA, RB3/6, pp. 257-260; BDA, RB3/8, pp. 194-203. 
87 The other owners of the vessel were John Knight, William Bate, and John Johnson. TNA, CO 1/28, f. 121. 
88 John Bushell and Francis Bond, Narrative of the late dreadful fire which happened at Bridge-Town in the Barbadoes, April 18 
1668. As the same was communicated in two Letters from Mr John Bushel, and Mr Francis Bond, two Eminent Merchants there, to 
Mr Edward Bushel Citizen and Merchant of London. Containing the beginning, progress, and event of that dreadful fire; with the 
estimation of the loss accrewing thereby, as it was delivered to his Majesty by several Eminent Merchants concerned in that Loss 
(London, 1668). See also TNA, CO 1/22, f. 120 & f. 126. 
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merchant’, and ‘Barbados merchant’. It is the latter of these descriptors we are interested in here. By 
systematically going through the Barbados deeds records and tallying up the names of those described as 
‘Barbados merchants’, it is possible to come to a better understanding of how the size of the local 
merchant community on Barbados changed over time.  
There are some obvious problems with this approach. For instance, this is just a proxy-based estimate of 
the size of the Barbadian merchant community, and as such is imprecise. It is possible that not every 
Barbadian merchant purchased property during their time in residence on the island, or that the records 
detailing their property transactions did not survive. There is better survival of source material for the 
1650s and 1660s when compared to the 1640s, for example. But in the absence of more reliable census 
records, these are the best estimates we can achieve. It is also important to note that a few individuals, 
such as Thomas Kendall and Isaac Legay, appear as both ‘London merchants’ and ‘Barbados merchants’ 
in the deed records. This is because the colonial population of the English Atlantic world was itinerant. 
Merchants would sometimes travel out with their vessels to oversee the sale of their goods, spend some 
time in the American colonies, before returning to England in the future. If a merchant purchased 
property while resident on Barbados they would be described in the deed books as a ‘Barbados 
merchant’. On the other hand, if they were absentee proprietors working through attorneys on Barbados, 
they would be referred to as ‘London merchants’ in the source material. 
These caveats aside, the evidence is quite revealing. A list of the names of every Barbados merchant 
recorded as purchasing property on the island between 1640 and 1670, divided by decade, has been 
collated and is available in the Appendix to this dissertation (see Appendix 4). During the 1640s, when 
the transition to sugar cultivation was just getting underway, there were 70 people described as ‘Barbados 
merchants’ living on the island. By the 1650s, when the sugar boom was in full swing, the Barbadian 
merchant community had seen a two-and-a-half-fold increase to 174 persons. The size of the merchant 
population remained relatively stable into the next decade, reaching 187 persons during the 1660s. To put 
this into context, a 1703 census of New York lists 110 persons as ‘merchants’, while a Philadelphia census 
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of 1756 identifies 230.89 In other words, the merchant population of Barbados in the decades following 
the start of the 1640s sugar boom either exceeded, or was at the very least comparable to, some of the 
most prominent port towns in North America in the first half of the eighteenth century. In terms of 
gender breakdown, all of the Barbadian merchants in the era of the sugar boom were men. Based on 
surname conventions, it also appears that most of the Barbados merchants between 1640 and 1670 were 
of English heritage, with a smattering of Dutchmen and Sephardic Jews too. Though we must be careful 
not to read too much into this, because it is possible that the names recorded in the deed books were 
Anglicised by notaries.    
The expansion of the Barbadian merchant community during the 1650s helped Barbados to become a 
centre of trade in the Caribbean by the 1660s. A scarcity of import and export data means we cannot 
quantify the merchant traffic to Barbados in the era of the sugar boom with precision. But from 
qualitative descriptions of Barbadian trade it is clear that, as an important node in the Atlantic economic 
system, the colony attracted hundreds of merchant vessels to visit its shores each year. The first historian 
of the British Empire, John Oldmixon, recounted in 1707 how ‘the Inhabitants [of Barbados] driving a 
considerable Trade with all Parts of the World, grew rich’. He marvelled how ‘many Merchants have in a 
little Time acquired Lands, Honours, and Offices, by the Credit and Profit of this once thriving Trade, 
which in the Reign of King Charles II, used to employ 400 Sail of Ships, of 150 Tuns each, one with 
another, in all 60000 Tuns’.90 Adam Smith concurred. Writing in 1776, Smith maintained that a century 
prior ‘the island of Barbados, in short, was the only British colony of any consequence of which the 
condition at that time bore any resemblance to what it is at present’.91 Samuel Copen’s print of 
 
89 Cathy Matson, Merchants & Empire: Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore, MD, 1998), p. 128; Thomas M. 
Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill, 
NC, 1986), p. 17. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to find a comparison at another English colony for the 
1650s and 1660s. Bailyn’s New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, for instance, does not provide any estimates 
for the merchant population of port towns in the region, such as Boston or Providence.  
90 Oldmixon, The British Empire in America, Vol. 2, pp. 11, 166-167. 
91 Quoted in Trevor Burnard, ‘Making a Whig Empire Work: Transatlantic Politics and the Imperial Economy in 
Britain and British America’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2012), p. 51. 
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Bridgetown in 1694 shows 44 merchant vessels riding in Carlisle Bay, providing visual evidence of the 
extent of Barbadian commerce in the seventeenth century.92  
Although the fact that Barbados was able to attract large numbers of merchant vessels to visit its shores 
was lauded by contemporaries and early historians alike as a marker of colonial success, we know today 
that the consequences of this heavy merchant traffic were not all positive. Infectious disease follows trade 
routes.93 Consequently, centres of trade such as Bridgetown were point sources for the transmission of 
epidemic disease. The timing of the first recorded epidemic of yellow fever on Barbados is telling. It 
occurred in the immediate wake of the sugar boom, in 1647, and was facilitated by the expansion of 
merchant traffic between West Africa and Barbados, and the growth of the sugar industry (the Aedes 
aegypti mosquito can survive on both sucrose and human blood).94 
As well as functioning as a site of plantation production and a centre of trade, Barbados also took on 
some more specialised roles during the 1660s. Indeed, the importance of Barbados to the English empire 
in the decades immediately following the sugar boom, and especially the fact that Barbadian merchants 
and planters financed new colonial offshoots, suggests that the Restoration empire had two core regions: 
London and Barbados.   
For example, for a brief time Barbados served as a commercial entrepot in the transatlantic slave trade to 
Spanish America. Rather than labouring on sugar plantations, enslaved Africans in Mexico, Peru, and 
New Granada worked either in urban centres or toiling to extract precious metals in the mines of 
Zacatecas and Potosí.95 While enslaved Africans tended to be sold to planters in the Caribbean on credit, 
the inhabitants of Spanish America were, by contrast, willing to purchase African captives from foreign 
 
92 Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, p. 333.  
93 Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Cambridge, 1986), ch. 9. 
94 Phillip D. Curtin, ‘Disease Exchange Across the Tropical Atlantic’, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, Vol. 15, 
No. 3 (1993), pp. 347-348. On epidemiology and the Caribbean more broadly, see J. R. McNeill, Mosquito Empires: 
Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914 (Cambridge, 2012).  
95 For a recent reassessment of the slave trade to Spanish America, see Alex Borucki, David Eltis, and David Wheat, 
‘Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 120, No. 2, (2015), pp. 
433-461. 
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merchants for inflated prices and in exchange for specie offered up front. This was an alluring prospect 
for the bullion-starved mercantilist empires of Europe, who jumped at the chance to provision Spanish 
colonists with enslaved Africans.  
In the historiography of the seventeenth-century Atlantic world Jamaica and the Dutch island of Curacao 
have been identified as the main colonies involved in the entrepot trade to Spanish America. It is usually 
forgotten, however, that it was merchants and asiento agents on Barbados, not Jamaica, who pioneered the 
lucrative re-export trade between the English empire and Spanish America during the 1660s. This was 
more than a decade before the first merchant vessels were permitted by the Spanish crown to travel to 
Jamaica and engage in the slave trade in 1677.96 In early March 1662 two Spanish merchants ventured to 
Barbados to inquire about securing themselves a supply of enslaved Africans for Peru. The speaker of the 
Barbados Assembly Thomas Modyford was enthusiastic about their proposal. As a result, the Spaniards 
returned in April 1662 and purchased 400 enslaved Africans in exchange for approximately 125 to 140 
pieces of eight per head.97 It is instructive that the Spaniards chose to travel to Barbados to make their 
proposal, and not Jamaica. The fact these early Anglo-Spanish slave trading encounters took place on 
Barbados highlights how the island was a regional centre of trade during the 1660s, and as such attracted 
new commercial opportunities. 
In July 1662, the asiento contract to supply enslaved Africans to markets in Spanish America was granted 
to a Genoese merchant firm directed by Domenico Grillo and Ambrosio Lomellino.98 Grillo and 
Lomellino did not have direct experience trading on the West African coast themselves, and so they sub-
contracted with external suppliers to ensure that they disembarked the necessary quota of enslaved 
Africans in Spanish America.99 One of these sub-contractors was the English corporation the Royal 
 
96 On Jamaica’s role in entrepot slave trade to Spanish America, see Curtis Nettels, ‘England and the Spanish-
American Trade, 1680-1715’, Journal of Modern History, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1931), pp. 1-32; Zahedieh, ‘The Merchants of 
Port Royal’. For Curacao, see Klooster, The Dutch Moment, pp. 181-183.  
97 George Frederick Zook, The Company of Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa (Lancaster, PA, 1919), p. 87.  
98 In the period when Grillo and Lomellino held the asiento contract, between 1663 and 1674, it is estimated that 
more than 18,000 African captives were disembarked in Spanish American ports. Borucki, Eltis, and Wheat, 
‘Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America’, p. 449 fn. 49 
99 Svalastog, ‘Mastering the Worst of Trades’, p. 187.  
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Adventurers Trading into Africa, which agreed to dispatch 3,500 captives to Cartagena, Portobello, and 
Veracruz for seven years. The financier of the Barbados sugar boom Martin Noell helped to engineer this 
deal by personally arranging for 600-1000 enslaved Africans, already on Barbados, to be delivered to 
Genoese asiento agents for transportation to Veracruz on the St. Jean Baptist. Once an agreement had been 
finalised, Charles II gave this lucrative trade legal sanction by lifting the Navigation Acts.100 Despite some 
initial promise, the Royal Adventurers were not particularly successful in transforming Barbados into a 
hub of Anglo-Spanish trade. This was partly because of the great distances between Barbados and the 
Spanish Main when compared to Jamaica’s location in the Greater Antilles, but was more immediately 
due to disruption to the supply of enslaved Africans to English colonies caused by the Second Anglo-
Dutch War (1665-1667). Approximately 15 percent of the enslaved Africans imported into Barbados 
between 1661 and 1667 were bought by asiento agents for re-export to Spanish America, highlighting how 
Barbados functioned as a commercial entrepot in the middle decades of the 1660s.101  
During the 1650s and 1660s Barbadian merchants and planters were deeply involved in co-ordinating and 
financing the settlement of new colonial offshoots in Surinam, St. Lucia, and Carolina. This suggests that, 
in the 20 years between 1650 and 1670, Barbados also acted as a nursery for new colonial ventures to 
expand the English empire in the Greater Caribbean. Indeed, I would agree with Ian Beamish and Justin 
Roberts that the expansionary impulse provided by Barbadian merchants and planters was even more 
powerful and extensive than the imperial ambitions of the English state in the Caribbean during the 
1660s. This was because of the massive wealth being created on Barbados in the era of the sugar boom, 
which Barbadian planters and merchants could only find an outlet for elsewhere to the limited resources 
on their island.102   
There were a number of expansion projects initiated by the inhabitants of Barbados in the aftermath of 
the sugar boom. Justin Roberts has explored how the English plantation on the Surinam river in Guiana 
 
100 Ryan Dennis McGuinness, ‘“They can now digest strong meats:” Two Decades of Expansion, Adaptation, 
Innovation, and Maturation on Barbados, 1680-1700’ (PhD dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 2017), p. 168; 
Svalastog, ‘Mastering the Worst of Trades’, p. 193.  
101 Borucki, Eltis, and Wheat, ‘Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America’, p. 444, fn. 30.  
102 Roberts and Beamish, ‘Venturing Out’, p. 52. 
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was the first ‘satellite’ colony settled by itinerant Barbadians. Just three days sail from Barbados and with 
copious amounts of alluvial land available for pasturage and sugar cultivation, Surinam served as the main 
destination for members of the Barbadian diaspora until the colony was surrendered to the Dutch during 
negotiations over the Treaty of Breda in 1667. The initial planting of the Surinam colony in 1650 was not 
financed by Barbadian merchants, however, but by wealthy royalist exiles like Francis Lord Willoughby, 
who personally invested £26,000.103  
After the Restoration, Barbadian colonial schemes increased in number and intensity. The explanation 
usually given for this change is that planters on Barbados were under increasing economic pressure due to 
the declining fertility of their plantations, and the scarcity of arable land to expand into. The densely 
settled island also left little in the way of opportunities for time-expired servants and the younger sons of 
planters to own land themselves.104 Another part of the explanation for why Barbadian expansion 
projects increased in the mid-1660s was that there was now an increasingly assertive merchant community 
resident in port towns on Barbados, looking to expand the sugar frontier beyond the shores of their 
island and thus create new opportunities for capital investment. In 1664, for instance, a group of 
merchants and planters from Barbados pooled their resources to purchase the island of St. Lucia from 
Thomas Warner, who claimed to be acting as a representative of the indigenous Carib population. The 
Barbadian settlement of St. Lucia quickly faltered due to disease and violent conflict with the Caribs. 
Within two years it had been abandoned.105  
The involvement of Barbadian merchants in the initial settlement of Carolina was more extensive and 
long-lasting than the abortive St. Lucia venture. In 1663 a ‘Company of Barbadian Adventurers’, made up 
of 85 investors, dispatched an exploratory mission to the Florida coast. This effort was spearheaded by 
the Barbadian merchants and ship captains Anthony Long, William Hilton, and Peter Fabian, who set sail 
from Speightstown on their expedition in August 1663. In a promotional pamphlet published shortly 
 
103 Ibid., pp. 52-53; Roberts, ‘Surrendering Surinam’. 
104 For a contemporary example, see The Earl of Carlisle, A Declaration by James Earl of Carlile, Lord of the Caribee 
Islands, or Province of Carliola, 22 November 1647, Huntington Library, 91251 (repro). See also Roberts and Beamish, 
‘Venturing Out’, pp. 50-52. 
105 Roberts and Beamish, ‘Venturing Out’, p. 53. 
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after their return, they extolled the potential of Carolina for agriculture and animal husbandry, and laid 
out the terms on which land was to be distributed by the Lords Proprietors to prospective colonists who 
were willing to invest capital and dispatch labourers there.106 Three successive waves of colonists departed 
Barbados between 1665 and 1667 to try to establish a viable settlement in Carolina, focusing their efforts 
on the Cape Fear peninsula.107 As Roberts and Beamish note, ‘Barbados played a central role in pushing 




This chapter has investigated why merchant capital was withdrawn from Barbados in the late 1650s and 
early 1660s, has offered some tentative suggestions of where this capital was reinvested, and has explored 
the multifaceted role played by Barbados in the structure of England’s empire after the Restoration. By 
1672 Barbados was undoubtedly the wealthiest and most important colony in the English empire. A look 
ahead to the late seventeenth century suggests Barbadian merchants and planters managed to maintain 
this prosperity for several decades, with one historian recently presenting quantitative evidence to 
demonstrate how Barbados reached its peak economic moment in the early 1680s, contrary to the 
previous historiographical consensus which suggested a process of steady decline was underway at this 
time.109 Even in the closing two decades of the seventeenth century, when the sugar boom had begun to 
wane and Jamaica had taken up the mantle of the asiento trade, Barbados remained the main port-of-call 
 
106 Anon., A Relation of a Discovery lately made on the Coast of Florida (From Lat. 31. To 33 Deg. 45 Min. North-Lat.) By 
William Hilton Commander, and Commissioner with Capt. Anthony Long, and Peter Fabian, in the Ship Adventure, which set Sayl 
from Spikes Bay, Aug. 10. 1663. and was set forth by several Gentlemen and Merchants of the Island of Barbadoes. Giving an account 
of the nature and temperature of the Soyl, the manners and disposition of the Natives, and whatsoever else is remarkable therein. 
Together with Proposals made by the Commissioners of the Lords Proprietors, to all such persons as shall become the first Setlers on the 
Rivers, Harbors, and Creeks there (London, 1664).  
107 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p. 112.  
108 Roberts and Beamish, ‘Venturing Out’, p. 59. See also Richard S. Dunn, ‘The English Sugar Islands and the 
Founding of South Carolina’, South Carolina Historical Magazine, Vol. 101, No. 2 (2000), pp. 142-154. 
109 McGuinness, ‘They can now digest strong meats’, p. 19.  
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for RAC vessels when dropping off enslaved Africans: Bridgetown received 86 more slave ships and 
18,808 more enslaved Africans than Port Royal in this period.110 This demonstrates the huge demand for 
slave labour in a mature plantation economy, and how, ever since the onset of the sugar boom, 
Bridgetown had been the leading Caribbean market for the transatlantic slave trade.  
Due to the growth of the Barbadian merchant community at mid-century, by the 1680s trade to and from 
Barbados was expansive. Efforts to circumvent the RAC’s monopoly led independent merchants to drive 
a slave trade between Madagascar and Barbados, for example.111 According to Richard Pares, by the early 
eighteenth century, there was a noticeable reduction in the business activities and status of the resident 
merchant community on Barbados and elsewhere in the British Caribbean, leading to a marked decline in 
their size and commercial stature. He suggests this was caused by the growth of the commission system, 
which meant only those involved in sugar production (i.e. planters and not merchants) received the 
financial backing from London needed to sustain business operations in the colonies.112 Because my 
analysis ends in 1672, it has not been possible to assess the veracity of Pares’ argument in this 
dissertation. But if correct, it indicates that the Barbadian merchant community experienced its halcyon 




110 Ibid., pp. 145-146. 
111 Bennett, ‘The East India Company, Transnational Interactions, and the Formation of Forced Labour Regimes’, 
pp. 72-73. On the seventeenth-century Madagascar slave trade more broadly, see Virginia Bever Platt, ‘The East 
India Company and the Madagascar Slave Trade’, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4, (1969), pp. 548-577; 
James Armstrong, ‘Madagascar and the Slave Trade in the Seventeenth Century’, Omaly sy Anio, (1983–84), pp. 211-
33. 
112 Pares, Merchants and Planters, p. 48.  




This dissertation has undertaken the first systematic study of the English merchants who financed the 
Barbados sugar boom. It has traced how merchant capital was invested in the Barbadian economy during 
the 1640s, produced transformative social and economic changes on Barbados and in England over the 
next two decades, before being withdrawn in the 1660s and reinvested elsewhere. The analysis of the 
merchant financiers of the sugar boom developed in this dissertation has resulted in a modified narrative 
of Barbadian colonial development from the 1620s to the 1670s, which can be summarised as follows. 
Barbados was founded by Sir William Courteen in 1627 because a colony there was ideally placed to 
function as a resupply point in Courteen’s existing trade with Dutch plantations on the Wild Coast of 
Guiana, and because the island also had the potential to act as a base for privateer attacks against Spanish 
America. However, many of the first Barbadian settlers looked to emulate the recent successes of 
colonists in Virginia by producing tobacco for export. Unfortunately for Barbadian plantation owners, 
throughout the 1630s the tobacco they cultivated was widely perceived as the ‘worst of all tobaccos’, and 
as a result English merchants were reluctant to trade with the island, preferring instead to focus their 
attentions on the better-quality leaf produced in Virginia. This meant that Dutch traders and markets 
were of increased importance to the inhabitants of Barbados in the first 15 years of settlement. The 
argument developed in Chapter One that the Barbadian economy was struggling at this early juncture due 
to the cultivation of poor-quality tobacco does not support Menard’s interpretation of Barbadian colonial 
development in the pre-sugar era, and instead is more in line with Gragg’s analysis.879   
In the late 1630s and early 1640s Barbadian planters diversified the crops they produced for export, 
leading to increased commercial traffic between England and the colony. For instance, it is in this period 
that some powerful London merchants, including Maurice Thomson, William Pennoyer, and Richard 
Batson, first developed a trading relationship with the Barbados. However, it was the emergence of a 
commercial sugar industry in 1643, and the extraordinary economic opportunities presented by this new 
 
879 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, ch. 1 & 2; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 89-92, 98. 
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commodity, which was responsible for attracting large numbers of merchant vessels and unprecedented 
amounts of investment into the island during the 1640s.  
London merchants financed the rapid transition to sugar production on Barbados. These merchants not 
only directly invested in the Barbadian plantation economy, but also gave planters ready access to credit, 
enslaved Africans, and raw materials. An infusion of merchant capital precipitated institutional changes in 
the organisation of land and labour on Barbados. Integrated sugar plantations worked by hundreds of 
enslaved Africans first developed on Barbados in the immediate wake of the sugar boom, and would, in 
subsequent decades, be adopted in other colonies in the Caribbean region. The capital which London 
merchants used to finance the sugar boom was generated through a variety of domestic and global 
business activities. This challenges Brenner’s assumption that the profits of previous American enterprise 
were reinvested in the development of the Barbadian sugar industry.880 Moreover, the political and 
economic uncertainty in England caused by the Civil War was a key reason why London merchants 
invested such large amounts of money in land and enslaved Africans in the colony during the 1640s. 
Historians of early modern England have not recognised the importance of the empire as an outlet for 
securing merchant capital during the tumultuous civil war years, principally because they have not placed 
the Caribbean colonies and the metropole into a single analytical frame. Indeed, the dependence of 
Barbadians on merchant direct investment and the London credit market does not support the claim that 
Barbados enjoyed virtual independence from England during the 1640s like historians have previously 
assumed.881 
An analysis of transatlantic slave trading voyages chartered by English merchants in the 1630s and 1640s, 
which draws upon a much broader range of source material than that used by other historians (e.g. court 
cases heard in the High Court of Admiralty and the Mayor’s Court of London), has revealed that there is 
no surviving evidence for slave trading ventures to Barbados in the 1630s, and that the traffic in enslaved 
Africans to the island saw a marked increase in 1644-45, probably in response to the establishment of a 
 
880 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, p. 162. 
881 E.g. Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 42. 
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commercial sugar industry on Barbados in 1643. This new evidence challenges Menard’s chronology of 
the rise of African slavery on Barbados, and instead reinforces the conclusions reached by Gragg, who 
has shown that enslaved Africans do not start appearing in Barbadian wills and plantation inventories 
until the mid-1640s at the earliest.882  
There were 14 London merchants explored in Chapter Three who were, for all intents and purposes, the 
‘fathers’ of African slavery in the British Empire. By being the first to charter voyages to Barbados via the 
West African coast in the early 1640s, these merchants made the decision to meet the escalating demand 
for unfree labour on the island by increasing English participation in the transatlantic slave trade, setting 
into motion a chain of events which would forever alter the demography of English colonies in the 
Caribbean and North America. Part of the reason why the population of enslaved Africans saw such a 
pronounced increase on Barbados in the 1640s was because of the desire of English merchants to tie up 
their capital in property overseas during the Civil War. Because of their customary status on the island as 
permanent and inheritable chattels, enslaved Africans were one of several outlets for merchant 
investment in these years. The money which London merchants poured into Barbadian land and labour 
in the 1640s challenges the broad assumption among historians that investing in the American colonies 
during the seventeenth century were inherently risky ventures.883 On Barbados, at least, there were 
numerous geographical, environmental, and political safeguards which helped to secure invested capital in 
the 1640s. Future research may reveal that direct investment into the American colonies by English 
merchants and members of the gentry was more prevalent in the seventeenth century than previously 
understood, and that contemporaries did not see such investments as hazardous as historians have 
suggested.  
In the immediate aftermath of the mid-century sugar boom Barbados was the most important colony in 
the English empire. Indeed, it was argued in Chapter Five that the English empire had two core regions in 
this period: London and Barbados. This points towards a wider polycentricism of empire, taking us 
 
882 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 47; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 119. 
883 E.g. Kupperman, Providence Island. 
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beyond the traditional mercantilist understanding of how empires operated in the early modern period. 
Empires were composed of multiple interdependent nodes and were thus a far more complex system 
than the binary ‘core-periphery’ model would have us believe. Some colonies usually portrayed as being at 
the ‘periphery’ of empire were, much like the metropole, important sources of capital, manpower, and 
expertise for the empire’s further growth. In the English empire during the 1660s, for example, Barbados 
functioned as a regional centre of trade and as a nursery for colonial expansion in the Caribbean and the 
Lower South. Moreover, the profits of the Barbados sugar boom were reinvested elsewhere in the empire, 
such as the Jamaican economy, the accounts of goldsmith-bankers in England, and the East India 
Company. One avenue for further research would be to trace in greater detail where the capital generated 
by the seventeenth-century Caribbean plantation system was reinvested, in order to investigate whether 
the profits of African slavery contributed to fundamental transformations which occurred in England at 
the turn of the eighteenth century, such as the ‘financial revolution’ and the growth of the fiscal-military 
state. 
When viewed collectively, then, the new research presented in this dissertation encourages historians to 
reappraise Russell Menard’s revisionist critique of the ‘sugar revolution’ hypothesis.884 While I share 
Menard’s preference for the more prosaic term ‘sugar boom’, because I believe it more adequately 
captures what happened on Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century (an economic boom caused by 
sugar production), his claim to have overturned the ‘sugar revolution’ hypothesis entirely requires further 
scrutiny. An infusion of merchant capital into the Barbadian economy, and the work this did in financing 
the rapid development of a commercial sugar industry, did produce social and economic transformations 
which we could interpret as ‘revolutionary’, both on the island itself and in England. 
On Barbados, for instance, the sugar boom led to the Africanisation of the island’s population, 
environmental degradation on an unprecedented scale, and the emergence of Barbados as a transnational 
centre of trade in the Caribbean. In England, the sugar boom facilitated changes in the organisation of 
 
884 Menard, Sweet Negotiations, passim. 
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colonial commerce (the commission system) and led to social and political change in London. For 
example, the wealth generated by sugar and slavery on Barbados played a major role in propelling a 
cluster of merchants to the top of the London merchant community in the 1650s and early 1660s. They 
were well represented on the councils and committees formed to administer the American colonies and 
sat on the directorates of several overseas trading companies. This powerful group of merchants sought 
to make the Barbadian government amenable to their interests, and submitted numerous petitions to 
Parliament in the 1650s and 1660s, forming an informal pressure group which I argue constituted a 
progenitor of the eighteenth-century West India Interest. The results of my research into merchant 
involvement with the economy of Barbados in the 1630s and 1640s means I am convinced that it was the 
commercial opportunity presented by sugar, not other cash crops, which initiated these transformative 
changes. I therefore side with Larry Gragg, who has also argued that the evidence to support Menard’s 
contention that demographic changes such as the rapid growth of African slavery were underway in the 
pre-sugar era (c.1627-1643) is strictly limited.885  
 
This study has also contributed to a broader historiographical debate over whether metropolitan capital 
stimulated plantation development in the British Atlantic world prior to the American Revolution. There 
were two periods in which large amounts of capital provided by English merchants found an outlet in the 
Caribbean colonies: c.1640-1660 and c.1730-1776. Evidence presented in Chapters Two and Three 
demonstrated how in the mid-seventeenth century English merchants directly invested in plantation 
production on Barbados and extended long credit to prospective sugar planters. The reasons why 
merchants chose to inject so much capital into the Barbadian economy were multifaceted, but it has been 
argued that external factors unique to the 1640s, including the English Civil War and the collapse of the 
Brazilian sugar industry, heavily influenced merchant patterns of investment. Most of the merchant 
financiers of the sugar boom withdrew their investments in the 1650s and early 1660s, and thereafter the 
 
885 Larry Gragg, ‘Review of Sweet Negotiations: Sugar, Slavery, and Plantation Agriculture in Early Barbados by 
Russell R. Menard’, The South Carolina Historical Magazine, Vol. 108, No. 2 (2007), pp. 169-170. 
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rise of the commission system meant that direct investment and loans provided by English merchants 
became less significant to economic development in the English Caribbean for a period of approximately 
70 years.  
 
Between 1660 and 1730 the expansion of the plantation system in the Caribbean colonies was mainly 
financed locally. Profits generated through plantation production, the entrepôt trade to Spanish America, 
and privateering, were reinvested into the development of a commercial sugar industry on Jamaica, for 
example.886 Financing the purchase of land, the construction of sugar mills, and the acquisition of 
enslaved Africans in this manner was much more gradual when compared to the direct investment and 
extensions of credit which Barbadian planters received in the 1640s and 1650s. The infusion of merchant 
capital into Barbados in the mid-seventeenth century explains why the colony underwent rapid 
transformations which constituted a ‘sugar boom’ or ‘sugar revolution’. Elsewhere in the English 
Caribbean, it took much longer for a fully-developed sugar industry to emerge (until at least the 1680s and 
1690s), principally because a variety of factors relating to geography, environment, and warfare meant that 
planters there had limited outside assistance from metropolitan merchants when compared to their 
counterparts on Barbados half a century earlier. Historians of the Atlantic world need to be more 
sensitive to the local geographic and environmental conditions of different Caribbean islands, and to how 
external political and economic contexts impacted the process of colonial development in different 
decades. All too often historians have generalised about how the Caribbean sugar industry was financed, 
glossing over the formative period of the seventeenth century, and taking a ‘one model fits all’ approach. 
I am convinced that further research on the economic development of other islands in the English and 
French Caribbean during the seventeenth century will show that a more nuanced analysis is needed.  
 
In the 1730s capital provided by English merchants once again became a significant means through which 
plantation development was financed.887 Institutional changes in the colonial credit market after the 
 
886 Zahedieh, ‘Trade, Plunder, and Economic Development’. 
887 Pares, Merchants and Planters, pp. 47-50; Smith, ‘Merchants and Planters Revisited’; Nash, ‘The Organization of 
Trade and Finance’, pp. 123-127. For the example of Henry Lascelles, a merchant whose business career reflects the 
revival in the importance of merchant capital to the American colonies between the 1730s and 1770s (in 1753, for 
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passage of the 1732 Colonial Debts Act, which introduced ‘legal uniformity in the treatment of debtors’ 
throughout the British empire, led to a spike in short-term credit and long-term loans being offered to 
Caribbean planters by commission agents in England.888 This helped to expedite the process of plantation 
development and the purchase of enslaved Africans in the mid-eighteenth century, especially on 
Jamaica.889 However, unlike 1640s Barbados, English merchants did not invest directly in the sugar 
industry after 1730, and instead just advanced capital to planters.  
Historians are divided about the origins of the capital which merchants operating as commission agents 
extended to planters in the mid-eighteenth century. S. D. Smith suggests that English merchants were 
investing a lot of new capital into Caribbean economies.890 But because commission firms retained as 
much as 80 percent of their profits, the general consensus is that the loans offered by commission agents 
were mostly made up of capital recycled from the sale of sugar that had been sent to England by 
Caribbean planters.891 For the moment, then, it remains uncertain whether Adam Smith was correct to 
suggest that the wealth of the British Caribbean was created by metropolitan capital ‘overspilling’.892 
Based upon the new research presented in this dissertation, it is clear that the Barbados sugar boom in the 
1640s and 1650s was financed predominantly by capital supplied by English merchants, most of whom 
were based in the City of London. But until we know more about the origins of the capital loaned to 
planters by mid-eighteenth-century commission firms, all we can say is Richard Pares’ conclusion that 
‘after some initial loans in the earliest period which merely primed the pump, the wealth of the West 
Indies was created out of the profits of the West Indies themselves’, is probably closest to the truth.893  
 
instance, he had £226,772 tied up in 78 separate loans to Caribbean planters), see Smith, ‘Merchants and Planters 
Revisited’, pp. 461-462; Burnard, Planters, Merchants, and Slaves, p. 121. Even after the American Revolution, in the 
years leading up to Emancipation, loans of increasing size were given to Caribbean sugar planters by London 
commission agents. S. G. Checkland, ‘Finance for the West Indies, 1780-1815’, The Economic History Review, Vol. 10, 
No. 3 (1958), pp. 461-469. 
888 Smith, ‘Merchants and Planters Revisited’, pp. 455-456.  
889 Ibid., pp. 457-458. 
890 Ibid., p. 446. See also Smith, Slavery, Family and Gentry Capitalism, pp. 139-176.  
891 Pares, Merchants and Planters, pp. 49-50; Nash, ‘The Organization of Trade and Finance’, p. 127.  
892 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 463. 
893 Pares, Merchants and Planters, p. 50.  




This dissertation has also deepened historical understanding about early modern merchants, and what 
they did with their capital. My research into the merchant financiers of the sugar boom casts doubt over 
Robert Brenner’s social analysis of the seventeenth-century English merchant community, and in 
particular his categorisation of ‘company merchants’ and ‘new merchants’.894 For example, I have found 
examples of so-called ‘company merchants’ investing in Barbadian plantations during the 1640s (e.g. 
Riccard, Williams, Browne), something which should not be possible if Brenner’s rigid categorisation 
were correct. Moreover, if Brenner had pushed his study into the late 1650s and 1660s, he would have 
seen that many of his ‘new merchants’ were incorporated into directorates of overseas trading companies 
which possessed exclusive monopolies (e.g. Maurice Thomson, who became governor of the EIC in 
1657). Indeed, in Chapter Four it was shown how, after Maurice Thomson and his business partners fell 
into short-term disfavour with Cromwell after 1653, a new cohort of merchants, most of whom had 
invested in the Barbados sugar boom and were associated with Martin Noell, stepped in and secured 
appointment to the committees and councils formed in Westminster to administer the American 
plantations and overseas trade. This takes us beyond Brenner’s analysis (which ends in 1653), and 
demonstrates how his ‘new merchant leadership’ did not retain power in Westminster under the 
Protectorate and Restoration governments.  
This study also sheds light on the attitude of early modern merchants towards politics and government. 
By analysing their petitions, it has been shown how the merchant financiers of the sugar boom wanted 
Barbados to be governed in a way which suited their investments. While not interested themselves in 
travelling overseas and becoming directly involved in colonial governance, they were keen to install 
trusted family members into specific offices to advance their private business interests. And when faced 
with the prospect of partisan violence on Barbados, these merchants expended time and energy to try to 
encourage colonial inhabitants to reconcile their political differences, which they hoped would ensure the 
 
894 Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, passim. 
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continued security of their assets. Historians have made similar observations about investors in Ireland 
during the 1640s.895 In the future, therefore, comparative research might reveal that the attitude we have 
seen displayed by the ‘Barbados merchants’ towards politics and government was common to many 
businessmen in the seventeenth century.        
 
By placing the merchant financiers of the Barbados sugar boom and their trading networks at the centre 
of my analysis, in this dissertation I have worked at the intersection of three historiographical subfields 
which are usually studied separately: the history of early modern England, Caribbean history, and global 
history. This dissertation is therefore in the vanguard of the new trans-Atlantic history, which seeks to 
make big points about the history of early English expansion in the Americas, Africa, and Asia through 
granular research.896 This study has made two main contributions to our understanding of the global 
dimensions of early English expansion.  
First is how, by investigating the array of trading activities which the English merchants who financed the 
Barbados sugar boom participated in, this dissertation has contributed to the efforts of a new generation 
of historians to situate the commercial pursuits of English merchants in a global context. A recent spate 
of PhD dissertations written by Edmond Smith, Aske Brock, and Julie Svalastog reflects the revival in 
interest in the merchant community of seventeenth-century England.897 A distinctive feature of this new 
historiography has been an effort to study the trading activities of English merchants from a global 
perspective. Smith, for instance, has demonstrated how members of the East India Company had 
diversified investment portfolios between 1599 and 1625, and argues that this highlights ‘the global 
 
895 Bottigheimer, English Money and Irish Land; Lindley, ‘Irish Adventurers and Godly Militants in the 1640s’. 
896 For other examples of the new trans-Atlantic history, see Alison Games, Web of Empire; Edmond Smith, ‘The 
Global Interests of London's Commercial Community, 1599-1625: Investment in the East India Company’, The 
Economic History Review (2018); Lauren Working, The Making of an Imperial Polity: Civility and America in the Jacobean 
Metropolis (Cambridge, 2020); Misha Ewen, ‘Women Investors and the Virginia Company in the Early Seventeenth 
Century’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 62, No. 4 (2019), pp. 853-874.  
897 Smith, ‘Networks of the East India Company’; Aske Brock, ‘The Company Director: Commerce, State, and 
Society’ (PhD dissertation, University of Kent, 2016); Julie Svalastog, ‘Mastering the worst of trades: England’s early 
Africa companies and their traders, 1618-1672’ (PhD dissertation University of Leiden, 2018). 
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connections between the various strands of England’s overseas development’. Brock has used social 
network analysis to investigate the overlapping membership of English merchants in the directorates of 
corporations involved in trade to various parts of the world.898  
This study contributes to this growing body of scholarship by using a prosopographical approach to trace 
how capital was created through a variety of domestic and overseas ventures in the 1630s, funnelled into 
the coffers of English merchants, before being invested into the emerging system of plantation slavery on 
Barbados in the 1640s. English merchants with a commercial interest in domestic retailing, the cloth 
trade, American tobacco, West African commerce, the East India Company, the Levant Company, and 
the Brazilian sugar trade all contributed capital to the sugar boom. This suggests that the capital used to 
finance the rapid expansion of plantation slavery on Barbados had global origins. Other historians of 
Barbados and the Atlantic world have not appreciated the diverse range of overseas commercial activities 
which English traders to the Caribbean participated in during the seventeenth century, principally because 
they tend to confine their analyses to the shores of the Atlantic basin. 
Second, is how this dissertation has contributed to the process by which the early modern Caribbean is 
currently being integrated into global history. The importance of the Caribbean colonies has been 
understated in the historiography of early America for decades, but in recent years, an exciting new vein 
of scholarship has gone a long way towards addressing this imbalance. Historians are increasingly 
highlighting the significance of the early modern Caribbean as a dynamic centre of change within the 
broader currents of early American history. Most scholars would now agree that, in the minds of 
contemporaries, it was the sugar-producing Caribbean colonies which were at the heart of the 
seventeenth-century English empire, and not the settlements in North America which would eventually 
coalesce to form the United States.899 Although historians with an interest in ‘vast early America’ now 
appreciate the significance of Caribbean colonies such as Barbados, the early modern Caribbean has still 
not yet been firmly integrated into global history. This is despite the fact that, by the turn of the 
 
898 Smith, ‘The Global Interests of London’s Commercial Community’; Brock, ‘The Company Director’.  
899 E.g. Roberts, ‘Surrendering Surinam’; Roper, ed., The Torrid Zone. 
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eighteenth century, the sugar colonies of the Greater and Lesser Antilles had become a pivot point in 
world trade and are thus an ideal case study for exploring the interconnectedness of global commerce and 
migration in the early modern period.900  
This study has highlighted the global significance of the Barbados sugar boom by analysing how the same 
merchants who financed the development of plantation slavery on Barbados also devoted their energy 
and capital to expanding the sugar frontier to the island of Assada in northwest Madagascar from 1649-
50. These merchants drew upon their previous experience with Barbados in order to fashion a colonial 
model for the type of plantation economy they wanted to see develop on Assada. Indeed, as I have 
shown in my other published work, the Barbadian plantation system was repeatedly used as a colonial 
model by English colonisers in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean during the seventeenth century.901 
Not only does this demonstrate the global significance of social and economic developments in mid-
seventeenth-century Barbados, but it also raises the profile of the Caribbean islands within the field of 
global history. The analysis of early modern empire developed in this dissertation is therefore more 
expansive and ‘global’ than is usually seen in current studies of seventeenth-century colonialism, which 
will hopefully encourage future historians to conceptualise the constituent parts of the seventeenth-
century English empire in America, Asia, and the Mediterranean as an integrated whole.  
  
 
900 There have recently been some steps taken in this direction, however. In September 2018, for instance, a two-day 
symposium was convened at the John Carter Brown Library in Providence, Rhode Island, which explored the 
concept of the ‘Early Modern Global Caribbean’. A corresponding trend involves the leading journal of early 
American studies, The William and Mary Quarterly (WMQ), which under the editorship of Joshua Piker has recently 
adopted the concept of ‘Vast Early America’. 
901 Bennett, ‘The East India Company, Transnational Interactions and the Formation of Forced Labour Regimes’, 
ch. 1.  
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Appendix 2. The Merchant Investors in the Barbados Sugar Boom 
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Appendix 3. The Operation of the Barbados Sugar Industry in the 
Seventeenth Century 
 
This appendix will briefly outline the agricultural methods used by planters on Barbados to cultivate 
sugar, and will also explain the industrial processes through which the cane was refined into sugar crystals.  
The seventeenth-century sugar industry was sustained by intensive plantation agriculture and the 
construction of wooden refineries where raw cane was processed. The inhabitants of Barbados who first 
experimented with the cultivation of sugar in the early 1640s drew upon their experience with growing 
tobacco and planted their cane stalks upright in small holes dug approximately three feet apart. Planters 
and overseers on Barbados quickly learnt that this method was ineffective. The freestanding canes were 
secured in the soil by only one root and were therefore susceptible to being blown over by heavy winds 
and tropical rains before they had ripened. Plantation owners instead began to instruct their field hands to 
dig trenches, half a foot wide, within which two cane stalks from a previous crop would be laid down and 
covered with soil. By encouraging numerous new stalks to sprout from the buried canes, this technique 
provided better anchorage for the young plants in adverse weather conditions, reduced erosion of the 
fertile topsoil, and produced a yield of greater density.1  
In the first couple of months after the plants had sprouted, the young shoots were tended to by field 
hands, who would remove weeds and use hoes to turn over the soil. After 12 to 15 months, the plants 
had grown to between 6 and 8 feet tall, and the crop was fully ripe. The mature cane was harvested by 
indentured servants or enslaved Africans working in the fields, who used small saws known as ‘handbills’ 
to cut the plant around six inches from the ground. The labourers then used the same tool to remove the 
top of the plant from the cane, and strip off the blades that grew along the side of the stalk. The canes 
were bundled into large pack saddles and carried to the sugar mill on the backs of asses.2   
 
1 Charles Cesar de Rochefort, The History of the Caribby-Islands, trans. John Davies (London, 1666), pp. 59-60; Ligon, 
True and Exact History, pp. 157-158; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 100; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 71.  
2 Ligon, True and Exact History, pp. 157-158; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 100-101.  
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The process by which raw cane was transformed into sugar crystals was, by seventeenth century 
standards, a sophisticated industrial procedure. In the 1640s and 1650s, when planters were still learning 
the most efficient techniques to refine sugar, the inhabitants of Barbados used a three-roller mill to grind 
their cane. This animal-powered device, often described as an ingenio by English authors in the 
seventeenth century, was contained within a large wooden structure.3 Hardy draught animals, including 
small horses, oxen, and cattle, were coaxed into harnesses attached to the central roller by wooden 
‘sweeps’. They provided the force necessary to turn the cogs of the mill and drive the three rollers. Ligon 
observed that sometimes five horses were needed to supply power to the mill when large amounts of 
cane were being processed.  
Indentured servants and enslaved Africans would then perform the dangerous work of feeding the raw 
cane into the mechanism. The motion of the rollers would crush the cane and press out the valuable juice, 
where it would collect in a cistern. It was important that the extracted juice did not remain in the cistern 
above 24 hours, otherwise it would quickly turn rancid. To prevent spoilage the cane juice was quickly 
ladled into a series of copper stills. The juice would be heated to extreme temperatures by furnaces so that 
workers could skim off any impurities (known as molasses) that should rise to the surface of the boiling 
liquid. In one of the most crucial steps in the clarification process, an alkaline substance made from water 
and ash was added to the liquid, which after further stirring, would cause the juice to coagulate and 
become viscous. The cane juice was then transferred to another cistern and allowed to cool. This tiresome 
procedure persisted for 24 hours a day, beginning on Mondays at one in the morning, and continuing 
through until Saturday evenings, with the furnaces of the boiling house only being extinguished for 
religious observance on Sundays. This demanding work schedule, which required extreme physical 
 
3 Ingenio is a corruption of the Portuguese word for sugar mill (engenho). This etymology demonstrates the importance 
of Brazilian precedents to the Barbadian sugar industry. The close association with the word ‘ingenious’ also 
indicates how the operation of the sugar mill was considered to be an advanced piece of technology in the 
seventeenth century. The term ‘ingenio’ does not appear in the 1654 edition of Thomas Blount’s dictionary, called 
Glossographia. It does, however, appear in the 1661 edition, with the entry ‘in Barbado's they call the house or mill 
where they make Sugar by this name’. Blount cites Ligon’s True and Exact History as the source of this information 
(published in 1657), which may explain why the term does not appear in the 1654 edition.  
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exertion in sweltering heat, explains why industrial accidents and the deaths of indentured servants, 
enslaved Africans, and draught animals were so common.4  
The final step in the production of sugar, known as curing, would determine the quality of the end 
product and the price it could command in European markets. Workers would pour the clarified sugar 
into porous earthenware pots, which allowed the liquid molasses and any other final impurities to drain 
through the bottom of the vessel. After a month, the dried sugar granules would then be knocked from 
the pots, leaving an inferior sugar of dark brown appearance known in the seventeenth century as 
‘muscovado’ sugar.5 If a planter was content to dispatch raw muscovado sugar from Barbados to 
England, he would then instruct his indentured servants and enslaved Africans to transport his 
merchandise to coastal storehouses on the backs of asses, where it would be stored in chests and either 
sold to merchants or shipped on the planter’s own account. 
Beginning in the 1650s, however, Barbadians began to export higher grade white sugar in increasing 
quantities. Further refining was required to produce this valuable commodity. While it was drying in 
earthenware pots, the surface of the muscovado sugar was coated with a layer of moist clay. As the water 
from the clay percolated down through the sugar, it dissolved further impurities. After approximately four 
months, the sugar loaf would be removed from the vessel, and the white sugar at the top would be cut 
away from the brown coloured sugar below. If the claying process was successful, the end product would 
be white sugar of increased purity, sweetness, and value.6 The various tariffs placed on white sugar and 
brown muscovado sugar by customs officials in England demonstrates how the claying process could 
greatly increase the value of an enterprising planter’s merchandise. Between December 1654 and 
December 1655, the tariff attached to imports of brown sugar produced by planters on Barbados was 2/8 
 
4 For further information on the operation of the three-roller sugar mill and the clarification process, see Ligon, True 
and Exact History, pp. 160-161; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 74-75; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, p. 100. 
5 Raw brown sugar was commonly known as ‘muscovado’ sugar among Englishmen in the seventeenth century. 
Scholars believe that this term derives from the Portuguese word mascavado, which translates as ‘unfinished’ or 
‘incomplete’. Menard, Sweet Negotiations, p. 75.   
6 For further information about the curing of sugar on Barbados in the seventeenth century, see Ligon, True and 
Exact History, pp. 161-163; Menard, Sweet Negotiations, pp. 75-76; Gragg, Englishmen Transplanted, pp. 101-102. Similar 
techniques were used on Hispaniola and in the Brazilian sugar industry. For Hispaniola, see Anon., America: Or 
Exact Description of the West Indies: More especially of those Provinces which are under the Dominion of the King of Spain (London, 
1655), pp. 161-167. For Brazil, see Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society, pp. 98-131.  
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pounds per hundredweight, which pales in comparison to the tariff of 9/8 pounds 4 pence per 
hundredweight imposed on white sugar.7 Despite the greater profits which could be made from refining 
sugar on Barbados, the survival of an entry book containing data on exports from August 1664 to August 
1665 suggests that in the early period of the Barbados sugar industry raw muscovado sugar was shipped 
to England far more frequently any other commodity (including white sugar).8 It was generally left to 
sugar bakers in England to refine the muscovado sugar further. These expert chefs would then deploy 






















7 TNA, CO 1/12, f. 126A. 
8 Bodleian Library, Ms. Eng. Hist. b. 122, ‘A Coppie Journall of Entries Made in the Custom House of Barbados. 
Beginning August the 10th, 1664 and Ending August the 10th, 1665’. Gary Puckrein has tabulated the data contained 
within this manuscript source. Using the journal entries, he has calculated that shipments of muscovado sugar made 
up 70% of the total value of exports from Barbados for the period between August 1664 and August 1665. This 
exceeds all other commodities produced on the island, including refined white sugar (12%), cotton (11%), rum 
(11%), molasses (4%), tobacco (0.82%), ginger (0.79%), indigo (0.08%), fustic woods (0.06), and miscellaneous 
goods (0.03%). Puckrein, Little England, p. 60.  
9 Mintz, Sweetness and Power, p. 131.  
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Appendix 4. [Redacted] 
 
